Asked by: Baroness Deech (Crossbench - Life peer)
Question to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office:
To ask His Majesty's Government what steps they are taking to uphold the provisions of Articles 38 and 44 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea relating to transit passage.
Answered by Baroness Chapman of Darlington - Minister of State (Development)
It has been a top priority for the Government in recent weeks, working alongside our international partners, to ensure the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz without tolls or conditions, and we will continue working to promote navigational rights and freedoms in the Strait of Hormuz and in other contexts around the world, in accordance with international law as reflected in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Asked by: Baroness Deech (Crossbench - Life peer)
Question to the Department for Energy Security & Net Zero:
To ask His Majesty's Government what plans they have to bring forward proposals to ensure that community benefit commitments made by renewable energy developers are binding on successor owners, in order to prevent the loss or dilution of benefits when projects are sold.
Answered by Lord Whitehead - Minister of State (Department for Energy Security and Net Zero)
In Great Britain, the provision of community benefits by renewable energy developers is currently voluntary.
As shown in the Community benefits guidance for onshore wind in England, the Government expects developers to consider their approach to community benefit provision at all stages of a project’s lifetime, including as ownership changes, to ensure communities continue to see benefits from hosting energy infrastructure.
Last year, the Government published a working paper on community benefits and shared ownership for low carbon energy infrastructure, which sought views on the introduction of a mandatory community benefit scheme.
Asked by: Baroness Deech (Crossbench - Life peer)
Question to the Ministry of Justice:
To ask His Majesty's Government what plans they have to commission a review of the effectiveness of the principle set out in the Guide to Judicial Conduct that tribunal judges should avoid extra-judicial activities that are likely to cause them to refrain from sitting due to perceived or actual conflict of interest; and what assessment they have made of whether tribunal judges do recuse themselves in cases where there is a reasonable perception that they would be biased.
Answered by Baroness Levitt - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Ministry of Justice)
The conduct of judges is a matter for the independent judiciary. It would therefore not be proper for the Government to require the publication of declarations of interest in relation to any court or type of judge. Doing so would risk undermining judicial independence.
All judges have taken an oath to act impartially. The Guide to Judicial Conduct sets out what this means in practice, stating that “judicial office holders should, so far as is reasonable, avoid extra-judicial activities that are likely to cause them to have to refrain from sitting because of a reasonable apprehension of bias or because of a conflict of interest that would arise from the activity”. The Guide then explains how parties to a case might approach applications to the court for the recusal of a judge because of a real or perceived conflict of interest.
Accordingly, the remit of the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office does not extend to complaints of bias in judicial decision-making. It can, however, investigate types of conduct such as the publication of “content which could damage public confidence in judicial impartiality”.
This means that although there is no register of judges’ interests, there are mechanisms in the court system and through the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office where issues about potential conflicts of interest can be raised.
Asked by: Baroness Deech (Crossbench - Life peer)
Question to the Ministry of Justice:
To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the advantages of ensuring that tribunal judges are subject to transparent and up-to-date declarations of interest comparable to those required of other public office holders and legislators.
Answered by Baroness Levitt - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Ministry of Justice)
The conduct of judges is a matter for the independent judiciary. It would therefore not be proper for the Government to require the publication of declarations of interest in relation to any court or type of judge. Doing so would risk undermining judicial independence.
All judges have taken an oath to act impartially. The Guide to Judicial Conduct sets out what this means in practice, stating that “judicial office holders should, so far as is reasonable, avoid extra-judicial activities that are likely to cause them to have to refrain from sitting because of a reasonable apprehension of bias or because of a conflict of interest that would arise from the activity”. The Guide then explains how parties to a case might approach applications to the court for the recusal of a judge because of a real or perceived conflict of interest.
Accordingly, the remit of the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office does not extend to complaints of bias in judicial decision-making. It can, however, investigate types of conduct such as the publication of “content which could damage public confidence in judicial impartiality”.
This means that although there is no register of judges’ interests, there are mechanisms in the court system and through the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office where issues about potential conflicts of interest can be raised.
Asked by: Baroness Deech (Crossbench - Life peer)
Question to the Ministry of Justice:
To ask His Majesty's Government whether they have identified any risks to public confidence arising from the absence of a mandatory publicly accessible register of interests for tribunal judges.
Answered by Baroness Levitt - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Ministry of Justice)
The conduct of judges is a matter for the independent judiciary. It would therefore not be proper for the Government to require the publication of declarations of interest in relation to any court or type of judge. Doing so would risk undermining judicial independence.
All judges have taken an oath to act impartially. The Guide to Judicial Conduct sets out what this means in practice, stating that “judicial office holders should, so far as is reasonable, avoid extra-judicial activities that are likely to cause them to have to refrain from sitting because of a reasonable apprehension of bias or because of a conflict of interest that would arise from the activity”. The Guide then explains how parties to a case might approach applications to the court for the recusal of a judge because of a real or perceived conflict of interest.
Accordingly, the remit of the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office does not extend to complaints of bias in judicial decision-making. It can, however, investigate types of conduct such as the publication of “content which could damage public confidence in judicial impartiality”.
This means that although there is no register of judges’ interests, there are mechanisms in the court system and through the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office where issues about potential conflicts of interest can be raised.
Asked by: Baroness Deech (Crossbench - Life peer)
Question to the Ministry of Justice:
To ask His Majesty's Government what is the governance framework that governs conflicts of interest in the tribunal system.
Answered by Baroness Levitt - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Ministry of Justice)
The conduct of judges is a matter for the independent judiciary. It would therefore not be proper for the Government to require the publication of declarations of interest in relation to any court or type of judge. Doing so would risk undermining judicial independence.
All judges have taken an oath to act impartially. The Guide to Judicial Conduct sets out what this means in practice, stating that “judicial office holders should, so far as is reasonable, avoid extra-judicial activities that are likely to cause them to have to refrain from sitting because of a reasonable apprehension of bias or because of a conflict of interest that would arise from the activity”. The Guide then explains how parties to a case might approach applications to the court for the recusal of a judge because of a real or perceived conflict of interest.
Accordingly, the remit of the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office does not extend to complaints of bias in judicial decision-making. It can, however, investigate types of conduct such as the publication of “content which could damage public confidence in judicial impartiality”.
This means that although there is no register of judges’ interests, there are mechanisms in the court system and through the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office where issues about potential conflicts of interest can be raised.
Asked by: Baroness Deech (Crossbench - Life peer)
Question to the Ministry of Justice:
To ask His Majesty's Government what mechanisms exist to ensure (1) accountability, and (2) effectiveness, of redress for complainants when the investigation carried out by the Judicial Conduct and Ombudsman is significantly delayed or is otherwise regarded as unsatisfactory.
Answered by Baroness Levitt - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Ministry of Justice)
The Judicial Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman (JACO) is a statutory office holder, supported by the JACO office. It operates independently of the Government in the exercise of its functions. The handling and determination of individual investigations is a matter for JACO. The Ministry of Justice regularly discusses with the JACO office the support it needs to meet its statutory functions.
JACO is accountable to Parliament through the Lord Chancellor, including by publication of an annual report, which provides information about: the enquiries and complaints received; how they are dealt with; and performance against the business objectives. In 2024/25 it reports that compared to 2023/24, it:
JACO acknowledged that there had been a significant increase in its caseload but said that it was taking action to improve its performance and in particular, to reduce the time taken to investigate the oldest cases. JACO does not report on the average time taken to complete an investigation, but the table below includes data from the last five years’ annual reports of how many preliminary investigations were completed within 6 weeks and how many full investigations were completed in less than or over a year:
Workload volumes per year | 20-21 | 21-22 | 22-23 | 23-24 | 24-25 | |
Preliminary Investigations | Reviewed | 235 | 272 | 240 | 292 | 447 |
Concluded | 144 | 192 | 205 | 256 | 424 | |
KPI 90% 6 weeks or less | met | met | met | met | met | |
Full Investigations | Received | 91 | 92 | 36 | 36 | 23 |
Concluded | 76 | 66 | 50 | 39 | 23 | |
12 Months+ | 5 (7%) | 10 (15%) | 30 (60%) | 24 (62%) | 21 (91%) | |
The time taken to investigate complaints depends on several factors, including case complexity, the level of supporting information which is needed from the relevant investigating body and whether the Ombudsman’s findings are referred to the Lord Chancellor and Lady Chief Justice.
JACO is consistent with other Ombudsmen which are responsible for publishing their own timeliness and related targets but do not have statutory performance standards. JACO has an internal complaints handling procedure for complaints about the level of service provided by the Ombudsman’s Office, which can be escalated to the Ombudsman for a final response.
Asked by: Baroness Deech (Crossbench - Life peer)
Question to the Ministry of Justice:
To ask His Majesty's Government what recent discussions they have had with the Judicial Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman regarding steps to improve the efficiency of the office; and what consideration they have given, if any, to introducing statutory performance standards for that office.
Answered by Baroness Levitt - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Ministry of Justice)
The Judicial Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman (JACO) is a statutory office holder, supported by the JACO office. It operates independently of the Government in the exercise of its functions. The handling and determination of individual investigations is a matter for JACO. The Ministry of Justice regularly discusses with the JACO office the support it needs to meet its statutory functions.
JACO is accountable to Parliament through the Lord Chancellor, including by publication of an annual report, which provides information about: the enquiries and complaints received; how they are dealt with; and performance against the business objectives. In 2024/25 it reports that compared to 2023/24, it:
JACO acknowledged that there had been a significant increase in its caseload but said that it was taking action to improve its performance and in particular, to reduce the time taken to investigate the oldest cases. JACO does not report on the average time taken to complete an investigation, but the table below includes data from the last five years’ annual reports of how many preliminary investigations were completed within 6 weeks and how many full investigations were completed in less than or over a year:
Workload volumes per year | 20-21 | 21-22 | 22-23 | 23-24 | 24-25 | |
Preliminary Investigations | Reviewed | 235 | 272 | 240 | 292 | 447 |
Concluded | 144 | 192 | 205 | 256 | 424 | |
KPI 90% 6 weeks or less | met | met | met | met | met | |
Full Investigations | Received | 91 | 92 | 36 | 36 | 23 |
Concluded | 76 | 66 | 50 | 39 | 23 | |
12 Months+ | 5 (7%) | 10 (15%) | 30 (60%) | 24 (62%) | 21 (91%) | |
The time taken to investigate complaints depends on several factors, including case complexity, the level of supporting information which is needed from the relevant investigating body and whether the Ombudsman’s findings are referred to the Lord Chancellor and Lady Chief Justice.
JACO is consistent with other Ombudsmen which are responsible for publishing their own timeliness and related targets but do not have statutory performance standards. JACO has an internal complaints handling procedure for complaints about the level of service provided by the Ombudsman’s Office, which can be escalated to the Ombudsman for a final response.
Asked by: Baroness Deech (Crossbench - Life peer)
Question to the Ministry of Justice:
To ask His Majesty's Government what recent assessment they have made of the performance of the Judicial Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman, in particular the timeliness of investigations.
Answered by Baroness Levitt - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Ministry of Justice)
The Judicial Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman (JACO) is a statutory office holder, supported by the JACO office. It operates independently of the Government in the exercise of its functions. The handling and determination of individual investigations is a matter for JACO. The Ministry of Justice regularly discusses with the JACO office the support it needs to meet its statutory functions.
JACO is accountable to Parliament through the Lord Chancellor, including by publication of an annual report, which provides information about: the enquiries and complaints received; how they are dealt with; and performance against the business objectives. In 2024/25 it reports that compared to 2023/24, it:
JACO acknowledged that there had been a significant increase in its caseload but said that it was taking action to improve its performance and in particular, to reduce the time taken to investigate the oldest cases. JACO does not report on the average time taken to complete an investigation, but the table below includes data from the last five years’ annual reports of how many preliminary investigations were completed within 6 weeks and how many full investigations were completed in less than or over a year:
Workload volumes per year | 20-21 | 21-22 | 22-23 | 23-24 | 24-25 | |
Preliminary Investigations | Reviewed | 235 | 272 | 240 | 292 | 447 |
Concluded | 144 | 192 | 205 | 256 | 424 | |
KPI 90% 6 weeks or less | met | met | met | met | met | |
Full Investigations | Received | 91 | 92 | 36 | 36 | 23 |
Concluded | 76 | 66 | 50 | 39 | 23 | |
12 Months+ | 5 (7%) | 10 (15%) | 30 (60%) | 24 (62%) | 21 (91%) | |
The time taken to investigate complaints depends on several factors, including case complexity, the level of supporting information which is needed from the relevant investigating body and whether the Ombudsman’s findings are referred to the Lord Chancellor and Lady Chief Justice.
JACO is consistent with other Ombudsmen which are responsible for publishing their own timeliness and related targets but do not have statutory performance standards. JACO has an internal complaints handling procedure for complaints about the level of service provided by the Ombudsman’s Office, which can be escalated to the Ombudsman for a final response.
Asked by: Baroness Deech (Crossbench - Life peer)
Question to the Ministry of Justice:
To ask His Majesty's Government what was the average time taken to complete a Judicial Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman investigation in each of the past five years.
Answered by Baroness Levitt - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Ministry of Justice)
The Judicial Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman (JACO) is a statutory office holder, supported by the JACO office. It operates independently of the Government in the exercise of its functions. The handling and determination of individual investigations is a matter for JACO. The Ministry of Justice regularly discusses with the JACO office the support it needs to meet its statutory functions.
JACO is accountable to Parliament through the Lord Chancellor, including by publication of an annual report, which provides information about: the enquiries and complaints received; how they are dealt with; and performance against the business objectives. In 2024/25 it reports that compared to 2023/24, it:
JACO acknowledged that there had been a significant increase in its caseload but said that it was taking action to improve its performance and in particular, to reduce the time taken to investigate the oldest cases. JACO does not report on the average time taken to complete an investigation, but the table below includes data from the last five years’ annual reports of how many preliminary investigations were completed within 6 weeks and how many full investigations were completed in less than or over a year:
Workload volumes per year | 20-21 | 21-22 | 22-23 | 23-24 | 24-25 | |
Preliminary Investigations | Reviewed | 235 | 272 | 240 | 292 | 447 |
Concluded | 144 | 192 | 205 | 256 | 424 | |
KPI 90% 6 weeks or less | met | met | met | met | met | |
Full Investigations | Received | 91 | 92 | 36 | 36 | 23 |
Concluded | 76 | 66 | 50 | 39 | 23 | |
12 Months+ | 5 (7%) | 10 (15%) | 30 (60%) | 24 (62%) | 21 (91%) | |
The time taken to investigate complaints depends on several factors, including case complexity, the level of supporting information which is needed from the relevant investigating body and whether the Ombudsman’s findings are referred to the Lord Chancellor and Lady Chief Justice.
JACO is consistent with other Ombudsmen which are responsible for publishing their own timeliness and related targets but do not have statutory performance standards. JACO has an internal complaints handling procedure for complaints about the level of service provided by the Ombudsman’s Office, which can be escalated to the Ombudsman for a final response.