European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 6) Bill

Debate between Baroness Deech and Lord Mandelson

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 5th September 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mandelson]

Nor am I. I am not so sure that we should just push them all to one side as though they have absolutely no potential whatever. That is not my view. My view is that they are not realisable in the foreseeable future and that, in the meantime, we would put the Good Friday agreement and the peace process in Northern Ireland in great jeopardy in a way that would be unjustified and unforgivable. There is a very interesting discussion to be had about the future. It depends on certain modalities, technology and related approaches that have potential—I fully accept that—but they are not for now; in my view, they are for the future.

There is not only the obvious economic, business and commercial argument to be had concerning people’s jobs and livelihoods that are at stake; in my view, there is also a very strong democratic argument to which we should attach great importance in our consideration of this Bill. Quite simply, it is that there was no mandate from the 2016 referendum for a no-deal Brexit. I know that people will say that it was not explicitly ruled out, but to all intents and purposes it was ruled out by the fact that nobody referred to it, nobody explained it, nobody justified it and nobody set out the arguments for it. Not one of the advocates of the leave campaign ever entertained the idea that this would be the outcome of our leaving the European Union.

Such a possibility was almost literally airbrushed out of the picture by the promises that were made by the advocates of the leave campaign—that getting a deal would be “the easiest in history”. Plus, there was a later guarantee—I remember that “guarantee” was the word used by No. 10 in repeating what the then Brexit Secretary, David Davis, had said. The precise words used were that we would have the “exact same trade benefits” after we left the European Union. Not only has that promise of the easiest trade deal in history turned out to be wrong and unfulfillable but the exact same trade benefits will, as we know, be nothing of the kind. They cannot be anything of the kind. We will sustain frictionless trade that is exactly the same as the trade benefits that we have at the moment only if, at the very least, we stay in a customs union with the European Union and fully in the single market. That is the only way in which those promises that were made—that guarantee put forward by No. 10 —could possibly be redeemed, yet it is firmly, consistently and explicitly excluded by the Government.

[Baroness Deech]

I have a point of order about the non-envisioning of a no deal. Of course it was not raised at the time. First, Article 50 mandates that the EU shall negotiate a treaty, which it has failed to do. Secondly, it was never envisaged that the remainers would fight this all the way along for several years. Thirdly, the agreement that we talked about in a broad sense and was mentioned at the time was to do with trade. The actual withdrawal agreement, when we get to it, is about much more than trade. In that sense, it is perfectly understandable that there was no explicit discussion of no deal.

[Lord Mandelson]

I do not remember any of those intricacies, highways and byways being set out by anyone at the time or since—but, of course, the House will be interested in what the noble Baroness has to say.

The fact that any possibility of maintaining frictionless trade has been explicitly excluded by the Government is extremely serious for the manufacturing sector in this country and the long-term health of our economy. I do not see and cannot understand how, given the nature of just-in-time, sophisticated manufacturing supply chains and the way in which they operate between the UK and the continent, it will be possible for Japanese car companies or Airbus or any significant manufacturing enterprise to sustain production in Britain in the medium term.

That does not mean to say that they are all going to pull stumps, shut the doors and pull the shutters down and leave the day after tomorrow. Of course they are not, and any sense that they might is an absurd piece of hyperbole. However, over time—by which I mean between five and 10 years and probably on the shorter end of that spectrum—these great manufacturing companies are going to have to make new arrangements. They are going to have to move production in a way that enables them to secure continuity of their supply chains and the frictionless trade that they will no longer have when sustaining production in this country.

Let us not go back over all the customs union and single market arguments. I do not know what has happened to the Kinnock amendment and his and his colleagues’ advocacy of Norway. All I would say is that it would appear that there is no political possibility of those options being reintroduced or attracting and sustaining a majority, certainly in the other House. Let us acknowledge that they would in any case raise issues of regulatory dependence by this country on the European Union, while having no say in the making of those regulations.

I do not dismiss that. Having been on both sides of this as a UK Business Secretary and a member of the European Commission, I take rather seriously the idea that we in this country would simply be on the receiving end of laws and regulations made in Brussels over which we would have been able to express no view. There are real issues involved here and I acknowledge them.

In conclusion, the central point—and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leeds made it earlier—is that the referendum in 2016 was an in/out one. It was an in-principle referendum. It was not about the how and the terms on which we would leave the European Union. No hint of those terms was spelled out between a soft and a hard Brexit, and of course there was absolutely no indication of leaving without n deal at all.

So now, as we find ourselves, at the behest of the new Prime Minister, hurtling towards a no-deal exit, I believe that the Government should accept that this really cannot and should not happen without the express approval either of Parliament or the public. I will wind up, if I may—it is nice to see the Government Front Bench intervening in a debate at long last. Here is my further point in conclusion. I do not believe that the express approval of the British public for how we leave the European Union can possibly be expressed by means of a general election.