Higher Education and Research Bill

Debate between Baroness Deech and Lord Lucas

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 8th March 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Deech (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak about Amendments 135 and 136. It was a bit of a shock to many people to find that the Competition and Markets Authority had entered this rather competitive field of regulation. The CMA’s job is to promote competition and make markets work. I think much of the debate we have had over the past few weeks is precisely about how universities are not really about competition and markets; they are about collaboration, scholarship and research.

The OfS is replacing HEFCE, which was the lead regulator, but the OfS is not taking over the Office of the Independent Adjudicator. I declare my interest as the first holder of that office, a few years ago. The OfS is intended to be a single, student-focused regulator. I think the Government might be seen to be undermining their own scheme if they allow the CMA to meddle in affairs which really are not suitable for it. There is already far too much compliance and legalism for universities to deal with—human rights, health and safety, data protection, freedom of information, judicial review, Prevent guidance and much more, including the common law. There is a crowded enforcement field as well—the CMA, other higher education bodies, consumer protection legislation, the Office of the Independent Adjudicator, Scottish and Northern Irish ombudsmen, government departments, the Advertising Standards Authority and the Quality Assurance Agency. The CMA admits how fragile its own guidance is because everything depends on how the courts would interpret consumer law applied to universities’ functions.

I would argue that the CMA is also an inappropriate regulator because it shows little experience of how universities work. It is insistent on clear information being given about course variation before a student signs up. This is an example of how it is inappropriate. The prospectus for a student goes to print four or five years before the potential student who has read it graduates some years further on. It is impossible, therefore, in a prospectus to lock in lecturers for five years because of sabbaticals, fluctuating demand and finances, and even building works. How can a university predict what its fees will be five years from now, especially with new mechanisms being introduced right now? The CMA has recently opined that it thinks that it is unfair for universities to withhold formal qualifications from a student who is in debt. Does it have any idea how difficult it is to chase a student through debt collection procedures or failure to provide campus accommodation the following year—which it suggests as a sanction—when a student has left with no forwarding address or gone abroad, as frequently happens?

The CMA will also come into conflict and overlap with the Office of the Independent Adjudicator. The latter has been in existence for about 13 years and has decided thousands of cases, many of which have a consumer flavour. It has given a wide range of advice to universities about the same issues that the CMA has involved itself in. The OIA’s task, however, is to decide what is fair and reasonable. This is not the same as the CMA’s perspective, which is about deciding a dispute on the precise terms of the contract.

The Office of the Independent Adjudicator offers alternative dispute resolution, which is far better than resort to litigation. Unlike the CMA, the OIA can be flexible and offer resolution tailored to the needs of the wronged student—not money but a chance, for example, to retake a year or have extra tuition. The OIA should prevail over the CMA because it was based on a statute designed to provide that one specialised service for students; namely, the settlement of complaints according to what is fair.

There is something wrong in theory about letting the CMA drive issues of university information and practices. Its perspective would cement the student as a paying customer expecting to reach an acceptable outcome. But we are dealing in this Bill with a participatory process—education, not training; knowledge, not skills; and teaching, not rote learning—in a situation that involves a relationship of give and take between students and lecturers, parents and universities, and employers and government. We do not want the commercialisation of this relationship, as if it were the purchase of a car. We want value placed on stimulation, career guidance and intellectual growth, not just the path to a paper qualification.

The consumer model that the CMA applies results in a totally one-sided set of contractual details. It seems to think that there are no obligations on students to pull their weight and no enforcement mechanisms against students’ own shortcomings. There is no mention by it, or in the TEF, of students’ efforts and their responsibility to learn. This one-sided market approach is more likely to lead to complaints about poor teaching after an unacceptable result has been handed down. We expect collaboration and not competition.

Higher education is not like a consumer transaction. The education relationship is unique. There is no fixed outcome which can be measured by organisations such as the CMA because the quality of the experience is determined by the aptitude and hard work of the student, as well as the facilities and teaching offered by the university.

Higher education is one of a class of major events in life which do not readily lend themselves to government by contract. Such situations are too emotional and personal, with no clear goal and perhaps an imbalance of power. The issue may be too important for the rest of society to be left to the narrow issue of a contract between the individual parties. Only overall regulation focused on the goals of higher education and the student will do, not intervention from an unrelated and unrepresentative body such as the CMA.

The CMA focuses on choice, price and competition. It assumes that satisfying the consumer-student is all that matters. Its view of contracts is about the provision of education, but it is no help when it comes to what education should achieve. Its interventions will not only overlap and conflict with the Office of the Independent Adjudicator but will lead to more micromanagement, box-ticking, checking and inspection, and not to greater quality or public benefit. It has no place in this new system.

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, I have a lot sympathy with what the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, said. Where I disagree with her is on university admissions. That seems to me to be a pure consumer transaction. The consumers are provided with information on which they are asked to make a decision. This is an area where I like the idea of there being common standards across the consumer realm rather than some cosy deal that, in the case of higher education, makes it unnecessary to provide the consumers with the level of information and reassurance that they have elsewhere. I think that it is even more necessary. It is probably the second or third biggest single transaction that most people will make in the course of their lives: their commitment to the amount of student loan they will end up with at the end of three years and their commitment to a direction in life which may require a lot of effort and sacrifice to change if they have taken one particular way down.

At the moment I think that it should be very much open to question by the CMA whether what is being provided to students is true, accurate and as much as they should have. Yes, I agree that the Office for Students should have a role in this, but the standards, the bar which we are aiming at, should be set in accordance with our national standards—and at the top of the range of national standards. I think that the CMA has a role in that. So I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, about what happens when you are in a university: all those sorts of relationships, the outcomes and the need for students to contribute, it being a partnership and so forth. It is very hard to read that as a consumer contract. But that first moment of decision—or that rather strung-out moment of decision—seems to me to be very much CMA territory.

Higher Education and Research Bill

Debate between Baroness Deech and Lord Lucas

Committee: 6th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 25th January 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Deech]

My Lords, I have spoken many times before about freedom of speech. I want to link together the Prevent guidance amendment, this amendment and Amendment 469. In my view they stand and fall together because they are trying to demarcate the line between lawful and unlawful freedom of speech. That is all that matters, including in the Prevent guidance.

People often see freedom of speech as too broad and as encompassing everything, but it is always within the law. I anticipate that in response the Government will say that freedom of speech is already guaranteed. However, Section 43 of the Education (No. 2) Act 1986 is too narrow. It is treated as limited to meetings and to the refusal of the use of premises to persons with unpopular beliefs. Universities have not handled this well. They have wrongly refrained from securing freedom of speech where student unions are involved, on the grounds that the unions are autonomous. That is not the case under charity law, nor does it fit with the universities’ own public sector equality duty. Moreover, Section 43(8) of that same Act expressly includes student unions. Universities have treated their duty as fulfilled if they have a code of practice concerning freedom of speech.

However, the practice of censorship is spreading, both by universities and by student unions. As I have explained before to this House, many explicit restrictions on speech are now extant, including bans on specific ideologies, behaviours, political affiliations, books, speakers and words. Students even get expelled for having controversial views. The National Union of Students has a safe-space policy and brands certain beliefs as dangerous and to be repressed, without regard to what is legal or illegal. The academic boycott of Israel-related activities is illegal as it discriminates against people on the grounds of their nationality and religion, and is contrary to the “universality of science” principle. Indeed, in this era of Brexit we should point out that attempts to put barriers in the way of exchange between scientists and other academics, inside or outside the EU, who wish to collaborate in research and conferences conflict with the principle of the universality of science, and it would be the same if other European states put barriers in the way of UK researchers. A recent bad example of behaviour is the LSE, which silenced a lecture by its own lecturer Dr Perkins because of his unpopular views on unemployment.

Freedom of speech in the UK is limited. I will not give noble Lords the whole list of measures; I shall name just a few. It is limited by the prohibition of race hatred in the Public Order Act 1986, the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, the Equality Act 2010, and the Charities Act 2006 as it applies to student unions, defamation, the encouragement of terrorism and incitement to violence. There is a great deal of law for universities to take on board in permitting lawful freedom of speech in any case.

We need a new clause to go beyond meetings and make all this clear. Students have been closing down free speech and universities have neither intervened, nor protected it, nor taken action when it is lawful— or unlawful. We all recall when the Nobel laureate, Sir Tim Hunt, was hounded out of University College London. Section 43 was irrelevant, because his tasteless joke was made abroad. Universities are not taking up training offers about freedom of speech—what is lawful and what is unlawful. This amendment would ensure that lecturers and university authorities took cognisance of the law, got training in it and ceased to treat student unions as autonomous. They should know that they have a duty to promote good relations between different groups on campus under the Equality Act. I wish this amendment were not necessary, but it is.

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, I very much support Amendment 468. It puts the matter clearly and positively. It needs doing. You only need to look at what is happening in US universities. There is a particularly nasty story coming out of Princeton today on the suppression of free speech. This ought to be the core of what is happening in universities. Within universities, we ought not to prohibit people from offending other people. There has to be the free exchange of ideas and this can be pretty buffeting from time to time. As is said in Amendment 468, if there are things going on which are illegal, then we should deal with them as illegal. Beyond that, we should not. We should allow ideas to flourish and grow and contest with each other at universities.

I do not support Amendment 469 in the same way. The idea of preventing speech requires you to know in advance what is going to be said. This means, if you fear that someone might say something, you are justified in stopping them coming to speak. This is a very difficult road to go down. Yes, take sanctions against people who allow illegal speech—this seems reasonable. If I invite a speaker in and they are then horrifically unlawful, I should face sanctions for that, even if I lose my right to arrange future meetings. However, to prevent it—to say that somebody at the university should know what someone is going to say in the future—I do not think is a good way to go.

I hope we will have the courage to stand behind Amendment 468 and say where our principles are because there is a great tide of the opposite coming across the Atlantic.