Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Baroness Deech and Lord Elystan-Morgan

Monday 28th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Elystan-Morgan (CB)]

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, makes the very proper point that there is ample precedent for Parliament to deal with the issue of judicial review. Indeed, he traced historically how prerogative writs developed, how they were placed on an administrative basis and how, ultimately, they became the subject of specific legislation. One point must be made, however, and I am not sure that the noble and learned Lord did not touch upon it in his powerful address: that when legislation intervened in this area, it did not diminish to the slightest degree the rights of the individual, or, indeed, any of the relative positions in relation to the various powers that judicial review seeks to deal with equitably. In other words, the boundary was not moved a single inch.

My second point has already been touched on: it is about the rule of law. Many here will have read the excellent treatise by the late Lord Bingham, in which he reminded us that there are two boundaries in relation to the rule of law. The most obvious is whether a law has been technically and lawfully passed through both Houses of Parliament and received Royal Assent. However, Lord Bingham went on to make it perfectly clear that if a law was unconscionably wrong, even though it had proceeded through all those stages in a thoroughly proper and technical way, it would still be in breach of the rule of law.

The point that Lord Bingham makes is that there are two boundaries: one is the technical parliamentary boundary; the other, of course, is a boundary beyond that. Indeed, it is in that context that this whole debate is taking place. The boundary that we are talking about is the boundary of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court, something which has been built up over many centuries and not spelt out by Parliament but which is nevertheless a very real and massive boundary.

If I am right—and I suggest that it most certainly is the case—that Clause 64 breaches that boundary and undermines it, there is a very strong case for changing it. That is the real relevance of the excellent debate that we have had today.

Many speakers have made the point about Clause 64 in the context where the result would have been no different. I would ask in how many cases the following situation applies. A party is elected to government after a hard-fought election. It has set out very clearly in its manifesto exactly what legal changes will be brought about in various fields of law. It will invoke procedures which are already set out in statute to make those changes. Those proceedings will, of course, involve consultation. However, every thinking person knows that that is something entirely chimerical. There will be consultation, yes, but the consultation will make no difference to the determination and resolve of that new Government to bring about that change. If you say that that consultation does not really matter, what can you do? You do not challenge the ultimate right of that party to bring about that legislation, but you can challenge the right of that party to make a mockery of the procedures of law. That is exactly what is entailed here.

Consultation does not, of course, mean that you have to weigh in the balance the views that are tendered to you, but it does mean that you have to look carefully at what is said and give a reasonable period and a reasonable prospect for people to be able to make such representations. The idea that those count for nothing is, I suggest, utterly inimical and utterly contrary to our concept of the law as we have it.

[Baroness Deech (CB)]

My Lords, I am not a practising lawyer, but I have experience of being judicially reviewed, and after much hard thought, I speak in support of the noble Lords, some of whom are learned, who have put their names to this amendment and similar ones. After much thought, I think that this is the wrong clause, and I think that the way in which it is drafted will open doors to as much costly litigation as it is intended to prevent.

I can well imagine the sort of thing that the Government had in mind in bringing this forward. For example, in my experience, a student would challenge a poor grade or a failing grade on the ground that some tiny bit of procedure had gone wrong, something had not been put up on the notice board at the right time or whatever, and one knew perfectly well that, no matter how many judges looked at it, this student would still, in the end, be a failing student or a student with a poor grade. I quite understand that. However, I do not believe that this is the way to tackle it. There are procedural problems that ought to be tackled first. There are too many opportunities to ask, and ask again, for leave to judicially review something, and then to appeal against it. There are very many bites at the cherry. Although one may know very well that in the end the judicial review will not succeed, for a year or two an expensive dark shadow hangs over the body that might be judicially reviewed while lawyers are having to cope with the case.

Nevertheless, despite those drawbacks, I support this amendment. I call on the Government, instead, to look at procedural reform that would make the whole procedure quicker, cleaner and cheaper.

Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill

Debate between Baroness Deech and Lord Elystan-Morgan

Monday 18th March 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

My Lords, I wholeheartedly applaud the intentions of those parties that have brought about this compromise and their integrity. I make that observation, however, subject to one factor. If I am indulging in a pettifogging lawyers’ argument then I apologise if it has no substance. However, if I happen to be right, it will be something that I can regale my grandchildren about for some time to come. A royal charter is, of course, a sovereign prerogative. How far can that prerogative be circumscribed, if at all, by any decision of either or both Houses of Parliament?

Let me test my doubt in this way. The creation of Peers, as we well know, is the prerogative of Her Majesty the Queen. Any decision taken by either House to circumscribe that authority to the slightest degree would be invalid. If I am correct in that submission, does it not apply to this situation equally so? In other words, any decision by both Houses of Parliament to circumscribe that absolute, sovereign royal authority will be less than valid. It may well be, and probably would be the case, that Her Majesty would graciously surrender her prerogative, but that is a different matter. I am raising this point now as a very narrow, legalistic point, and I would be grateful if I could be told exactly what the constitutional answer to it is, if you please.

[Baroness Deech]

My Lords, following on from my noble friend’s comments, will the Minister explain how any future Parliament could be stopped from repealing this amendment by a simple majority? There is, as far as I understand it, no such thing as entrenchment in our law because our Parliament is sovereign. Were a future Parliament to become extremely annoyed with excesses of the press in some way or whatever it might be, I cannot see any mechanism for preventing a future Parliament from simply repealing this amendment by a straightforward majority.