Landmines and Cluster Munitions Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Chapman of Darlington
Main Page: Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Chapman of Darlington's debates with the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
(2 days, 21 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, for securing this debate and to all noble Lords who have contributed. We could have done with longer, because this is such a complex issue and, as many noble Lords have said, incredibly timely. I was struck that my noble friend Lord Dubs reminded us, as I knew he would, of the dangers and of the reasons why we helped to lead the formulation of these treaties in the first place. His view was echoed by the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Southwark, among others.
As the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, and the noble Baroness, Lady Stuart, said, this debate is more relevant now than it has been in the recent past. The words of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, resonated with me when he said that risk must be proportionate to military advantage and asked us to imagine a threat on our borders—certitude, he advises, is not always possible. I understand his argument, and I think the best thing is for me to set out the Government’s position, including answering the questions, particularly those from the noble Earl, Lord Effingham, on interoperability.
This Government remain committed to the Ottawa treaty and to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Each treaty plays an important role in the protection of civilians, and we continue to use our best efforts to promote the treaties and their norms. It is for good reason that the UK and a majority of countries have come together to ban the use of anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions. The human and financial costs of their use are devastating. Long after conflicts cease, civilians—and it is civilians, frequently children, who comprise the majority of victims year on year—continue to be killed, maimed and left permanently disabled by anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions.
As well as the terrible human cost, this creates a further toll on the long-term development and health systems in countries trying to recover from conflict. Anti-personnel and cluster munitions also deny access to land, further imperilling food security. The direct financial costs of this can be devastating. The World Bank estimates that, in Ukraine alone, fully demining affected territory will cost upwards of $37 billion.
The history of these treaties predates the end of the Cold War. The first efforts to exert legal constraints on landmines were through the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, started in the early 1980s. While the CCW’s protocols set minimum standards in how landmines are used, their limitations led to the vast majority of states agreeing to and joining the Ottawa treaty in order to provide for an outright ban on landmines. Meanwhile, international proposals to prohibit cluster munitions date back to the Vietnam War era and were also first discussed in the CCW, which remains an important star chamber for future mechanisms. The UK played a major role in the negotiation of both treaties, and we continue to believe in their role and impact in protecting civilians and military personnel alike. As state parties have fulfilled their commitments, the risks to civilians from the remnants of anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions have fallen in the vast majority of countries. It is no coincidence that, even among non-state parties, there were no officially confirmed transfers of anti-personnel landmines between 1999 and 2024, and fewer and fewer states produce either system.
However, the Government recognise that Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine has created significant challenges, upending the global security environment, raising tensions in the Euro-Atlantic space and undermining international law, including international humanitarian law. This is why the Chancellor announced last week a necessary increase in our defence budget to 2.5% of GDP and a plan to go further in the next Parliament. We will make the UK a defence industrial superpower and ensure that our Armed Forces have the equipment they need to defend our nation and our allies.
The Government’s support for Ukraine remains steadfast. We are absolutely committed to securing a just and lasting peace in Ukraine. This is vital for both Ukraine and wider Euro-Atlantic and international security and prosperity, but a just and lasting peace is possible only if we continue to show strength and provide Ukraine with the support it needs to defend itself against continued Russian aggression. This is why we recently signed a £2.6 billion loan agreement with Ukraine, earmarked for military spending, and a £1.6 billion export finance deal that will supply Ukraine with more than 5,000 air defence missiles.
Like the UK, our allies, particularly those with borders with Russia, have legitimate concerns about their security, and we recognise that they need to take difficult decisions about their own national defence. It is their sovereign right to do so, within the bounds of international law. As I noted in this Chamber in August, we regret that Lithuania took the decision to withdraw from the Convention on Cluster Munitions, a process that was completed last month. None the less, we recognise that Lithuania saw itself as an outlier in the region, and we do not anticipate further withdrawals from the CCM.
Last month, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland stated their intention to withdraw from the Ottawa treaty. We have closely engaged with them, as our allies, on this subject for many months, and we are working to understand what these decisions will mean in practice. We will work with them in an effort to ensure that they keep as close to the principles underpinning these treaties as possible to mitigate impacts on both the treaties themselves and the vital humanitarian disarmament norms that they have established. As well as a shared interest in the security of our allies, the UK also has strong defence partnerships in the region through NATO and the JEF.
While we work through any implications of the withdrawals with our partners, we are confident that we will be able to work with partners that are non-state parties. The Convention on Cluster Munitions contains explicit provisions under Article 21 concerning interoperability with non-state parties. Similarly, consistent with our position in international law, the Landmines Act 1998 provides a defence for military operations wholly or mainly outside the United Kingdom where anti-personnel landmines have been or may be deployed by a partner who is a non-state party.
The Act is clear that while it is a criminal offence for British personnel to engage in the laying of anti-personnel landmines or related activities, such as assisting, encouraging or inducing others to do so, other conduct that takes place in the course of or for the purpose of a military operation or the planning of such an operation alongside a state party would be permitted.
To conclude, the Government continue to believe that we can advance both our own national security and that of our allies, and the vital humanitarian norms that protect civilians, which these treaties represent. None the less, we cannot ignore the fundamental change in the geopolitical context that has taken place, and I am grateful to all noble Lords for raising these questions. Just as the UK played a key role in the formation of these treaties, we are happy to take the lead and work with our allies and all interested partners to consider the best way to sustain the important norms these treaties have established in this new context, while at the same time continuing to prioritise our national security.
But simply walking away will not help to achieve this. The UK’s long-term security and that of our allies is served not just by our military strength but through the establishment of and commitment to international norms and rules. The UK’s role should be to respond to Russia’s flagrant disregard for long-established global humanitarian norms by working to protect them, rebuilding confidence in the rules-based order for the long term and demonstrating that Russia is on the wrong side of history.