Iran (Sanctions) (Amendment) Regulations 2024

Baroness Chapman of Darlington Excerpts

Monday 21st October 2024 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington]

That the Grand Committee do consider the Iran (Sanctions) (Amendment) Regulations 2024.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Baroness Chapman of Darlington) (Lab)]

My Lords, these regulations amend the Iran (Sanctions) Regulations 2023. The instrument was laid before Parliament on 12 September under powers contained in the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018. The measures entered into force the following day.

The UK has transformed its use of sanctions. We have deployed sanctions in innovative and impactful ways, including in our response to the threat from the Iranian regime. This instrument contains measures to deter the Government of Iran from causing regional and international instability by disrupting their unmanned aerial vehicles—UAVs—and missile industries, and their access to items critical to military development.

The Iranian regime’s development and proliferation of large volumes of advanced conventional weapons, including UAVs and missiles, continues to destabilise the Middle East and prolong Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine. Iran’s use of an unprecedented number of UAVs and missiles during its attack on Israel on 13 April 2024 demonstrated how Iranian weapons development and proliferation is fuelling conflict in the Middle East. The Iranian regime also used hundreds of these arms in its attack on Israel on 1 October, which we condemn in the strongest terms. This attack once more endangered the lives of innocent civilians and escalated an already incredibly dangerous situation. It cannot be tolerated.

In response to Iran’s attack on Israel on 1 October, the UK has designated nine individuals and entities involved in facilitating Iran’s destabilising activity. These include senior military figures and the Iranian Space Agency, which develops technologies that have applications in ballistic missile development. We are deeply concerned about the prospect of further escalation. All efforts must now be on breaking the cycle of violence. At this moment, when tensions are at a peak, calmer heads must prevail. All sides must take immediate steps to de-escalate. A regional war is in no one’s interest.

This is the latest in a long history of Iran destabilising the region, including through its political, financial and military support for its proxies and partners, such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis and aligned militia groups in Iraq and Syria. We have been clear that Iran must cease this support.

Iran is now one of Russia’s top military backers; it has supplied Russia with hundreds of UAVs since 2022. Russia has used these to target Ukraine’s critical infrastructure and kill innocent civilians, prolonging the suffering of the Ukrainian people. In September, Iran also supplied Russia with hundreds of close-range ballistic missiles. This is a further escalation of Iran’s military support to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and will further enable Russia’s invasion. In return, Iran is receiving Russian military and technological support, enabling it to further develop its military capabilities and enhancing the risk that it poses to the region and beyond.

This legislation expands the UK’s trade sanctions against Iran with the aim of disrupting its UAV and missile industry, as well as its access to items critical to military development. It includes sanctions in relation to items on the Russia common high-priority list. This list was jointly agreed by the UK, the EU, the US and Japan in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine. It identifies items that Russia is using in its weapons systems, ranging from semiconductors to machine tools.

These items are also significant in Iran’s production of advanced conventional weapons. As the Committee will know, there have been many public reports about Iran’s supply of weapons to Russia. We are therefore prohibiting the export, supply, delivery and making available of these items to Iran through the measures in this instrument. We are also prohibiting the provision of ancillary services associated with the goods, such as brokering services, technical assistance, financial services and funds.

All of the items prohibited by the EU in May have been prohibited by this instrument. In addition, prohibitions will also be applied to some items identified by the Ministry of Defence as significant to Iran’s UAV and missile industries. These trade restrictions complement our existing export controls and sanctions, ensuring that no UK business or person, wherever they are in the world, can facilitate the export, transfer, supply, delivery or making available of these items to Iran without the appropriate licence.

Finally, this Government are committed to enforcement. It is right that we ensure that we have the necessary powers, tools and capacity to implement and enforce our sanctions regimes effectively. That is why, on 10 October, we launched the Office of Trade Sanctions Implementation, with enhanced civil enforcement powers, in order to maximise the impact of the UK’s trade sanctions against Russia. These powers include the abilities to issue civil monetary penalties for breaches and to make details of breaches public. There are also new reporting requirements on sectors well positioned to find evidence of trade sanctions breaches.

To conclude, these new regulations will increase the pressure on Iran’s defence industry. They will disrupt Iran’s production of UAVs and missiles that could be supplied to its proxies in the Middle East or to Russia. We will continue to work with like-minded partners to disrupt, deter and respond to threats from the Iranian regime and to co-ordinate sanctions action. These regulations send a clear message to the Government of Iran and those seeking to harm the UK’s security, as well as that of our partners: we will not stand idle in the face of this aggression. I beg to move.

[Lord Polak (Con)]

My Lords, I totally support these regulations and agree with every word that the Minister has just spoken. The Iran regime is the problem, not the Iranian people. I remind the Committee that two Members of your Lordships’ House are proscribed by the Iranians: me and the noble Lord, Lord Alton, to whom the Minister referred.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I thank the Minister for her kind introduction to this subject. We also fully support these regulations on drones, broader drone technology, financial services, funds and brokering services related to other items of strategic concern; of course, they are one piece of a much larger jigsaw. The Minister commented on the impact of Iran in our previous debate on Russian aggression in Ukraine.

Both the other noble Lords who have spoken outlined graphically how actively and malevolently Iran is undermining the international order through its support for Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis. While it is tempting to think that these are faraway conflicts, any action by the Houthis in the Gulf has the potential to undermine international shipments of oil, gas and other important commodities, which can affect the economy and well-being of this country. Therefore, it is right that we are targeting further the Iranian regime. We fully support these sanctions.

I lend my support to the point made by my noble friend on the proscription of the IRGC. It is strange that so many Conservative Ministers and MPs were in favour of proscription but never managed to get it through the Foreign Office bureaucracy and now so many Labour Ministers and MP who were previously in favour of proscriptions also do not manage to get it through the FCDO bureaucracy. It makes you wonder whether “Yes Minister” was a commentary or a documentary indicating the true state of affairs with the standing bureaucracy in this country. I know that this is difficult, but political will must win over bureaucratic will. I hope that the Minister can influence the Foreign Secretary to return to his previous views and hers and those of her ministerial colleagues and finally proscribe the IRGC. That would meet with widespread support across both Houses of Parliament and from me and many of my noble friends.

We support the sanctions and hope that the Government have success in implementing them.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

My Lords, I again thank noble Lords for their contributions and support for these measures.

On the IRGC, I note the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, about the frustrations of political life and government. That is all I will say on that line of inquiry. We have already sanctioned the IRGC in its entirety. The separate list of terrorist organisation proscriptions is, as noble Lords know, kept actively under review. We do not routinely comment on whether an organisation is or is not under consideration for proscription. I will leave that there for today.

The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, makes an important point on Sudan. I will write to him about Sudan, but I point out that when sanctions are applied to Iran, they will affect Iran’s ability to supply Sudan as much as it would Russia. That will be the intention. On the issue of personal property, we have in minds such things as laptops, phones and other personal items. It would be restricted to that. It is right to flag this issue, and we are aware of it, but we felt it was important to include it.

This will apply to UK entities and individuals overseas and anyone who is in the UK. It will not apply any more widely than that. This is how the UK organises its sanctions, as the noble Lord knows. I know that he has long had a very keen interest in the issue of secondary sanctions and how we might engage with them. That is the situation as embodied in these regulations and with regard to the UK’s policy towards sanctions more generally. If I have missed a point there, which I think I may have done, the noble Lord must feel free to come back and help me out.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

It might be my ignorance about how this operates, as it may well be covered elsewhere. I understand that there will be a prohibition on exporting this equipment, but I am not sure that any of it has end-use certificate requirements. Therefore, how will we know if we are sending it to another country which then immediately ships it to Iran? How is that covered?

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I will hopefully improve my note-taking as we go on with this. Brokers would be specifically in breach of sanctions were they to facilitate or knowingly support in any way something ending up with Iran. I hope that helps the noble Lord. If he needs any further information, I would be happy to speak to him about it.

These measures represent a step forward in our capability to restrict Iran’s proliferation of advanced conventional weapons, which continue to fuel conflict in the Middle East and support Russia in its illegal war in Ukraine. The UK Government are firmly committed to using sanctions to hold the Iranian regime to account for its malign activities in the UK and elsewhere. I beg to move.

Motion agreed.