Sentencing Bill

Debate between Baroness Chakrabarti and Lord Lemos

Committee stage
Wednesday 3rd December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for her amendment and for taking the time to discuss her related concerns with my noble friend Lord Timpson. I also thank her for her support for the Bill and its overall intentions—that is very much appreciated coming from someone with her track record.

Amendment 140 would remove an important safeguard which, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, said, is very rarely used but remains an option for the courts as a measure of last resort and out of concern for the defendant. Eliminating this provision could leave vulnerable individuals without any viable protection, particularly where alternative care arrangements were simply unavailable or could not be implemented swiftly enough. We fear that those may be the consequences. Examples where it may be used include where it is the only option available to the court to keep someone safe, such as in cases where the defendant is a member of a gang and could be subject to repercussions if they were not protected.

I hope it will also reassure your Lordships that the Mental Health Bill, which the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, referred to, is now in the other place. It includes a reform to end the use of remand for one’s own protection under the Bail Act where the court’s sole concern is the defendant’s mental health. This reform should ensure that remand for one’s own protection is, therefore, used only as a last resort in the circumstances I have outlined.

At this stage, repeal would leave a gap in the available provision. Courts must retain the flexibility to act decisively in safeguarding individuals when no other option exists. The amendment would risk unintended consequences for vulnerable defendants and undermine the protective function of the justice system.

Amendment 147, which I thank the noble Lord, Lord Foster, for tabling, seeks to allow prisoners held on remand to access rehabilitative programmes, education, therapy and other support before the start of their sentence. The Government’s view is that the amendment is not necessary, given that remand prisoners can already access those programmes where prisons run them.

There is also an important legal distinction here that I should highlight to your Lordships. Remand prisoners are held in custody pending trial or sentencing, and some have not yet been convicted. Of course, we recognise that people are spending more time on remand; therefore, as I have said, where these services are available and in the right circumstances, they should be able to access them. However, remand prisoners are legally distinct from sentenced prisoners, and we have to reflect that in the priorities for resources.

There are already mechanisms in place to support remand prisoners, including access to healthcare. At the moment, the Government have no plans to expand all rehabilitative programmes, education, therapy and other support to remand prisoners. This would require substantial changes to prison operations and resourcing, and could divert resources from those already convicted and serving sentences. We recognise, however, some of the changes in the remand population. My noble friend the Minister and I would be very happy to continue to talk to the noble Lord, Lord Foster, about these matters but, given what I have set out, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I am so grateful once more to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, but, I have to say, I am disappointed in the responses from both Front Benches on this occasion. They were uncharacteristic, knee-jerk responses that do not display a broader understanding of the other laws of England and Wales that deal—or should deal—with vulnerable people.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, mentioned children. There are ample measures for protecting children under the Children Act 1989 and looking after them in more appropriate circumstances than in criminal justice detention. I remind the Committee that we are talking about defendants who are being detained not for the classic justifications that they would commit further offences, interfere with witnesses and so on, but for their own protection. Of course, the criminal justice estate is not a place of safety or protection for anyone.

I did not hear a reply to my question about how this can be justified under Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, but perhaps my noble friend the Minister could drop a note on that and offer it to other Members of the Committee. There will not be too many to send it to because there are not many Members here, but I would be hugely grateful for that.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, had it right when she talked about a Victorian hangover. There are too many Victorian hangovers in this area of law and policy, and I know that my noble friend Lord Timpson is well aware of that. The thrust of the Bill, in general, is about departing from such Victorian hangovers, such as social death and locking people up and throwing away the key. I urge further reflection.

If I am a member of a criminal gang who wants to turn King’s evidence but I am not charged with a minor offence, I will have to be put in a safe house, and there are schemes and measures to do that. But if I happen to be charged with a low-level offence that does not attract a custodial penalty, I am told that it is a last resort and that I am going to be locked up in a prison system where I will be more at danger from the criminal gang than I ever would be in a safe house. These are rather disappointing arguments from members of the Committee who, on reflection, may think again. I shall certainly return to this on Report, but I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.