Strikes (Minimum Service Levels) Bill

Debate between Baroness Chakrabarti and Lord Cashman

Committee stage
Thursday 9th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Cashman (Lab)]

My Lords—

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I wonder whether I could speak, because I will respond directly to the noble Baroness opposite. To be clear, I support all the amendments in this group, but I will tailor my comments in direct response.

Essentially, there were two comments about the Joint Committee. The first was that its language was too moderate to be taken seriously. I disagree in principle with the proposition that the fact that the report was not “damning”, as opposed to concerned or critical, should somehow undermine the value of that commentary. The Joint Committee is to be praised for its constructive tone in matters of industrial relations—if only everyone did the same.

Crucially, on the issue of who the arbiter is, I think it a bit rich for people who spend a lot of time undermining the legitimacy of the courts, of “unelected judges who do not speak for the people or have democratic legitimacy”, whether here or in the international court in Strasbourg, and who do so in the context of one Bill—perhaps about refugees—then to come along and criticise and undermine an essential element of our domestic human rights settlement which is a parliamentary committee of both Houses that has more of an element of “democratic legitimacy” and was always intended when the Human Rights Act was passed. Yes, of course, the courts will be the final arbiter, but before we get to that extreme situation—it should be rare in a modern democracy that the Executive and the courts have to be in a head-to-head collision—there is a role for Parliament. There is a role for Ministers when they make a Section 19 statement under the Human Rights Act. Ministers on this occasion have taken the view that they can make a Section 19(1)(a) statement; in other words, they believe that this measure complies. Following on from that executive statement—that is what a ministerial statement is—it is a key part of our settlement, and rather a constructive one, that a parliamentary committee of both Houses has a look at ministerial reasoning for it. I do not need to put it higher than this: on this occasion, the Joint Committee, with an element of democratic legitimacy—because it is not just Peers but to a large extent Members of the other place—has taken the view that the case has not been made by the Government. The noble Baroness did not address the specifics of that.

I will try to crystallise what the noble Lord, Lord Fox, identified in the criticism of the Joint Committee. Essentially, when one interferes with qualified rights such as freedom of association—it is a qualified right; it is not torture that we are talking about here; this is freedom of expression and freedom of association—one needs to comply with a convention that was drafted by Conservative lawyers after the Second World War. I will keep saying that because it is an important part of political history in this country and the world. To comply with Article 11, interference or potential interference—not violation, but interference—with freedom of association needs to be necessary and proportionate and in accordance with the law. “In accordance with the law” means not arbitrary—to be clear and foreseeable enough when that interference is set out.

The Joint Committee asks reasonable questions of noble Lords and Ministers opposite. First, how is this measure proportionate, when there are more proportionate means such as negotiation, of establishing what minimum service levels should be? Secondly, how is it proportionate to introduce this element of retroaction in relation to people who have balloted on the understanding of the law as it currently is? Thirdly and crucially, how is it not arbitrary to put the meat, the potatoes and the dessert—the whole meal—in regulations and not in the Bill? Those are incredibly pertinent, reasonable and legitimate questions for the Joint Committee of Parliament—not the courts, because we are not in that extreme situation yet—to ask. That is the point of Parliament; we do not want to set a collision course between our Government and His Majesty’s judges, let alone an international court. That is why I address those comments to the noble Baroness opposite.

More generally, I am more concerned by the hour, let alone by the day, about this Government’s approach to human rights. On this occasion and with this Bill, they have taken the view that the Bill complies. I disagree, but I am sure that we will shortly hear from the Minister the rationale about how in his view this Bill—not just the policy behind it but the way the policy is executed—complies with those requirements of “proportionate interference” and accessibility in terms of non-arbitrary measures that are in accordance with the law. It is legitimate that we ask the Minister to do that.

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[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I will respond, briefly, to the noble Baroness, and I am grateful to her for her ability to disagree well. First, I point out that many of the fundamental employment rights that she holds so dear are actually human rights, and they are set out in international conventions and the covenants of the Churchill settlement. If she does not like the word “human”, she does not have to use it, but these rights are, as a matter of law, international human rights.

Secondly, again, I know that she does not like our human rights settlement or the Human Rights Act, but in our public law in this country, not just under the Human Rights Act, one of the main benefits to the Government of putting the policy neat in primary legislation and not leaving it all to regulations is that regulations—to respond again to the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes—may be struck down in the courts in ways which primary legislation may not.

[Lord Cashman (Lab)]

My Lords, I speak in support of Amendments 1 and 51 in the names of my noble friends Lord Collins of Highbury and Lady O’Grady. It seems to me that the amendments in this group are perfectly reasonable. Amendment 1

“seeks to stop regulations under this Bill from being applied to strikes which have already been balloted for.”

I cannot think of anything more reasonable.

The Bill causes me deep concern, on the basis not only of human rights but of the fundamental rights enshrined in British law. For example, under the Bill,

“Workers could … be sacked for taking strike action that has been agreed in a democratic ballot. If a person specified in their employer’s work notice continues to take strike action despite being required to work during the strike, they will lose their protection from automatic unfair dismissal. This currently applies for first 12 weeks of a strike.”


This is a gross infringement of individual freedoms.

In listening to the earlier intervention by the noble Lord, Lord Henley, I thought he made a rather good case for Amendment 51—that is, that the amendment requires the publication of a report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights before the Act can come into operation. Again, that is perfectly reasonable, engaging the organs of Parliament in how we go forward.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Debate between Baroness Chakrabarti and Lord Cashman

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Thursday 3rd February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, unsurprisingly, I agree with everyone who has spoken so far except, I am afraid, for the noble Lord, Lord Horam. This is why: we are out of the EU now and have taken back control of our borders and laws. This is the Government’s policy. We are no longer in this family of nations, this bloc called the EU. Therefore, on what logical basis should we be saying that, by definition, we will never consider a claim made by an asylum seeker from that group?

It is one thing when you are in the EU to say that we do not need to be taking refugees from the EU because there is free movement in the EU and we are part of that bloc. You might well say that it will be inadmissible and that we do not consider refugee claims from within that family of nations of which we are a part, but we are not in it anymore. We have taken back control. Therefore, we are no longer able to assert pressure on others in that group to buck up their ideas about human rights or to threaten the Hungarians with being ejected from the EU if they do not sort out their human rights record. We do not have that leverage anymore. Therefore, it is our obligation as global Britain, as great believers in human rights and a signatory to the refugee convention, that if Hungarians are being persecuted we will consider their claims for asylum because we are better than them and we have taken back control in a lovely global Britain sort of way. It is totally illogical for Clause 14 to be part of the Bill.

More generally, the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, made an important point about complexity and efficiency. In an earlier group, everyone in the Committee agreed that decision-making needs to be faster and better. That is in everybody’s interest, whichever side of the argument we are on. Creating lots of convoluted provisions about what is inadmissible, before you even consider whether someone is being persecuted, will only make life harder for caseworkers in the home department. I have seen Governments of both persuasions do this over the years. They think they are making it easier, but they actually make it harder by creating more convoluted hoops for people to jump through before their claim is even considered. It is better to have a clean slate and to consider somebody’s circumstances: do they qualify for asylum or not? It would be much easier without all these hoops, so Clauses 14 and 15 should go.

Just consider the claims: if countries are safe, they are safe. If people are not telling the truth, test their credibility and make that decision. Of course, I agree with everything my noble friend Lord Dubs said about safe countries, who has or does not have an association with one and the Government making the decision for them on a spurious basis.

Finally, I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, it is a well-established principle of refugee convention jurisprudence the world over that you do not have to be persecuted just by agents of the state. States have a duty to protect all the people in their state. If they do not do it, there can be behaviour and persecution by non-state agents within that territory. If the state is not offering protection, if there is no effective rule of law, it is not enforcing the criminal law and is allowing Roma or gay people or whoever to be persecuted by fascist skinheads in Hungary or whatever it is, that is persecution for the purposes of the refugee convention.

[Lord Cashman (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. I will be brief. I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, for moving Amendment 68 and associate my name with this amendment. It deals with a glaring omission. I hope the Government will accept the amendment because, as has been rightly said, the Bill states:

“The Secretary of State must declare an asylum claim made by a person who is a national of a member State inadmissible … For the purposes of subsection (4) exceptional circumstances”.


This is where Amendment 68 beautifully sits and deals with that omission because intolerance is on the rise on the grounds of many protected characteristics listed within the Equality Act not only in Hungary, but in Poland and other parts of the EU. Indeed, the EU is somewhat restricted in what it can do with independent member states on some of these issues. I hope that the Minister will indicate that the Government will move on this, and the other positive amendments within this group, because in the end we are dealing with issues of human rights.

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[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I have no doubt that that is sometimes the case, but my point is that you do not need Clause 25 to deal with that case, because the decision-makers listed here are well capable of looking at evidence whenever it is served. If the idea is that this is late, incredible or mischievous evidence, or the other concerns of the noble Lord, these decision-makers are capable of getting there by themselves. They do not need this insult to their intelligence that they must give it minimal weight. I never knew about this principle of minimal weight. It has been invented. Sometimes late evidence is good and sometimes it is bad, but this is asylum; refugees are at stake.

The noble Lord opposite always wants to talk about the numbers. He is very concerned about the numbers and I appreciate that, but this is not about numbers. It is about getting decisions right and protecting even the one claimant in a thousand who is the torture victim, who has been persecuted, who may be a child and who may have been trafficked. To turn this into a matter of a parking fine or commercial litigation, in which your case is prejudiced because you were only just advised that being gay is relevant and that you do not have to be afraid to say so, because this is Britain and Hungary, is tawdry. To make that process point, when we are talking about life or death—not big bucks or small bucks but life and death—is totally tawdry.

Clause 25 does not help. If anything, it will make life more difficult for the Home Office because, I promise you, there will be endless litigation about what good reasons are. That is why the amendments are helpful, because they are beginning to tease out what will eventually be the subjects of litigation. We do not need it. We all know that late evidence is sometimes an abuse and is sometimes incredible, but sometimes it emerges because people have only just got decent translators or lawyers, or country or other vital information, which is sometimes hard to get.

I am sorry to hear that the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, is unwell. I am sure that the Committee will join me in wishing her a swift and full recovery.

On the point about identifying documents, let us go back to the history of the refugee convention. Some of the most genuine refugees have to escape without identifying documents, and some of the least oppressed people are the ones who have fantastic documents. That is why Amendment 85 has to go. This is not the biggest problem in a terrible Bill, but Clause 25 is a tawdry little clause, unworthy of Her Majesty’s Government; let us strike it from the Bill.

[Lord Cashman (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. I have deep concerns about Clauses 17, 19 and 25. Others have already expressed why, so I will not overly repeat myself. I congratulate my noble friend Lord Coaker on brilliantly moving the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Rosser. Equally, I associate myself with the amendments in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, my noble friend Lord Dubs and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton.

The reality of what is sometimes the last line of defence, not only in LGBTQ issues but in other vulnerable situations, is that it is the last thing you want to have to deal with yourself. Sometimes the very notion of coming out to yourself is deeply painful, because the recognition in certain cultures, countries and religions means to shut yourself off, not only from a body of support, your religion or community, but from your family. Initially, to come out to yourself is a huge step. Then you have to make the decision, day in and day out, whether to come out in other, very ordinary situations. You are here and you have put in your claim, and someone might say, “How was your weekend? Did you spend it with your girlfriend?” You have to decide whether to lie or tell the truth. If you tell the truth, you may become isolated in the asylum community, and perhaps from your country or religion. This is the community that you associated yourself with, to give yourself support and belonging, in a country where you seek to belong. Then you come out in late evidence, with that last line of defence. If your claim is rejected, you are possibly putting yourself in danger at home, in that you could be returned to one of the seven countries where you are criminalised simply for the reason of being LGBTQI+, or to one of the 11 countries where you could face the death penalty.

I remember in the 1990s working on the case of an 18 year-old Iranian who came out in this country. His asylum application was going to be rejected. A group of us were privileged to intervene on his behalf. What that teenager had said publicly would have been recorded and noted back home. We were successful—I do not say this boastfully, but it is one of the few things I am proud of in my life—in preventing that young man being returned to Iran, where, like three other young men in the weeks before, he could have been hung by his neck on the gallows until he was dead. How will the Government deal with exceptional cases where people bring in late evidence in order to substantiate their claim?