Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Baroness Chakrabarti and Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Monday 25th October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Before—

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)]

May I remind the Committee that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, is participating remotely? I apologise if I interrupted somebody who wanted to speak.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Forgive me, but before the Minister sits down, can I ask her to reflect and, if she wants to come back, to address the issue of who decides? I am very grateful for her assurance about intention and that there is no attempt to go further than classical practice has gone, which is a public interest exception to general patient confidentiality. But if, for example, under the new provisions, there were to be a dispute between, say, the police and the relevant health authority and/or the relevant health authority and the individual practitioner, who would decide? That is of course crucial in relation to patient-doctor trust.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Debate between Baroness Chakrabarti and Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall

Committee stage & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 3rd December 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, this amendment is very simple but, none the less, incredibly important to reassure some noble Lords and organisations, which you heard from earlier, about peaceful, legitimate protest and political activity, such as trade unions, environmental movements and so on. This is an important amendment to reassure them against abuses by Governments present and future. No disrespect is intended to a Government of any particular stripe. It has been drafted with some care, because I understand that it is difficult to limit the precise positive purposes of a covert human intelligence source, not least because the Government have chosen in this legislation to cover a wide range of public authorities and their investigatory, regulatory and enforcement work. I have tried to rule out the use of a criminal conduct authorisation for the purposes of agents provocateurs.

I complained on other groups that one of the problems with the legislation, as drafted, is that it grafts criminal conduct—which is much more serious than normal intrusion—on to a legislative scheme designed for intrusion, but not for the greater harms of criminality. It also has a limited Long Title and a limited scope. It is difficult to use amendments to the Bill to improve the RIPA scheme on to which so much weight is now being placed. However, I believe it is possible to do a great deal of good, even within the limited Long Title, in preventing agents provocateurs.

For the avoidance of doubt, and for members of the public watching at home or reading tomorrow, an agent provocateur is a state agent who is placed undercover, quite often in a protest movement, trade union or other innocent, legal, peaceful organisation, for the deliberate purpose either to incite crime on the part of others who would not normally go that far in their protest or for the agent to commit crime, while undercover, to delegitimise the wider peaceful movement in the public’s eyes or to justify a more repressive policing or banning response by the state. This method has been used throughout history and throughout the world, even in the United Kingdom. It was used during the hunger marches and in various trade union activity. We will see what comes from the Undercover Policing Inquiry.

I have no doubt that the Minister does not intend the Bill to allow criminal conduct authorisations—which now come with immunity, as they never did before—to be used to license agents provocateurs. Therefore, it seems to me that she would want to support this amendment, or something like it, which puts it beyond doubt that no CCA is able to authorise agents provocateurs.

The amendment is carefully drafted not to rule out the agent who finds himself or herself joining in with criminal activity to keep their cover or encouraging, assisting or inciting, while in discussions with others, to keep their cover. It prohibits the authorisation for the primary purpose—this is the crucial part of the amendment—of inciting crime, to use the modern definition under the Serious Crime Act 2007, or otherwise seeking to discredit the person or organisation being spied on. That is, they are not inciting it, but they are doing it undercover to discredit that organisation. To me, it seems simple and carefully crafted, if I may say so, but desperately important to reassure those involved in peaceful protest in particular. I beg to move Amendment 41.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Warsi, is not participating in this debate, so I call the next speaker, who is the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]]

Of course.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am afraid that that is not within the rules at present. I apologise to the Minister but we have to let the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, finish.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]]

I apologise. It is hard to see the Minister’s face or responses from this angle on Zoom. Briefly, in my scenario there is no trial, fair or otherwise, and therefore there is no issue of evidence against entrapment. There is just a CHIS who has been authorised for the purposes of discrediting a movement that may be feared to become violent in the future but is nowhere near doing so at the moment. My amendment seeks to ban a criminal conduct authorisation being issued for that primary purpose.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)]

Would the Minister care to respond to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti?