Victims and Prisoners Bill

Debate between Baroness Campbell of Surbiton and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

3rd reading
Thursday 23rd May 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Campbell of Surbiton (CB)]

My Lords, I will be brief because I know that time is of the essence. I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for her sterling work on this Bill. She has given great comfort and strength, as well as enormous amounts of information, to the infected blood community, so that they can keep up with what we have been doing in this House up until today. She is right that there is now confusion in the community.

At the end of a very long day on Monday, I had thought that I might just get a day off, but by Tuesday my phone was ringing off the hook, and I became a helpline to many in the infected blood community who have the concerns that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, just described. I urge the Minister to give a little more clarity, if he can today, so that we can go back and continue to give reassurances to a community that has been campaigning and working towards this week for probably 35 years. I thank the Minister for his open door, because we have been going in and out of it for weeks. I, for one, really appreciate his support and help.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I add the thanks of these Benches to the Ministers—the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy—and the Bill team as a whole for the way they have handled the Bill. It has been a real example of co-operation and cross-party help, leading to a number of amendments, not only on this particular issue but on all the issues that we have faced. We have not always reached agreement and there have been Divisions; nevertheless, I think everybody here agrees that the Bill will leave this House much improved.

I also very much wish to associate these Benches with everything that has been said by my noble friend Lady Brinton, speaking from these Benches, and the noble Baroness, Lady Campbell of Surbiton. I pay tribute to the noble Earl for the way he has handled the infected blood issue, particularly by meeting with the community and noble Lords in a way that has been utterly helpful and completely sympathetic. We all know that it has devoured an enormous amount of his time, and we all respect and admire the care he has given to handling this issue. I hope that he will be able to give the reassurance today—to my noble friend Lady Brinton, the noble Baroness, Lady Campbell, and the House—that is sought by the infected blood community; it would be a great relief to them.

Many of us had telephone calls yesterday in which extreme concern was expressed about what was happening in view of the calling of the general election, the fear that the Bill might be lost and that further improvements or reassurance on the scheme might not be possible. I add that it would have been a crying shame if this Bill had been lost and had not got through the wash-up. That seemed a real problem yesterday; there was concern that it would happen. It has got through, and for that we are extremely grateful.

It is also a great shame that the Arbitration Bill and the Litigation Funding Agreements (Enforceability) Bill look as if they are under threat. That is ridiculous. The Arbitration Bill is a Law Commission Bill. It has to start in the House of Lords, it went through a long Special Public Bill Committee procedure, ably chaired by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and there is no opposition to it. Similarly, the Litigation Funding Agreements (Enforceability) Bill has no opposition. These are two Bills important to the British economy because of the contribution that the legal services sector makes to it as a whole. For the progress of those Bills to Royal Assent before Prorogation to be stymied by an absurd convention that, if it has not already been introduced in the other House, a Bill will necessarily fail, is wrong. In those circumstances, I profoundly hope that the Whips in the Commons can come to an agreement. As I understand it, there is all-round agreement in the Lords that these Bills should go through. They must be taken through, just as this Bill has been taken through.

We are very grateful that this Bill has gone through. However, if the other Bills that are non-controversial and agreed cannot get through, the procedure on the wash-up needs a radical shake-up.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Baroness Campbell of Surbiton and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Wednesday 30th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

On Clause 68, there is only one amendment in my name, Amendment 75F, which removes subsections (6) to (11). The reason for that is we firmly believe that the making of costs capping orders should be left to the discretion of the court in appropriate circumstances. Of course, those depend on the financial circumstances of the parties, which are mentioned in subsection (5), so they should stay in Clause 68. However, the factors that are set out in subsections (6), (7) and (8) relate to public interest proceedings and might legitimately influence the decision of the court in an appropriate case.

By Amendment 80A in relation to Clause 69—I am proceeding on the basis of a suggestion that Clauses 68 and 69 should be debated together—which is in my name and that of my noble friends Lord Lester of Herne Hill and Lord Carlile of Berriew, further factors are listed as factors that the court should take into account.

In relation to the explanation that the Minister has just given of the origin of the costs capping jurisdiction, I fully accept that the Corner House principles limit the jurisdiction to public interest proceedings. I am not sure that that limitation is legitimate or necessary, although it is plainly relevant. The reason I suggest that it is not necessary to limit it in that way is that there may be unusual cases where an individual is so justifiably aggrieved by an unlawful decision of a public body in a case which does not have universal or public importance that a costs capping order or a protected costs order might be appropriate, even though there is no wider public interest.

I fully support Amendments 75 and 75A in respect of Clause 68, which would remove the bar on making a costs capping order until after the permission stage. For my part, I can see no reason for such a bar, unless it were to choke off applications for leave to apply for judicial review for fear of an uncapped costs order. That, I suggest, is an unacceptable reason for stifling proceedings at that stage.

Our Amendments 77A, 80A and 80C to Clause 69 would restore the position that costs capping orders in judicial review proceedings are discretionary. Amendment 77A would require the court, when considering making such an order and then in considering the terms of any such order, to have regard to all the circumstances of the case. There would then follow a list of circumstances to which the court should have regard. This is a common enough formulation: in the provision of a non-exhaustive list, Parliament gives an indication to the courts as to the factors that should be considered. However, in its acknowledgement of the fallibility of lawmakers, and of the range of possibly unforeseeable circumstances, as mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, the requirement that the court should have regard to all the circumstances of the case is, I suggest, a just and sensible one, which would allow judges to make the right decision in the particular cases that come before them.

As I have said, Amendment 80A would add to the list of factors that the courts should take into account all the factors drawn from the present proposals in Clause 68. These factors would not—and, I suggest, should not—be ranked in any particular order of importance. The court would be entitled to have regard to them as it thought appropriate. As I have also said, this does not require public interest considerations to be a precondition for a costs capping order.

Amendment 80C would remove the requirement that a costs capping order in favour of an applicant would necessarily import a requirement that the court make a costs capping order in favour of the defendant at the same time. It would make the imposition of such an order discretionary in any given case. This was the present position, as outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, in answer to the question posed by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern. It does not seem to me that there is anything sensible or justifiable in an automatic rule that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. It may sometimes be appropriate to make a costs capping order in relation to a defendant’s costs—more rarely, I suggest, because of the nature of the parties, than it is to make such an order in respect of an applicant’s costs. But again, I see no reason for interfering with the discretion of a court to make whatever orders appear to it to be just.

[Baroness Campbell of Surbiton]

My Lords, I also wish to speak—[Interruption.]. Sorry, I did not intend to knock over the microphone. Let me begin again.

My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group, in particular Amendments 75 to 77 and Amendment 81, in the name of my noble friend Lord Pannick, and I oppose the Question that Clause 68 stand part of the Bill.

The proposals are yet another barrier to access to justice. While we are talking about barriers to access to justice and people’s access to advocacy, I hope that the Minister will humour me—unfortunately, I have not yet figured out a way to intervene when he is speaking, apart from waving my arms about—and allow me to come back to him on the subject of the importance of cases and of intervening in such cases. Cases are often not all about winning or losing; they are about what we all gain from the proceedings. Yes, Leslie Burke lost on appeal, but his was the first case that prompted the GMC to change the guidelines on issues of life and death, and to begin to change the nature of the involvement of patients in their treatment. So we gained from that case, even though it was lost on appeal. That shows us how important access to justice is—not necessarily just for the particular case, but for what it offers us all in society.

The Government’s proposals on costs capping are deeply worrying in two respects. As I understand it, under Clause 68 the court can make an order only if the claimant already has permission to ask for judicial review. This will have a dramatic effect on access to justice. At present, an order can be made before the claimant asks for permission, so the claimant knows from the outset how much they will be liable for. This is vital, because most of the work is done in the early stages before the permission hearing. The Government themselves have said their costs can amount to £30,000. Without the protection of an order, most charities will simply not be able to seek permission. The risk is too great.

The clause defines “public interest proceedings” and sets out the matters the court must consider in deciding that question. But the Lord Chancellor can change those matters by regulations. That cannot be right. In effect, the Lord Chancellor is surely then able to dictate to the court what is in the public interest—when it is the Government who are most likely to be the target of such proceedings.

These proposals have to be seen in the context of the whole package of increasingly worrying legal reforms. As legal aid is withdrawn in cases of significant public interest, costs capping becomes even more important. In a recent case that I know of, a disabled and destitute man from Nigeria, who had been living on the streets, was denied legal aid and was able to get his case brought before the courts only because he got a protective costs order. If costs capping is severely restricted, what chance will individuals have of holding public bodies to account? I am mystified. This is yet another barrier in the way of ordinary people getting access to justice at every level—and it is the marginalised who will be most affected.

Both the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Constitution Committee of this House have expressed concerns about these proposals. Their effect will be to drive away all but the wealthiest of claimants. The one route available for righting wrongs will be eroded for those who most need it. I do not feel that we can allow this to happen.