Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Baroness Butler-Sloss and Lord Etherton

Report stage
Monday 4th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, I will also speak to related amendments that I have tabled: Amendments 24, 26, 28 and 30. I am extremely grateful to those who have co-signed all or some of those amendments: the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton.

I will speak very briefly, because I spoke previously about this both on Second Reading and in Committee. The current version of Clause 4(1) enables an applicant to oppose removal to Rwanda on the grounds that it is not a safe country for the applicant, but only if the applicant provides

“compelling evidence relating specifically to the person’s particular individual circumstances”.

Similarly, Clause 4(4), on the ability to obtain interim relief from removal to Rwanda, depends on particular individual circumstances relating to the applicant in question.

The defect in those provisions—a very basic defect—is that no provision is currently made for applicants in one of the important categories of refugee defined in Article 1A(2) of the 1951 refugee convention. That category comprises applicants who have a well-founded fear of persecution because of their

“membership of a particular social group”.

You can immediately see the difference between other categories of refugee under the convention, who are individual persons, and this category—which is probably the largest, or certainly the most important—comprising a large number of people who qualify as refugees because they are members of a particular social group. Yet when we look at Clause 4—I mentioned subsection (1) as well as subsection (4) on interim relief—there is no reference whatever to “group”, so one category of refugee has simply dropped off the list completely.

The proper approach of courts and tribunals to such a refugee was described in detail by the Supreme Court in HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, a 2010 decision, especially in the judgment of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry. I will not take the House through the case in detail. It is sufficient for me to say briefly that the approach to be taken, as established by that case, is that, if the applicant for asylum claims to be a member of a particular social group, the other members of which have a well-founded fear of persecution, the applicant is entitled to be considered a refugee provided that they satisfy the particular decision-maker that they are a member of that social group.

HJ (Iran) and the other case I mentioned concerned men who wanted to live an openly gay life and would have faced persecution in their home country had they done so, but the principle that I just described of the way to treat this category of refugee, as set out in HJ (Iran), applies across the board. It is not limited to people who are LGBT but applies to those who are members of a particular social group because of their ethnicity or gender or who hold a particular religious or political belief. For example, by way of analogy with the LGBT men who applied in HJ (Iran), if people hold particular philosophical, political or religious views that they have not expressed because of a real risk of persecution, but would like to do so and to live a life in which they can express those views, they are to be treated as members of a social group and granted the status of a refugee accordingly.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said in Committee, the Bill presents us with a false dichotomy. On the one hand, it is all about me—the claimant, the individual; on the other hand, it is about Rwanda generally. The former, the Bill says in Clause 4, allows you to make a claim for interim relief or removal generally to Rwanda, but the latter does not. In between those two extremes is the category of a member of a social group with a well-founded fear of persecution. This is not a torpedo point; it is not intended to undermine or delay this legislation. It is a reflection of the omission of a basic category of refugee defined in the convention, and an extremely important category as well. On that basis, I beg to move.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I have put my name to the four amendments tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton. I support everything he says and, since we are on Report, I do not propose to add to it. I also have my own Amendment 42. I declare an interest as the co-chairman of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Human Trafficking and Modern Slavery and the deputy chair of the Human Trafficking Foundation.

I spoke to this in Committee. Quite simply, and taking on what the noble and learned Lord has just said, this is a very special group of people who are in this country not because they have chosen to take the boat trip but because they have been brought here, by boat, lorry or some other route, and they are victims. When one starts complaining about people who should have stopped in France because France is a safe country, it absolutely does not apply to victims of modern slavery. They are here on an involuntary basis and need to be regarded in a totally different way.

Since I have been opposing much of the Rwanda Bill, I have heard endlessly, “What is it that you or other opposition would do to improve the situation of those crossing the channel?” I deeply regret those crossing the channel and I do not have an answer, but I do not believe that the need to stop people crossing the channel in a dangerous situation is any reason to pass an utterly shocking Bill. It is constitutionally incorrect and does not look at genuine victims, such as those victims of modern slavery. It is no answer to those of us who cannot accept what is going wrong in this country and what is going wrong in this Bill that, because we cannot offer an answer to the people crossing the channel, therefore we should be disregarded. Modern slavery is one of the most shocking crimes, making vast sums for perpetrators across the world. About a third to half the victims of modern slavery come to this country. The Government are ignoring the plight of this most vulnerable group of people. I hope that, at this last moment, they will think again about victims of modern slavery.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Baroness Butler-Sloss and Lord Etherton

Committee stage
Monday 19th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, I have given notice, with the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, of my intention to oppose the Question that Clause 5 stand part of the Bill. That is because, notwithstanding the eloquence of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffmann, and the noble Lord, Lord Howard, its provisions are in plain breach of the United Kingdom’s obligations under international law and in breach of the rule of law.

Although complications have been cited and expanded on, the reasons for this are very simply stated. Article 32 of the convention states that the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights

“extends to all matters concerning the interpretation”

and

“the application of the convention”.

Critically, in the event of

“dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the Court shall decide”.

That is an approach that is not unknown to our own law in certain circumstances. Rule 39 of the rules of the European Court of Human Rights provides for the court to make interim orders. 

In Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey, to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, referred, which was a case decided by the court in 2005, and Paladi v Moldova, decided by the same court in 2009, the European Court of Human Rights said that the failure of a member state to comply with interim measures is a breach of Article 34 of the convention. That article states that member states undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of the right of the court to receive applications from any person.

Reference has been made to a lengthy and elaborate argument in a Policy Exchange document, published in 2023 during the passage of the Illegal Migration Bill, by Professor Richard Ekins, in which he contended that the power to make interim measures was outside the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. That is the document with which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffmann, expresses his agreement. What is clear is that Article 32 confers on the court the right to determine the extent of its jurisdiction in the event that it is disputed. That article says so in the plainest terms, and, as a member state, we have signed up to that.

What is also indisputable, and is accepted by Professor Ekins, is that since the decision of Mamatkulov in 2005, the European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly upheld the binding nature of Rule 39 interim measures, and the UK Government have never once challenged before the Strasbourg court that decision and the binding nature of interim measures. Indeed, the United Kingdom has not only complied with such measures but called on other states to comply with them. It has supported resolutions and declarations that assume that Rule 39 is legally binding.

International law has, therefore, reached a settled state of practice and agreement between member states and the Strasbourg court. Whatever other course might properly be taken in the future—that could include matters concerning the way in which these orders are dealt with, about which the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, complained—it is clear that it would be a breach of international law and the rule of law for that settled agreement and practice to be peremptorily and unilaterally jettisoned by the United Kingdom acting alone. That is a basic principle of international law.

The wording of Clause 5 reflects similar, but not identical, provisions in the Illegal Migration Act. The challenge by Members of this House to those provisions in that Act were rejected by the Government and voted down in the other place. Should we then just placidly accept them now? I believe that it would be quite wrong to do so. This is yet another example of a blatant breach of the United Kingdom’s legal obligations. The other amendments in this group are worthy attempts to leave Clause 5 in the Bill but, in effect, to neuter its current intent and effect. My contention is that our constitutional role in this House impels us to reject Clause 5 in its entirety, and not provide it with any blanket of legitimacy, either in its current form or with amendments.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I was in a queue waiting to pay my bill at dinner and therefore arrived a few minutes late. I am very grateful for the Committee allowing me to speak.

I listened with particular interest to two of the most distinguished lawyers in this House: the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffmann, with whom I sat on the Court of Appeal regularly, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton. There is undoubtedly a potential dispute. Without going into what it should be, Clause 5(2) and (3) exclude the English court. The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, complained about the international court; ought we not to be complaining that the English court is excluded?

If there is to be a dispute with the Court of Human Rights, we might bear in mind that we are a member of the Council of Europe. If we blatantly refuse to follow the ECHR at Strasbourg, we might be turfed out, like Russia. Would we want to be the second country after Russia to be excluded from the Council of Europe? Some might not care, but others might think it would not look very good.

What I am complaining about is that Clause 5(2) and (3) will stop our domestic court making a decision. That seems a very good reason to support some, if not all, of the amendments.