Online Safety Bill

Debate between Baroness Bull and Baroness Fox of Buckley

Committee stage
Tuesday 9th May 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bull (CB)]

My Lords, I support the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, on the built-in obsolescence of any list. It would very soon be out of date.

I support the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and by the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes. They effectively seek a similar aim. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Fraser, I tend towards those tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, because they seem clearer and more inclusive, but I understand that they are trying for the same thing. I also register the support for this aim of my noble friend Lady Campbell of Surbiton, who cannot be here but whom I suspect is listening in. She was very keen that her support for this aim was recorded.

The issue of “on by default” inevitably came up at Second Reading. Then and in subsequent discussions, the Minister reiterated that a “default on” approach to user empowerment tools would negatively impact people’s use of these services. Speaking at your Lordships’ Communications and Digital Committee, on which I sat at the time, Minister Scully went further, saying that the strongest option, of having the settings off in the first instance,

“would be an automatic shield against people’s ability to explore what they want to explore on the internet”.

According to the Government’s own list, this was arguing for the ability to explore content that abuses, targets or incites hatred against people with protected characteristics, including race and disability. I struggle to understand why protecting this right takes precedence over ensuring that groups of people with protected characteristics are, well, protected. That is our responsibility. It is precedence, because switching controls one way is not exactly the same as switching them the other way. It is easy to think so, but the noble Baroness, Lady Parminter, explained very clearly that it is not the same. It is undoubtedly easier for someone in good health and without mental or physical disabilities to switch controls off than it is for those with disabilities or vulnerabilities to switch them on. That is self-evident.

It cannot be right that those most at risk of being targeted online, including some disabled people—not all, as we have heard—and those with other protected characteristics, will have the onus on them to switch on the tools to prevent them seeing and experiencing harm. There is a real risk that those who are meant to benefit from user empowerment tools, those groups at higher risk of online harm, including people with a learning disability, will not be able to access the tools because the duties allow category 1 services to design their own user empowerment tools. This means that we are likely to see as many versions of user empowerment tools as there are category 1 services to which this duty applies.

Given what we know about the nature of addiction and self-harm, which has already been very eloquently explained, it surely cannot be the intention of the Bill that those people who are in crisis and vulnerable to eating disorders or self-harm, for example, will be required to seek and activate a set of tools to turn off the very material that feeds their addiction or encourages their appetite for self-harm.

The approach in the Bill does little to prevent people spiralling down this rabbit hole towards ever more harmful content. Indeed, instead it requires people to know that they are approaching a crisis point, and to have sufficient levels of resilience and rationality to locate the switch and turn on the tools that will protect them. That is not how the irrational or distressed mind works.

So, all the evidence that we have about the existence of harm which arises from mental states, which has been so eloquently set out in introducing the amendments— I refer again to my noble friend Lady Parminter, because that is such powerful evidence—tips the balance in favour, I believe, of setting the tools to be on by default. I very much hope the Minister will listen and heed the arguments we have heard set out by noble Lords across the Committee, and come back with some of his own amendments on Report.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

Before the noble Baroness sits down, I wanted to ask for clarification, because I am genuinely confused. When it comes to political rights for adults in terms of their agency, they are rights which we assume are able to be implemented by everyone. But we recognise that in the adult community —this is offline now; I mean in terms of how we understand political rights—there may well be people who lack capacity or are vulnerable, and we take that into account. But we do not generally organise political rights and access to, for example, voting or free speech around the most vulnerable in society. That is not because we are insensitive or inhumane, or do not understand. The moving testimonies we have heard about people with eating disorders and so on are absolutely spot-on accurate. But are we suggesting that the world online should be organised around vulnerable adults, rather than adults and their political rights?

[Baroness Bull (CB)]

I do not have all the answers, but I do think we heard a very powerful point from the right reverend Prelate. In doing the same for everybody, we do not ensure equality. We need to have varying approaches, in order that everybody has equality of access. As the Bill stands, it says nothing about vulnerable adults. It simply assumes that all adults have full capacity, and I think what these amendments seek to do is find a way to recognise that simply thinking about children, and then that everybody aged 18 is absolutely able to take care of themselves and, if I may say, “suck it up”, is not the world we live in. We can surely do better than that.

Online Safety Bill

Debate between Baroness Bull and Baroness Fox of Buckley

Committee stage
Tuesday 9th May 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bull (CB)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 141 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Stevenson and Lord Clement-Jones. Once again, I register the support of my noble friend Lady Campbell of Surbiton, who feels very strongly about this issue.

Of course, there is value in transparency online, but anonymity can be vital for certain groups of people, such as those suffering domestic abuse, those seeking help or advice on matters they wish to remain confidential, or those who face significant levels of hatred or prejudice because of who they are, how they live or what they believe in. Striking the right balance is essential, but it is equally important that everyone who wishes to verify their identity and access the additional protections that this affords can do so easily and effectively, and that this opportunity is open to all.

Clause 57 requires providers of category 1 services to offer users the option to verify their identity, but it is up to providers to decide what form of verification to offer. Under subsection (2) it can be “of any kind”, and it need not require any documentation. Under subsection (3), the terms of service must include a “clear and accessible” explanation of how the process works and what form of verification is available. However, this phrase in itself is open to interpretation: clear and accessible for one group may be unclear and inaccessible to another. Charities including Mencap are concerned that groups, such as people with a learning disability, could be locked out of using these tools.

It is also relevant that people with a learning disability are less likely to own forms of photographic ID such as passports or driving licences. Should a platform require this type of ID, large numbers of people with a learning disability would be denied access. In addition, providing an email or phone number and verifying this through an authentication process could be extremely challenging for those people who do not have the support in place to help them navigate this process. This further disadvantages groups of people who already suffer some of the most extensive restrictions in living their everyday lives.

Clause 58 places a duty on Ofcom to provide guidance to help providers comply with their duty, but this guidance is optional. Amendment 141 aims to strengthen Clause 58 by requiring Ofcom to set baseline principles and standards for the guidance. It would ensure, for example, that the guidance considers accessibility for disabled as well as vulnerable adults and aligns with relevant guidance on related matters such as age verification; it would ensure that verification processes are effective; and it would ensure that the interests of disabled users are covered in Ofcom’s pre-guidance consultation.

Online can be a lifeline for disabled and vulnerable adults, providing access to support, advice and communities of interest, and this is particularly important as services in the real world are diminishing, so we need to ensure that user-verification processes do not act as a further barrier to inclusion for people with protected characteristics, especially those with learning disabilities.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, raised so many of the challenges that people face online, and I am sure that the masses who are watching parliamentlive as we speak, even if they are not in here, will recognise what she was talking about. Certainly, some of the animal rights activists can be a scourge, but I would not want to confine this to them, because I think trashing reputations online and false allegations have become the activists’ chosen weapon these days. One way that I describe cancel culture, as distinct from no-platforming, is that it takes the form of some terrible things being said about people online, a lot of trolling, things going viral and using the online world to lobby employers to get people sacked, and so on. It is a familiar story, and it can be incredibly unpleasant. The noble Baroness and those she described have my sympathy, but I disagree with her remedy.

An interesting thing is that a lot of those activities are not carried out by those who are anonymous. It is striking that a huge number of people with large accounts, well-known public figures with hundreds of thousands of followers—sometimes with more than a million—are prepared to do exactly what I described in plain sight, often to me. I have thought long and hard about this, because I really wanted to use this opportunity to read out a list and name and shame them, but I have decided that, when they go low, I will try to go at least a little higher. But subtweeting and twitchhunts are an issue, and one reason why we think we need an online harms Bill. As I said, I know that sometimes it can feel that if people are anonymous, they will say things that they would not say to your face or if you knew who they were, but I think it is more the distance of being online: even when you know who they are, they will say it to you or about you online, and then when you see them at the drinks reception, they scuttle away.

My main objection, however, to the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, and the whole question of anonymity in general is that it treats anonymity as though it is inherently unsafe. There is a worry, more broadly on verification, about creating two tiers of users: those who are willing to be verified and those who are not, and those who are not somehow having a cloud of suspicion over them. There is a danger that undermining online anonymity in the UK could set a terrible precedent, likely to be emulated by authoritarian Governments in other jurisdictions, and that is something we must bear in mind.

On evidence, I was interested in Big Brother Watch’s report on some analysis by the New Statesman, which showed that there is little evidence to suggest that anonymity itself makes online discourse more febrile. It did an assessment involving tweets sent to parliamentarians since January 2021, and said there was

“little discernible difference in the nature or tone of the tweets that MPs received from anonymous or non-anonymous accounts. While 32 per cent of tweets from anonymous accounts were classed as angry according to the metric used by the New Statesman, so too were 30 per cent of tweets from accounts with full names attached.18 Similarly, 5.6 per cent of tweets from anonymous accounts included swear words, only slightly higher than the figure of 5.3 per cent for named accounts.”

It went through various metrics, but it said, “slightly higher, not much of a difference”. That is to be borne in mind: the evidence is not there.

In this whole debate, I have wanted to emphasise freedom as at least equal to, if not of greater value than, the safetyism of this Bill, but in this instance, I will say that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bull, said, for some people anonymity is an important safety mechanism. It is a tool in the armoury of those who want to fight the powerful. It can be anyone: for young people experimenting with their sexuality and not out, it gives them the freedom to explore that. It can be, as was mentioned, survivors of sexual violence or domestic abuse. It is certainly crucial to the work of journalists, civil liberties activists and whistleblowers in the UK and around the world. Many of the Iranian women’s accounts are anonymous: they are not using their correct names. The same is true of Hong Kong activists; I could go on.

Anyway, in our concerns about the Bill, compulsory identity verification means being forced to share personal data, so there is a privacy issue for everyone, not just the heroic civil liberties people. In a way, it is your own business why you are anonymous—that is the point I am trying to make.

There are so many toxic issues at the moment that a lot of people cannot just come out. I know I often mention the gender-critical issue, but it is true that in many professions, you cannot give your real name or you will not just be socially ostracised but potentially jeopardise your career. I wrote an article during the 2016-17 days called Meet the Secret Brexiteers. It was true that many teachers and professors I knew who voted to leave had to be anonymous online or they would not have survived the cull.

Finally, I do not think that online anonymity or pseudonymity is a barrier to tracking down and prosecuting those who commit the kind of criminal activity on the internet described, creating some of the issues we are facing. Police reports show that between 2017-18, 96% of attempts by public authorities to identify anonymous users of social media accounts, their email addresses and telephone numbers, resulted in successful identification of the suspect in the investigation; in other words, the police already have a range of intrusive powers to track down individuals, should there be a criminal problem, and the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 allows the police to acquire communications data—for example, email addresses or the location of a device—from which alleged illegal anonymous activity is conducted and use it as evidence in court.

If it is not illegal but just unpleasant, I am afraid that is the world we live in. I would argue that what we require in febrile times such as these is not bans or setting the police on people but to set the example of civil discourse, have more speech and show that free speech is a way of conducting disagreement and argument without trashing reputations.