Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Bill [HL]
Debate between Baroness Berridge and Lord Redesdale
Baroness Berridge
On that discrete point, again, the resources that were available to the Metropolitan Police unit in this area were raised at Second Reading. If my noble friend is to write in relation to this matter, can she also tell your Lordships’ House how the military unit is to be set up in a way to pass relevant intelligence to the Metropolitan Police unit? It may glean information from the field that is relevant to the Metropolitan Police, which is not a usual situation to have, so it might be useful in that same letter to have clarification of the appropriate form of communication between that specialist unit and the private contractors, as well as back into the Met and probably more widely into Europol and so on.
Lord Redesdale
My Lords, while I almost support the theory behind these amendments, we might have difficulty with a couple of issues. I should say first that the attitude taken by the British Armed Forces in protecting cultural objects has been exemplary, especially recently in the targeting of Libya and the specific direction not to destroy archaeological sites.
However, there is an issue in relation to our troops being directed by other forces. In 2003, I went over to Qatar to talk to CENTCOM about the bombing that was being carried out by American forces. People there thought it was a particularly good day when I talked to them because they had convinced the American air force that not dropping ordnance during sandstorms and instead waiting until they could see the ground would be a good idea. There is the issue of how, if you are involved in a joint operation and under the command of others, you influence that commander, or whether you would even be able to.
Of course, this becomes a particular issue when fighting the types of warfare that are being fought now, whereby most of the information used for targeting enemy forces comes through drones and indirect forces. That process has to be based on information. I follow the point that of course we need information and expertise within the MoD to understand what sites can be used, because the real issue of Daesh funding its operations through the sale of antiquities means that, given the MoD’s primary duty of denying the enemy sustenance and funding, it needs to understand the implications of the looting of certain sites and the financial implications for the forces they are fighting.