(10 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, first, my apologies for missing the first two sentences of the debate on this amendment. I left 1 Millbank over the road as soon as debate on the Bill started but I am not as nimble as I thought and I make my apologies to the House.
I, too, am grateful to the Minister for his reflection on this matter since Report and for the amendment that the Government have laid. I join the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, in thanking him for the meeting that was arranged at short notice prior to the Recess. I, too, am grateful that the amendment narrows the definition of what the tribunal should consider to be a new matter and that what is or is not a new matter will be for the tribunal to determine according to the legislation. The narrowing of the definition is most welcome as, once the matter is determined to be a new matter, the tribunal cannot hear it without the consent of the Home Secretary.
I am also grateful for the specific guidance outlining the circumstances in which the Home Secretary will consent to such a new matter being in front of a tribunal. I am grateful for my noble friend’s explanation of what will happen if very junior counsel are in front of a tribunal when a new matter is raised and unfortunately they cannot get instructions or the file containing the necessary information.
Everything in the Government’s amendment is welcome as far as it goes but I do not think that it will come as any surprise to the Minister that I remain disappointed that the Government have not laid an amendment giving the tribunal an exceptional discretion to hear a new matter if the demands of justice require it. Justice is of course the overriding purpose of our courts and tribunals, and ordinarily the Secretary of State should be the primary decision-maker on a new matter but not if justice demands otherwise.
On Report, the constitution arguments were ably outlined by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hope, Lord Woolf and Lord Brown. This is the first time that a party to any proceedings will have this kind of control over jurisdiction and I shall be interested to know—as I am sure all noble Lords will be—how it works out in practice. I would be grateful if the Minister could indicate whether, if this new power results in judicial review cases, there will be a way of keeping a record of the judicial review decisions in relation to the guidance and to consent being refused. Will those figures be available some time after the Bill is passed for the purposes of post-legislative scrutiny?
My Lords, the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association has pointed out that this is a meaningless amendment because a tribunal would not be able to consider a matter that was not within its jurisdiction in any case. It is disappointing that the Government have not noticeably reflected, as my noble and learned friend assured me they would, on the alternative suggestions made by my noble friend Lady Berridge, on this clause, and supported by several noble and learned Lords, to give effect to the recommendations of the Joint Committee on Human Rights in its eighth report. Your Lordships were almost unanimous in condemning a proposal to allow one of the parties to an appeal to instruct the tribunal on what matters it can or cannot consider.
My noble and learned friend the Minister did not challenge the assertion that the tribunal had not allowed abuse of its own process in the past or had treated the Secretary of State unfairly, or that the existing process was inefficient. There was no suggestion on Report that the Government had raised any concern in the past over this alleged problem, but if we concede that there might have been cases in which a new matter—which is only to be defined in guidance, as we heard—was raised, that still does not mean that your Lordships should agree to grant this sweeping power to allow the respondent to veto the consideration of the new matter, even when the reason for its last minute appearance was the difficulty in getting hold of the presenting officer, as in one of the cogent examples given by my noble friend in introducing her amendments. In such cases the presenting officer who may have been unable to get instructions from senior counsel overnight can ask for an adjournment. My noble and learned friend did not say that he knew of any instance when such a request had been refused.
My noble friend said that she thought satellite judicial review went against what the Government were seeking to achieve, but that would still be the only way of challenging a decision by the Secretary of State to prohibit the use of a proposed new matter, after the amendment that is now before us. I asked my noble and learned friend whether the Government had made any estimate of the number of judicial review cases likely to be heard as a result of this provision and what would be the estimated reduction in the savings expected from it. I received no answer. I certainly agree with the suggestion made by my noble friend just now that a record should be kept of such cases.
The main reason why the Government insist that the Secretary of State should have this power seems to be, as we have heard, that she is the primary decision-maker of right on these applications rather than the late arrival of new matters, some of which is due to the inaccessibility of the Home Office. Nobody argues with that in principle, although my noble friend Lady Berridge pointed out that the Secretary of State had, in effect, voluntarily abdicated that role by allowing officials to make such a large number of wrongful decisions at first instance.
Even if that problem is solved, there remains a serious objection to what the Government propose. The fundamental principle of the rule of law is the right to a fair trial. In his wonderful book, The Rule of Law, the late noble and learned Lord Bingham emphasised that the right applies to,
“adjudicative procedures of a hybrid kind … proceedings in which one or more parties may suffer serious consequences if an adverse decision is made”.
He goes on to mention a recent case in the Supreme Court in Canada, where the Chief Justice, delivering the unanimous judgment of the court, said that,
“a fair hearing requires that the affected person be informed of the case against him … and be permitted to respond to that case. This right is well established in immigration law”.
Thus, if the applicant is denied the right to present what may be a crucial piece of evidence, he is denied the right to a fair trial. That right trumps the Secretary of State’s right to be the primary decider. This amendment, leaving Clause 15 effectively untouched, does not cover the mischief dealt with so effectively by my noble friend Lady Berridge.