(8 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I start with an apology, as I have not spoken on the Bill before. I thank, in particular, POhWER, the organisation of which I am a patron, for alerting me to the Bill and to its concerns, as well as the concerns shared by a wide range of groups, including Liberty, Age UK, Mencap and so on.
As other speakers have outlined, it is essential that we get this absolutely right, because we are talking about potential deprivation of liberty. According to those organisations, people with dementia or a learning disability are at risk under the proposed changes. Therefore, I speak in support of Amendment 1, proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and Amendment 20 in the name of my noble friend Lady Thornton. I believe that this amendment would ensure that the views of the donees and deputies already appointed by cared-for persons to make decisions in their best interests were given appropriate weight with regard to where the cared-for person resides for care and treatment.
I will say no more than that because there are experts on this issue in the Chamber. I sit willing to support but more willing to listen and learn.
My Lords, I apologise for being slightly late. I was taken by surprise at the swiftness with which we concluded our previous business.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, for many of the points that she made in her speech. It took a lot of work to get the concept of an advance statement on wishes into this legislation, and I, like her, regret that it has not been more widely adopted or accepted, particularly by the medical profession. She will know that when the Select Committee reviewed the legislation, one of the biggest disappointments was the extent to which the Mental Capacity Act had not been understood by the medical profession. She will perhaps remember that when representatives of different parts of the medical profession come to talk to us, they began by saying that in an A&E department it is extremely difficult to work out somebody’s advance decision. We knew that when we passed the initial legislation, but that legislation was not meant solely to take its lead from that; it was meant to apply to a whole range of matters just within medicine. It is a shame that the medical profession still relies on a very conservative interpretation of the existing legislation and takes a read-out from emergency situations when it really should not, as there is plenty of time to discuss with the person what is happening and to understand their previously stated wishes and feelings.
I am glad that the noble Baroness has raised this issue. She is right that at the heart of the Bill is a fundamental change from the Mental Capacity Act. There will no longer be a whole series of decision-specific assessments of people who lack capacity, and that is not something that I object to. Over the last few years while this legislation has been in place, we have quite often found people being subjected to unnecessary assessments. It is quite clear that when somebody has a medical assessment for advanced dementia, say, they will not have the capacity to make the same decision, even though they go to live in a different place. I accept that it is possible to make a decision of a lack of capacity and to carry that forward throughout a person’s care. What I am not clear about, though—given that people will be subject to fewer assessments, and therefore be less likely to have changes in their conditions brought to light—is the extent to which that will interplay with somebody’s statement of advance wishes. I would rather like it if the Minister, in his response, could talk about how that will work.
I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. The safeguards on liberty and safeguarding have been thoroughly confused by many people. That is fundamental. Whether we turn this around from safeguards against deprivation of liberty or safeguarding the liberty of somebody, I do not think that anything I have seen in the Bill has yet addressed that fundamental misunderstanding. In fact, in some cases, it probably compounds it. I want to put that on record as we discuss the many issues the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, has introduced so well.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, for her amendment and the noble Baronesses, Lady Thornton and Lady Murphy, for their amendments. I am delighted that the noble Baronesses were able to make it on time so that we could start on our deliberations of what are clearly very important issues.
The purpose of these amendments is to clarify that a liberty protection safeguard authorisation cannot override a valid decision to refuse care or treatment by the donee of lasting power of attorney or a court-appointed deputy or contained in a valid advance decision to refuse treatment. The comment that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, made at the start of the debate, about conflict and avoiding conflict by recognising valid decisions where they have been made, was very important. I hope that all noble Lords know that the intention of the Bill is to enhance the role and agency of those deprived of their liberty and those with an interest in the care and welfare of that cared-for person. That is why this debate on the first grouping of amendments is so important.
This debate gives me the opportunity to clarify and confirm that the Bill does not allow a decision to be made that conflicts with that made by a donee of a lasting power of attorney or a court-approved deputy’s valid, best interests decision. I am glad of the opportunity to do that. Section 6(6) of the Mental Capacity Act already provides for this, and the Bill does not change that. Therefore, an authorisation under the liberty protection safeguards could only be given if it was in accordance with a valid decision—namely, one that is authorised in the lasting power of attorney—by the attorney or deputy.
The Bill also does not change the current position regarding advance decisions to refuse treatment, and those will remain an important part of care planning. I absolutely recognise the important role that the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, and others in this House played in introducing that. I assure all noble Lords that there is neither the intention nor action in the Bill to water down the power and validity of those in any way. If a person has made a valid advance decision to refuse medical treatment, that treatment cannot be given and it would not therefore be possible to deprive someone of liberty in order to provide it. We intend to give further explanation of the legal position in the code of practice. I hope that that answers some of the key issues raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay, Lady Thornton and Lady Murphy, in their comments.
Those comments were echoed by my noble friend Lady Browning, and she is quite right to discuss the importance of support for those with communication difficulties so that they are able to enunciate the kinds of decisions and indications of future treatment that would adhere to their own wishes. We will return to this issue later in Committee, particularly when we get on to the issue of IMCAs—the advocates—but she is right to reiterate the point made in the proposed amendments that those acting on behalf of the cared-for person, whether they are the family, have an interest in care or have been formally appointed to do so, are, in the end, responsible for taking those decisions on behalf of that person, and their decisions should be respected, as the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, pointed out.
The fundamental question that underpins these amendments is: why is the Bill not explicit on these issues when, as the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, pointed out, the Law Commission’s Bill is? Because there is no change in the current position, there is therefore no reason to outline what is already the case. Nothing is changed about what is already in the Act by what is being proposed through this Bill. Therefore, there is no need to reiterate what is already the case and will not be changed. I hope through the course of this debate that we have aired this issue. It is one that the Government agree with and, in the way that the Bill is structured, I can confirm to the Committee that there is no change in the status quo about the validity of those decisions.
With those reassurances, I hope that the noble Baroness is prepared to withdraw her amendment. I recognise that there is great concern, not least among many of the campaign groups, service providers, commissioners and others who are implementing these rules and laws every day, and they need to know that there is consistency. As we move between now and Report, I am more than happy to meet with noble Lords and others to discuss these issues and make sure that we can give every reassurance so that they can be sure that the law as it stands today has not changed and will not change as a consequence of this Bill.
My Lords, I make a brief intervention, primarily to underline the importance of two points that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, made when introducing his amendment. Like my noble friend Lady Jolly, I fear we have no alternative other than to carry on and scrutinise this Bill. The reasons for doing something have just been set out very clearly by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, but I retain two really key concerns which I raised at Second Reading.
The first—referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt—is that of timing and understanding the relationship with the review of the Mental Health Act. I understand that it is due in the autumn—I am not quite sure when—together with amendments to the Mental Capacity Act, given that both Acts relate to non-consensual care and treatment. It seems that the overlap between the two systems is one of the reasons why the current system is so complicated, and why so many staff struggle with it. Frankly, it is why I struggle with it so much. There must be real concerns that changes to address problems under one system will have unintended consequences for the other. Clarity is needed from the Government over when patients should be subject to one Act over the other, so that, in the words of Sir Simon Wessely, chair of the Mental Health Act review,
“arguing over the framework does not get in the way of delivering the care that the person needs”.
I could go on at length—I will not, your Lordships will be pleased to hear. I have just one more thought on this. In addition to the need for clarity on when the Mental Capacity Act or the Mental Health Act should be used, it is really important that patients do not find that they are deprived of their liberty by both Acts at the same time. There are examples of this happening, particularly when a patient has both a mental disorder and an unrelated physical disorder.
That is my first point. My second point, which was made very cogently by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, is about the consultation that is taking place with the sector. Like everyone else, I have received a large number of briefings in the past few days. Frankly, it has been difficult to take them all on board. I have done my best. I was particularly concerned by a survey that was published only a couple of days ago by an organisation called Edge Training. I do not know it personally, I do not know exactly what else it does, but I do know that it was a survey of 900 people and nearly half the respondents were best-interests assessors, with the rest being primarily social workers, health professionals and independent mental capacity advocates. I will not go through what they said, other than to say that there were really very high levels of concern—80% this and 90% that—particularly in relation to the new roles being placed on care home managers, the potential conflicts of interest, plans to charge care home managers with deciding whether it is in a resident’s best interests to have an advocate if they lack capacity to request one, and the lack of a specific requirement to consult the person themselves about a proposed deprivation of their liberty.
My conclusion from all this is that the sort of consultation that should have gone on with the sector for a change such as this, which really has to work—this is not political, it is about something that has to work on the ground and people who do this have to understand it and feel that it does work—cannot have happened to the extent to which I think it should have happened, and that has real importance for the pace at which this can be taken forward and the consultation and implementation timescale.
My Lords, I just want to share the thoughts that I had over the summer, when we had a very long time to look at this proposal. I have been wrapping my head in wet towels looking at this legislation, trying to work out what it is all about, and to answer a key question: why this Bill now? I am still not happy that I have the right answer.
The noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, referred to the Mental Capacity Act as a “monstrous” Act—the DoLS part of it. But let us be fair, when the Select Committee did its review, we found that the Act was held in quite high regard; the problem with it was that it was not properly understood and that had caused problems with its implementation. It is true that we said in the Select Committee report that there needed to be an absolute root and branch review of DoLS, but we prefaced all our recommendations for the review of the Act on one other premise, which has been ignored by the Government. We said that one of the reasons that we saw for the failure of the Act to be properly implemented was that there was no central ownership of the Act and no single body responsible for its implementation. The Government have chosen to ignore that. Instead, they have shoved responsibility for the MCA on to the CQC, where it does not get specialist attention. There is nothing like the attention paid to the Mental Capacity Act that there is to the mental health legislation, and yet if it is not properly implemented, people can be deprived of their liberty.
I am grateful to the Minister, although I am reeling from the shock that he thinks that I called for a second Second Reading debate to take place on a Clause 1 stand part discussion.
I of course agree that the current system is not fit for purpose. I agree with the Minister and with the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and other noble Lords. I agree with the need for a streamlined system, but it has to be the right system. I say to the noble Baroness that one of the briefings that I received was from 39 Essex Chambers, which is pretty expert in this area. It was a very interesting piece by Victoria Butler-Cole which sets out seven changes to the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill that the courts are likely to make unless Parliament gets there first.
We have to be very careful that in wishing to support the Government to get a streamlined process through we do not build in mistakes and errors that, rather like the Cheshire West decision, will lead to the court, and then to further legislation. In her piece, Victoria Butler-Cole says that the Court of Protection has a record of rejecting capacity assessments conducted by consultant psychiatrists with years of training in mental health and specifically in relation to the MCA. The Bill permits care home managers to assess capacity in this context. There is no way that will withstand scrutiny by the court, and there are likely to be even more cases in which assessments of incapacity are overturned as care home managers with little or no relevant training are required to carry out what can be a complex task. That seems to me to be the problem.
I know that this has to be signed off by the local authority. The impact assessment makes it clear that in the vast majority of cases that will be a desktop exercise. That does not fill me with confidence that these assessments will be scrutinised effectively by local authorities which themselves are very hard pressed. That is why I think that, when it comes to the detailed amendments, this is a very important part of this legislation. We need to be very careful to ensure that this is going to work effectively.
On training, the noble Lord has made some very welcome comments, but I refer to the fact that there is an annual turnover of 27% in this sector among the people who are going to have to do this work. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, that I was trying to be polite. This is a very vulnerable sector, with low-paid people who have low qualifications being asked to deal with issues to do with the fundamental liberty of people in this country.
My gut feeling is that it will not do. This cannot be left to care managers. The Government will have to look again at the Law Commission’s assumption that local authorities would do the work. I of course do not wish to prevent Clause 1 standing part of the Bill.
My Lords, I hope that it is permissible for me to rise again. For the avoidance of doubt, will the Minister confirm that I understood him correctly? Is he saying that the role of the care home manager has not changed? I understand that, under the existing law, a care home manager may request that somebody’s capacity be assessed, but that assessment is not usually done by them. That assessment is done by somebody else. Is he saying that that is not going to change? I am sorry, but I think it very important that noble Lords understand what the Minister says.
I understood that the Minister said “escalate”, which means that something changes. Perhaps when he is answering the question of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, he could also explain the word “escalate”.
The Government may need to think about carrying out some form of assessment of the appropriateness and suitability of care home managers to undertake this task. If that has not been done, perhaps it needs to be done in the next month or so.
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, has produced a perfectly adequate descriptor which would substitute perfectly well for “unsound mind”. We always face this difficulty in discussing terms that relate to stigmatised disorders. We have to keep changing the language to keep it up to date and to refresh people’s thinking about what we are dealing with. “Unsound mind” went out in the 1960s and 1970s—I do not think that I have ever diagnosed anybody as being of unsound mind—and we must now have an alternative. We do not need the convenience of it remaining as it was back in the 1950s. Therefore, I support the descriptor given by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler. It is a very good one. We have used it before and it would be perfectly adequate. Let us ditch “unsound mind”.
My Lords, I shall not detain the Committee for long but it is important to recap on a bit of history. The original legislation that came before your Lordships’ House on this issue—the Mental Incapacity Bill—was subject to the first ever pre-legislative scrutiny. In going through that then very innovative procedure, Members of this House and another place did a couple of things which at that time were game-changing. One was that we invited people who lacked capacity to come and give evidence to us. But we went further than that. When we produced our report, we invited them back to discuss with them what we had listened to and what we had changed. One of the first and most important things that we did was to change the title from the Mental Incapacity Bill to the Mental Capacity Bill. We also, for the first time ever, produced an easy-read version of a Bill.
I strongly support my noble friend Lady Tyler because this feels like a real regression in thinking. I understand that the term is there because somebody somewhere believes that it has a legal meaning. We came up against those same arguments all those years ago and this House led the way in getting lawyers and counsel to change their minds. I do not see a reason for us not to do the same again.
I wish to add one point. I vividly remember listening to the people whom we invited back to talk to us after we had produced our report. At this point, there were only Members of your Lordships’ House in the room—the Commons were busy and had not turned up. I remember one particular gentleman who said, “When I first saw this, I thought it was really rubbish, but actually you’ve done quite a good job”. I have to say that in all my years in your Lordships’ House I do not think that I have ever received a more sincere accolade. That is not to belittle anybody’s contribution to this, but I think that my noble friend has made a very strong point.
These Benches support the amendment. As the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, and others have said, the reference to unsoundness of mind is offensive to those with learning disabilities, dementia and brain injuries and their families. The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, has just demolished all the legal arguments for including the phrase in the Bill, and indeed a lot of organisations, including the Royal College of Psychiatrists, say that it out of place in today’s society. The GMC argues that it is not clear what added protection or benefit is achieved by using the term. VoiceAbility says that “unsound mind” is not used in modern psychiatry and that it could lead to debate in disputes. Therefore, I hope that the Minister will be as agreeable about this amendment as he was about the last one.
If the real purpose is to ensure protection under the Human Rights Act for those we are concerned about, has the Minister considered whether that might not be achieved merely by stating that the category of people we are looking at should have the benefit of the relevant section of the Human Rights Act? When I say the Human Rights Act, I mean the convention.
The Human Rights Act was in force when the Mental Capacity Act was being debated. During the passage of that Act we considered very carefully what language we should use. Is the Minister saying that we got that wrong, and have there been cases of people who have fallen into the gap? If so, how many are there, and can he give the evidence by which the Government arrived at the conclusion they have now?
It might be complex to find the right nomenclature, but I heard the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, say that this was a starter for 10. I cannot see why we have to regress to 1959 language in the Mental Health Act without further exploration of whether we could redefine the term about perhaps affecting the mind, to take in that very small minority of people with severe physical illness that occasionally affects the mind. We have worked so hard to destigmatise both learning disability and mental health that it seems very sad that we cannot work a bit harder at this point on this issue.
My Lords, Amendments 7 and 8 in my name are yet another attempt to make some sense of this Bill. Perhaps they might not have been tabled had we been able to have more discussion over the Recess. As several noble Lords have already mentioned, there has been considerable disquiet about the non-appearance of best interest assessments in this Bill. Indeed, a number of noble Lords attempted to table amendments that, at the very least, like this amendment, were trying to probe where the best interests of the cared-for person would come into play.
This particular part of the Bill—Part 2 of Schedule 1 —is on “Authorisation of arrangements”. In putting down these probing amendments, I was particularly taken by the briefing given to us by the Law Society, which suggested:
“Remove the distinction between the ‘arrangements’ and ‘care and treatment’ as it will result in difficulties when applied in practice. For example, how would a person’s capacity to make medical treatment decisions or decisions about contact with others be distinguished from decisions about the ‘arrangements’ to provide that treatment or to prevent contact with others?”.
In light of that, at the very least we ought to be asking the Minister how this is going to work. I accept a number of the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, about the clumsiness of the existing DoLS procedure, but the removal of best interest assessors is one that has caused a fair degree of disquiet among the different groups.
Amendments 7 and 8 are also meant to begin to probe a key provision in the Bill—the assertion that the arrangements need to be “necessary and proportionate”. There is no further explanation in the Bill about what the term “necessary and proportionate” might mean, who will make the decision and on what basis it will be judged and reviewed. This goes back to some of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, that, given the increased role— let us say that—of care home managers, they will be making the assessments of what is necessary and proportionate.
No doubt I am going to be told that these amendments are either deficient or unnecessary, but they are here to begin to probe some very unclear but key parts of the Bill about the authorisation of arrangements. In that vein, I beg to move.
My Lords, I support the principle behind Amendment 8 in particular. Perhaps this is something the Minister will want to view as going in the code of practice, as I am not sure that putting this on the face of the Bill is necessarily the right place for it—although I completely understand the sentiment, which is to avoid serious risk. We live in a risk-averse system, and it is serious risk that we must be concerned with.
A case that I heard about in the last few days came to mind. An elderly lady with dementia became extremely agitated when it snowed. Because of her tendency to wander, she was not going outside unescorted. A conversation with her son revealed that she had been a meteorologist, so her view was that when it snowed she had to go outside and measure the depth of the snow and telephone the Meteorological Office. What they did was simply wrap her up really well, let her go out and measure the depth of the snow, give her a telephone and let her make a mock phone call to the Meteorological Office. She was very calm and happy. You do not want her to go wandering because she is near a main road and a railway line and all the other risks, but it was not a serious risk to let her out in the garden, well-wrapped up when it was snowing. That illustrates the granularity of the need to take appropriate decisions focused around the individual person.
Other cases that do concern me are those people who will become sexually disinhibited when exposed to great temptation. That struck me about a case I came across in a home for people with a history of sexual offences. There had been a DoLS in place for somebody not to go unescorted through woodland because, if he came across a young girl on her own in woodland, his sexual drive would overcome his rational behaviour—exposure to porn sites would also overcome his rational behaviour. However, the rest of the time, he could live well. Sadly, that DoLS was apparently overturned by the Court of Protection and, within weeks, he offended and ended up being imprisoned for his offence, but he had been living well with an enormous degree of freedom prior to that point. I think that the serious risk to the cared-for person has to be considered, because there the risk to him was that he would offend and, sadly, that came true.
I hope that the Minister will look sympathetically on the sentiment behind this.
I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to the debate for their desire to be brief, which I know was shared by others who have not been part of the discussions on the Bill, but it is also important to be comprehensive in discussing these issues because, as pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, the best interests of the people being cared for is what this is all about.
I know that this is an issue for noble Lords; it was raised at Second Reading and has been raised again in this debate. It is important to state that best interests decision-making for care and treatment remains fundamental to the Mental Capacity Act. In a way, it is the founding stone around which the rest is built. The liberty protection safeguards sit under the aegis of the Act. The Bill does not change that. One request made by noble Lords at Second Reading was for us to publish the Act as amended by the Bill. We have done that; I understand that it is in the Library. I can make sure that a digital copy is circulated, and I will make sure that it is sent to all concerned. Clearly, understanding the flow of how it is read in not just legislation but the code of practice is critical. I want to make that clear and I understand that important desire.
Under the current system, there are two different best interests tests: one exists under Section 4 of the Mental Capacity Act—the decision, usually made by a clinician, to provide care or treatment—and a second, separate, additional one falls within the tests required for the DoLS system. The Law Commission recommended that the DoLS tests be replaced with a necessary and proportionate test. In that sense, we are following where it led. Prior to a liberty protection safeguards authorisation being considered, the decision will need to be taken, normally by a clinician, that the care or treatment enabled by the arrangements is in the person’s best interests. As I said, that will apply under Section 4. Subsequently, it must be demonstrated that the arrangements to enable that care and treatment are necessary and proportionate. Of course, that is the single test applied by the liberty protection safeguards; it is a secondary test following a consideration of best interests.
The current requirement that the deprivation of liberty must be necessary, proportionate and in the person’s best interests is instead replaced by a single, primary best interests test in an attempt to avoid confusion and conflict—the word used by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, at the beginning of the debate—between two determinations. The focus of the second-stage test on what is necessary and proportionate is an attempt to remove this confusion. It is not an attempt to downgrade in any way the primary and prior importance of a person’s best interests being taken into consideration.
As well as giving that assurance, I want to pick up on the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, that avoiding risk to the cared-for person will form part of the necessary and proportionate test. There is already a principle in the Mental Capacity Act to use less intrusive arrangements, which will continue to remain, unamended, an important principle in the new model. As was brought to light by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and other noble Lords, the application of “necessary and proportionate” requires a degree of granularity that makes it difficult to overdetermine in legislation, and that is the reason why the code of practice is so important. That is why it will contain a range of scenarios, principles, circumstances and so on of what the application of a necessary and proportionate test should look like.
I hope that I have been able to assure noble Lords, whose considerations I take very seriously, that best interests are foremost in our minds and will remain so in the legislation, unamended by the changes brought in by the Bill. Clearly, I want to make sure that this sentiment and its legal power are understood by all concerned, particularly if there is concern in the wider sector. As I said, I do not believe that a second test is necessary; as said by the Law Commission, it could be counterproductive. It is important that we make sure of a clear understanding of the primacy of the best interests test. I would like to explore that with noble Lords to make sure that it is properly understood by all; we can do that between now and Report. On that basis, I hope that the noble Baroness will be prepared to withdraw her amendment.
I thank the Minister for his helpful response. As we begin to get to the heart of the debate, he will understand that he and the Bill team can perhaps see the Bill as a whole, but the rest of us are struggling to do so. Therefore, we have to test individual elements of it, perhaps to a greater degree than he may think is warranted. None the less, it was helpful of him to put those statements on record. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(8 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we return to the topic that we were discussing before the break: the conditions that have to be met for authorisation of deprivation of liberty arrangements. During the dinner break, I reflected on what the Minister said in response to the previous Amendments 7 and 8, which were in similar territory. I understand entirely what he said about the best interests test being in the Mental Capacity Act and that being the first stage of assessment. However, on the secondary assessment for arrangements for either care and treatment or deprivation of liberty, the Minister seemed to suggest that there was a possibility of conflict between those two things or a misunderstanding of them. I will go back over some of that territory again; that may irritate the Minister, but it has been clear all afternoon that one of the main purposes that these proceedings in your Lordships’ House may serve is to enable people outside in the lobby groups, who, like us, have not been able to see a clear read-across from this Bill back to the original legislation, now to do so.
Amendments 9, 10 and 30 seek to reiterate or reintroduce concepts which will be very familiar to all those who took part in the deliberations during the passage of the Mental Capacity Act. Under that legislation, it was always to be made clear to a person who was possibly going to be subject to a deprivation of liberty, and to anybody involved in that decision-making, that the well-being, wishes and feelings of that person had to be taken into account, that any decision would be the least intrusive as possible, and that the arrangements being made for the person were the least restrictive, particularly with regard to where somebody should reside. That is for many people, particularly older people, perhaps one of the most contentious decisions. It is often one of the subjects on which there can be conflicting views between families and individuals or between professionals and individuals.
I have said before and—given that the one thing that has stuck out in the Bill is the enhanced role for care commissioners and, particularly, home care managers—I do not think it is unreasonable to go back again and satisfy ourselves that, when the authorisation of arrangements happens, these key parts of the Mental Capacity Act will again form part of the assessment. I hope, when we come to further amendments down the line, that they will be part of the record of decision-making. I do not make any apology for raising these amendments. I am sure the Minister will bat them back, but if he will do so with a deal of explanation then I think we will have served a purpose. I beg to move.
I thank the Minister for that reply. We started with the mental capacity legislation, which is explicit in having the person at the centre of everything that happens. Yet we know from several reviews that have been conducted, including the review by the Select Committee, that the implementation of that legislation has been very patchy. To then be faced with a piece of legislation in which consultation with the person is not on the face of the Bill seems to be moving a long way from that original principle.
I have let the Minister talk about the code of practice repeatedly and I have not mentioned it so far, given that we have other amendments to debate. However, we found out with the Mental Capacity Act that reliance on the code of practice was one of the reasons why the Act was not implemented as well as it should have been. We will come on to that in far more detail, but there are some things that are so fundamental to the operation of this that we should know by now that leaving them to the code of practice is not acceptable. We can talk about implementation within the code of practice, but there are some things that need to be on the face of the Bill. For me, we really have hit that. If we are not even going to attempt to consult people, that for me is a red line, so I am pleased that the Minister has agreed to talk to us about that.
The points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, about the weighting of the wishes and feelings are also important. Those wishes do not sit on an equivalent level with the views of everybody else. They should be pre-eminent.
This needs emphasis because of the culture of care that we have in this country. There is still such a paternalistic attitude towards the person, that not to emphasise it is to miss the point.
I thank noble Lords for their support. We will need to return to this and I am glad that the Minister has taken that point.
Another reason for tabling the other amendments to ensure that arrangements are the least intrusive and least restrictive option is that, as we will debate on later amendments, the Bill is somewhat deficient in the extent to which it requires that people should be given information on which to base the consultation.
I make no apologies for raising this again at this time. It is something that I hope we will discuss between now and later stages of the Bill. I hope that the Minister can understand the reasons for the concerns that lay behind the amendment. Having said that, at this point, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I shall give just a brief response to that. It is a good idea. The Government think that the proposals for care homes, how they will carry out commission-needs assessments and the process for reviewing and authorising where necessary are a critical part of creating a more proportionate system that does what it says it will do, rather than the current system, which says it will do a whole bunch of things and then does not actually do them. That is where we want to get to.
I am being robust, as it were, in defence of the model. I want to explain—I think noble Lords are enthusiastic about this—how this will work in practice with the kinds of people who are most likely to be in the most difficult situations, so there is a clear understanding of the safeguards that exist to prevent conflicts of interest, provide independent oversight, make sure there is advocacy to support, and so on. It is clearly the case that there is not yet that understanding, and we need it to proceed.
I thank the Minister for his explanation, which has been very helpful. Over the next few weeks, while he is seeking to give further clarification, I wonder whether it would be possible to explain this. One of the Government’s arguments is that the consideration of deprivation or the safeguarding of liberty should come much earlier in the care planning process. Most care is commissioned, most of it by local authorities. Can the Minister explain—perhaps not now at this late hour—how the commissioning of services will change to reflect the new system?
There is a useful flowchart that exemplifies it and brings it to life. I will make sure that it is shared. I agree that we need to find ways of bringing it to life, and that is something we can do outside this Chamber.
(8 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am not saying that some Members of your Lordships’ House are not veterans on this subject, but I came in today with my hard copy of the Mental Capacity Act 2005: Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards—Code of Practice. I may be the only person who has one, but I went back to look at it over the weekend in preparation for this. I am very glad to be taking part in this debate, alongside the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, who will bring to it her fresh eyes: I think that that perhaps shows one of the great strengths of your Lordships’ House.
I start by saying that the legislation we are considering came about because a vulnerable adult, HL, was detained in a place he did not want to be and which his carers knew was not right for him. It turned out that he had fewer safeguards than someone who had been sectioned under the Mental Health Act, or who had been detained under the criminal justice system. As we dive into the detail of what is inevitably quite a technical Bill, I urge us all to keep that person, and the hundreds of thousands of people like him, in mind. As we look at a piece of legislation that is essentially more than a decade old we need to think about updating this legislation in light of changes in society. We know that by 2030 there will be 2 million people over the age of 65 who are ageing without children: they will not have close family members to look after their interests. I rather think that our acid test ought to be whether we think that what is being proposed will look after those people.
It has been apparent since 2007—we should bear it in mind that the legislation we are talking about was not part of the Mental Capacity Act but part of the mental health legislation—that the safeguards have been poorly understood and practised. That is because the two pieces of legislation do not work well together or, indeed, at all. The mental health legislation rests on the judgment and expertise of individuals, saying ultimately what they believe to be right for the safety of other people. The Mental Capacity Act is instead based around the principles of autonomy, empowerment and the importance of supporting decision-making. Mental health legislation is very strictly overseen by statutory oversight bodies. The Mental Capacity Act never has been and therefore it is not surprising that when it has been implemented, it has been implemented very patchily and has been reliant largely upon the dedication of interested professionals.
Noble Lords will have had a number of briefings which talk about the welcome extension of these safeguards to settings such as care settings. I do not have a problem with that; in fact, I welcome it. I think many care facilities, particularly those run by charities, which have long and dedicated experience in looking after people with learning disabilities, will implement this extremely well, but they will do so without sufficient oversight or a sufficient guarantee that if they do not do their job properly the people concerned and their carers will have the relevant access to information and right of appeal. If the Government had intended to sort out this fundamental issue that has been hanging around for 20 years, they would have waited until the current review of the mental health legislation, which is being carried out by Sir Simon Wesley and which is inevitably looking at DoLS, had been concluded, but they have not.
Unlike the Law Commission, which took great care to consult on its proposals, the Government have come forward with this piece of legislation on which there has been very little consultation. It is quite clear that the Government have gone through the Law Commission legislation and selectively picked pieces out of it, when in fact the Law Commission was trying to bring together a whole package of measures which, taken as a whole, would have been a robust defence of the liberty of individuals. So my first question to the Minister is: why this legislation and why now? Why not wait until the mental health legislation is reviewed? Why not have a consultation on which people with interests, such as the parents or the families of people who have been detained, could talk about what has gone wrong and what has not worked in the current system? I say to the Minister that if the hurry is about saving money, that is something your Lordships’ House will have to bear in mind as we scrutinise the Bill.
The Select Committee which reviewed the implementation of the Act, on which I sat, was concerned about very patchy introduction. We were right. We now have the figures, which show that in some parts of the country the waiting time for having one of these assessments done is longer than the time for which somebody is supposed to be detained. There is no doubt that this has to be changed. But the changes which the Government are choosing to bring in do not strike me as being sufficiently robust. The noble Lord, Lord Touhig, began to outline some of the main areas of concern.
There is also concern about the limiting of legal aid. I hope that other noble Lords, in particular the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, will perhaps look at the limitation of legal aid. We are all in favour of having a system in which fewer people need to go to court fewer times, but when they do have to go to court they need to be able to be properly represented. Very few of them are in a position to represent themselves against local authorities or other authorities which have access to their own legal services. I would like us to look at that.
Secondly, the new definition of “proportionate” does not adequately reflect the best-interest tests that were in the original legislation. That is a severe problem. I understand, and noble Lords will appreciate, the desire to cut down on repetitious assessments and so on, but there is a danger that we might end up with decisions being made about a person’s capacity to make one decision which rest on information that was gathered for a wholly different purpose. That would not be right. I also think we have missed a trick in relation to the recognition that there are a number of people whose capacity to make decisions fluctuates. The Law Commission recommendation on that subject has not been picked up in the Bill.
Finally, I do not doubt for a moment that the Government have good intentions but there are several areas in which the detail of the Bill is deficient. We should also bear in mind the strong possibility that people who found themselves in the position that HL did all those years ago may not have the protection of the European Court of Human Rights in the future. Therefore, it is incumbent upon people in this Parliament to make sure that the human rights of those people enjoy greater safeguards than they have ever done in domestic legislation before. For those reasons, I conclude that the Bill before us is extremely flawed and deficient. I suggest that your Lordships bring their considerable experience and expertise to bear to change it radically before it goes to another place.
(8 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank all noble Lords for an incisive, illuminating, at times technically complex but always wise debate, which has been a credit to the House. I will attempt to answer as many questions as I can. I will not try to cover all of them as we actually would be here all night, but I will have time to explore the major categories of issues. I hope noble Lords will indulge me as I do that.
I welcome my noble friend Lady Barran and congratulate her on a very passionate and moving speech. It is clear that she has already been a force for good in the world and we look forward to her bringing her singular qualities to the stage which she now fills with such great authority. I hope noble Lords also noticed the attendance for the first part of the debate of my honourable friend the Minister for Care, Caroline Dinenage, who obviously takes a close interest in this. She was at the briefing and we are working closely together to try to get the right Bill through this process.
I think the general tone of the debate was that there is a strong desire to reform the DoLS system and to end, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, pointed out, the lawlessness and the highly unsatisfactory current situation. My noble friend Lady Barran brought this to life. The truth is that the current system has overwhelmed local authorities and others. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, pointed out, Cheshire West has extended the definition to whom this should apply, such that the backlog of cases is now extraordinary. The only consequence of that is a denial of access to justice. The challenge we have in the Bill is to make sure that we do not have access to justice just in theory but that it actually happens, and it cannot happen if more than 100,000 people are getting it in theory but not in practice.
As somebody who was new to this before preparing for the Bill, the situation almost sounds too good to be true. We are going to extend the number of people who have access to safeguards but we are also going to stop the system being overwhelmed and save money. This is achievable because it is about introducing a proportionate system that reflects the needs and wishes of the people whom it is there to protect, rather than having a maximalist approach that in theory applies to everyone but in reality does not and is sometimes random in its application, which is clearly unacceptable.
As many noble Lords have pointed out, the system that we need to create must be patient-led. It needs to have proper oversight and to deliver that access to justice which we have discussed. Clearly, if, as the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, pointed out, only one in 20 have benefited from the current system, it is highly inefficient. As many noble Lords also pointed out, there is a huge urgency here.
Many noble Lords pointed out the benefits of the new system. I will come to some of the challenges but, ultimately, this is about making sure that caring organisations take a more active role in the assessment of deprivation of liberty. Where they do so and integrate it into their care planning, we will provide a proper system of oversight and support for individuals deprived of their liberty in general but, specifically, for those who object, or whose families who care for them object. That is ultimately what we are trying to do and it is the intention of the Bill.
Several noble Lords, including the noble Baronesses, Lady Jolly, Lady Greengross and Lady Thornton, asked about our consultations to date. There have been very wide consultations but this debate has shown that there is much work to be done over the summer, not just with noble Lords but with stakeholder groups, to ensure that we are not only explaining the consequences of what is proposed—I think there are still some misunderstandings about that—but able to demonstrate the benefits and, critically, learn how we can further improve what is proposed.
I turn to some of the issues raised. Several noble Lords including the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker, Lady Finlay, Lady Greengross and Lady Tyler, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, and the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, talked about the absence of a statutory definition. I can tell the House that we are aware of that and are listening particularly to the recommendations of the Joint Committee. However, the debate demonstrated some disagreement over the right way forward. There are various options, such as definitions in the Bill or through a code of practice, but we clearly need to get to an answer in order to proceed.
We have talked about wanting a system that has the person’s wishes and best interests at the heart of the process. That was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, and endorsed by the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker, Lady Finlay, Lady Greengross, Lady Meacher, Lady Browning and Lady Hollins. It is absolutely right for us to be clear that there is no watering down of the interests of the individual concerned through this process. As the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Finlay, pointed out, capacities can fluctuate; as the noble Baronesses, Lady Browning and Lady Hollins, pointed out, they can also be varied—strong in one area and weak in another. Any system needs to take account of that and I can tell the House that it is absolutely not our intention to water down the role of a person’s expressed wishes. The best interest test still applies absolutely in the care setting, but the necessary and proportionate test is to account for those cases where a person may wish to do something regarding their liberties which is contrary to their best interests for their individual care. Striking that balance and making sure that there is proper oversight, with proper advice for people who are unable to enunciate their own wishes, is at the core of getting the Bill right.
As noble Lords have also pointed out, getting the Bill right is actually about getting a statutory code of practice right. It is out of date and there is a degree of urgency about improving it. I will return to that in a moment but, in talking about the statutory definition, I will finish on the power of attorney and the role of families. They still have primacy under the Mental Capacity Act, the principles underpinning which still apply. It will not be possible to deprive a person of liberty when the attorney acting on their behalf has stated that their best interests are served otherwise. I want to make that clear but it is something that we will need to explore and explain better. Attorneys will be part of the group that is to be consulted, and the Bill creates an explicit requirement for further consultation with families. Family members can also act as appropriate persons, so I think there is a greater strengthening of the role of those acting on behalf of a person deprived of their liberty in the process of scrutinising that and making sure that it is done appropriately.
If this matter is unclear to some of us who can claim to be fairly well informed on it, clearly, there has been a communication problem. Might I suggest to the noble Lord that it would be enormously helpful—as it has been in similar situations—to have a copy of the Act, as amended by the Bill, for us and interested parties to look at? Believe me, it makes the whole business a great deal clearer and easier to understand.
That is an excellent suggestion. I should be clear: any confusion comes from a failure to communicate on our behalf, rather than there being any suggestion that noble Lords who are extremely expert on this do not understand what is proposed. There is a need to explain better exactly how all this will work in practice.
Obviously, the system depends on the quality and independence of the reviews, assessments and authorisations that take place; that issue was particularly raised by the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins. There were also questions asked by the noble Baronesses, Lady Tyler, Lady Murphy, Lady Jolly and Lady Thornton, about the capacity of those carrying out assessments in local authority care homes, the NHS and so on to do them properly and in a way compliant with the law. I agree with noble Lords that in the coming weeks we will need to set out much more clearly how that independence support and those assessments will be staffed and provided, making sure that there are sufficient resources and proper training. I am reassured that training in the implications of the Mental Capacity Act is part of medical training, and that there are Health Education England resources for that. Clearly, all that will need to evolve as we go through this process and the Act itself is amended.
The noble Baronesses, Lady Barker, Lady Greengross, Lady Tyler and Lady Murphy, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, asked about the interaction with mental health legislation and whether we should have delayed publication. The noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, described a tension between the two Acts. We are conscious of the interface—that is the term used—but there is an urgency to reform the system, notwithstanding its interaction with the Mental Health Act. We do not yet have a timescale on completion of the review and any subsequent legislation that might be required. There has been lots of talk about the work to reform—the committee, the Law Commission, the Joint Committee and so on—and we need to get on with this, cognisant all the time that subsequent changes may need to be made once we have the outcome of the Mental Health Act review. It is not in my gift to promise time for legislation in the future but we are cognisant of the need to make sure that our interface works, once we have the review itself completed.
Several noble Lords asked why the Bill does less than the Law Commission. We could spend a lot of time going through that, but I do not propose that we do so at this point. We can achieve non-legislatively several of the Law Commission’s proposals; it is made up of lawyers, so they prefer law but there are other ways of doing things. One of the key issues raised is the Bill’s not applying to 16 and 17 year-olds. There is clearly an important interplay here with the education, health and care plan process, but I have listened to noble Lords on the subject today and shall reflect on whether we can do something about it.
The code of practice was raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay and Lady Greengross, and my noble friends Lady Barran and Lady Browning. Getting it up and running quickly is critical. Detailed work is going on, and we need to be very specific in it to provide reassurance about how it will work. Unfortunately, I do not have a timetable yet for its production, but I will endeavour to get hold of one. We need to make sure that its implementation is properly resourced. The CQC will continue to inspect its implementation, so there will still be that quality oversight.
A few other issues were raised. Many noble Lords referred to “unsound mind” being an unhelpful and, frankly, out-of-date phrase. I do not disagree. The concern here is the interaction with the jurisprudence and the ECHR itself. If we were to move on that—I make no commitment at this point—we would need to think it through very clearly, but I would like to explore it.
The noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Jolly, asked about legal aid. I can confirm that it is, and will still be, available on a means-tested basis. The noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, and my noble friend Lady Browning asked about advance consent—an issue that the Law Commission also raised. Again, there is an important distinction to be made here between an advance decision to refuse treatment, which will continue to be respected and is untouched, and advance consent to a future deprivation of liberty. Although that was in the Law Commission report, officials engaged in the process indicated that this did not receive support from families. There was a concern that you could sign yourself up to being deprived of your liberty at some point in the future, so it did not garner support. Perhaps it was the wrong subset or sample of people; nevertheless, we need to consider the best way forward on that.
Finally, the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, asked about the equality impact assessment. I do not have an answer at this stage about why it was not carried out but I will endeavour to get one.
To conclude, I hope that I have been able to summarise the main issues and topics. Clearly, there are some very big questions that still need to be answered, but I return to the point that my noble friend Lady Browning made, which is that we need to solve the problems this time. We cannot introduce another Bill or piece of legislation that just creates a problem three years down the line. It is not just about the Bournewood gap; it is about making sure that we avoid, and do not create, any other gaps. The words “nightmare” and “disaster” have been used to describe the current system, and that is why we need to act now, but clearly we need to act in such a way that we do not create another problem further down the line.
It has been clear from this debate that there is still much work to be done to provide the right kind of reforms that we all want to see. Looking at the Chief Whip, I am sure that we will have adequate time in Committee to make sure that the Bill is in the best possible shape. We saw a nod of the head from the chief, so that is good. This debate has demonstrated—the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, said as much—that there is no group of people better qualified to improve this legislation and make sure that we get the right reforms. I look forward to engaging with noble Lords and others throughout the coming months to make sure that we can achieve that and deliver a Bill that provides for people deprived of their liberty the fair and proportionate access to justice that we all want to see.
(8 years, 2 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Lingfield, that it is an absolute joy to take part in this debate with him this afternoon.
Following on from the noble Baroness’s comments, I can recount that about 20 years ago a lady called Mary Anne MacLeod Trump woke up in a hospital ward in New York following a stroke. Most of her nurses thought that she was speaking gibberish, but she was very lucky because one of her nurses was Irish and knew that she was speaking Gaelic. In fact, Mrs Trump had been born on the island of Lewis in Scotland and, unlike her son, did not routinely speak gibberish—it was just the effects of a stroke—and she recovered. The noble Baroness is quite right.
The noble Lord, Lord Lingfield, set out for us the state of stroke care in England and Wales today. However, one point is so obvious that he did not make it: we have a national health service and, consequently, we are in a uniquely good place to gather information about the detection, diagnosis and treatment of stroke and about people’s recovery from it. That is something that we often overlook but it is very important. Just in the last 10 years or so, the work that the noble Lord, Lord Darzi, has done in London in reorganising stroke services has had a measurable effect. Our National Health Service is able to measure, at scale, the effectiveness of new thrombolytic or clot-busting drugs as they come in. That is why we have a real forward steal on the rest of the world in this highly complex area.
In another place back in December, MPs talked a lot about the development of mechanical thrombectomy —I am pleased that I got that out; it is not the easiest word to say. It is a marvellous step forward in the acute treatment of stroke. The ability of surgeons to remove clots and stop further neurological damage makes an immense difference to patients and their recovery.
We are, unfortunately, able to have a 24 hours a day, seven days a week, service in only very few places. Like the noble Lord, I am very lucky to be living up the road from St George’s Hospital: we are okay. Other places are not. The ambition, surely, ought to be to make that service available at specialist neurological centres around the whole country, and easily accessible to the majority of the population as soon as possible.
A particular problem with thrombectomy is that it requires the input of several different medical disciplines, specifically surgeons and others who are not normally part of a stroke response unit. Far be it from me to accuse the NHS of territorialism, but getting surgeons to change their ways is not the easiest thing to do. I ask the Minister, therefore: will thrombectomy services be commissioned via specialist commissioning, and if the provision of the service requires redesign and redefinition—not just of the services but of the medical roles in the team—how that will happen? Does he believe, as I do, that STPs may well face a real battle to get so many people from different disciplines to change the way they work?
My understanding is that the department has not yet decided to refresh the stroke strategy; it is relying on the 2013 cardiovascular disease outcome strategy. Does the Minister believe that that is an adequate way for the department to require the NHS to look at some pretty significant changes among staff?
I also refer the Minister to the experience of some MPs who looked at provision in their local areas. They mentioned the tension between university hospitals and district general hospitals. It requires the might not just of NHS England but the department to look at this problem.
My next point is on research. We have one centre of excellence in research—certainly in thrombectomy—which I think is the University of East Anglia. It is one of several across Europe. I am a Liberal Democrat spokesperson and am therefore bound to ask what the Government are doing to make sure that, post Brexit, research and research collaboration continue? I know that the Royal Society is looking across the piece at the impact of Brexit on research, taking an unbiased and pragmatic view of it. I simply ask the Minister to tell us how the Government will keep an eye on that.
My third observation is that in 2016 Stanford University reported remarkable results from a very small-scale study—about 16 patients—on the use of stem cell therapies. These are often considered to be wonder solutions to quite an array of neurological conditions. I would not go that far: there is a lot to be done by neuroscientists before they realise the potential of stem cell therapy in all sorts of conditions, but principally such neurological diseases as Parkinson’s and possibly Alzheimer’s. If and when those trials are replicated on a larger scale and get to a further stage, where they might lead to some form of therapy, will the NHS build on its track record of work in stroke treatment by taking advantage of such developments?
On the question of rehabilitation, much of what the noble Lord, Lord Lingfield, said pointed to a system in which we have highly skilled staff but not enough of them. We have highly skilled therapists, physiotherapists and nurses—I have been in awe of the ones I have had to deal with—but we need to enable them to impart information first to care workers and secondly to family members, who are there in that golden six-week gap in which recovery can be advanced if people know what to do. To what extent are we asking our NHS acute staff, as part of their duty of care, to pass on information to carers to make sure that they can be there to assist and improvise with things which work?
What do the Government intend to do about the collection of data on post-acute service provision as part of the overall stroke strategy? The bulk of stroke recovery happens in the weeks and months afterwards.
The difference between acute provision and community provision would be that acute provision will help you deal with a physical deficiency, and a community service will help you deal with a lack of confidence. For most people, life after a stroke means living with a lifelong lack of confidence, but that can be aided, helped and treated.
We have done a lot in this country of which we should be proud, but with clever thinking we could do a lot more.
(8 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberTo ask Her Majesty’s Government, in the light of the result of the referendum to repeal the eighth amendment of the constitution of the Republic of Ireland, what assessment they have made of its impact on the ongoing criminalisation of women seeking access to abortions across the United Kingdom.
My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper. In doing so, I declare an interest as the chair of the All- Party Parliamentary Group on Sexual and Reproductive Health.
My Lords, under existing arrangements women across the United Kingdom have access to high-quality, safe abortion services. Parliament decided the circumstances under which abortion can be legally undertaken. It is accepted parliamentary practice that proposals to change the law on abortion come from Back-Bench Members and that decisions are made on the basis of free votes.
I thank the Minister for that Answer. Do the Government not think it is wrong that women in Northern Ireland can be coerced to continue with a pregnancy under legislation passed in 1861 by MPs, all of whom were men elected solely by men? Does he not agree that to overturn Sections 58 and 59 of the Offences against the Person Act would enable the men and women of Wales, Northern Ireland and England to determine under what circumstances women should be able to access safe, legal abortion?
It has been the position of successive Governments that abortion policy and law is a devolved matter for Northern Ireland, to be decided by elected politicians in Northern Ireland on behalf of the people of Northern Ireland. That is our position: they should be the group that makes the decision.
(8 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis is obviously a concern. There has been an increase in women buying online the drugs necessary for medical abortions, and that is something on which we are attempting to crack down. It is worth pointing out that 90% of abortions are NHS funded and therefore provided for in that way. The noble Baroness was talking about medical abortions at a late stage; it is worth pointing out that, actually, there has been an increase in the number or percentage of abortions that are happening at an early stage, which is obviously in the interests of women’s health.
The noble Baroness, Lady Eaton, mixed up two completely different things. She mixed up early medical abortions and late abortions. Can the Minister confirm that a 2011 court case brought by BPAS established that the Secretary of State has the power to allow early medical abortions to happen at home? If he agrees, and if the evidence from the Scottish trial is convincing and underpinned by the decision of the Scottish courts, will the Secretary of State then undertake to look at the development of a facility for legal abortion which may well be to the benefit of thousands of women in this country, particularly those who live in rural areas?
I am aware of the opinion in that judicial review. It is worth pointing out that there is still uncertainty about the legal position. This is why we will watch the developments in Scotland carefully and proceed cautiously. It would be wrong of me to prejudge either the opinions that come from the court or indeed any evidence if this scheme does get up and running in Scotland.
(8 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy noble friend makes an important point. Gift aid is a wonderful scheme that obviously has driven huge contributions. She is quite right that public sector bodies cannot provide the gift aid opportunity, which is why in the health sector those charities attached to hospitals exist. She makes an excellent suggestion for what councils should do and I shall take it up with my colleagues in that department.
Can the Minister tell the House whether integrated care trusts can have associated charities so that people can make donations not just to healthcare but to social care in their area?
The noble Baroness asks a very interesting question. Clearly these are emerging organisations and most of the charities are attached to hospital trusts—although not exclusively: some are attached to primary care. None of these are yet quite in being. Once they are in being, this will be an excellent suggestion that we should take forward.
(8 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Wheeler, for the opportunity, as the noble Baroness, Lady Pitkeathley, just said, to return again to this subject. I will not make a long speech as I would like to leave as much time as possible for the debate that will follow. On behalf of my colleagues on these Benches, I wish the noble Baroness, Lady Jowell, all the very best and ask her colleagues to convey that to her.
The noble Baroness, Lady Pitkeathley, is right: we have been back to this ground so many times. In preparing for this debate, I thought back to many of the debates that we have had in the past. The origins of the problem we are looking at go back to the National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990. In that Act, for the very first time, welcome things happened: we began to break down procedures within the NHS and to cost and quantify them. But the problem was that we made them into individual units of activity, and to this day, within the NHS, the systems that join up those individual units are failing. They fail completely when they have to be matched up with the social care system, which is completely different.
Those problems were identified and partially addressed in 2003 with the Community Care (Delayed Discharges etc.) Act, when the then Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, was sitting there trying to answer questions from very talented opposition spokespeople such as me. We asked him a question that he never could answer, which was why the then Government thought that the answer to the problems in the NHS was to fine social services departments. I never understood that. We still have, within the whole system of discharge, a system of penalties.
Perhaps I can answer the noble Baroness. Surely the point is that both local government and the NHS were being properly funded at that point. Therefore it was entirely appropriate to have a system to encourage local authorities to do the right thing.
The issue that I think the Government were trying to solve was one for which we have never had any evidence: that of local authorities trying to game the system. It is correct that the overall amount of funding has gone down, but we have not had evidence of people gaming the system.
We have never had a system, or even part of a system, that incentivises GPs and those in charge of social care to prepare for winter pressures, invest in programmes that will see older people through the increased incidence of illness that we know happens in winter, and avoid unnecessary admissions to A&E. What has changed in that time is that we now have better data and better information systems, but in many ways we are still failing to take all that and improve those systems. At the moment we still have ambulance services being rated on completely different systems across the country so we cannot generate data.
The Government have done some things that are very welcome. Everyone agrees that the primary care streaming system, into which they put £100 million, is a worthwhile initiative. Unfortunately, the initial evidence is that it is failing simply because it takes people from another part of the system—GPs—and locates them in hospital. What are the Government going to do to properly monitor that system in its entirety as part of an overall approach to winter pressures, to see whether it is worth more investment or whether it simply takes resources from other parts of the system?
On the question of beds, we have a national system of monitoring general and acute beds and ways of measuring the overall occupancy rate. We do not have a method of assessing the number of beds in relation to need. For example, we can open up a load more beds, as the NHS always does at times of crisis, but if there are no more staff to look after the people in those beds then we are not really addressing the need. We need to refine the measurement of this so that we have a metric along the lines of “nurses per bed per day”. That is the point at which things become really bad. I remember talking to a nurse about a patient—actually my mother—and being told that she was far too good to be in hospital and would be going home. She died two days later, which was not a surprise to any of us. I say that because it is not an uncommon experience for patients.
We have been through this time and again. The one thing that we have failed to do is incentivise GPs to work with community organisations from the summer onwards to predict the people in their area who are going to be most at risk and to put in place very low-level, simple and low-cost packages of care for them that can be there very quickly when they are discharged. The biggest cause of delayed discharge is not the absence of social care but the absence of community nurses and NHS staff available to work in the community to ensure that we do not send people home only to see them return unnecessarily into acute care.
(8 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberI absolutely recognise the picture that my noble friend paints. We know the impact of the decision on backdated pay on those providers of social care of all kinds—charities, families and others. We are looking carefully at this, and there is a market analysis going on at the moment to find out the number of affected providers, the number of affected staff and the overall cost implications. Discussions are taking place with the European Commission to make sure that whatever route we take, we know it will be legally possible.
My Lords, these providers have been hit this year with a bill of £400 million. HMRC has given a one-month deferment of its decision, which is not enough time for them either to raise the money or to make alternative arrangements. Does the Minister agree that this can only be solved satisfactorily, without detriment to people with learning disabilities and people who are cared for, if there is a rescheduling of the liabilities? Are the Government looking, with HMRC, at drawing up a longer deferment schedule to allow them to raise the money?
Again, I would point the noble Baroness in the direction of the social care compliance scheme that has been set up, which allows precisely that deferral of payments. It allows for a period of up to 15 months for assessments to take place while providers work with HMRC to provide the payment. I should also point out that although HMRC would usually levy fines in the case of underpayment of taxes after 28 days, those fines have been waived in these cases, as one would expect.