Sudan

Baroness Ashton of Upholland Excerpts

Friday 13th September 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Ashton of Upholland (Lab)]

My Lords, I too am grateful that my noble friend the Minister is leading us in this debate. His determination, knowledge and dedication are clearly well known and respected across your Lordships’ House and, certainly, in a 40-year friendship, by me.

I know something of this region of Africa, but my focus was constantly being driven either to the north to Egypt and Libya, or to the south to the new country of South Sudan. There was much to worry about as South Sudan was created about the transit of oil; the nomadic people, for whom the new borders were a significant issue; and how these fragile countries would survive in a new situation. I spoke at the ceremony that saw the South Sudanese flag raised for the first time and the recognition that a new country had been born, and I looked at this vast area, with two countries grappling with the fundamental issues of providing food, water and opportunity for their people.

It is a general point that I and many other noble Lords know well that the international community invests insufficiently in places of fragility. We do not scan the horizon for potential problems, partly because we are drowning in current ones. Crises and challenges do not come in neat packages one after the other; they arrive jumbled up on top of each other. But when we fail to look ahead and invest, the consequences are obvious.

As noble Lords know, around 150,000 people have been killed, 250 villages and towns have been burned, and much of Khartoum has been flattened. Millions of people have been forced to flee; about 8 million are within Sudan, and over 2 million are in neighbouring countries. Some have managed to get further. Estimates suggest that about 60% of those waiting to try to get across the channel to the UK are from Sudan.

On the ground, those analysing what is happening tell me that this current phase of the war is nearing an end, but that is no cause for any sense of relief. The next phase will be increased fragmentation, and it is clear that Sudan is fragmenting rapidly. That means that, in turn, centres of violence are multiplying. It is now becoming a myth to believe that we could simply bring the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces to the table to find a solution; neither is able to demonstrate any real chain of command. The RSF may be effective at seizing territory, but it struggles to maintain control and consolidate its gains. Internal divisions are growing in both parties, and it does not appear that the parties, militias or foreign interests are much engaged with the plight of the Sudanese people.

As commentators and others have pointed out, there is a familiar ring to this. They ask whether we are risking a new version of Libya—a country that I saw disintegrate into violence and chaos. This was an outcome many of us feared would happen without the planning needed, and against our best efforts. But Sudan is significantly more complicated than Libya. In 1923, a Foreign Office note said bluntly, “Who controls Sudan controls the Red Sea”. Concerns about the implications of a failing state or the pursuit of interests have internationalised Sudan.

Egypt has fears about the future of the Nile and the 1959 agreement it has with Sudan—the two being the biggest users of Nile water, of course. Those fears are growing. There are also unresolved issues with a number of countries wanting a greater—and, they would argue, fairer—share of water, and especially with Ethiopia over the building of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which makes for uneasy relations. Egypt has supported the Sudanese Armed Forces, but as the RSF now controls two of the dams on the Nile, it also has to deal with the RSF, even though its sympathies lie with the SAF.

Egypt is also reliant on the United Arab Emirates as a major investor in its economy. As we know, the UAE has a major interest in who controls the fertile lands of the crescent between the White Nile and the Blue Nile—an important source of food. We are seeing the whole region of the Horn of Africa becoming divided into spheres of influence and the Red Sea at risk, compounding what the Houthis are currently doing in their attacks against shipping. As a colleague working at the highest levels in the region pointed out to me, it is complicated and fluid, and the risks of misunderstanding and miscalculation are high.

However, as many noble Lords have said, the humanitarian catastrophe that we are facing is almost unimaginable and certainly bigger than Ethiopia’s crisis of 1984. If assistance does not get to the people, they will move. So far, international efforts have not succeeded. The latest efforts in Geneva were modest in scope and impact, with some of the key parties not there. We need to focus on humanitarian issues, open channels of supply and communication, and, arguably, draw in the neighbours of Ethiopia, Eritrea, South Sudan, Egypt, Chad and Libya. The UN, as my noble friend Lady Amos said, must co-ordinate these efforts and needs to take this role really seriously, working locally with whoever is legitimate in each area.

At the US-led initiative in Geneva, those attending announced, as noble Lords have said, the Aligned for Advancing Lifesaving and Peace in Sudan—ALPS—Group and managed to secure agreement to open some aid routes. Bringing all those international actors together—Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt—is a positive outcome of Geneva. The establishment of ALPS shows that it is possible to secure their buy-in and mutual co-ordination on important topics such as humanitarian aid. But we need a pragmatic negotiating strategy that requires those who claim responsibility for an area to deliver services to that area: responsibility in action, with localised agreements that can build momentum.

In doing that, we need to take care to protect critical infrastructure, perhaps with third-party forces. Airports, dams, hospitals, key roads and water purification are essential if we are to prevent the spiral further down. We need to move quickly, by talking and negotiating in local areas, even if a more substantial ceasefire is not possible. Above all, it needs leadership, or this situation will aggravate what is already a fragmentation of global efforts. I believe that my noble friend the Minister and any envoy he appoints have a significant role to play. There is a need for less diplomatic theatre and more real politics behind the scenes. We know which countries have interests and which countries fear the consequences of chaos. It is a good place to start.