European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Baroness Altmann and Lord Higgins

Report stage (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Tuesday 7th March 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Altmann]

My Lords—

[Lord Higgins (Con)]

My Lords—

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[Baroness Altmann]

My Lords—

[Lord Higgins]

My Lords—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Higgins]

My Lords, I sought to intervene earlier far more aggressively than I would ever normally do, simply because I wished to pursue the point made by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay and the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, which was of considerable tactical importance in relation to this debate. There is widespread agreement that there should be parliamentary approval for the outcome of the negotiations. The Prime Minister herself has made it clear that she believes that should be so, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has sought to incorporate that undertaking in the Bill. Again, I believe that that is the right thing to do.

The problem, however, is in the drafting of the amendment. In opening the debate, the noble Lord said he realised there were problems because it seemed to give a veto to the House of Lords—that would not be acceptable. Also, he said that it failed to recognise the relationship between the two Houses, whereby, at the end of the day, the House of Commons must be supreme. He suggested that we should agree to the amendment before us and then the House of Commons would sort it out. I think there is a very simple problem with that: people are less likely to vote for his amendment on that basis than would otherwise be the case. Therefore, it may never get to the House of Commons and its Members will not be able to put the matter right.

As we now stand, we have a very difficult situation as to whether or not we should support the amendment. My inclination is still to do so, subject to what may be said subsequently, because it is important to have the undertaking in the Bill. However, we have to resolve the problem of ensuring that the House of Commons remains supreme. We cannot have a veto on what is being negotiated; it would be wholly inappropriate if the House of Commons took the opposite view.

One possible solution is to try to draft a manuscript amendment or to amend the Bill at some later stage in the proceedings. I fear that may be very difficult, although perhaps we might try. In any case, we should agree the amendment, but I understand that many people will feel it is defective in the respect I have mentioned. It would be very unfortunate if, as a result of these debates, we do not have anything to ensure that the undertaking given absolutely clearly by the Prime Minister is in the Bill and that there is no uncertainty about the situation in the future.

[Baroness Altmann]

My Lords, I preface my remarks by expressing my belief that speaking in favour of any amendment to the Bill does not amount to trying to frustrate the referendum result or to deny the will of the people. I respect the result, and we are trying to implement it as responsibly as we can in the interests of our great country.

The referendum was about taking back control and ensuring parliamentary sovereignty. That is vital to safeguard our democracy and protect our national interests. The people want to be able to trust our Parliament to look after their future. But in the context of the Bill, it seems to me that Parliament is in danger of abrogating its responsibility.

I have heard the arguments to suggest that parliamentary oversight somehow makes it inevitable that the EU will only offer us a bad deal. However, I respectfully disagree. Indeed, I believe that the likelihood is the other way round. If the negotiators and Ministers know that at the end of the day they will have to sell this deal to Parliament, I believe they will be properly incentivised to be more likely to achieve a deal that is acceptable.

As currently proposed, the Bill will effectively hand responsibility for our future to a group of negotiators and Ministers who apparently countenance with a measure of equanimity the idea that no deal is better than a bad deal. If we enter negotiations with a view that the EU will not give us a good deal and that we will just have to leave the single market, the customs union, Euratom and so many other fundamental parts of our current economic security, then we must surely ask ourselves whether those negotiators will be sufficiently incentivised to actually get a good deal for the country.

A no-deal scenario was never put to the British people. The White Paper and the referendum campaign have not considered the consequences either. Leaving the customs union, the single market and Euratom are recent decisions with significant implications for people’s jobs, for standards of living, for national security, for the nuclear industry, for Northern Ireland and so much else. Yet the risks have been skirted over, almost as if they do not really matter. They do matter. In normal negotiations, corporate negotiators would reserve the option of taking an offer back to their board; a lawyer would reserve the option of referring back to their client.