That the Grand Committee do consider the Space Industry (Licence Exemption for Military Activities of Allies) Regulations 2025.
Relevant document: 13th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee
My Lords, missile defence is a critical thread in our tapestry of national security. The threats we face, highlighted by Russia’s reckless targeting of Dnipro with a ballistic missile, underline the need to be prepared. We test and train regularly with our allies, and our next missile defence testing and training exercise, codenamed Exercise Formidable Shield, is in May 2025.
Formidable Shield is a US-led exercise, hosted by the UK Government, at the MoD’s Outer Hebrides air weapon range, on behalf of NATO and our other defence partners. It is one of the most advanced and comprehensive missile defence training exercises in the world. It involves the UK and allied forces conducting live-fire drills, missile defence tests and real-world scenario-based training.
These activities are critical to the defence and security of the UK and the strength of our military alliances. First, they enhance interoperability. Exercise Formidable Shield will bring 10 nations together, each with distinct systems, targets and technologies. It will allow us to align these different systems and work in concert effectively in real-world operations, so that the UK and our allies can respond quickly and cohesively to any threats.
Secondly, Formidable Shield improves our collective missile defence capabilities, and our ability to adapt to evolving ballistic missile and other threats. This is why the live-fire element of Exercise Formidable Shield is particularly valuable.
Thirdly, Exercise Formidable Shield reinforces strategic deterrence, which is vital in maintaining stability and preventing conflicts escalating. The exercise sends a strong message to our adversaries that the UK, NATO and its allies are prepared to defend ourselves and our territories against any form of aggression.
In order to replicate operational conditions for these exercises, the UK and allied nations need to operate ever more sophisticated defence missiles, capable of climbing above the stratosphere. This would bring them within the scope of the licensing regime within the Space Industry Act 2018 and its associated secondary legislation. The Space Industry Act 2018 was never intended to regulate military activity. It was passed into law to ensure the safety and appropriate governance of the commercial spaceflight industry and is regulated by the Civil Aviation Authority.
The Government seek licensing exemptions under the Space Industry Act and associated secondary legislation for allied armed forces activities. This exemption is very narrow. It allows only allied armed forces, their operatives and international military organisations, such as NATO, to fire sub-orbital—that is, non-orbiting—uncrewed rockets from MoD sites or platforms, with MoD permission and under the control of the MoD’s regulator. To clarify the SLSC report, this exemption will not cover activities from UK spaceports, only MoD sites.
The exemption would bring multinational exercises into line with sovereign ones. Similar stratospheric tests conducted solely by the MoD are not affected by the Space Industry Act 2018 and its accompanying licensing regime on the basis that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the Act must not bind the Crown. Exercises above the stratosphere, which would be exempt under this instrument, would be under the expert supervision of the defence regulator, which has monitored military activities for decades, including MoD rocket launches above the stratosphere. Unlike the civilian authorities, the defence regulator has the infrastructure and expertise to oversee the safety of these exercises properly. The amendments the Government seek would avoid putting an increased and new burden on civil authorities.
This instrument will apply to England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. It is subject to the affirmative procedure, as set out under Section 68(6) of the Space Industry Act 2018.
To conclude, the UK’s missile defence capability is a critical component of national and global security but, like all defence capabilities, to be effective it must be constantly maintained, updated, exercised and tested. Exercise Formidable Shield, planned for May 2025, is the next essential opportunity to conduct live-fire drills, missile defence tests and real-world scenario-based training. An enormous amount of military planning has gone into it from all the nations involved, and the Government seek appropriate regulatory certainty by the end of February in order to get maximum value from the exercise.
Approving this exemption in a timely manner will send a clear signal that the UK Parliament is united on the defence of our national security, united against our adversaries and united in its support for NATO. I hope that noble Lords will join me in supporting these measures. I beg to move.
My Lords, it would be easy simply to stand up and thank the Minister for introducing this statutory instrument clearly, and it goes without saying that it should have the support of the opposition parties, in particular for the reasons that she outlined at the end—to demonstrate that we stand united with our NATO allies on a cross-party basis—but I have a few comments to make.
On the Liberal Democrat Benches, we considered whether somebody on the defence side or the transport side should respond, but the sad circumstance is that today my noble friend Lady Pidgeon is in Cardiff for the funeral of our late lamented friend Baroness Randerson, so it was agreed that, almost regardless of the subject matter, I would take the business today. In doing so, I pay tribute to Baroness Randerson, who would in many ways have been the perfect person to lead on this because her interests were in transport but she also had a real interest in the international.
With those words of introduction, I came to this statutory instrument rather cold. When we take part in the Armed Forces Parliamentary Scheme, we are very much told that air, sea, land, cyber and space are so important for defence. It is very clear that we need to ensure that space is safe, so we absolutely support the principle of the statutory instrument. In particular, as the Minister said, it is vital that Exercise Formidable Shield can take place, but a few questions come up.
The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, has on various occasions pointed out that, if the UK were subject to the sort of attacks that Israel faced from Iran, we would not have been able to defend ourselves in the way that Israel was able to do with its Iron Dome. One of my questions, therefore, is: will the exercise that takes place in May, which, as the Minister said, brings together our NATO allies, be replicated in various ways and places to assist in our securing space? I realise that that may be a defence question on which she may wish to write, but I thought I would raise it here and now.
I also have a couple of other questions. Clearly, the Minister is right that the regulation can be done better by the MoD than by the Civil Aviation Authority, but if actions are being undertaken by our service personnel under the auspices of the MoD and therefore military law, there are various issues at stake and, if something went wrong, we would know whom to hold accountable. With our partners and allies, how will that be dealt with? Are there international agreements that would enable us to ensure that any accidents, errors or misdemeanours could be dealt with in an appropriate way? This is not to suggest that the statutory instrument should not go ahead but rather to understand how matters will be dealt with if there is some flaw in the system that means we might need legal measures.
I also have a query—nothing of great import—that I was slightly wondering about. The statutory instrument refers to the “Crown interest” and “Crown land”, as well as to the “Duchy interest”, which is:
“an interest belonging to His Majesty in right of the Duchy of Lancaster or belonging to the Duchy of Cornwall”.
Does that mean the rights of the Duchy of Cornwall currently, which belongs to the Prince of Wales, or are there Duchy lands that still adhere to His Majesty the King? That is purely a question that puzzled me slightly.
Apart from those few questions, there is nothing else for me to say other than that we wish the statutory instrument well.
My Lords, first I associate myself with the sentiments expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, with reference to her friend and colleague Baroness Randerson.
If the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, comes to this cold, I come to the issue out of the deep freeze, but let me do my best. The Minister has helpfully laid out the primary purpose of the draft statutory instrument, by describing the exemptions that the draft instrument creates; of course, these activities, unless exempted, would otherwise be caught by the civilian-focused regulations. Therefore, let me say first that I accept the priority that must be accorded to defence operational flexibility, and I not only support but applaud the Government’s desire to ensure such flexibility is not compromised.
Having said that, while I support the statutory instrument, developments in the space domain are fast-moving and, while protecting our defence capability activity is of course vital, broader questions arise as to how the Government will keep abreast of that fast-moving scene. I have a number of questions, on which I will be very happy if the Minister wishes to write to me. My first question is: welcome though this SI is, how do the Government align this exemption with consistent principles of oversight and accountability, which are central to the overall integrity of space operations?
To minimise risk, do the Government propose to review the operation of this exemption in practice, perhaps after a year, to ensure that there are no unintended and potentially dangerous consequences and that there is transparency about how the exemption is operating? We must be satisfied that the shift of power from civilian regulators, such as the Civil Aviation Authority, to the MoD is not inadvertently reducing accountability unacceptably and potentially sidelining important safety protocols that are in place for good reason. I seek the Minister’s reassurance about that.
I thank noble Lords for those very thoughtful questions, which covered quite a range of activities. I ask them to give me a moment to gather my thoughts.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, for her comments about Baroness Randerson. It is my great privilege that the last meeting that I had before Christmas was with Baroness Randerson, as well as my noble friend Lord Hendy, on a great passion of hers: the buses Bill. I hope that we can do her justice in the passage of that Bill through the House because I know just how much it meant to her.
I will take up the generous offers from the noble Baronesses, Lady Goldie and Lady Smith, and will write to them on the more technical issues that they raised.
This is a very important subject. We can sum up its importance by saying, as was expressed in both sets of comments from the noble Baronesses, that the threat we face is advancing, proliferating and converging; it is probably the most acute it has been in over 30 years. The UK employs a broad approach to deterring and defeating air and missile threats, including through NATO. I assure noble Lords that, of course, the UK continually reviews our air and missile defence requirements to ensure that we are adequately defended against the evolving threats that we face. Further developments in these capabilities are being considered in conjunction with the strategic defence review. I hope that that brings some reassurance.
On experience, the MoD has been firing rockets safely from its sites since the 1950s. The MoD and allies would carry the liability, as they were already doing before the Act, for activity in respect of firing allied rockets.
With respect to the Duchy of Cornwall and the Crown Estate, I am grateful for the offer for me to write just to clarify the matters that the noble Baroness raised around those issues.
Regarding the MoD regulations, again allies have been undertaking activity, including firing rockets below the stratosphere, alongside UK military at MoD sites under defence regulation for decades. All activities conducted by foreign allies in the UK need MoD permission and must conform to MoD regulations, be overseen by the MoD regulator and be on MoD sites. I hope that this addresses the concerns.
In terms of the environmental questions that were raised, I will write and hopefully give the reassurance that it goes without saying that those considerations will be taken into account in everything that we do.
I hope that I have addressed the points that were raised. I reinforce my thanks to both parties opposite in their support for this, particularly regarding the time pressures that we are under and in ensuring that we have a very successful operation in May from our site in the Hebrides. We must ensure that the legislation that we bring through enables our defences to outpace the malign ambitions of our adversaries.