Grand Committee
(3 months, 1 week ago)
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Arrangement of Business
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The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Pitkeathley) (Lab)
My Lords, I start with the usual warning that, if there is a Division in the Chamber while we are sitting, the Committee will adjourn as soon as the Division Bells ring and resume after 10 minutes.
Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [HL]
Tuesday 10th September 2024
(3 months, 1 week ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [HL] 2024-26 View all Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [HL] 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 2-II Second marshalled list for Grand Committee - (6 Sep 2024)
“(6) Use of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme for bank recapitalisation and associated costs must not reduce bank depositors’ entitlement to the full amount of Deposit Guarantee Insurance.”
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
My Lords, it falls to me to open proceedings again. This is very much a “what it says on the tin” amendment. If it were phrased as the question “Will the deposit guarantee always be honoured?”, I would expect the answer to be yes.
Last week, we discussed that there may be more than one recapitalisation dip. For a moment, let us imagine a worst-case scenario where there is more than one but things are worse than expected due to market circumstances—maybe contagion or other unforeseen circumstances—and the insolvency route has to be taken. Can we be certain that there would be no change to bank depositors’ entitlement—I do not think that is intended in any way, but I would like to hear the Minister say it—and that the system would have the capacity for whatever is thrown at it, if not cash capacity then some form of underwriting in addition to whatever borrowing is available? Does the overall capacity extend beyond the borrowing that is already set up or is it fundamentally underwritten by the Government? As they will get it back, I do not object to that; I am just inquiring as to what the mechanism is, although maybe one does not want to think about that until we get there, if we do.
Are the state of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme and the affordability of the levy, if there had already been recent large calls, for example, a factor in the analysis of whether to mount a recapitalisation rather than allowing the insolvency? There could be public interest factors that relate not merely to the bank under consideration per se. Does the public interest consideration also extend to the state of the compensation scheme? I beg to move.
Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)
My Lords, I rise to make a few comments about this, many of which have already been made by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. I am determined to make my comments none the less, so I shall use different words in a different order. The amendment does what it says on the tin—that is absolutely right—and I am confident that the Minister will state that there will be no diminution in the benefit of the deposit guarantee scheme, but is that in and of itself sufficient comfort? The framing of this Bill and the Minister’s exposition of it are shaped by a mindset that there will be a single resolution event; it will be an isolated occurrence; it will clearly be in the public interest, and it will be a single financial institution following specific issues relating only to that bank. That seems to be the vibe that I get when I read the information, particularly that which accompanies the Bill, and I remain concerned that there are insufficient checks and balances in place to enable Treasury input when the measures are used as envisaged, but also where there are multiple failures during a wider systemic event—a reasonable worst-case scenario.
A reasonable worst-case scenario can develop quickly, or it may become apparent only over time. In a slow burn and developing situation, decisions relating to banks facing challenges early on in a prolonged event will be made in a very different context from those whose challenges perhaps developed over a longer period. In essence, decisions will be made, but in very different environments, given what might have happened in the intervening period. It may well be that there is significantly less money left with which to play, so to speak, to ensure financial sustainability.
Whether a reasonable worst-case scenario is a one-off event or a slow burn, FSCS resources are going to come under significant pressure should two or more banks face insolvency or resolution, and choices will surely have to be made. Who makes those choices and based on what guidance? Will the FSCS prioritise DGI entitlements over the resolution of a bank or banks? What would happen in circumstances where the public interest test is at best marginal? There will be many circumstances when it is very clear, black and white, but there will be some when it is not quite so clear. On one hand, one might have a bank which needs to go through the insolvency procedure and therefore one set of obligations fall on the FSCS and, on another, a bank could go through resolution and it is a bit marginal whether the public interest test has been met. How are all those decisions going to be worked through, given the lack of direct oversight from the Treasury?
We have been told that the FSCS will be unfettered when it comes to decisions relating to the allocation of existing resources and borrowing from sources other than the Treasury for DGI or recapitalisation. Therefore, it seems that until the FSCS needs to go cap in hand to the Treasury to get more money over and above what it can already borrow, there is an obligation on the FSCS only to consult the Treasury and others and the decision-making essentially remains beyond the reach of Ministers. I will be interested in the Minister’s response.
The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Livermore) (Lab)
My Lords, I hope I can address the concerns of the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles and Lady Vere, and provide them with reassurances about the protections in place for depositors as a result of the mechanism under this Bill. I can assure the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, that in the event that the mechanism under the Bill is used, it would not reduce a covered depositor’s entitlement to a payout in the event of a subsequent bank insolvency. In this situation, eligible depositors would continue to be paid out up to the coverage limit set by the Prudential Regulation Authority, which is currently £85,000. That protection is enshrined in the rules set by the Prudential Regulation Authority. If the mechanism under the Bill is used and a bank subsequently enters insolvency, the Financial Services Compensation Scheme will continue to have access to the same resources as it does now. This means that it would first seek to use any existing funds or its commercial borrowing facility to meet its costs. If that is not sufficient, the Financial Services Compensation Scheme is able to turn to the Treasury and request a loan under the National Loans Fund. Any borrowing under the National Loans Fund would then be repaid by future levies. That is an important backstop that means that the Financial Services Compensation Scheme can continue to access the funding it needs.
The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, asked a specific question about affordability being taken into account when deciding to recapitalise using the payout in insolvency. The answer to that is yes. The bank would consult the PRA when deciding to use its powers to consider affordability in levies. I hope this provides the reassurance that the noble Baroness is seeking that covered depositors will not face a reduction in what they are entitled to in insolvency if the new mechanism is used. On that basis, I hope she will be able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
Can I just clarify what happens when the FSCS has gone to the Treasury, because there does not appear to be a limit on the amount of money that it could draw down to meet its obligations to protected depositors? As the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, pointed out on our first Committee day, there might be several financial institutions—my noble friend also raised this—in play at one time. It cannot be the case that an infinite amount of money can be funnelled through the FSCS and ultimately funded by loans from the National Loan Fund with the expectation that that will always then be met by subsequent years’ levies on the institution. Is there is there no break in the system which says, “No, this is too much for the FSCS to deal with”, especially as it is now potentially being loaded with a different kind of expense to process through its mechanisms?
Lord Livermore (Lab)
As the noble Baroness said, we touched on this briefly in the first day of Committee. If it is okay with her, I will write to set out the precise way in which the mechanism would work in that instance.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
I thank the noble Lord for his reply, which was broadly as I expected. We can draw from it that, in a situation in which the scheme will be used for recapitalisation, it will not set any precedents, because we do not know how much money will be in the pot if there have been other events. It will be considered case by case.
On the one hand, that has to be so, otherwise you might fall into the sort of trap perceived by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes: that it is a perpetual pot, which the banks will have to fill, no matter what. That is not satisfactory but, at the same time, it is nice to have as much clarity as possible about the expected outcomes. We come back to the same point about what goes into the code of practice or other versions of it, whatever they may be.
My final point—I do not need to labour points that we have been around before—is that, in his answer about eligible depositors, the Minister said that this is enshrined in PRA rules. I just wish that it was enshrined in primary legislation, as it used to be. I had not absorbed how that was in the rules and was therefore changeable by the PRA. I thought that it would be fixed in primary legislation, but that is something else to think about. With those comments, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Noakes
“214F Engagement with Parliamentary Committees(1) If the Bank of England exercises the power under section 214E it must, as soon as reasonably practicable, notify in writing the chair of each relevant Parliamentary Committee that the power has been exercised.(2) Relevant Parliamentary Committees are—(a) the Treasury Committee in the House of Commons, and(b) the Financial Services Regulation Committee in the House of Lords.(3) References to the committees referred to in subsection (2)—(a) if the name of the Committee is changed, are references to that Committee by its new name, and(b) if the functions of that Committee (or substantially corresponding functions) become functions of a different Committee of the House of Commons or the House of Lords, are to be treated as references to the Committee by which the functions are exercisable.(4) Any question arising under subsection (3) is to be determined by the Speaker of the House of Commons in relation to committees of the House of Commons and by the Senior Deputy Speaker of the House of Lords in relation to committees of the House of Lords.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the Bank of England must notify the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons and the Financial Services Regulation Committee in the House of Lords if the recapitalisation power is used.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 15 would add a new section to FSMA. This would create a requirement for the Bank of England to notify the Treasury Select Committee in the other place and the Financial Services Regulation Committee of your Lordships’ House of the use of the recapitalisation power.
On our last Committee day, I tried to add a requirement for Treasury consent when the recapitalisation payment power was used in order to improve parliamentary accountability around the use of the power. That would, in effect, have tied Ministers into the decision, thus allowing Parliament—in particular, the other place—to hold Ministers to account. As I have said many times, the accountability of the Bank of England is weak. Unsurprisingly, because Ministers have never been known to be in love with ministerial responsibility or accountability, the Minister turned this down.
However, in response to my amendment, the Minister said, as if it was a self-evident truth, that:
“It is important to maintain the position that the Bank of England can take decisions on the appropriate resolution action independently”.—[Official Report, 5/9/24; col. GC 33.]
I am not sure that that is correct. The independence of the Bank of England certainly exists in relation to monetary policy, but it does not extend to the totality of its functions.
I invite the Minister to look at Section 4 of the Bank of England Act 1946, which was when the Bank of England was nationalised. Section 4 allows the Treasury to issue directions to the Bank of England—it has in fact never issued a direction, but the power exists. There are carve-outs from that power of direction to cover monetary policy, the activities and functions of the PRA, and something to do with central counterparties. It does not carve out the Bank as a resolution authority, so a power exists for the Treasury to direct the Bank on resolution functions. We should not therefore get hung up on the so-called independence of the Bank in considering amendments to this Bill, though we may well return to the topic on Report.
Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
My Lords, very briefly, I support the noble Baroness’s amendments. Perhaps I would say that as a member of the Financial Services Regulation Committee—as one of the majority of us in this Room, I should say, who are members of that committee.
I see this as working closely alongside the reporting amendments that we discussed on Thursday. When we were talking about the reporting requirements the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, mentioned that it is all very well issuing reports, but not if there is no one to read them. This gives us somebody to read them. It is a fairly light-touch requirement: it is an obligation to notify but does not give any obligation on anybody to do anything with it, unless they feel they need to and that it is important. I hope that this simple measure, alongside the reporting discussions we had last week, will be something that the Minister is minded to accept.
Lord Eatwell (Lab)
My Lords, perhaps I might suggest that it would be wise of the Minister, if I may be so bold, to look warmly on the amendment. Discussions around the accountability issue were a persistent theme in the debates on what is now the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023, and led as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, pointed out, to the creation of the Financial Services Regulation Committee of your Lordships’ House, charged with the responsibility for maintaining parliamentary accountability of financial services regulators. I can assure him that if the Treasury does not accept this amendment, he will become weary of the number of times that it will come back again and again—the reason being simply that the committee feels strongly that its role is now a crucial part of the regulatory framework in the UK and that the reports to the committee effectively establish the groundwork of its role in pursuing the accountability agenda.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
Not surprisingly, I too support this amendment. I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, on her exposition of the genesis of the terms of Section 38 of the 2023 Act. Of course, I am a member of the committee that came as a consequence of that. In her presentation, although not in the amendment—wisely so—she suggested that maybe there would be some hearings and questions, and the possibility that they would be in camera.
I urge the Minister, the Treasury and, indeed, the Bank not to shy away from such suggestions, because it would not be the first time that I have heard mutterings about things being confidential and not wanting to talk about them to parliamentary committees. In Germany, its parliamentary committees can look into the books of the banks and get all kinds of confidential information and—do you know?—it does not leak out. It is quite possible for committees of this House to behave just as well. I put that in as some impetus for how you can get better accountability, oversight and, I suggest, help from the committees, where everybody, ultimately, is pulling in the same direction.
Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)
My Lords, there is not an awful lot more to say. This is a very elegant amendment from my noble friend Lady Noakes, and it was very elegantly explained. I am the sole member of this Committee today who is not a member of the Financial Services Regulation Committee—no, neither is the Minister—and I am sorry about that. All noble Lords involved in getting the committee set up have an enormous amount of experience in the field of financial services regulation and, looking at the inquiries that it is already doing, I think it will be a very valuable part of our regulatory infrastructure. I look on this amendment with warmth and favourability and I should imagine that the Minister will do so, too.
Lord Livermore (Lab)
My Lords, the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, focuses on the important theme of how the Bank of England is accountable to Parliament. As I have said in response to other amendments, the Government agree that it is right that the Bank of England is held to account for the actions it takes in resolution. That includes being accountable, as appropriate, to Parliament, so I do look warmly, in the words of my noble friend Lord Eatwell, at the intent of this amendment. I also stress that it is right that the Bank of England can act quickly and decisively when exercising its powers. That is particularly important in a crisis situation.
That said, the Government expect that the Bank of England would engage with Parliament after taking resolution action, including when the mechanism under the Bill is used. Specifically, under the existing provisions of the Banking Act, when the Bank of England exercises its resolution powers it must provide a copy of the relevant legal instrument to the Treasury. The Treasury must then lay that instrument in Parliament and the Bank of England must also publish it. This will continue to apply under the new mechanism and ensure that Parliament is notified when resolution action is undertaken. I shall give one specific example. In the case of SVB, the Bank sent to the Treasury the copy of the legal instrument the same morning as it exercised its power. The Treasury then laid the relevant document in Parliament on the very same day.
I also reiterate points I have made elsewhere about the Government’s commitment to require the Bank of England to produce reports in the event that the mechanism is used. The Government strongly expect such reports to be made public and laid in Parliament unless there are clear public interest grounds for not doing so, such as issues of commercial confidentiality. I hope this provides some comfort to the noble Baroness and, on that basis, I respectfully ask her to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
Just to clarify something with the Minister, I understand that the resolution instruments are notified to the Treasury and laid before Parliament but they, of course, do not refer to the use of the mechanism in the Bill. That is what I was focusing on, rather than the resolution action itself. They may be separated, so it is not quite satisfactory to say that the law already provides for the resolution instruments to be relaid, unless that bit of the legislation, from the 2009 Act, were amended to cover the use of the Bank’s payment capitalisation power. I was trying to fill in a gap that I thought existed.
Lord Livermore (Lab)
I do not know whether this goes far enough for the noble Baroness but we absolutely intend, and would be clear, that we expect the same exact procedure to apply for this new mechanism.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
I am very glad that the Minister has said that.
First, I thank my fellow members of the Financial Services Regulation Committee for their support on this amendment—I was never in any doubt that I would get it—and I thank my noble friend, the shadow Minister, for her support.
I think this will come down to whether the Treasury’s expectations should be backed up somewhere in the legislation or whether we can allow it to exist on the basis that Treasury expectations will always somehow work out in practice. I favour the former: we need to be clear in the legislation about the trail of information that needs to go and when it needs to go.
Lord Vaux of Harrowden
“(aa) on a winding up of the institution, any recapitalisation payment is to be treated as a debt of the institution and paid out of the institution’s assets in preference to all other claims except any prescribed fees or expenses of the official receiver;”Member’s explanatory statement
Because the recapitalisation payment is not paid by the FSCS to the institution, but is paid to the Bank of England, it is not clear how it would be treated on a winding up of the institution. This probing amendment aims to ensure that it is treated as a debt of the institution and to ensure that recapitalisation payments are recovered first in any insolvency process, in preference to other creditors or shareholders, other than the expenses of the receiver.
Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
My Lords, this amendment is simply intended to try to obtain some clarification on how a recapitalisation payment that has been made by the FSCS to the Bank of England will be treated if the failing bank eventually gets into insolvency. This could occur if the bank is transferred to a bridge bank, the buyer is not found and the bank’s financial situation does not improve. There is a two-year deadline for the bridge bank although that can be extended in certain circumstances but, eventually, the process can end up with the bank being wound up.
If that happens, the recapitalisation payments should be treated as a debt of the bank and should rank ahead of all other liabilities, debts or other claims other than the fees of the official receiver when it comes to distributing any value that might be left in an insolvency situation. This is related to other discussions that we have already had and partially to Amendment 23, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, which we will debate later.
The principle should be that the shareholders, lenders and other creditors should not be put in a better position as a result of the recapitalisation. To put it another way, the industry-funded compensation scheme should not, in effect, be bailing out the losses of shareholders and creditors other than the depositors who will be compensated under the scheme should their deposits be lost in the insolvency. However, that is not clear in the proposed Bill, although it is entirely possible that I have missed something in the interplay between the various Acts that apply here. I would therefore be most grateful if the Minister could explain exactly how the amount provided by the FSCS would be treated in such a situation. It might most easily and clearly be dealt with by including it in the worked example that the Minister agreed to consider providing during our discussions on Amendment 1 on Thursday.
I should say that I suspect that my amendment as it is currently drafted probably does not work, and that it may require some changes to be made to insolvency legislation to work properly if there is an issue. Rather than worrying about the specifics of the amendment, I hope that the noble Lord will concentrate on the principle and explain how the recapitalisation payment would be treated in an insolvency process, as it stands, in particular in making sure that it does not advantage shareholders and lenders, and ideally point me to the relevant clauses of the relevant legislation. If I am right that the situation is unclear, we can sort the details out on Report. I beg to move.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
I support the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has put forward, and in particular the request for worked examples, preferably with numbers in, because the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and I are accountants and we like looking at numbers rather than words. Having read the proceedings of the first Committee day in Hansard, I realised that I did not know how some of these things work in practice, so I think that it is important to have those worked examples.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
I support this amendment as well, or something like it, and I would be very pleased if the Minister was prepared to try to work out something that might go in the Bill, because we need to have some clarity around these issues. We come back, as has been suggested, to our shareholders being advantaged at the end of the day. I find who is getting what in insolvency remarkably difficult to follow anyway; I certainly defer to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, who is an accountant and a lot better at it than I am. I suggest that, if the noble Lords present cannot get their heads around it or are wondering, it needs laying out somewhere for clarity, ideally in legislation.
Lord Livermore (Lab)
My Lords, I am about to write to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, on the matter that he raises in his Amendment 17, following a commitment that I gave on the first day in Committee. I will also happily reflect any points raised in this debate in that letter, if helpful. In the meantime, I will set out some of the content of that letter, while providing some additional clarity on the points he raises. Again, I hear the request for worked examples that we discussed on day one.
The Bill extends the role of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme to include providing funds at the Bank of England’s request, which the Bank of England could then use to recapitalise the firm in question. As I have set out previously, the intention would be to achieve that recapitalisation by injecting equity into the failed firm, helping to restore it to viability. In the event that the Bank of England places the failed firm into a bridge bank, the Bank of England would become the sole shareholder for that bridge bank.
It is therefore possible that the Bank of England would receive recoveries in a subsequent winding-up of the bridge bank if all other claims were met, reflecting its position in the creditor hierarchy as a shareholder. The Bill provides for any such recoveries to be returned to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme. The Government consider this to be an appropriate method for dealing with funds used in a resolution and in keeping with the existing principles of the creditor hierarchy. I note four further important points.
First, by ensuring an injection of equity, it achieves the core purpose of the new mechanism, which is to restore the firm to solvency. By contrast, if such a payment were classified as debt—even if that had a more favourable ranking in the creditor hierarchy— there is a risk that it would not restore the firm to the necessary level of balance-sheet health.
Secondly, I note that the primary intention in deploying resolution tools using the new mechanism would be to sell the firm. It is therefore the Government’s expectation that a sale should be the outcome in the majority of cases, rather than placing the firm into insolvency and winding it up from a bridge bank.
Thirdly, I point out that, if the firm entered insolvency from a bridge bank and there were still eligible depositors, the Financial Services Compensation Scheme would pay compensation to those depositors and take on their position in the creditor hierarchy, as it usually does. That of course is the right approach, ensuring depositors maintain their super-preferred status in an insolvency. It is important to note that changes to the creditor hierarchy must be considered carefully to ensure there is clarity for investors and market participants as to how they would be treated in a failure scenario. Treating the funds provided by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme as a debt only at the point of winding up the firm, and not prior to that, might create uncertainty as to its interaction with insolvency law more broadly.
Finally, I note that the super-preferred status in the creditor hierarchy that the Financial Services Compensation Scheme currently enjoys in insolvency reflects a different set of objectives. In those circumstances, the Financial Services Compensation Scheme is standing in the shoes of depositors and that preferred status is seeking to protect depositors’ interests. That is different to the intent of the mechanism delivered by the Bill, which is to provide a source of resolution funding to recapitalise a failing firm.
I appreciate the Committee’s interest in what is a technical but important matter. I hope that I have been able to clarify the intent of the Bill and that the noble Lord is able to withdraw his amendment as a result.
Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
I understand what the Minister says about the equity of the original shareholders being effectively written down to zero, but what happens with, for example, lenders who are transferred into the bridge bank? It cannot be right that they probably lose everything in the event of an insolvency situation, but if the FSCS, via the Bank of England, has injected a load of money into the failing bank and it then goes into insolvency, there is more money there and therefore those lenders will receive a share of their cash, if there is enough, which they would have lost in an insolvency situation. However, the FSCS gets nothing back because there is nothing to recoup as it has gone to the lenders. In effect, in certain circumstances the lenders to the failing bank may be bailed out by the FSCS through the Bank of England. That does not seem right to me. Those lenders took a risk in the first instance that was not predicated on being bailed out. I think there is something here that needs to be followed up. Have I got that right?
Lord Livermore (Lab)
In the letter I will write, we will set out exactly what would happen in the example that the noble Lord gives.
Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
I thank the Minister for that explanation and look forward to receiving the letter with the details and, I hope, a detailed worked example. However, an issue remains. The principle must be that a recapitalisation of the bank by the FSCS will not, in effect, bail out the existing shareholders—which it seems it does not do—or existing creditors, with the exception of the depositors, who are protected separately. There is something that needs looking at quite carefully here. I think we will come back to this on Report, but for the moment I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Noakes
“(2A) In section 4 (special resolution objectives), at the end of subsection (9) insert— “(9A) Objective 8, which applies in any case in which the Bank of England uses the power in section 214E of the Financial Services and Markets Act (recapitalisation payments), is to ensure that the costs which are born through the Financial Services Compensation Scheme do not exceed those which would have been born if the bank insolvency procedure had been used.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment adds to the special resolution objectives so that the Bank of England has to consider the net costs recouped via the FSCS if it uses the recapitalisation power with the counterfactual of the use of the bank insolvency procedure.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, this amendment would insert a new special resolution objective into Section 4 of the Banking Act 2009. That objective is to ensure that the costs of using the recapitalisation payment power, thus loading costs on to the banking sector and in due course on to its customers, are not more than if the bank insolvency procedure had been used.
The special resolution objectives in Section 4 are not absolute requirements. The Bank has to have regard to them when using the resolution and related powers under the 2009 Act. There are seven existing objectives, and I am simply adding one more “have regard” for use only when the bank recapitalisation payment power is used. Section 4(10) states:
“The order in which the objectives are listed in this section is not significant; they are to be balanced as appropriate in each case”.
Thus, I am not trying to impose a requirement which trumps everything else in the special resolution regime. I regard this amendment as quite modest.
Two strands of analysis underlie my tabling of this amendment. The first is that the code of practice is clear that the bank insolvency procedure is the default option, unless there are public interest considerations that outweigh the important market discipline of failure. I am not sure we have seen in practice the use of the default option, but it ought to remain the core option for smaller banks in particular, which the Government insist are the main target of this new power.
The second concern was expressed during the consultation on this Bill—that there ought to be something akin to the “no creditor worse off” provisions of the Banking Act 2009. These provisions ensure that creditors are not disadvantaged by the use of one of the resolution tools compared with the option of insolvency. I am trying to ensure that the banking sector, which is footing the bill via the recapitalisation payment, should not be worse off than if the failed bank had been put through the insolvency process, resulting in the banking sector picking up the costs of reimbursing protected depositors.
I completely accept that there are difficulties in making this an absolute rule, because the Bank of England may well prioritise other matters, such as the continuity of banking services for critical functions. That is why I have drafted this amendment as an additional objective rather than an absolute rule. However, its inclusion in the 2009 Act would ensure that the Bank was especially mindful of the costs that would fall on the banking sector when using the bank recapitalisation power. I beg to move.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
I have mixed feelings about this amendment. I am grateful for the comments of the noble Baroness on why it was an objective; I understand that. Very definitely, the costs should not be disproportionately larger, but, if it was a relatively small amount larger than an insolvency and there was a good public interest case, I would not want to bar it. I am not quite sure whether the words used and having it as an objective necessarily convey that; if we were to proceed further with it, we could somehow make it a little more explicit in that regard. It needs to be in the same order of magnitude, not hugely more. With that caveat, I am probably in the same position as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes.
Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
I was not going to speak on this amendment, but I am also slightly in two minds. One hesitation is that it is very hard to know on the day you do the recapitalisation payment what the cost of an insolvency situation would be. However, I understand where the noble Baroness is heading with this, and there is a lot of sense in the sentiment behind it. This gives more ammunition to the question around reporting—we need the Bank of England to give a very clear explanation as to why it has chosen recapitalisation over insolvency. That might be my preferred way of going about it, but I understand absolutely what the noble Baroness said and support the sentiment behind it.
Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)
I also support the sentiment in the amendment from my noble friend Lady Noakes. I think all noble Lords here, including the Minister, would agree that this has the right intention but, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, mentioned, there will be edge cases which we cannot foresee at this time. The question is: should such a statement of intent be in the special resolution objectives and, if not, where should it go? I do not know—perhaps in a code of practice, or perhaps not. I am interested to hear what the Minister has to say.
Lord Livermore (Lab)
My Lords, the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, seeks to introduce a new objective into the special resolution regime. The new objective would state that the costs in using the new mechanism should not exceed those that would be incurred in the counterfactual of placing the firm into insolvency. This amendment therefore touches on an important point raised both in consultation and during Second Reading, which is whether there should be a formal test or objective that seeks to prevent the use of the new mechanism, or make its use significantly more challenging, where the cost is higher than insolvency.
I also note that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, raised similar points on the first day of Committee, which he alluded to today, making the case that the Bank of England should be required to present an assessment of costs in reports to the Treasury and to Parliament.
The Government carefully considered the case for inclusion of various forms of such a safeguard, sometimes referred to as a least-cost test, in response to feedback received during the consultation. In considering this matter, it is important to strike the right balance between ensuring that the Bank of England can respond quickly and flexibly to a firm failure and ensuring that costs to industry are properly considered. Having considered this, the Government concluded that the existing public interest test and special resolution regime objectives remained the appropriate framework for deciding whether the mechanism in this Bill could be used.
Adding a specific objective for the Bank of England to ensure that the costs to industry from using the new mechanism do not exceed insolvency could prevent it taking the most appropriate action to advance its broader resolution objectives. Those objectives include protecting financial stability, certain depositors and public funds. It is right that these aims are prioritised at a time of significant risk, which is part of the reason why the Government have not proposed changes to the broader resolution framework.
There is also the potential for such a change to impose important practical challenges. Resolution would likely take place in an uncertain and fast-paced context. Estimating the costs of different approaches during this period will be highly challenging and could change over time. There is therefore a risk that such an objective could create legal uncertainty around any resolution action, which in turn may undermine the usability and effectiveness of the new mechanism in situations where it is justified. This could have significant and undesirable consequences, including crystallising a set of indirect costs for the financial services sector and the wider economy. Further, it should be borne in mind that the alternative if the new mechanism is not available may be to use public funds.
However, I appreciate the intent behind the noble Baroness’s amendment and hope that I can provide some reassurance by reiterating previous points on the subject of the scrutiny and transparency of the Bank of England’s actions. As I have noted, the Bank of England is required under the Banking Act 2009 to report to the Treasury when exercising some of its stabilisation powers and, as was set out in response to the consultation, it is the Government’s clear intention to use these existing reporting mechanisms to ensure that the Bank of England is subject to appropriate scrutiny when using the mechanism provided by the Bill. However, I take the point that the noble Baroness made in response to my earlier point.
The Government have committed to updating the code of practice to provide further details on how these reporting requirements will apply when the mechanism is used. I reaffirm that the Government intend to include confirmation in the code that, after the new mechanism has been used, the Bank of England would be required to disclose the estimated costs to industry of the options considered, including the comparison with insolvency. The Government consider that using the code of practice in this way, rather than putting these requirements in the Bill, is the best approach to hold the Bank of England to account for its actions.
The Bank of England is legally required to have regard to the code and the Government are required to consult the Banking Liaison Panel, made up of regulatory and industry stakeholders, when updating it. Using the code will therefore ensure that a full and thorough consultation is taken on the approach. Given the complex and potentially fast-moving nature of bank failures, this will also ensure that any approach is sufficiently nuanced to account for the range of possible outcomes under insolvency or through the use of other resolution tools.
As I have previously said, the Government will share drafts of the updates to the code of practice as soon as practicable and provide sufficient opportunity for industry stakeholders to be consulted on them. The noble Baroness also made the case that insolvency should be a preferred strategy for small banks and I stress that this is the case. I hope that I have provided some helpful explanation to her of the Government’s position on this matter and respectfully ask that she withdraws her amendment.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for supporting the principle behind my amendment, even if they did not fully align with the mechanism that I have chosen. We have had a useful debate on the issues involved. The Minister’s response was clearly helpful and I want to consider it carefully.
The Minister talked about things being very fast-paced, which I completely accept. Nevertheless, the Bank has to make a decision on the best information that it has. I am trying to build only on what it should be doing anyway, even though that is difficult to do when things are moving very fast.
Let me reflect on what the Minister said. It may come back to the issues which I am going to discuss in the next amendment, which are about the code of practice and needing to see what is likely to be said in that. I will shut up at this point and save my powder until the next group. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Noakes
“(2A) In section 5 (code of practice), at the end of subsection (1) insert “and—(iv) the bank recapitalisation power under section 214E of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Treasury to include the use of the recapitalisation power created in this Bill in the Code of Practice issued in respect of the special resolution regime.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
Amendment 21 would amend the Banking Act 2009 so that the code of practice, which has to be issued for various aspects of the special resolution regime, must cover the use of the bank recapitalisation payment power being created by the Bill.
My reading of Section 5 of the 2009 Act is that it would not require the Treasury to cover the use of the recapitalisation payment power in the code of practice. Although I am aware that the Treasury says that it intends to update the code of practice—the Minister repeated that again, a few minutes ago—it should be put beyond doubt in the Bill that it is one aspect of the resolution regime, as a result of the Bill, that should be covered in the code of practice. It should not be optional now or at any point in the future.
We debated the code of practice a little in our first Committee day, and we do not yet have any idea of when the revision to the code will appear. Can the Minister assure the Committee that it will be reissued before the Bill comes into force? The Treasury has control of that because it has control of the regulations bringing the Bill into force, and it clearly is important that there is a revised code of practice covering the use of the recapitalisation of payments available at the same time.
The Minister would not give any specific timing for the updated code or the consultation on it when he responded last week. He repeated that a few minutes ago. Last week, I specifically asked him whether the draft updates, which he had said to my noble friend Lady Penn would be provided, would be available ahead of Report. On checking Hansard, I found that he had sidestepped that question. I hope that he will answer it today because, if he cannot commit to sharing draft updates before Report, it puts the House in a difficult position when it comes to that stage of the Bill.
Turning from timing to topics, can the Minister outline which topics are likely to be addressed in any updates?
In our first Committee day, when we debated the first group of amendments which sought in various ways to constrain the scope of the bank recapitalisation payment power to small banks or those on the glide path into the MREL regime, the Minister said:
“I appreciate noble Lords’ concerns about this issue and am happy to commit to exploring how to provide further reassurance on the Government’s intent via the code of practice”.—[Official Report, 5/9/24; col. GC 11.]
I found that rather alarming, as it implied that it was not the Government’s current intention to include something about the key target of the bank recapitalisation payment power being small banks. However, that is exactly how the power in the Bill has been marketed—a power to deal with the insolvency of small banks or the failure of small banks. I would have expected the code to set out where the Government expect the new power to be used, especially as the power has been drawn so very broadly.
Our second group of amendments on the first Committee day concerned the extremely wide definition of costs which can be covered under the bank recapitalisation power. The Minister said that it was important that the Bill was “not overly prescriptive”; that might have been an opportunity for him to say that the issues would be covered in a code of practice, but he did not do so. Does that mean that the code of practice will be silent on the important issues surrounding this very wide ability to charge practically any cost under the recapitalisation heading? That may be important to those of us who think that the current formulation of the Bill goes too far.
When we discussed double dipping into the FSCS last week, I asked the Minister whether the code of practice would cover the use of the power more than once for the same institution. This would also cover the need to reconsider the resolution strategy of not using the banking insolvency procedure before using the power a second or subsequent time. When I asked the Minister if that would be covered in the code of practice, he said:
“We can certainly take that away and look”.—[Official Report, 5/9/24; col. GC 25.]
at it. In other words that, too, was not in the plans for updating the code of practice. The only definitive reference to the content of the updated code of practice that the Minister made last week—he made it again in the previous group today—was in relation to the reporting requirements, where he said that the bank
“would be required to disclose the estimated costs”.—[Official Report, 5/9/24; col. GC 47.]
involved in using the power.
Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
My Lords, on this amendment I agree with every word that the noble Baroness has just said. Like most noble Lords, I have an inherent preference that things should appear in a Bill, rather than relying on slightly woolly statements of Ministers that this is what they intend to do. There are circumstances when that is appropriate but in a case like this, where the code will be so important, there should be an obligation that the code is updated to take account of the recapitalisation process.
To repeat what I said on Thursday, and what the noble Baroness has said, it is deeply unsatisfactory that the Minister seems to be relying on the existence of the code and its updating to avoid detailed amendments being put down on Report and pushed through. If that is the case, it is surely important that we get a chance to look at the revised code before then, or at least a draft of it—or, at the very least, clear details of what Ministers are expecting to include in it. I urge the noble Lord to see what we can do to achieve that. Otherwise, he will face detailed amendments to deal with the issues that we have discussed, because we have nothing else on which to base our position.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
I agree with what both previous noble Lords have said. We cannot rely just on the fact that something is going to be revised. It is the same old problem that we have with primary legislation a lot of the time: it lays out something that could be good or bad, but it says, “Trust me, we will get it right when we come to secondary legislation or something else down the track”. That is not satisfactory and, in the absence of some more detail, we have to see something about the code of practice or similar—whatever one calls it—in the Bill, just to make sure that there is an understanding of the direction of travel for the sort of detail that we are asking about.
Lord Eatwell (Lab)
I should like to pick up on the request for detail put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. I am concerned that the powers that the Bank of England has to act in an emergency, which this would presumably be, should not be constrained to any degree other than that which is absolutely necessary. In other words, we should not load up the code with detail, the reason being that the next crisis will be one that none of us has anticipated. It will be completely different.
If we look at the financial crises that have occurred, the major one in 2007-09 and some minor ones since, they have appeared in completely unexpected directions. The Bank must then have the freedom to adapt its procedures to whatever new challenge arises. I quite understand that we do not want just to say it can do anything it likes, but I feel strongly that we must be very careful about loading the code, and indeed the legislation, with excessive detail.
Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)
My Lords, I added my name to the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes about the code of practice because it is important that we have this debate. I recognise what the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, says, but it slightly struck fear into my heart because it is about those circumstances where there is not sufficient guidance or a code of practice. Essentially, this is not necessarily just for the Bank of England; it is for all those stakeholders who will be involved in the other side of a resolution. A lot of people will read the code of practice and internalise it. When it is needed, it will therefore already be in their hearts because they will have read it, so I am not as concerned as the noble Lord is about putting in too much detail. The simple fact is that we have not seen anything, so we do not really know what we are dealing with.
It struck me that in the slight rush to bring forward some legislation to keep Parliament occupied, perhaps, the Government are not providing all the information that the House needs to consider this Bill fully. It is complex, and as noble Lords go through it, it is clear that we are all picking up new nuances that we consider might be of concern in the future. The code of practice makes up an important component of the regime and the Committee is slightly flying blind, having not seen a draft of the changes—not only a draft of what would happen as a result of the Bill, but also potentially to fill gaps that we know are not going to be part of the Bill. We know that the code is potentially the only protection between anybody who uses banks—essentially, the taxpayer—and the Bank being able to perform maximum adaptation to a situation. There has to be something in the middle that stops that happening.
I am warming to my noble friend Lady Noakes’s suggestion that the Bill should not come into force until the code of practice is finalised, but I sense that that might be a little churlish. The amendment itself is a little anodyne. I think all noble Lords agree that the Government will, of course, make changes to the code of practice, but I would appreciate hearing more information from the Minister about what changes are anticipated—specifically, what will be left out—and the timing for any code of practice because while it remains outstanding, even in draft form, there is a significant lack of clarity.
At Second Reading, the Minister stated that the update will happen in due course. How many times have I used that phrase? I know exactly what it means. It means “when we are sort of ready”. We need to be a bit more ambitious than that. Can the Minister give any further guidance on timing? If he cannot, would it be helpful if I tabled an amendment on Report that required the code of practice to be updated within, say, three months and subject to approval by both Houses? I am happy to do that if it is helpful.
As my noble friend Lady Noakes and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, pointed out, the Minister has referred to these things being addressed in the code of practice. Many of the elements in the reporting are also supposed to be in that code. My concern is that six weeks have now passed since the Minister said “in due course” and the House rises at the end of the week for Conference Recess. I presume that the Treasury is still working, so that would be a further window during which progress on a draft code of practice could be made. Therefore, I very much hope that the Minister can commit to having a draft document available for review before Report stage is scheduled. I look forward to hearing from the Minister.
Lord Livermore (Lab)
My Lords, I should state at the outset that the Government have no objections to the principle under discussion. Indeed, the Government have already stated publicly in our response to the consultation on these proposals that we intend to update the code of practice to reflect the measures in the Bill. I have already committed to share a draft of the proposed updates at the earliest opportunity, and I am happy to reaffirm that commitment today. I am aware that this is not the answer that the Committee is looking for, but I am afraid that I cannot commit to providing that before Report. However, I expect it to be available before the Bill comes into force.
As set out in the Government’s consultation response, the updates to the code will do three things: first, they will ensure that the code appropriately reflects the existence of the new mechanism; secondly, they will set out that the Bank is expected to set out estimates of the costs of the options considered and, as noted elsewhere, this is expected to include the case of insolvency; and thirdly, they will set out the expectation that any use of the mechanism is subject to the ex post scrutiny arrangements that I have described elsewhere.
The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, perfectly fairly asked for a series of clarifications of what the code will include. She asked about two points specifically. The first was whether the code will confirm the mechanisms intended for small banks and the expenses covered? Yes, it is the intention that it will. She also asked whether the code will cover multiple uses of the mechanism. Yes, the code will cover that. I will answer other specific questions in writing.
In preparing these updates, the Government are mindful to ensure that they are done efficiently and carefully to ensure that they achieve the intended effect within the wider resolution framework, for instance, ensuring that the right set of costs is considered on the appropriate basis.
The Government will ensure sufficient opportunity for industry stakeholders to be consulted on these proposed updates to the code of practice. In particular, the final wording of any proposed updates would be subject to review by a cross-section of representatives from the authorities and the industry on the statutory Banking Liaison Panel, which advises the Treasury on the resolution regime. As noted, the Government will aim to progress these updates and make the proposed changes available for consultation with industry as soon as practicable.
Finally, I note that the Banking Act 2009 already imposes an implicit requirement on HM Treasury to update the code of practice, even without this amendment. Addressing the operation of the new mechanism would therefore already fall within the scope of this requirement.
I know that this explanation may not be sufficient, but I respectfully ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
The Minister just referred to an “implicit requirement” in the Act. Does he believe that Section 5 can be interpreted only as requiring the code of practice to include matters relating to the bank recapitalisation power? That would be extraordinary because nobody knew about the bank recapitalisation power when the 2009 Act was drafted, so under the principles of ordinary interpretation, it would not be included.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
I thank noble Lords for taking part in this short debate. There were three parts. First, Section 5 of the 2009 Act needs to mention the bank recapitalisation power, which is what the amendment does. The Minister is going to write on that.
We moved on to issues with the content and timing of the code. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, that we all understand that the Bank needs powers to act as quickly as possible. Nobody is trying seriously to harm that. Taking what the noble Lord said to its logical conclusion, the statute would say just that the Bank of England can do whatever necessary when it comes to situations of bank failure—full stop. We would not have the many pages of the 2009 Act and all the complicated, mind-blowing arrangements that exist, holding companies and everything like that. We would not need that because we could just say that it could do everything. It is overstating the case to say that trying to write codes of practice would hold the Bank up in doing its duty when things go wrong.
What the Minister said on content is a helpful move forward from where we were. We may want to explore that a bit further on Report. However, timing is a concern, as we will not have further clarity by the time we reach Report. The only useful thing he has said is that they expect to reissue the code of practice prior to this Bill coming into force. I suggest that it would be pretty negligent not to update it before bringing the Bill into force.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to ensure that the FSCS should only be used for recapitalisation not for bailing out shareholders.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
I am afraid that I will have to spend a little time on this, although we will still close well before time. We are in a slightly new world. The noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, referred to how—although he did not say it like this—once upon a time, when there were problems, you left it to the Bank of England to do the right thing. By and large it did, within the state of knowledge of that time.
However, banking and the way that we deal with resolutions have moved on a long way since then. We are moving further with this small but significant Bill, using the funds of other banks to give to a bank that has failed. Beyond the public interest of depositor guarantees, which in their day were a new thing, we are using private money for what would in the past have been done with public money. That is a different place. Just as with insolvency, you put in the right safeguards about priority orders and so on, we need to put in priority orders for how that money is properly used.
Turning to my amendment, I will have to delve into realms where words have taken on different meanings over time. “Recapitalisation” now seems to incorporate bits of resolution; it does not just mean “putting capital in”. I used that sense of it in my amendment but I will carry the Committee through it as best I can.
The purpose of this amendment is to probe further whether the language used in the Bill, which ends up meaning “reducing the shortfall”, is too broad and therefore allows the FSCS funds to be used not only as new capital for the ongoing bank but to reduce the write-down of other capital instruments and correspondingly increase the amount that would otherwise have been taken from the Financial Services Compensation Scheme above the level that would have been needed if those other capital instruments were fully written down, as is the present presumption under the Banking Act 2009 and everything that feeds into it.
When I wrote the amendment, I was thinking of the ordinary meaning of recapitalisation—replacing capital—and not covering write-down manoeuvrings. So, please think about it as if I had said that and at the end it said: “and without reducing write-down of loss-absorbing capital instruments or shareholdings”, or some such wording. That was the intention of the amendment; if I go around the loop again, I will have a better shot at it.
Overall, I now come to the thought that my previous Amendment 22, which just deleted this, was probably a better option and a good thing for a variety of reasons. We need to avoid capture by the dubious “shortfall” wording from the Banking Act 2009 and the EU BRRD. The things that feed into shortfall are now synonymous with the things that are called MREL but they are looking at it from different ends. If we are going to tie back to the BRRD, I remind noble Lords that the shortfall is the sum of write-down of eligible liabilities to zero—that is what it says under Article 47.3(b)—plus the recapitalisation amount under Article 47.3(c). In essence, I am saying that the FSCS should be used only for amounts under Article 47.3(c)—that is the recapitalisation, which is what I am trying to capture—and that it cannot be used ahead of the writing down to zero of what is in Article 47.3(b). However, the trouble is that we are dealing in this world now where different things have been put in a pot, this time called the shortfall, linked by “and”, and we have no idea which bit we are allowing to be changed.
If we look at the broader picture of trying to cover banks with MREL, that is where it starts to get messy. It was quite simple if we just did it for the smaller banks, and we did not have to worry about things that were supposed to be written down to zero not being written down to zero again. It seems that that is exactly what the Explanatory Notes are telling us—I will quote from my copy to keep myself on track. They say that Clause 4(3)
“amends section 12AA”,
which goes back to the things I have just talked about,
“to allow the Bank to take into account the funds provided by the FSCS when they are calculating the contribution of shareholders”—
that is what it says at paragraph 26—
“and creditors required when exercising the bail-in write-down tool. This is to ensure that the Bank is not required to write-down more capital than necessary”.
However, as I read the law when it came from BRRD in the Banking Act 2009, you have to write down to zero unless you have so much that you get there before you have written it down to zero, and then you should not be going fishing in any other ponds anyway. So, there is some inconsistency or there is a hidden agenda.
There are some things in the insolvency stack that are worthy of rescue, as was the Silicon Valley Bank reasoning—such as uninsured deposits—but not things in that loss-absorption stack, especially not shareholders, because they are right at the top. Otherwise, what is the point of all the expense and effort that we go to to provide MREL, which is further on down, if we are then not going to use it? I really cannot understand what is meant to be going on by adding in this reference to the shortfall. I tried to amend it to say that it should not do bad things, in effect, but I think that we are a lot better off without it.
I then went back and looked at the response the Minister gave me when I raised this on the first day in Committee. He said:
“The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, asked whether the Bank of England should reduce MREL requirements in the knowledge that it could instead use FSCS funds. The Bank of England sets MREL requirements independently of government but within a framework set out in legislation … The Bank of England will consider, in the light of this Bill and wider developments, whether any changes to its approach to MREL would be appropriate”.—[Official Report, 5/9/24; col. GC 11.]
The Minister was answering a question that I did not ask, but it is an interesting response, which the larger banks should get quite excited about. Is a quid pro quo for chipping in through the FSCS that you end up having less MREL? What an interesting suggestion. I can read what was said that way. According to that interpretation, reading through what is in the Bill, it is perfectly open that you could then not write down to zero things that appear under article 47.3(b) of the BRRD.
I can skip a lot of the other things that I was going to say but, to summarise, if the Explanatory Notes are correct, the intention is to use the FSCS to reduce the amount of write-down for shareholders or other loss-absorbing capital instruments. That is almost going backwards to the days that the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, was perhaps recollecting of the Bank basically choosing who it should favour in the capital and liability stack. That seems to be the power we are giving it. If we are returning to something like that, it should be done in the context of a proper review of the Banking Act 2009, not in a kiss-me-quick Bill like this one, which was sold to us as being rather more about saving uninsured deposits, not saving sophisticated investors who have enjoyed good returns from bail-inable bonds or who are at the top of the stack and are the shareholders in the failing bank.
The FSCS cannot just be a pot for general usage; it has to be targeted. I tried to amend it with this amendment, but I am now coming to the conclusion that linking back to shortfall has no place in this Bill because it introduces too many ambiguities. I beg to move.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I will be brief. The noble Baroness raises some important issues in her amendment. I think the Minister confirmed earlier that shareholders would disappear because the Bank of England would take over their share capital, so they could not benefit from the use of the recapitalisation, but if there is any suggestion that the recapitalisation amount will excuse the bail in of some of the bail-inable liabilities, that would be pretty unacceptable. I hope that the worked examples that I hope the Treasury will enjoy working on while we are on Recess can illuminate how all this is going to work.
Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
My Lords, I find my head spinning a little about some of this. It comes back to the confusion about how the various flows here work, so that worked example is becoming more and more crucial. I come back to the principle that I raised before: recapitalisation by the industry should not bail out those who should be at risk in the case of a failure. MREL capital et cetera must surely be used up first before we take recourse to the industry. It is similar to, but slightly different from, the point we made in Amendment 17 that, again, people who are creditors of the failing bank should not be bailed out by the recapitalisation in the event that it all goes wrong. It seems rather confused, so I look forward to the worked example, and I wish the Minister good luck with getting something that covers all the aspects.
Lord Eatwell (Lab)
My Lords, I was rather enjoying being characterised as an old-fashioned central banker, until the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, attributed to me to me the idea that selecting from whichever pot would be entirely at will, so to speak. I add my support to what the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, just said: in a recapitalisation, shareholders and MREL must clearly be used first, and FSCS money used simply when those pots have been exhausted.
Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)
My Lords, I simply make the same point. The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, was absolutely right to summarise the principle which I think all noble Lords on the Committee feel is the purpose of the Bill. There cannot be any circumstances by which there is MREL or whatever it might be left, yet money is going in from FSCS to ensure the resolution of the bank. I cannot see any circumstance in which that would happen—perhaps Treasury officials would be able to think of one—but I think all noble Lords are agreed on the need for some clarity on what would happen.
I appreciated the comments from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. I got about 60% of them, so I was really proud of myself; the other 40% went way over my head. I am going to try to understand her points. We are in quite a difficult situation, but the way that she has been so forensic about it has allowed the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, to state what the principle is. It is about combining those two things—the forensic attitude to “This is what the Bill could say if read in a certain way” versus “Just tell us whether the Bill abides by the very simple principle that basically FSCS money should be a last resort, not there for anybody else, but just to prop up a bank to make sure it gets through to the other side of resolution, for the public interest and no more”.
Lord Livermore (Lab)
My Lords, in response to the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, I reassure her that the Bill does not seek to introduce measures to bail out shareholders. I note that she raised concerns about this point on the first day in Committee, about which I am about to write to her. I hope my response will provide the clarification she is seeking pending that letter and the worked examples that we have discussed.
The amendment relates to a subsection of the Bill that would amend Section 12AA of the Banking Act 2009. This sets out the definition of the shortfall amount, which is a figure calculated by the Bank of England when using the bail-in resolution tool. The shortfall amount determines how much of a firm’s resources need to be bailed in to restore its capital ratio to the extent necessary to sustain sufficient market confidence and enable it to continue to meet the conditions for authorisation for at least one year and to continue to carry out its authorised activities. The methodology for determining the shortfall amount is not changed by the Bill, and it remains the case that when using the bail-in tool a firm’s own resources and eligible liabilities—its shareholders and creditors—would bear losses.
The relevant provision is not intended as a means of reducing the amount of MREL that should be used when bailing in a firm. Instead, it is intended to ensure that, in the event the mechanism is used alongside the bail-in tool, funds from the Financial Services Compensation Scheme are taken into account and used rather than the Bank of England having to bail in other creditors further up the creditor hierarchy. As an example, without this provision, if a firm had insufficient MREL to meet its shortfall amount without being able to take into account Financial Services Compensation Scheme funds, it may need to bail in creditors, such as uncovered depositors. Retaining this provision therefore ensures that the Bank of England may exercise some discretion in not bailing in other liabilities beyond a firm’s MREL, such as uncovered deposits, where to do so might risk further destabilising the business of the firm, other participants in the banking sector or other sectors, or reducing wider confidence in the financial system. Therefore, the Government consider it important to maintain flexibility to respond to the relevant circumstances.
In this context, I also note that funds provided by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme under the new mechanism can be used to cover the costs of recapitalising the failed firm, the operating costs of a bridge bank, and Bank of England and HM Treasury costs in relation to the resolution.
It is important to note that Sections 6A, 6B and 12AA of the Banking Act 2009 require the Bank of England to ensure that shareholders and creditors bear losses when a banking institution fails. This is an important principle that will continue to apply where the new mechanism is used.
I can reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, that the regime provides an extensive and proportionate set of powers to the Bank of England to impose consequences on the shareholders of a failed firm in resolution. The bail-in tool specifically enables the Bank of England to impose losses on shareholders and to write down certain unsecured creditors. This is an important principle that ensures the firm’s owners and investors must bear losses in the case of failure.
This is of course a highly technical area, and I understand the noble Baroness’s concerns. To that end, I am happy to explore whether there is further material that the Government can make available, such as worked examples, to help illustrate how this approach may work in practice. I hope these points can reassure the noble Baroness and I respectfully ask her to withdraw this amendment.
Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
The noble Lord has just confirmed the point that we talked about in Amendment 17, that there are situations where the use of the recapitalisation payment can, in effect, bail out some types of creditors. Indeed, he referred to unprotected deposits as being one area that might make sense. This is quite complex and I suspect that when we have seen the worked examples and so on, there is going to be more to discuss. Would he be prepared to meet with officials and Members of the Committee to go through these things prior to Report, so that we can make sure that we all really understand in what circumstances that that could happen and in what circumstances it cannot?
Lord Livermore (Lab)
Yes, absolutely; I will very happily meet. I will write a letter setting this out in greater detail, provide the worked examples, and then perhaps we can meet on that basis.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
I thank the Minister for his replies but I am still not satisfied, in part because of what is in the Explanatory Notes. They should be amended because they cannot stand alongside everything else that is said. I know that they have no legislative power but if we are looking for ways to interpret, they are there. The problem comes from, as I said, “shortfall”, which is defined in a way that has ambiguities. I know full well that “shortfall” was an unusual word; it did not need to be in the BRRD and was put in by the counsel—I think I know who did so because I was told to guard it with my life—for various operations that may still be needed. Now is the time to make it clear. The linkage back to it is not good.
Alongside worked examples, it would probably be quite useful to have a list of the instruments that we think are covered and those that are outside. MREL, which is loss absorption amount plus recapitalisation amount, covers common equity tier 1, other equity instruments, subordinated senior non-preferred instruments and ordinary unsecured senior instruments. It does not include repayable deposits and non-returnable deposits.
How have we ended up talking about bailing in unsecured depositors when we are talking about MREL, because they should not be there in the first place, as far as I understood things? If we cannot understand that, that is not right to put before the public. Can we have a list of the instruments that we think can be bailed in, where they are bailed in, and then the point at which in that stack the FSCS compensation can come in? Once we have worked out where that is and can see it clearly, I should be much better pleased if we could define that ab initio in the Bill rather than reference back to language that is flawed and risks either leading us up the garden path or not being able to understand it, even though I declare that I have confidence that the Bank of England will probably get it right.
It is splitting hairs, but I cannot make that wording work; I am sorry. Therefore, in hoping that I will get some more explanations, for the present, I shall withdraw the amendment, but it may well be that either this or my Amendment 22 in some form might need to reappear on Report. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.