That the draft Regulations laid before the House on 20 March be approved.
Relevant document: 34th Report of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee (special attention drawn to the instrument)
My Lords, the Stormont brake is at the heart of the Windsor Framework. In the view of His Majesty’s Government, it addresses the democratic deficit, restores the balance of the Belfast agreement and ends the prospect of dynamic alignment. It restores practical sovereignty to the United Kingdom as a whole and to the people of Northern Ireland in particular.
In a democracy, people should have a say over any change to the laws under which they live but, under the old protocol, that was not the case, as noble Lords from Northern Ireland have frequently pointed out in this House. Changes to laws were automatically imposed on Northern Ireland whether it wanted them or not, and I, like many in this House, found that an unacceptable state of affairs.
The Stormont brake not only ends that situation but ensures that changes to rules and regulations have the consent of both main community designations in the Northern Ireland Assembly, asserting a fundamental principle of the Belfast agreement. The process works as follows: once an amendment to existing EU law within the scope of the Windsor Framework has been adopted, this will be notified by the United Kingdom Government to the Northern Ireland Assembly. The brake is triggered if, within two months of notification, 30 MLAs from two or more parties object to an amending rule or regulation. These MLAs can be from the same community designation so, in theory and in practice, they can come from two or more unionist parties or two nationalist parties. The exercise of the brake will require no other process and no vote in the Assembly. Once the brake has been pulled, the law will automatically be disapplied in Northern Ireland after two weeks. The EU could challenge the use of the brake only through international arbitration after the law had been suspended, where the bar to overturn it would be exceptionally high.
In our view, the Stormont brake is one of the most significant changes that my right honourable friend the Prime Minister has secured. It is a robust change that gives the United Kingdom a veto over dynamic alignment with EU rules. Just as importantly, the regulations put the democratically elected representatives of the people of Northern Ireland in charge of whether and when that veto will be used.
The old protocol had some measures aimed at giving it democratic legitimacy; for example, the Government had—and still retain—a veto over any new laws that the EU wanted to add to the protocol. However, that veto did not extend to amendments to laws that are already here. Crucially, there was no role for the Northern Ireland Assembly in deciding whether and when to use the veto. Of course, the old protocol also contained a democratic consent mechanism as a means of giving the Assembly the right to end the application of its Articles 5 to 10. Those measures are maintained in the Windsor Framework but they were not in themselves enough to address the democratic deficit, as my noble friend Lord Dodds of Duncairn and others have pointed out to your Lordships’ House many times.
To address that, the regulations will add a new democratic scrutiny schedule to the Northern Ireland Act 1998 to codify the brake in domestic law. There will be a binding statutory obligation in domestic law on Ministers to pull the brake when a valid notification is provided by 30 or more MLAs. The UK Government must notify the EU when a valid notification of the brake has been provided by MLAs. This is an important new function for Members of the Assembly. It is vital that they can exercise this new function with the right information and expertise, which is why these regulations also provide for a Standing Committee of the Assembly to scrutinise the relevant rules properly.
Some have described these arrangements as tantamount to a consultative role for MLAs. The Government do not agree. In our view, this is a robust power for MLAs to stop the application of amended rules—a power that neither the UK Government nor the EU can override provided that the conditions in the framework are met. Some have also claimed that the EU must have some means of blocking the brake. These regulations are clear that the process is an entirely internal one for the United Kingdom; the process is firmly and unambiguously within strand 1 of the Belfast agreement, relating to the internal affairs of Northern Ireland. There is no role for any institutions outside the United Kingdom, whether the EU or anyone else, to determine whether the brake is pulled. It will be a choice for the United Kingdom and its sovereign Government alone, alongside elected MLAs, whether the brake is pulled.
Some also claimed that the Government might simply ignore the brake. These regulations make clear that the Government have no discretion and MLAs cannot be ignored. Valid notifications of the brake must be made to the EU, with the subsequent disapplication of any new law automatically after two weeks.
The Government’s actions will be subject to all the normal public law principles that attach to decision-making and cannot be abused for reasons of political expediency. For the avoidance of doubt, the regulations are clear that the prospect of remedial measures by the EU cannot be a relevant factor in the Government’s determination.
It is not enough simply to allow MLAs temporarily to halt the application of a rule but to allow the UK Government simply to override them when the joint committee decides whether the rule should be permanently disapplied. These regulations go much further and provide a clear, robust, directive role to determine whether the Government should use our veto or not.
The regulations are very clear: unless there is cross-community support in the Assembly, Ministers will be legally prohibited from accepting an amended or new EU law which creates a regulatory border between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom, except in varying exceptional circumstances. To be clear, “exceptional circumstances” means just that; the threshold is very high and any Minister invoking exceptional circumstances must be able to defend that decision robustly and in line with normal public law principles. Moreover, a Minister must account to Parliament where they have concluded that exceptional circumstances apply or where they consider that a measure would not create a regulatory border.
In the view of His Majesty’s Government, this represents one of the strongest statutory constraints on the exercise of ministerial functions under any treaty codified in domestic law. These regulations could scarcely make it clearer: the overwhelming presumption is that, unless the Northern Ireland Assembly says yes, the United Kingdom Government must say no.
Finally, as with any international agreement, if the EU considers that the UK has pulled the brake improperly, it may choose to initiate a dispute. We need to be clear that any dispute could arise only after the rules have been disapplied in Northern Ireland and that the resolution of that dispute would be for an international arbitration panel. The European Court of Justice would have no role in resolving that dispute.
These regulations also make the case for functioning devolved institutions in Northern Ireland even more compelling. These measures will become operable only once the institutions are restored. The regulations give domestic legal effect to this democratic safeguard and restore the UK’s sovereignty. Without this measure, Northern Ireland would continue to have full and automatic dynamic alignment with EU goods rules, with no say for the Northern Ireland Assembly and no veto on amending or replacing measures. That is not a situation that I can support. Should we vote on this measure, I would urge all Members of this House to back an end to that full and automatic dynamic alignment. I therefore commend the regulations to the House and beg to move.
Amendment to the Motion
My Lords, it has been a long debate and I will not detain your Lordships for much longer, but I want to deal with a couple of issues which have been the theme of today’s debate. The Labour Party will support the Government, as it did in the House of Commons, and it will urge Members to vote against the DUP’s amendment to the Motion.
Much has been said about the hype which the Prime Minister is supposed to have used when he was selling this measure. Well, that is what Prime Ministers do, in my experience; they do an awful lot of hyping. In this case, I think he was right to hype it, compared to what his two predecessors had done over the last few years, when they simply did not address the issue of their own making. The irony is that those two former Prime Ministers, who wanted to see change, then promptly voted against the current Prime Minister’s own proposal. It is a bit daft, really.
The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Swire, was extremely valid: this all goes back to the whole issue of Brexit. I am not saying whether we should be for or against it, but the fact that Brexit occurred had a disproportionate impact on Northern Ireland, more than any other part of the United Kingdom. I was there when that agreement was made 25 years ago, and it was made much easier because both Ireland and the United Kingdom were members of the European Union. It meant we were in the same club, and that officials and Ministers dealt with each other all the time, in Brussels and elsewhere. And it meant, of course, that the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland was very different from any other border that could be envisaged, outside Brexit. As soon as Brexit happened, there was inevitably an effect upon Northern Ireland. The noble Lord, Lord Swire, is right that far too much inattention was given to the problem of Northern Ireland during the referendum debate. People in Northern Ireland discussed it, but elsewhere in the United Kingdom it did not figure at the top of the lists, but every year since, it has dominated because we knew that we had not dealt with the situation in the way that it should have been.
You cannot be in a single market without rules; it is as simple as that. If you do not want any rules, you get out of the single market. I think this framework means that those rules are simplified; they are fewer and less cumbersome; they allow things to happen between Great Britain and Northern Ireland which could not happen before.
The Stormont brake is complicated and convoluted, but it is an answer to the difficulties that we are in. The only way the brake can be applied is if there is an Assembly up and running. The biggest democratic deficit is not EU laws affecting Northern Ireland, as difficult as that is for many people; it is the fact that there is no Assembly, no Government, no Executive, no north-south bodies, no Good Friday agreement in parts operating in Northern Ireland—that is the deficit.
The irony is that the Stormont brake can operate within the structures of a restored Assembly and Executive. More than that, where is the best forum to discuss all the issues that people, including the DUP and others, are concerned about? Not here, but in Belfast. This issue should be decided in Belfast, not in London or in Brussels, and the only way that can happen is if you have an Assembly and Executive up and running again. I say to the DUP, “Go into the Assembly and argue your case. Ensure that the Assembly and all its Members listen to the points that the DUP has made during the last three hours”.
Excepting my noble friends Lord Hain and Lady Ritchie, very little has been said about the fact that it is not just unionists who are in the Assembly; the majority are not unionists. That is not for one second to say that the unionist view should be ignored; of course it should not, because consent between the communities is the basis of the Good Friday agreement. Little has been said about what nationalists think about the Windsor Framework, the protocol, the Stormont brake and how it could affect them, because they would inevitably see it as a means by which unionists have to be assuaged, whether that is right or wrong.
The other thing that has been ignored is that there is a shift in Northern Ireland politics. The last number of elections have shown us that there are large swathes of people who no longer identify either as nationalists or unionists. That has been seen in the election results for the Alliance Party, which now has 17 seats in the Assembly, only eight fewer than the Democratic Unionist Party. Its views ought to be taken into account as well, but none of that can happen if there is no Assembly or Executive.
Much has been made tonight, particularly by the DUP Members of your Lordships’ House, of the importance of the union and of sustaining it. But as we approach the 25th anniversary of the Good Friday agreement in two weeks’ time, central to that—the core of it, really—is the issue of consent. That is not just the consent of unionists and nationalists but the consent of the people of Northern Ireland to make a change in their constitutional status. The union is absolutely safe so long as the principle of consent is agreed to, and it will be. If the people of Northern Ireland democratically wish to leave the United Kingdom, they will leave. But they have not said that, and there is no indication that they will.
When I took the Northern Ireland Act 1998, as it became, through the House of Commons 25 years ago, it enshrined in our constitution and in our law that people in Northern Ireland will have the final say. However difficult it is to accept that EU law is law above British law in Northern Ireland, the union is safe so long as the principle of consent is there. We will celebrate the 25th anniversary of the Good Friday agreement in two weeks’ time. Most Members of this House, including myself, can take our minds back to 30 years ago and think about what Northern Ireland was like then, and what it has been like since 1998. We must not jeopardise that.
Forgive me, my Lords, if I just try to get my circulation going.
I am extremely grateful to all noble Lords who have participated in this debate, which noble Lords will recall was time-limited in the House of Commons to 90 minutes. We have now spent three hours and 23 minutes on it, which at least gives some indication of the diligence and seriousness with which noble Lords take the scrutiny functions of this House. I am grateful at the outset to all those who have spoken. I fear that, if I tried to address every question and every point that has been raised, the Chief Whip might have to cancel the Easter Recess, which I do not think would make us very popular. I hope noble Lords will forgive me if I cannot cover every speech and every point.
As ever, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Murphy of Torfaen, for his wise counsel and support, and to the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, from the Liberal Democrats. The noble Lord referred to the importance of getting the institutions back up and running. As we mark the 25th anniversary of the Belfast agreement in a couple of weeks’ time—I think he and I will be at some of the same events—that is an urgent priority for His Majesty’s Government. I give the assurance that we will continue to work strenuously towards that objective.
I am also grateful to a number of my noble friends behind me. My noble friend Lord Lexden made a customarily powerful intervention, and I share his assessment of the Windsor Framework. My noble friend Lord Swire said some kind words about my thighs on the Bench. His dilemma, if you like, and the issues he confronted back in 2016, entirely echoed my own when it came to the referendum. I think we found ourselves voting in the same way in the end. My noble friends Lord Robathan and Lord Taylor of Holbeach also expressed support, for which I am grateful.
We are being asked to consider the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, so I believe it would be helpful if I tried to address at least some of the points that he and all his DUP colleagues who spoke in the debate raised this afternoon and this evening. I acknowledge the concern expressed by a number of noble Lords, including DUP Peers but also my noble friend Lord Robathan, that the mechanism in these regulations does not apply to EU law already in place and that it applies only to future new or replacement EU law. To this I simply say that the amount of EU law that applies in Northern Ireland is less than 3% of the whole. Of course, as has been pointed out during the debate, democratically elected representatives in Northern Ireland retain the right to reject that 3% through next year’s consent vote. I know noble Lords have views on the democratic consent mechanism, but I do not think it would be fruitful to reopen that debate at this moment. It is the case that through the Windsor Framework we have removed 1,700 pages of EU law. In response to a recent Question from my noble friend Lord Dodds of Duncairn, I highlighted that in annexe 1 of the EU regulations concerning SPS rules to accommodate Northern Ireland, 67 EU rules are disapplied. All the disapplied law is, I think, contained in the legal text published on 27 February.