Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 9) Regulations 2022
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debate
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
That the Grand Committee do consider the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 9) Regulations 2022.
The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon) (Con)
My Lords, a copy of these regulations were laid before this House on 27 April. They were laid under the powers provided by the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, and they came into effect under the “made affirmative” procedure. I say from the outset that this instrument has been considered and not reported by both the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments and the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee.
In lock-step with our allies, we continue to develop the largest and most severe package of economic sanctions that Russia has ever faced. These measures are already helping to cripple Mr Putin’s war machine through restricting finance access, targeting his corrupt cronies and cutting them off from the international community, and indeed paralysing the Russian military-industrial complex for years to come.
This new legislation introduces trade sanctions relating to internet services and online media services. Put simply, this allows us to cut off propagandists and organisations spreading the Russian regime’s vicious lies and disinformation online. The Russian Government are conducting an aggressive set of online information operations against Ukraine at times in a transparent but clearly shameful attempt to justify their illegal war on Ukraine. This must be stopped.
Ofcom has already removed the broadcast licence of “Russia Today” on the basis that it is not fit and proper to hold it. However, until the regulations now being debated in your Lordships’ House entered into force, no powers existed in the UK to block access to the same disinformation being spread by way of the website, social media accounts and applications of “Russia Today”. This instrument will ensure that social media services, internet services and app stores will have to take reasonable steps to prevent UK users encountering content produced or uploaded by a person designated for this purpose. Indeed, it will be for Ofcom to enforce this new legislation, and it has been given the power to impose fines on those who fail to comply.
ANO TV-Novosti, the parent organisation for RT, and Rossiya Segodnya, the parent organisation for Sputnik, were designated for the purpose of these measures by my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary on 4 May 2022. These puppet organisations are demonstrably part of Russia’s global disinformation campaign, as RT’s own editor-in-chief has made clear in the past when she called the network an “information weapon” of the Russian state. These organisations are propaganda arms of the Russian state—as a consequence of both their ownership and of Russian law, which prevents the war being reported objectively and truthfully. Now that third parties are required to restrict access to content pumped out by these designated organisations, this will limit their audience and blunt the effect of their Russian state message of aggression against Ukraine.
To conclude, we will not cease in delivering further sanctions while Mr Putin’s illegal and egregious invasion continues. The ultimate objective is to ensure that Ukraine succeeds. The whole of the UK Government—I also fully acknowledge the support in your Lordships’ House and across all parties—together with our international allies are working to ensure that this happens. Our fight against disinformation and harmful propaganda forms a key component of this. Mr Putin’s war on Ukraine is based on lies. Britain has helped to lead the way in tackling disinformation, and this new legislation enables us to blunt Mr Putin’s weapons of war and hit the shameless propagandists who push out his fake news and narratives. I beg to move.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
My Lords, the Liberal Democrats support this instrument, having consistently maintained views the Minister has indicated. This is the ninth sets of such regulations that we have scrutinised and supported. The Minister is absolutely right that, as this illegal aggression continues, depressingly, we continue to see horrors inflicted on the people of Ukraine. Therefore, the Government’s response, supported by the Opposition—to use every mechanism to seek to impact on the decision-making of the Putin regime—is to be supported.
There are early signs that the collective imposition of the sanctions from the United Kingdom and our allies is impacting on the Russian economy. We are mindful that many people in Russia are in receipt of the lies and misinformation of the Putin regime, in addition to those around the world, and they are likely to be victims of this. That is why, as President Zelensky has indicated, it adds to the pressure on the Putin regime to come to a diplomatic solution and to cease the violence.
I want to probe just a couple of areas, and then ask the Minister a couple of questions on aspects related to these sanctions, rather than the sanctions themselves. First, we have been aware of the European Union sanctions on social media on 2 March, and then the reciprocal decisions by Russia on Instagram determining Meta as an extremist organisation on 11 March and blocking Euronews on 21 March. On 14 April, it registered as foreign agents under its laws 79 NGOs and 131 media outlets. The Putin regime is not only waging war on the people of Ukraine, but it is waging war on free media around the world. It is right, therefore, that the European Union, the United States, Canada and the UK, as the Minister said, work in lock-step.
Will the Minister demonstrate how robust these measures will be, given that there has been a gap between the EU operating its sanctions and the measures before us, and that there is some indication that RT and Sputnik have been successful in working around some of the EU regulations? The Minister has highlighted the designated persons measure, which I support, but we have already seen in respect of the equivalent for those indicated by the European Union the use of proxy sites and other social media platforms to disseminate information. The use of visual content bearing RT logos but not originating from RT, uploaded by users, has been co-ordinated and has an absolute purpose to work around the sanctions. How robust does the Minister consider these measures will be, in the light of what we have seen of RT-hosted material on other platforms around the world? How easy is it for those to be used in the United Kingdom?
Will the Minister confirm that these measures will cover virtual private networks? Use of VPNs and RT content through other countries has increased by 50%. If someone is seeking to access RT, Sputnik or other material from designated persons via a VPN, is that an offence under UK law?
My second question regards the extraterritorial jurisdiction nature. It is right that the designated persons are overseas entities, but can the designated persons be operating across all groups seeking to use the disinformation tactics of the Putin regime? I mention specifically Wagner Group, one of the arms of which has been sanctioned by the UK as named individuals. That is correct, and the Minister knows I am on record as wanting the Government to go beyond that and have it proscribed as a terrorist organisation. It is active, as are other mercenary groups, as the disseminator of disinformation and misinformation.
Can mercenary groups be designated persons under these matters? I know that the Minister will say that they keep the list of designated persons under review, but I should like him to go beyond that and say that there are no limits under the terms of the legislation on who designated persons could be. It would be regrettable if there were those seeking actively, with resource from the Putin regime working in many countries, to work around sanctions such as these, but they were not included. Can Ofcom police them if they are designated persons who are groups outside the UK? What legislative powers does Ofcom have to work with international partners on policing?
Finally, I ask the Prime Minister—the Minister, although I see I had a Freudian slip into a dream world I have, even if the Conservatives are in power, that someone might be doing a better job than the Prime Minister. Now that I have emphasised that point, Hansard will not be able to correct me.
The Prime Minister’s spokesman is now on record as indicating why we are not in lock-step with one of our allies, Canada, on the sanctioning of Alexander Lebedev. As the Minister will well know, the Canadians have been working extremely closely with the UK and others and the Minister said that we are working in lock-step, but when it comes to the judgment of the Canadians that Alexander Lebedev should be sanctioned, the Prime Minister’s spokesman said,
“it’s not for me to comment on the judgment of a different country”.
What do we believe the Canadian judgment to be and why do we not share it? Alexander Lebedev has been singled out by the Canadians as worthy of being sanctioned. What mechanisms do we have in the United Kingdom to ensure that this individual, sanctioned by one of our closest allies, or any of his family members will not be able to use the United Kingdom to circumvent Canadian sanctions? With those questions, I support the regulations overall.
Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)
The noble Viscount is absolutely right. The real issue here, on our policy of ensuring that Putin cannot act with impunity, is that this Government act with one voice and that all departments—be it the FCDO, the Home Office or the Department for International Trade—act in concert. I hope the Minister can respond to that point.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to today’s short but insightful and timely discussion. I will address the important questions that been raised. If there are questions that I do not cover specifically, I will flag them and write to noble Lords in the usual way.
First and foremost, on that final point, the Government work across government but also with key sectors. We also work with British companies so that they fully understand the impact of the sanctions being imposed, because challenges are being felt far and wide because of them.
Equally, I say from the outset to the noble Lords, Lord Collins, Lord Purvis and Lord Rooker, that we absolutely have to work in lock-step. The noble Lord, Lord Collins, is fully aware of my view as the FCDO Minister responsible for sanctions that the most effective sanctions are those where we work in absolute lock-step with our key partners—the likes of Canada, the US and the European Union. I assure all noble Lords that we have regular and frequent conversations about the designations we will make, but equally about the designations that other jurisdictions are making, to ensure that any semblance of difference can be addressed quickly and in an expedited form. Indeed, the measures we have had to introduce over the last few months reflect the Government’s desire to ensure that our own regime and framework reflect our ability to act, and quickly. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, for recognising that. As all noble Lords will recognise, there is a need for agility to act very quickly.
While I cannot give assurance beyond what I normally state about future designations, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, that nothing, or no one, is out of our consideration for any designations of individuals or organisations. It would be speculative to go into any further detail, but we are looking at this in terms of ensuring that our sanctions team is extensively resourced and of working very closely with our allies in this respect. We have directly sanctioned more than 1,000 individuals and more than 100 businesses since Mr Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. This is constant. I assure the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, that the number of designations and the information I see, and the fact that we are having our ninth or 10th debate on specific issues in this respect, reflect the Government really focusing on the priorities.
The noble Lord, Lord Rooker, asked about the Crown dependencies, as did the noble Viscount, Lord Waverley, about the OTs. In all instances, our legislation has direct impact in the Crown dependencies and the OTs. There is an exception in two OTs—Bermuda and Gibraltar—where an Order in Council cannot be issued and they legislate for themselves, but they have been legislating to effect anything introduced in the UK jurisdictions elsewhere. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Collins, we are working very closely with all our Crown dependency Governments, as well as the OT Administrations and Governments, to ensure they follow the UK Government’s lead. The Order in Council allows us to act decisively when it comes to the OTs.
I thank noble Lords again for their strong support of the Government’s position. As I acknowledged in my opening remarks, I am grateful in particular to the noble Lords, Lord Purvis and Lord Collins, for their strong support for the Government’s position, both in and outside the Chamber. As I have done previously, I will continue to update them as required and appropriate to ensure that they are fully up to speed with the Government’s position and the future actions that we will take.
The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, raised the important issue of VPNs and asked whether this was an offence under UK law. It is not as it applies in the UK and the EU. The issue is cutting off the information at the source of spread—that is, the ISPs and social media companies. The measures we and our partners have been taking act on the providers, not the individual users, of the internet. In our view, it is not appropriate to place the offence on individuals who may be using VPNs. That said, VPNs have been used as a tool to circumvent, as the noble Lord mentioned, but our position is that this is not unique to the UK; we are talking to our partners to see how, as Russia continues with its approach on misinformation, we can work in a more co-ordinated fashion.
Viscount Waverley (CB)
My Lords, I will just take this opportunity briefly to address VPNs. VPNs are a two-way street: a VPN can also enable information from outside Russia to get into Russia to enable those Russians who wish to understand what on earth is going on better to do so. That may be somewhere in the mix, but this is a rhetorical question; the Minister does not need to respond.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
The noble Viscount partly answered my point on VPNs. He is quite right that they are used as an important tool and we are working with key organisations on this. What is very different with the BBC World Service, for example, is that it reports independently of government and autonomously. However, the use of VPNs has a benefit. That is why I suggested to the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, that we could perhaps meet to address some of these issues.
As to the noble Lord’s other question, I have gone as far as I can at this time. Our responsibility is for what applies in the United Kingdom. In the designations we have made we have acted to ensure that, where we identify family members who may be involved—in this case we looked directly at the family members of Mr Putin, for example—they are individuals who we look at very closely and designate as appropriate. As I said, we continue to look at all situations concerning individuals and organisations, and will keep this under review. We are also mindful of the actions our allies are taking. With that, I once again thank noble Lords for their contributions and their continued support of the Government’s position.