Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill (Second sitting)

(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)

Committee stage
Tuesday 18th May 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I am afraid I have to strike a balance and I have to switch to the Minister, for his questions. I am sorry.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Chris Philp)]

Q Thank you, Mr McCabe. To pick up on the questions asked by the hon. Member for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham) about minimum sentences, we have minimum sentences in very rare circumstances at present. Can you give the Committee your views about the pros and cons or the considerations we should have in mind if any proposals are made to increase the range of circumstances or offences to which minimum sentences might be applied?

Adrian Crossley: So that I understand the question and I answer it properly, are you asking what merits we would need to see in order for there to be an expansion of minimum tariffs in sentencing? Is that what you mean?

[Chris Philp]

Or the risks. What are your views about the principles of the possibility?

Adrian Crossley: My own view is that judicial discretion should be king. I have not done any huge research into this, but in my view and from my practice, sentencing guidelines have become very prescriptive and they almost railroad judges into decisions. Judges always have parameters to work within, but what is before the court is often something that is necessarily unique. Minimum sentencing can shackle decision makers who are acutely aware of the facts in front of them.

The only benefit I see is in cases where there are overwhelming public interest concerns that mean that a minimum tariff would adequately address a specific mischief and would undo it. If I were to see that, I would regard that as a pro for minimum sentences. I would need to see an evidence base that that would achieve that.

Phil Bowen: I agree with what Adrian says. In general, a lot of the evidence from, for example, the United States on mandatory minimums is not encouraging, but I see an argument for Parliament identifying particular crimes of concern and putting those in place. We should be clear that the deterrent effect of that is likely to be pretty mixed. The evidence is pretty mixed about whether that kind of thing really does deter future crime, but I can see the public need for the Government to be seen to respond to public desires around particular signal crimes. That is why, although I do not reject them out of hand, I agree entirely with Adrian that judicial discretion is extraordinarily important because judges will know the facts of the case much better than the press or the public watching on.

[Chris Philp]

Q In relation to the proposals to make curfews potentially longer and more flexible, do you think that will make community sentences potentially more effective and might, furthermore, potentially reduce reoffending?

Phil Bowen: I think the emphasis in the Bill and the White Paper on flexibility around the use of electronic monitoring is the strongest part of the proposals. What the Ministry seems to be doing, which I think is right, is to encourage probation officer discretion and the flexible use of electronic monitoring powers, both to control people where there is need for further control, and to loosen up things where they are doing well. Part of the problem with electronic monitoring to date has been far too rigid sets of curfews without the ability for probation officers to vary them while people are on community sentences. I certainly support that.

In terms of providing for longer periods of electronic monitoring, I can see cases where that may well be useful. The only note of caution that I would suggest to the Committee is that the evidence base suggests that for younger people—in particular, young adults who live at home and people assessed as low risk—longer periods of electronic location monitoring can have a backfire effect. In other words, it can lead to increases in reoffending. All that really means is that the Bill provides the powers that it does, and it is then the job of the probation service to use those powers as flexibly as possible and in line with the evidence.

[Chris Philp]

Thank you. I was going to ask about problem-solving courts, but I think that was covered adequately in earlier questions. I think Minister Atkins has some questions.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Victoria Atkins)]

Q This is a quick question for Mr Crossley. The CSJ has obviously done a lot of work over the years on gang crime and on the many levers we can try to use to address it. What is the CSJ’s view of serious violence reduction orders, namely the piloting of stop-and-search orders for known—in other words, convicted—knife offenders aged over 18?

Adrian Crossley: This policy actually has its origins in the CSJ. We are obviously very supportive of the serious violence reduction order. Just for clarity, and so I can answer that more fully, this is a post-conviction order. We regard it as being part of the wider system. We do not regard it as a stand-alone solution to knife crime in our country.

We see a very significant increase, not just in possession of weapon offences, but of violent offences perpetrated with the use of a weapon. What is clear to us is that we need to do something about that which is robust enough to challenge the mindset of someone leaving their home with a weapon. We draw from the group violence intervention models piloted in Boston in the US under Operation Ceasefire, which create a sort of pull-push effect. We really want to deter people from being able to leave the home feeling that they are safe walking around with a weapon. They should know that they are much more likely to attract police attention if they are on these orders. At the same time, in the sentencing court, we would hope that the order would be able to include other, positive provisions—perhaps even a knife crime behaviour order. Real intervention, engaging young people and pulling them away from that sort of offending can also have a pull effect away from that kind of offence.

I should say that currently, as it is being piloted, it is only for adults. Our view is that knife possession is pervasive across a number of age groups: it is particularly concerning when young people are carrying knives. We would like to see this scheme really being rolled out, so that we can intervene early when people are younger, to see that we do everything we can to take knives off the street and keep people safer.

[The Chair]

As it is 2.45 pm, we had better call this session to an end. I thank the witnesses for the evidence they have given to the Committee.

Examination of Witnesses 

Jonathan Hall QC and Matt Parr gave evidence.

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[The Chair]

I am going to have to stop you there. I will switch to the Government side and Victoria Atkins.

[Victoria Atkins]

Q Thank you. First, Mr Hall, I would like to understand how the measures relating to MAPPA in clause 162 will improve public protection and the management of terrorist offenders.

Jonathan Hall QC: First of all, it means that anyone who is a risky offender—whatever they were put inside for, whether they were sentenced for a terrorist offence or were sentenced for a non-terrorist one but are in fact a risk—can be managed under MAPPA. The law as it stands states that someone must be a risk based on their offending.

To take the example of a fraudster who went to prison and was then dangerously radicalised and became a terrorist risk, their risk would not in fact flow from their offending. Clause 162 cures that, so that anyone who is identified as a terrorist risk may be manged under MAPPA. That is a good thing, because the authorities found it quite hard to deal with that cohort of people.

The other thing that clause 162 does is to make it very clear that people can provide information to MAPPA without having to do what they used to do when I carried out my review, which was to look for information gateways in, for example, the Children Act 1989 or the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, because they did not feel that there was a clear basis for them to share information with MAPPA. As you will understand, the key thing about managing terrorist risk is that all the right information should be receivable. Clause 162 cures that point as well.

[Victoria Atkins]

In other words, dealing with the reality presented by a very small number of the most dangerous offenders—dealing with that reality, rather than being constrained by the fact that they committed a fraud offence in the past, rather than a terrorist offence.

Jonathan Hall QC: Exactly.

[Victoria Atkins]

Q Thank you. May I clarify something, Mr Parr? Please forgive me if this was my mishearing or misunderstanding. You asked a series of questions in relation to the public order measures and at one point, I think, used “significant”, rather than “serious”. You said that HMIC had looked at the risk of serious disruption and so on. Is that correct? Did I understand you correctly?

Matt Parr: There were four tests in the law as it stands, one of which is “serious disruption”. Clause 55, I think, changes that to “significant disruption”, among some others. It is a general lowering of the bar.

[Victoria Atkins]

Q I must confess that I cannot see that wording—perhaps we can take this up afterwards. Clause 55(6) talks about

“serious disruption to the activities of an organisation”,

or,

“serious disruption to the life of the community.”

That is the wording in clause 54 as well. As you will understand, clauses 54 and 55 are about ensuring consistency between moving protest and static protest. We heard from police witnesses this morning that one can flow into the other very easily, and back again.

May I also ask about clause 59? That places the common law offence of public nuisance on the statute book. Does the inspectorate have any views on that, or has it made any recommendations on it previously?

Matt Parr: Not previously, but we did in the report we put out in March. That was one of the five proposals that the Home Secretary asked us to comment on in particular. Our view was that we agreed with what the Law Commission recommended back in 2015, I think. We concluded, for much the same reasons as they did, that that was a sensible thing to do. In summary, we thought that protesters deserve to know where they stand, and that there was no harm in making the rules clearer than they are. It was supporting the Law Commission’s proposal.

[Victoria Atkins]

Thank you very much indeed.

[Chris Philp]

Q May I start by asking Matt Parr if you have any views on the proposals for out-of-court disposals, in particular to simplify the current number of out-of-court disposals, cautions and so on from six down to two, following the pilot that took place in three force areas?

Matt Parr: I am really sorry. I have not looked at that. I cannot give you an answer, I am afraid.

[Chris Philp]

Q Not to worry; no problem at all.

Let me turn to Jonathan, if I may, going back to clause 108, which Alex Cunningham was asking about. This is in relation to prisoners sentenced for non-terrorist offences who are deemed to become high risk in the course of their sentence. To clarify, is your understanding of the clause the same as mine—that the Secretary of State does not have the power to unilaterally ask for their prolonged incarceration, but instead the Secretary of State simply has a power to refer the prisoner to the Parole Board, which will then make the assessment of dangerousness? It is the Parole Board that makes the decision, not the Secretary of State; the Secretary of State simply refers. Is that your understanding as well?

Jonathan Hall QC: Yes. I have it in front of me. I think the point that Mr Cunningham was making is that it is the Secretary of State who refers it, but you are right: it is the Secretary of State who refers it, but ultimately it is the Parole Board that decides.

[Chris Philp]

Q I think Mr Cunningham said that the Secretary of State took the decision, so I was simply seeking to clarify that the Secretary of State refers but the Parole Board decides. Mr Cunningham also made a point about the prospect of longer incarceration, and he quoted the Prison Reform Trust. Jonathan, can you confirm that no one can stay in prison for longer than the sentence handed down by the judge? What this is simply doing is potentially removing the release point, and removing the release point within a sentence— a sentence handed down by the judge that cannot be exceeded—is considered lawful and compatible with ECHR and other rights. Indeed, we have done it before, have we not, in changing the automatic release provisions in previous legislation?

Jonathan Hall QC: Yes, that is right. When the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020—the emergency legislation that came in after the attack at Fishmongers’ Hall—transformed people from automatic release prisoners to people who would have to apply to the Parole Board at the two-thirds point, it had an effect on people who are currently serving. That was challenged in the courts by one of the affected prisoners, and the High Court concluded that it was consistent with article 7.

[Chris Philp]

Q Exactly, and this would have a similar effect. I was the Bill Minister for that Bill, and I was delighted that the High Court found our legislation to be lawful and compatible with human rights.

The final point that Mr Cunningham raised was in relation to the potential for a cliff edge if somebody serves all of their sentence in prison and is not released early. He referred to the possibility of a cliff edge, which exists in various other contexts that you have referred to already. Am I right in saying that if the Government, the security services or the authorities are concerned about the risk that a particular prisoner might pose following release if they were released without licence conditions because they had served all of the sentence, it would be open to the security services, acting through the Secretary of State for the Home Department, to apply for a TPIM if they felt the threshold was met? That would be one option available if they wanted to manage risk, accepting that TPIMs are rarely used.

Jonathan Hall QC: You anticipated what I was going to say. Yes, that is available, but TPIMs are very resource-intensive, and they are very rarely used for that reason.

[Chris Philp]

That is an option. That is extremely helpful clarification.

[The Chair]

Does anyone else have any questions?

[Alex Cunningham]

I misunderstood the line about the role of the Parole Board. I was concerned about what happens beyond the completion of the sentence. As the Minister says, the TPIM is used only in extremely rare circumstances, and it was unclear when that would apply and when it would not apply. Again, my concern is the cliff edge—somebody being released into the community without any licence conditions or further restrictions on their movements.

[Chris Philp]

Q To clarify, the serving of the full sentence is a matter for the Parole Board. It is open to the Parole Board to choose to release the prisoner after the automatic release point but before the end of the sentence, in which case there would be a period on licence between the release point and the end of the sentence. It does not follow automatically that they would be released with no licence period following, although it is possible.

[Alex Cunningham]

rose—

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[The Chair]

I think we will switch to the ministerial side of the Committee.

[Victoria Atkins]

Q On the subject of unauthorised encampments, can you give us any insight about the harms and costs caused by unauthorised encampments in your local areas?

Alison Hernandez: I want to be really clear what we are all talking about. We are not talking about all Gypsies and Travellers.

[Victoria Atkins]

Exactly.

Alison Hernandez: We are not talking about the travelling community. We are talking about a minority of people. I have examples in Exeter city where the local authority created a very nice site so that we could admit them quicker from where they were. It had everything that they needed and the facilities that they wanted, and it was in a nice, secluded spot. When the police went in to evict them, they decided not to go to that site that was available to them. They wanted to go to the next game that they wanted to play. Let’s be really clear about this: we are talking about a minority of people who do not want to abide by the law of this country. I believe we need this offence to support our communities and to send a very strong message: you do not do this type of behaviour.

I mentioned the £18,500 metal fencing created at Drumbridges roundabout to stop them accessing that land. They broke into that land. I have communities who will tell me that they have spotters who go ahead to break open the gates, so they will use the excuse that the gates were already open. All these sorts of things are happening. I have asked about CCTV—can we put it on the main sites where we have these things happening? It cannot be done, because of human rights—because it is where someone is living. Every place you turn to as a community to try to solve this problem is not available.

For me, harms are being caused. On Dartmoor alone, when they had an unauthorised encampment, it became absolutely huge. When these things get so huge, no one can move them on, because the amount of resource required to do so is immense. The bailiffs were going to cost £50,000 a day, and they would still need police back-up in order to do it. The cost is absolutely huge. There is something about sending a message through this Bill which tells the public that we are on their side and that we do not support people who do not want to abide by the law.

David Lloyd: I entirely agree with that. In Welwyn Garden City, we have a person who has almost been driven to the verge of bankruptcy because there was an unauthorised encampment which decided, at the same time, to take on industrial-level fly-tipping. It would cost about £150,000 to move those materials. That originally happened 18 months or two years ago. It is still there among all the woodland.

These people are at the end of their tether. The cost is not just monetary. I have people calling me who really are frightened because they have had large numbers of people on their own land and they feel intimidated and personally threatened. We need to do something about it. Much of it is about sending a message.

While I recognise that it is not helped, as I said earlier, by the fact that local authorities do not provide sufficient spots for Travellers to move on to—I recognise that is something we need to do—we also need to send a message that these people can be moved on if they are in an unauthorised place. We need to send that message out again, as Alison has said far more ably than me, so that the public recognise that we are on their side and we are on the side of the underdog.

Councillor Caliskan: All I would add is that I recognise that there are strongly held views, and we have councils who articulate exactly what colleagues on this panel have spoken about. It can be a huge cost to a local authority.

The best way to deal with these issues is through a collaborative approach, not just through agencies in a particular area, but also with the communities themselves who may be occupying the space. Something has got to give at some point, and an obvious solution is trying to identify space. Local authorities absolutely do not want to be encouraging criminality and disruption, not least because it costs a lot of money, but we could be going round and round in circles unless we find a long-term solution. I recognise that the Bill is an attempt to do that. All I would say is that in order for there to be a collaborative approach, alongside that there needs to be an approach that is about dialogue with communities, too. I do not think that contradicts anything that other panel members have said.

[Victoria Atkins]

Just to assist the Committee, clause 61 focuses on the conditions whereby this offence can be committed. The phrases “significant damage”, “significant disruption” and “significant distress” appear to cover the descriptions given by Commissioner Hernandez and Commissioner Lloyd.

On the serious violence duty, where the Government are requiring local agencies to work together to draw together plans to tackle serious violence in their local areas, I am happy to reassure Commissioner Lloyd that clause 13 very much views police and crime commissioners and mayors with policing powers as having a convening role in that. What value do you think will be gained in your local areas from requiring these organisations—vital as they are, in their many ways, in tackling the serious violence that we hope to prevent—to get around a table and work together with schools and educational establishments, in particular, to ensure that we prevent serious violence?

[The Chair]

Very briefly, please, because we are almost out of time.

David Lloyd: Things that are asked for specifically and are required of us get done. This measure strengthens what many of us are already putting into our own police and crime plans. It is always better to place a duty on us, because that ensures that it gets done. We really do need to ensure that the scourge of serious violence is reduced. There are many parts of the country—thankfully not Hertfordshire—where this is out of control, and this measure will help.

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[The Chair]

We had better move to the Government side.

[Victoria Atkins]

Q I should declare that I am a door tenant at Red Lion Chambers. Mr Wagner, I will first deal with the issues you raised. Presumably you accept that freedom of speech and freedom to assemble are qualified rights.

Adam Wagner: Yes, of course.

[Victoria Atkins]

Q And presumably you accept—well, you tell me. Do you accept that the Public Order Act 1986 is a piece of legislation that has stood the test of time and should remain in law?

Adam Wagner: I think I would be neutral on that. It is a very wide piece of legislation. Every time I read it, I am pretty surprised at how wide it is already. What I am pretty clear about is that section 12 does not need to be widened.

[Victoria Atkins]

Q So the Public Order Act 1986 goes too far for your liking in some instances in section 12.

Adam Wagner: Well, potentially. The proof is often in the pudding. It depends on how the police use it and whether they are using it effectively. I have read the report from Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services. I speak to a lot of police, and my experience is that they know they have a wide suite of powers when it comes to protest. What they struggle with, if you look at what has happened over the covid regulations, is deciding when to use them and what is proportionate. These are very difficult policing situations, and they are not necessarily solved by imposing widespread conditions that may lead to legal challenges, which may be successful. Successful policing of protests ultimately comes down to working with the protesters and civil society—hearts and minds stuff from the police. You saw that with the Sarah Everard vigil, and you see that with Extinction Rebellion and Black Lives Matter. I do not think you can really enforce your way out of some of the disruption caused by protest. It is really about allowing voices to be heard and being careful.

[Victoria Atkins]

Q And yet the 1986 Act, which you have described as very wide ranging, has permitted the protests that you have described by some of the organisations you have described—yes?

Adam Wagner: Well, in part. The Public Order Act was used quite extensively over the course of the Extinction Rebellion protests, and Black Lives Matter was under the covid regulations last summer. That was the power that was used, and those are much more extensive. The covid regulations are far too extensive. We saw there the problems when the police are given too much power, because then they have to make what are not really public order decisions but substantive political decisions about which protests they do and do not allow. That is the danger. I do not think it is a right-wing or left-wing issue; any Government should be worried about protests being limited by political decisions, rather than public order decisions.

[Victoria Atkins]

Q Mr Wagner, just to be clear, you are the only person thus far in this Committee who has used the phrases “right wing” or “left wing”. Presumably you are pleased that in clause 54(3) the Government have introduced the objective test of a person of reasonable firmness in order to assist police officers making the very difficult decisions—as you yourself have said—under this part of the Bill. In other words, it is an objective test, rather than a subjective test.

Adam Wagner: I think the objective test would assist the courts; I do not think it would assist police officers. Anything that limits these powers is better than not, but I just think the powers themselves are too wide for the reasons I have set out. I do not think that helps anything. From a policing perspective, applying all those tests is not going to be easy anyway. Really, this is about the width of the powers overall as a package, rather than the reasonable firmness test or anything like that.

[Victoria Atkins]

Q Chair, I am conscious of time. Mr Willers, I want to draw to your attention the drafting of clause 61. I hope that you would accept that it is very focused on Travellers or people in unauthorised encampments. In other words, they are seeking to reside or are residing on private land without the consent of the occupier. Proposed new section 60C(4) of the 1994 Act lays out conditions that have to be fulfilled in order for this particular offence to be satisfied, including “significant damage”, “significant disruption” and “significant distress”—yes?

Marc Willers QC: I do not think it would just be related to private lands—

[Victoria Atkins]

I accept that. There are provisions on common lands as well—you are quite right.

[The Chair]

I think we had better let Mr Willers answer as we are going to run completely out of time.

Marc Willers QC: It covers private and public land, and common land, and you are right that the conditions are “significant damage”, “significant disruption” and “significant distress”. My comments earlier were about the fact that significant damage and disruption can be covered by other legislation. The “significant distress” point was one I made in the context of the fact that the occupier may have their own impression of “significant distress”, or may suffer significant distress because of an inherent prejudice towards Gypsies and Travellers.

[Victoria Atkins]

So what is appropriate distress—

[The Chair]

I am really sorry Minister, but we are going to have to stop there because we are out of time allotted for this session. I thank you both for your evidence.

Examination of witness

Stephanie Roberts-Bibby gave evidence.

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[Chris Philp]

Q I will not need all that time, because most of the points that I was going to raise have been helpfully raised already by colleagues. To return to the question of secure schools, I think you expressed in your answers at the beginning support for the proposed introduction of secured schools and gave a bit of flavour as to why you support them. Can you talk about the benefits that may be delivered by increasing the range of organisations that can be brought into the business of providing these services with the change being contemplated here?

Stephanie Roberts-Bibby: We would see the benefits very much related to the skills, experience and expertise that multi-academy trusts could bring into a secure school setting. As you may know, the secure estate is split into three different sections: secure training centres, secure children’s homes and young offenders institutions. The custodial element of those organisations is very strong and probably strongest in the YOIs and the STCs. The introduction of a very different model that accounts for children’s needs will not mean that they will not be secure; it will mean that they have a focus on education, mental health, and a trauma-informed approach to working with children who have complex needs, which is very much needed.

[Chris Philp]

Q Do you have any particular observations on measures we might consider to reduce offending, either in the Bill or, indeed, beyond it?

Stephanie Roberts-Bibby: Gosh. We could probably provide you with a significant amount of evidence on that and I would very much welcome the opportunity to do that in writing to the Committee.

We would suggest coming from the perspective of the child first and using the evidence base that has been developed recently, which focuses on children, their personal and social identity and their strengths, rather than being deficit-based. The evidence, which equally applies to adults, is that if you look for good and build on good, much more is achieved than if you tell people that they are no use and no good and cannot contribute to society.

We know that with children, the earlier we intervene, the better—early intervention and prevention, and targeting services upstream. That is a challenge for youth offending teams at the moment. They have statutory caseloads and trying to balance intervening earlier is really difficult. Some local authorities manage to do that better than others. There is a massive evidence base and we can share the evidence after the Committee today.

[Chris Philp]

Q My final question is on the remand review. What is the Youth Justice Board able to do to support the remand review and its subsequent implementation?

Stephanie Roberts-Bibby: We have been working really closely with the Ministry of Justice on the remand review. We are very keen to understand the data better and to have a look at the trends across the country. One of the things we would really welcome as, dare I say, an amendment to the Bill is for there to be a decision why bail is and is not granted. There is still a lack of evidence on what needs to change for more children to remain in the community, and we want to avoid perpetuating cycles of evidence.

You asked about what more we could do around the remand review. There is certainly something more we could do around trying to knit the system together better, through our heads of regions constantly having discussions with the sector around remand. We are doing quite a lot of work at the moment on developing alternative models for accommodation. We are working across London. We are investing in a pathfinder project to try to develop a different model for children, to prevent them being taken into the secure estate on remand.

[Chris Philp]

I think that covers everything I wanted to ask. Thank you for the work you are doing.

[The Chair]

If you do wish to furnish the Committee with further written evidence to support your comments, that would be most welcome. I think Mr Cunningham had a further question.

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[Alex Cunningham]

Q Finally, what safeguards could the Government place in the Bill to ensure that clause 168 does not detrimentally impact fair trial rights?

Derek Sweeting QC: In the end, it will have to be managed judicially. I am not sure that we need to hem in the exercise of discretion in relation to that. There are already provisions in relation to what the judge must take into account when considering whether there should be remote participation. They are very difficult to apply to juries, by the way, but if they are followed, we will find that they involve a significant number of safeguards for the fair conduct of proceedings.

[Victoria Atkins]

Q A quick point of clarification. Mr Sweeting, in relation to clause 59, which is the statutory offence of public nuisance, you made reference to wishing there was a defence of reasonable excuse. I wanted to reassure you that it is in there, in subsection (3).

Derek Sweeting QC: Yes, I think my point was really about the suggestion that the statutory offence—these are the words—is to cover the same conduct as the existing common law offence of public nuisance but, yes, you are right that there is an offence of that sort in there.

[Chris Philp]

Q I have one or two brief points. Mr Sweeting, you discussed remote hearings already; have you or your members seen during the pandemic evidence that using video and remote hearings is any more convenient for participants, both advocates and witnesses, or that the proceedings are any more efficient than they would ordinarily be?

Derek Sweeting QC: Two questions. Is it more convenient? Certainly, during the pandemic it has been important to have a method of holding hearings when we have to socially distance. Under the circumstances of the pandemic, it was vital. Remote hearings have enabled the family jurisdiction in particular to keep on working from the word go—it never stopped. Using technology in those circumstances in remote hearings was extremely helpful. It was certainly convenient during the pandemic.

Is it convenient for everyone? During the pandemic itself, we had some opposing views. Counsel certainly found it convenient, but one or two participants in family proceedings publicly said that they felt detachment from the proceeding. We have to recognise that there are reasons for being cautious about making the assumption that if it is convenient for legal professionals and judges, it is also necessarily a good experience for users. Certainly, there are whole categories of users for whom, if they cannot get to court or if they have mobility problems, the ability to have a hearing remotely is going to be valuable. Of course, we have been in a big laboratory, and we have tested a lot of these things in a way that we that we would not have been able to do in the decades before the pandemic. We need to take forward the best of remote and carry on using it.

Are there disadvantages? Yes, I think there are. There are experiences that we have all heard about, which are salutary and should make us be cautious about just assuming that we can always do things as well if we are doing them remotely.

[Chris Philp]

Q Thank you. You touched in one of your answers on the question of sentencing powers where a memorial—for example, a war memorial—might be desecrated, and you made some observations about the potential sentence length. It is the case, is it not, that sentences are always a matter of judicial discretion. Notwithstanding what the maximum may be, it will always be for the judge to decide what the appropriate sentence is, given the facts of a particular case. Is not the overriding consideration here that we are simply giving judges more discretion where a memorial may have a more symbolic value that goes beyond mere monetary value, and that we are simply recognising that in the statute?

Derek Sweeting QC: I am not sure that is right. The point that I was making is that the proposed amendment is to the mode of trial for a limited class of offences of criminal damage. That is the effect of the amendment. It removes the power for an offence involving a memorial to be tried in the magistrates court, however small the value of any damage. That was the point I was making earlier. I was really being asked whether that is a proportionate measure, and the point I was making is that there are some offences involving memorials where one would have thought that the magistrates’ powers are perfectly adequate, and it is not proportionate to require that matter to go to the Crown court.

[Chris Philp]

Q Okay. Although of course, as I say, the magistrate has limited sentencing powers, and there might be some cases, might there not, where the desecration may be of a sufficiently serious nature that the magistrate’s maximum sentencing power of six months may be inadequate. On some occasions, therefore—not in every case necessarily—the increased sentencing power of the Crown court might be appropriate?

Derek Sweeting QC: Well, there might be, but equally there might be cases where it is wholly unnecessary to go to the Crown court. Since the definition of “memorial” extends to moveable items, removing a bunch of flowers from a memorial amounts to the offence. It is difficult to see why that merits a trip to the Crown court. It is well within the magistrate’s existing sentencing.

[Chris Philp]

Q Is your understanding of the change that it makes it an either-way offence? Is it your understanding that it would be compelled to be held in the Crown court, as an indictable-only offence would be, or that it could be heard in either, as in an either way offence?

Derek Sweeting QC: My understanding that a mode of trial change is being contemplated under part 2.

[Chris Philp]

Q My final question relates, again, to judicial discretion. I am not talking about any particular offence; I am just asking in general terms. What are your general views about minimum sentences and how they interact with judicial discretion?

Derek Sweeting QC: There are obviously circumstances in which minimum sentences can be used. It is a matter for Parliament. You have to reflect on public disquiet and the need to make sure there is a sentencing regime that reflects the seriousness of offences. The general position is that if you have minimum mandatory sentences, you inevitably tie the hands of the judge to some extent. If you carry on extending that, you are making potentially significant inroads into judicial discretion. The lesson of sentencing is that cases generally need individual sentences because there are very complex differences between them. You were just making the point about judges having discretion to sentence according to the gravity and nature of the crime.

[Chris Philp]

Thank you, Mr Sweeting. I have no further questions.

[The Chair]

Does anyone else have any further questions? I cannot see anyone. In that case, Mr Sweeting, thank you very much for your evidence to the Committee. I thank all witnesses who gave evidence today to the Committee. That brings us to the end of our oral evidence session for today. The Committee will meet again on Thursday to take further evidence. We will meet in this room at 11.30 am.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Tom Pursglove.)