Privileges and Conduct Committee

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Monday 17th December 2018

(6 years ago)

Lords Chamber
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I suggest that the unhappy experience in the case of Lord Lester confirms that in future we should follow that advice in relation to our disciplinary procedures, certainly in relation to complaints of this nature. There should be an appeal from the Commissioner for Standards not to one of our committees but to an independent appeal body composed of retired judges and distinguished lay people, and the House should have no role other than to implement the decision of that body. Independence—and the appearance of independence—and the confidence which this House needs to instil in complainants and in the wider public, so require. We cannot continue with a system in which the Privileges and Conduct Committee passes judgment on a Member of this House, this House then debates the matter, and the committee and this House then continue to debate the matter until the committee gets its way.
Baroness Evans of Bowes Park Portrait The Lord Privy Seal (Baroness Evans of Bowes Park) (Con)
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My Lords, I did not speak during the debate on 15 November, nor did the leaders of the other main political groups, despite all of us being members of the Privileges and Conduct Committee who unanimously supported its conclusions. We felt then, as now, that whether or not to endorse the committee’s report is not a party-political decision but a House decision. However, as Leader of this House, I feel that today I should speak briefly.

As the Senior Deputy Speaker has said, to an extent the recommendations of the committee’s report have been overtaken by Lord Lester’s decision to retire from the House last Wednesday. But it remains important for us to come to a conclusion on the Motion before the House in the name of the noble Lord, Lord McFall. For my part, I fully support it. I understand that the noble Lord, Lord Newby, is not intending to speak today, but he has asked me to make it clear that the report has his full support too.

I and my fellow members of the Privileges and Conduct Committee believe that the commissioner carefully and methodically followed the procedures set out for her by our Code of Conduct, which I am confident comply with the procedures of natural justice and fairness. Our commissioner is both impartial and independent. She sought and received instruction from the sub-committee in the way she approached the investigation. She ensured that Lord Lester was aware of all the points made by the complainant, and had time to respond to them, and she carefully evaluated all the evidence and explained why she reached her conclusions. A great deal of work went into the investigation of the complaint and into ensuring both parties were given a fair opportunity to comment, and that is only right: two people’s reputations were at stake.

During the debate on 15 November, much was said about the process followed by the commissioner not being fair, because it did not provide for cross-examination, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has repeated. The absence of cross-examination does not mean that the process followed was unfair. Our code provides for an inquisitorial rather than an adversarial system to determine breaches. What is necessary—and what our code provides—is an impartial adjudicator who takes full statements from all parties, gives each party notice of the case made by the others, gives all parties the opportunity to respond and carefully reaches decisions by thorough testing and evaluation of all available evidence. That is what our commissioner did.

As a House, we should show that we support the processes that we ourselves have put in place and that we are capable of regulating ourselves. I am sure that I am not alone in being very concerned at the letter sent by 74 well-esteemed staff of this House expressing their disappointment in the outcome of our previous debate. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, this has not been a happy experience for any of us, but I truly hope that following our further debate today, noble Lords will support the report of the committee.

Baroness Kennedy of Shaws Portrait Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)
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My Lords, I was not present at the previous debate. Ironically, I was in India speaking to a gathering of senior judges about the failure of justice systems to deliver justice for women and the underlying problems, sometimes with the law but more often with attitudes, that persist in our societies to the detriment of women.

Had I been here, I would not have voted. I would have recused myself because of my friendship with Anthony Lester. I have known him since I was a young barrister. I have huge admiration for him, and my fondness for him and his family is considerable, but we do not sit in judgment in cases involving a friend or a colleague. No juror would sit in a case where a friend was in the dock; no judge would sit in such a case. That is because friendships colour our judgment. We do not want to think ill of a friend. We see their pain and feel their humiliation. We hear their side of the story and want to believe it. That is in the nature of friendship; we are partisan.

That was why we created in this House an independent commissioner. It was because we recognised that the risks of partisanship were great. We recognised that institutions often protect their own, as we had seen the scandals around the Catholic Church, the Anglican Church, the BBC, the police and different aspects of the establishment. Reflecting on all that, we created the current rules.

I ask the same question as the Senior Deputy Speaker: when the previous debate took place, who was in the House to make the case for the complainant, to speak as her friends and to speak of her character and achievements? That was why, when I read the Hansard of the debate, I was covered in gloom: it was an ill judged and misconceived debate. Although it was presented as being about process, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and others expressed views that implied they found such an accusation difficult to believe of their friend. That is how we all feel about our friends. The debate was presented as being about process, but it was not about justice.

All the tropes that imply that women are somehow not be to be relied on were presented to this House; for example, about delay. We have learned that delay is not a reason for not believing somebody, especially when they have experienced some transgression of a sexual kind. Things were said about writing something nice in a book about somebody who might have done something inappropriate to you, but probably every woman in this House will tell you how you get on with business after somebody has behaved inappropriately and try to normalise it so that your relationships can continue, especially if your promotion, your Bill, which you are trying to get through Parliament, or your pupillage might rely on the good will of the person who has crossed the line.

I want to remind the House of the terrible folly that has blighted this distressing business in the way that it has been discussed in the media and in this House: the confusion between criminal trial rules and disciplinary processes. This is not a criminal process—I want to emphasise that to many of the older lawyers in this House who do not seem to have kept up with the times and the disappointment that women feel about how legal processes fail them. This is a disciplinary process. Talk of proof beyond reasonable doubt, rigorous cross-examination and the need for counsel is wholly inappropriate.

Let us remember why: we are here dealing with an imbalance of power. That is the basis of the complaint. Women are complaining that their working lives and professional interactions are blighted by sexual harassment. There will be few women in this House who have not experienced it at some point in their careers. Many of us just learned to brush it off and get on with things but the young do not accept that any more; they want proper processes and they do not want it to be dealt with in the way that has been described by many of our older lawyers. Young women will not come forward to make complaints about powerful men if they are going to be subjected to Old Bailey-style quizzing in the presence of the very Lord they are complaining about.

Let us imagine that it is a young librarian in this House who has been groped by a Peer. Is she really expected to face him or his well-heeled lawyer? How do we create equality of arms when we have a Lord able to secure the professional services of a top QC and the young librarian can afford no such grandeur? Do we find some low-level lawyer and pay him or her out of the public purse when we are cutting legal aid so much to the bone that most people are having difficulty finding representation? Could we justify it? It was for all these reasons that Members of this House devised a system in keeping with most disciplinary procedures, using the inquisitorial method, not the traditional adversarial method. That means an independent assessor, arbitrator or commissioner investigating the complaint, sensitively testing its veracity, applying the same careful, probing attention to the account of the person complained of and then allowing each the opportunity to respond to the account of the other. The commissioner then reaches a conclusion on whether the complaint has probity.

I have sat in that role on a number of occasions. She has the advantage over any of us in that she has heard the live accounts of both parties. We invented this process without complaint at the time. I have no doubt that it could be improved and, as we go forward, I think it should be. Because of my own experience in these cases, sitting as the commissioner did, I suggest that it is better to sit with another assessor, as I usually do. I have always felt that I benefited from the help of others in evaluating credibility. The commissioner in this case has been subjected to wholly unjust criticism. She is a very experienced solicitor and we chose her carefully after a competitive process. She has dealt, in her 40 years’ experience, day in, day out, with the stuff of humankind, sitting as a judge in mental health matters. She is not an acquisitions and mergers lawyer, a commercial contracts lawyer, or someone dealing with fine points of law in the Supreme Court, but she has dealt, day in, day out, with the stuff of human frailty—human falls from grace and issues of dishonesty and honesty. We burdened her with the responsibility of judgment on our behalf and she deserves our respect, rather than what she was treated to.

I shall mention one area where I think she may have been wrong in law. She took the view that the allegations stood or fell together. While she may have felt handicapped by Lord Lester’s position that all the matters were fabricated, it was quite possible, for example, that there was inappropriate conduct and an unwelcome sexual pass but that the business of having a discussion about coming into this House, perhaps sitting on the Cross Benches—a discussion that many of us might have had with talented persons we thought might have contributed to this House—might have been misunderstood. The two may have become conflated, so to have felt that the allegations all stood or fell together seems to me a mistake. Evidence is not a seamless role: you can be absolutely truthful and right about one thing and mistaken about something else. The Privileges Committee, however, agreed with the commissioner’s decision and this House will have to make a decision too.

I suggest to the House that those who are friends of Lord Lester, like me, should not be voting. I will not vote. It would not be appropriate: I am conflicted between my friendship with Lord Lester and my desire to see greater justice for women. I believe that we still have not got the system for women right.

Before I finish, I want to say that I think the suspension of four years was too long, but that boat has sailed now that Lord Lester has resigned.