Wednesday 2nd November 2016
(8 years ago)
Lords ChamberRead Hansard Text Amendment Paper: HL Bill 55-III(a) Amendments for Committee, supplementary to the third marshalled list (PDF, 64KB) - (1 Nov 2016)
“( ) a designated NCA officer who is authorised by the Director General of the National Crime Agency (whether generally or specifically) to exercise the powers of a law enforcement officer under this Chapter, or”
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen (Con)
My Lords, government Amendments 196, 199, 200 and 201 are essentially consequential on the provisions in Clause 138 which enable the director-general of the National Crime Agency to designate NCA officers with the powers of general customs officials. The amendments clarify that NCA officers so designated are able to exercise the new maritime enforcement powers in the same way as NCA officers designated with the powers of a constable. As a result, these important new powers will be available to NCA officers investigating customs matters such as the smuggling of drugs and firearms. I beg to move.
Lord Paddick
Section 66 of the Metropolitan Police Act was repealed on the basis of the powers to stop and search under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. The earlier powers were superseded, so it was decided that Section 66 was no longer necessary.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
Well, my Lords, it just shows how marvellous this House is. We have experts who can always answer the questions for us, which is an enormous help.
As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, explained, Amendments 196A and 200A relate to the power, by regulations, to add to the list of law enforcement officers who may exercise the new maritime enforcement powers in Chapters 5 and 6 of Part 4 of the Bill. Clause 82(3) defines “law enforcement officers” in England and Wales for the purpose of exercising the maritime powers. This includes provision for the Secretary of State to specify in regulations other categories of person who may be allowed to exercise these powers. Clause 94(3) makes equivalent provision for Scotland. The proposed amendments would require the Secretary of State to consult prior to making such regulations.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, mentioned foreign ports. Ports in foreign countries are included. Maritime powers can be exercised in international and foreign waters all over the globe. It is a practical and operational necessity that those exercising such powers should be able lawfully to divert a ship to a port and detain it there where the operation in question takes place hundreds or thousands of miles away from England and Wales. I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Rosser—
Lord Rosser
My concern was that “or elsewhere” might be used in cases involving foreign ships which are discovered within our territorial waters to contain, or are suspected to contain, refugees and others in need of international protection who might be in breach of immigration law but who nevertheless have certain rights which, on the face of it, could be overridden if there was a power to divert ships to a port elsewhere—indeed, anywhere in the world. It could mean them being sent back to a place where they would be in danger. It would also mean that they would not have had the right to have their claim for protection fairly determined before they could be returned. The question I was asking is, was my interpretation of the apparent power in the Bill for a law enforcement officer or the Secretary of State to be able to do that correct? If it was not correct—and I said I hoped it was not correct—will the Government explain to me why my analysis was not right?
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, inspiration has appeared from over my left shoulder. The maritime provisions of the Bill are strictly intended to enable enforcement officers to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute offences under the law of England and Wales. Any decision to divert a foreign ship that is not in UK territorial waters to a foreign port will require the authority of the Secretary of State. These powers are not intended to be used in a way which is contrary to the Human Rights Act, the 1951 refugee convention or the 1967 protocol.
I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, that the Home Secretary will consult appropriately before making any such regulations. Such consultation will certainly include any person or body to be specified in the regulations and, in relation to any regulations to be made under Clause 94, the Scottish Government. Indeed, there is an implied duty to consult the Scottish Government and more in Clause 94(6), which requires Scottish Ministers to consent to any regulations under Clause 94(3)(e), which makes devolved provision. Having stated our intention to consult on any such regulations, I hope the noble Lord will agree that it is not necessary to set this out in the Bill.
Amendments 196C, 196D, 197 and 198 relate to Clause 92, which imposes an obligation on the Secretary of State to provide a code of practice for law enforcement officers who use the power of arrest conferred by Clause 88. This code must provide guidance on the information—for example, procedural rights to be given to a person at the time of their arrest. Amendments 196C and 196D seek to amend Clause 92 to extend the scope of the code of practice so that it also addresses the matters which a law enforcement officer must have regard to when considering making an arrest under the maritime powers. We believe that the proper focus of the code is on the information that should be provided to a suspect at the point of arrest, including in relation to their procedural rights. Importantly, the provisions in the Bill in respect of the code of practice closely mirror those in the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and it would be confusing to law enforcement officers to adopt a different approach here.
The power of arrest, like other powers under the maritime provisions, is clearly set out in the Bill. For example, Clause 88 is clear that the power of arrest may be exercised where an enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence under the law of England and Wales has been, or is being, committed. It will be down to the knowledge, experience and professionalism of the officers concerned as to whether the use of the power is both necessary and appropriate for the purpose of preventing, detecting, investigating and prosecuting offences. The priority for enforcement officers who have apprehended a person on a vessel at sea will be to bring them back to the UK, where they will be processed under PACE in the usual way.
Amendments 197 and 198 relate to the parliamentary procedure for bringing codes of practice into force. The Bill makes provision to bring a new code of practice into law through the affirmative procedure. However, Clause 92(9) provides a choice of procedure for any subsequent revisions to the code. This enables the right level of scrutiny to be provided, proportionate to the revisions being made to the code. For minor or consequential changes the affirmative procedure would, we believe, be disproportionate. Insisting on the affirmative procedure in all cases could cause unnecessary delays in revising the code, with the result that the code would remain out of date in operational terms for longer than necessary. Amendments 197 and 198 would remove this choice, requiring both the first draft of a new code of practice and any revisions to go through the affirmative procedure.
The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee recommended in its report on the Bill of 13 July that when using Clause 92(9), the Minister should be,
“bound by the views of the House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee”.
This is similar to the procedure used for revisions to codes of practice for the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. My noble friend’s letter of 7 September to the noble Baroness, Lady Fookes, chair of the Delegated Powers Committee, accepted that recommendation, so the choice of procedure provided by Clause 92(9) will be exercised with reference to the views of the Home Affairs Select Committee. We believe that this will provide the best approach to ensuring that the appropriate level of scrutiny is provided for any changes to the code.
I hope I have been able to satisfy noble Lords that these amendments are not necessary and that accordingly the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, will be content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Rosser
I certainly will withdraw the amendment. Unless I was not paying as much attention as I should have been—and I accept that that is a genuine possibility, and I mean that—I am not sure that I got an answer to the question: what kind of current unspecified category of persons do the Government believe may need to be designated as a law enforcement officer that cannot be so designated clearly and specifically now in the Bill? That related to both Clause 82(3)(g) and Clause 94(3)(e).
The only other point I would ask for clarification on, which comes back to the question I raised about how the powers could, on the face of it, be used to override the rights of those in need of international protection, is whether in giving the Government’s response the Minister said that it was not intended that the powers be used to override the rights of those in need of international protection, or that they would not be used in that way. The latter is rather firmer than a statement of intent.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
On the noble Lord’s first point, these powers are necessary to enable the categories of law enforcement officer who may exercise these maritime enforcement powers to be extended in the light of changing operational requirements. For example, both the Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990 and the Modern Slavery Act 2015 confer powers on Armed Forces personnel and there may be an operational case for extending the powers in this Bill to such personnel in future.
Lord Rosser
Is there any clarification—or perhaps the Minister could write to me subsequently—of what was said in relation to the apparent ability to override the rights of those in need of international protection through the facility to divert a ship to a port elsewhere, or indeed anywhere in the world? Was the response that it was not intended that that power should be used to override those rights, or was it a clear statement that it would not be used to override those rights?
Lord Rosser
I thank the Minister very much indeed. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, Amendment 196B is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. As we have just been discussing, Chapter 5 of the Bill gives extensive powers to law enforcement officers in relation to maritime enforcement—not just in British territorial waters and not just British vessels but far more extensively—including the power in Clause 86(1) to stop, board, divert and detain the ship,
“if a law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that … an offence under the law of England and Wales is being, or has been, committed”.
The amendment seeks to probe whether the powers are intended to apply if a law enforcement officer suspects that any offence whatever has been committed. For example, if two crew members are involved in a fight, could these powers then be used,
“to stop, board, divert and detain”,
the ship? That would appear rather disproportionate. While two crew members having a fight might not be considered a good example, stranger things have happened at sea, apparently. The amendment works on the basis that imitation is the sincerest form of flattery. It takes its wording from proposed new Section 137B by restricting enforcement powers to “indictable” offences only, and only those offences specified in regulations by the Secretary of State. I beg to move.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has explained, Amendment 196B seeks to limit the exercise of the new maritime enforcement powers by the police to suspected offences which are “indictable” and specified in the regulations made by the Secretary of State. He indicated that the intention is to limit the use of these powers to serious crimes, so as to ensure a proportionate response to crime that takes place in the maritime context. I do not believe it necessary to limit these powers in this way.
In other contexts the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has argued that we should put our trust in the operational judgment of chief officers. This is one such area where we should adopt that principle. We should trust in the operational judgment of the police to determine when it is appropriate to commit resources to investigate an offence on a vessel at sea. It is perhaps highly unlikely that resources would be committed to interdicting a vessel for the purposes of investigating a minor summary-only offence, but we should not rule out the possibility that the police would want to exercise these powers in relation to an either-way offence. We do not impose restrictions on the categories of offences that the police can investigate where they take place on other modes of transportation, so I am unclear why we should treat maritime vessels any differently. For these reasons, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Paddick
I am grateful to the Minister. The reason why this should apply in the case of these maritime powers is that the potential impact of diverting a cargo vessel in the English Channel, for example, is quite significant. While I may have suggested in other contexts that the number of ranks in each police force should be left to the judgment of chief officers, I do not think that the chief constable of whichever force it is will be making the decision as to whether to divert a ship; it will be an officer of relatively junior rank. The Minister also says that the Government should not be restricting the powers to particular offences, in which case I would ask her to explain why proposed new Section 137B does exactly that. But at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
““designated NCA officer” means a National Crime Agency officer who is either or both of the following—(a) an officer designated under section 10 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 as having the powers and privileges of a constable;(b) an officer designated under that section as having the powers of a general customs official;”
“( ) a designated NCA officer who is authorised by the Director General of the National Crime Agency (whether generally or specifically) to exercise the powers of a law enforcement officer under this Chapter, or”
““designated NCA officer” means a National Crime Agency officer who is either or both of the following—(a) an officer designated under section 10 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 as having the powers and privileges of a constable who is entitled to exercise the powers and privileges of a Scottish constable (see paragraph 11(3) to (5) of Schedule 5 to that Act);(b) an officer designated under that section as having the powers of a general customs official;”
Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab)
I think the noble Earl raises an interesting point—I feel that I have learned something. I am not convinced that the amendment should be in the Bill; it is the sort of thing that should be sorted out in guidance or in a letter to the various police forces. If the noble Earl is right, it should be sorted out quite simply.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)
My Lords, I begin by declaring that I am not the owner of a tank-carrying vehicle and I therefore hope that I speak from a neutral point of view.
I am grateful to my noble friend for his explanation about abnormal loads and, in particular, the electronic service delivery for abnormal loads, or ESDAL. It is a government-funded portal built for this purpose and free to use. However, some hauliers prefer to use other methods of transmission, as he pointed out, such as fax, email, hard copy or proprietary software.
The decision on which methods to accept lies with individual chief constables. As my noble friend is aware, the provisions for use of abnormal loads are laid out in the Road Vehicles (Authorisation of Special Types) (General) Order 2003, to which he referred. Schedule 5 to the order, which deals with notices to police states:
“The Notice must be in a form acceptable to the recipient and should be agreed by both parties.”
Commercial software owners and hauliers may argue that a chief constable is not complying with the 2003 order if he or she limits the methods for accepting the notification and the haulier does not agree. However, the order makes it clear that the form of notification must be acceptable to the recipient and there is very good reason for that requirement. Obliging chief constables to accept notification in all the forms proposed in the amendment could have negative practical and resource implications for the police. Moreover, as a matter of principle, it would not be appropriate to intervene in operational matters in this way.
I also suggest to my noble friend that this is not an appropriate matter for primary legislation, given that the Secretary of State already has the power to amend the detailed provisions laid out in Schedule 5 to the 2003 order.
Notices to road and bridge authorities are covered separately in Schedule 9 to the 2003 order. Again, it does not specify the form the notice should or could take, but states that it must be acceptable to the authority to which it is to be given and should be agreed by both parties. So a bridge or highway authority would not be obliged to accept email notification generated by ESDAL if it was not reasonably acceptable to it.
My noble friend asks about the consequences of an operator notifying a police force by a means which is not accepted by the recipient. It is a condition of an operator obtaining authority to transport an abnormal load that it notifies the police in accordance with Schedule 5. If it provides notification in a form which it has been informed is not acceptable to the recipient, it would be difficult for it to claim to have met the conditions set out in the 2003 order.
If an operator has not met these conditions, it will not be authorised to use on the road a vehicle that does not,
“comply in all respects with the standard construction and use requirements”.
On that basis, if it were to proceed with an abnormal load movement on a road, it would be committing an offence under the Road Traffic Act 1988. I know that my noble friend will have hoped for a rather different response, but I hope that, having had this opportunity to debate this issue, he will be content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
Before the noble Baroness sits down—and I should say that I am not the owner of a tank either—I do not see why it can be said that an electronic means of communication in the 21st century is an unreasonable way of giving this type of notice. Something like this cannot be beyond the wit of man to sort out. If we are just going to rely on the post it really is not a very efficient way of doing things.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
What I have said is that the order specifies that the notice must be in a form that is acceptable to the recipient. If the recipient—Merseyside Police, for example—insists that it is an online application, then that is the form in which it is acceptable. But it should be agreed by both parties—in other words, it is not “must” but “should”.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
Are we saying that it would be acceptable if they insisted on receiving only a letter? That seems ridiculous in the 21st century.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
No, an online application may be acceptable, an email may be acceptable, pigeon post may be acceptable—but it has to be acceptable to the recipient.
Earl Attlee
My Lords, my first question for my noble friend the Minister is, why is an email not acceptable?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, it has to be acceptable to the recipient—an email may not be acceptable to the recipient. The order says that it should be acceptable to the recipient.
Earl Attlee
My Lords, it rather seems as if my noble friend cannot explain to the Committee why it is acceptable for the police to say that they will not accept an email notification. It is an extremely reliable system of communication with a good audit record. I think some inspiration might be coming from the Front Bench so I shall sit down.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I think what is coming from my left is probably what I was going to say anyway, which is that it is entirely a matter for Merseyside Police, for example, on which method it accepts. It is an operational decision for the chief constable.
Earl Attlee
I thank the Minister for that reply but she seems to be struggling on the point of why a police force can say that it will not take an email. I think that Ministers need to be rather careful about teasing noble Lords when they declare an interest; it is vital that we can declare an interest in an issue without being teased by Ministers. This is the second time on this Bill that I have been teased by Ministers regarding declaring an interest.
I want to make it clear to the Committee that I tried to avoid even tabling this amendment, because I knew that it would involve a lot of work within both the Department for Transport and the Home Office. Unfortunately, I could not encourage the Government to deal with this matter offline. That is why I had to table an amendment and speak to it in your Lordships’ House.
The Minister said that the police force can determine what the form should be—how the notification is laid out and whether the width and the weight are described. It does not say in the STGO what the means should be, only the form—what it looks like when it comes out of the fax machine or in the email—but not the means. I am not convinced that the system is watertight.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I apologise to my noble friend. I was attempting to be self-deprecating rather than teasing him. I hope that he did not get that impression.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I did not intend to speak on this matter but the issues the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, raised, particularly around religious dress, need to be considered very carefully. I bear in mind the scenario that the noble Lord, Lord Dear, presented us with where constables on the street, faced with individuals who they interpret as deliberately trying to conceal their identity, are radioing an inspector for authority who is not at the scene and cannot make that assessment himself or herself. That is potentially difficult. I am not a lawyer and I may have misread it, but my reading of the existing legislation was that it allows for a scenario where written authority could be given contemporaneously with the actions of the officers on the ground. Can the Minister therefore help the House by saying whether the Government think that the amendment is necessary? However, I absolutely accept that flash mobs and spontaneous public disorder are becoming an increasing problem, as we saw in the riots in London only a few years ago, which were driven by social media.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is right that the permission in writing can be given after the event, but we now find that that is not an ideal situation. On what the noble Lord, Lord Dear, proposes, both national policing leads and others would welcome a clarification on this matter. The noble Lord, Lord Dear, answered the question posed by the noble Lord, Lord Harris, for me, but I will repeat it, as it is important. With regard to removing face coverings for religious reasons, for example, the Act states that when an authorisation is in place, a constable can require a person to remove a face covering only if the constable reasonably believes that the person is wearing the item,
“wholly or mainly for the purpose of concealing his”,
or her “identity”. Of course, it is for individuals to ensure the fair and proportionate use of their powers.
If the noble Lord is content to withdraw his amendment—it sounds as though he is—I will give the matter further sympathetic consideration in advance of Report.
“SCHEDULE 14ASCHEDULE TO BE INSERTED AS SCHEDULE 7A TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND PUBLIC ORDER ACT 1994“OFFENCES SPECIFIED FOR THE PURPOSES OF SECTION 137APART 1OFFENCES UNDER THE LAW OF ENGLAND AND WALES1_ Any of the following offences at common law—(a) false imprisonment;(b) kidnapping;(c) indecent exposure; (d) cheating in relation to the public revenue. 2_ An offence under any of the following provisions of the Offences against the Person Act 1861—(a) section 20 (inflicting bodily injury);(b) section 24 (administering poison etc with intent);(c) section 27 (exposing child whereby life is endangered etc);(d) section 31 (setting spring-guns etc with intent);(e) section 37 (assaulting an officer etc on account of his preserving wreck);(f) section 47 (assault occasioning actual bodily harm).3_(1) An offence under any of the following provisions of the Sexual Offences Act 1956—(a) section 10 (incest by a man);(b) section 11 (incest by a woman);(c) section 30 (man living on the earnings of prostitution);(d) section 31 (woman exercising control over a prostitute);(e) section 33A (keeping a brothel used for prostitution)._(2) An offence under section 12 of that Act (buggery), other than an offence committed by a person where the other person involved in the conduct constituting the offence consented to it and was aged 16 or over._(3) An offence under section 13 of that Act (indecency between men), where the offence was committed by a man aged 21 or over and the other person involved in the conduct constituting the offence was under the age of 16.4_ An offence under section 4 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 (assisting offenders).5_ An offence under section 5 of the Sexual Offences Act 1967 (living on the earnings of male prostitution).6_ An offence under any of the following provisions of the Firearms Act 1968—(a) section 1(1) (possession etc of firearms or ammunition without certificate);(b) section 2(1) (possession etc of shot gun without certificate);(c) section 3(1) (manufacturing, selling etc firearms or ammunition by way of trade or business without being registered as a firearms dealer).7_ An offence under section 106A of the Taxes Management Act 1970 (fraudulent evasion of income tax).8_(1) An offence under section 50(2) or (3) of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 (improper importation of goods), other than an offence mentioned in subsection (5B) of that section._(2) An offence under section 68(2) of that Act (exportation of prohibited or restricted goods)._(3) An offence under section 170 of that Act (fraudulent evasion of duty etc), other than an offence mentioned in subsection (4B) of that section.9_ An offence under section 4 of the Aviation Security Act 1982 (offences in relation to certain dangerous articles).10_ An offence under section 127 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (ill-treatment of patients).11_ An offence under either of the following provisions of the Child Abduction Act 1984—(a) section 1 (abduction of child by parent etc);(b) section 2 (abduction of child by other persons).12_ An offence under section 1 of the Prohibition of Female Circumcision Act 1985 (prohibition of female circumcision).13_ An offence under either of the following provisions of the Public Order Act 1986—(a) section 2 (violent disorder); (b) section 3 (affray). 14_ An offence under section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (possession of indecent photograph of a child).15_ An offence under section 2 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 (unauthorised access with intent to commit or facilitate commission of further offences).16_ An offence under section 72(1), (3) or (8) of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 (fraudulent evasion of VAT etc).17_ An offence under either of the following provisions of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997—(a) section 4 (putting people in fear of violence);(b) section 4A (stalking involving fear of violence or serious alarm or distress).18_ An offence under section 29(1)(a) or (b) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (certain racially or religiously aggravated assaults).19_ An offence under section 38B of the Terrorism Act 2000 (information about acts of terrorism).20_ An offence under section 3 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 2000 (sexual activity with a person aged under 18 in abuse of a position of trust).21_ An offence under section 35 of the Tax Credits Act 2002 (tax credit fraud).22_(1) An offence under any of the following provisions of the Sexual Offences Act 2003—(a) section 13 (child sex offences committed by children or young persons);(b) section 16 (abuse of position of trust: sexual activity with a child);(c) section 17 (abuse of position of trust: causing or inciting a child to engage in sexual activity);(d) section 18 (abuse of position of trust: sexual activity in the presence of a child);(e) section 19 (abuse of position of trust: causing a child to watch a sexual act);(f) section 40 (care workers: sexual activity in the presence of a person with a mental disorder);(g) section 41 (care workers: causing a person with a mental disorder to watch a sexual act);(h) section 52 (causing or inciting prostitution for gain);(i) section 53 (controlling prostitution for gain)._(2) An offence under section 25 or 26 of that Act (family child sex offences) where the offence is committed by a person under the age of 18._(3) An offence under section 47 of that Act (paying for sexual services of a child), where the offence is committed against a person aged 16 or over.23_ An offence under either of the following provisions of the Terrorism Act 2006—(a) section 1 (encouragement of terrorism);(b) section 2 (dissemination of terrorist publications).24_ An offence under section 45 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 (participating in activities of organised crime group).25_ An offence under section 67 of the Policing and Crime Act 2016 (breach of pre-charge bail conditions relating to travel).PART 2OFFENCES UNDER THE LAW OF SCOTLAND26_ Any of the following offences at common law—(a) culpable homicide;(b) treason;(c) rape;(d) assault, where the assault results in serious injury or endangers life; (e) assault with intent to rape or ravish; (f) indecent assault;(g) abduction with intent to rape;(h) public indecency;(i) clandestine injury to women;(j) lewd, indecent or libidinous behaviour or practices;(k) sodomy, other than an offence committed by a person where the other person involved in the conduct constituting the offence consented to it and was aged 16 or over;(l) abduction;(m) mobbing;(n) fire-raising;(o) robbery;(p) fraud;(q) extortion;(r) embezzlement;(s) theft;(t) threats;(u) attempting to pervert the course of justice.27_ An offence under any of the following provisions of the Firearms Act 1968—(a) section 1(1) (possession etc of firearms or ammunition without certificate);(b) section 2(1) (possession etc of shot gun without certificate);(c) section 3(1) (manufacturing, selling etc firearms or ammunition by way of trade or business without being registered as a firearms dealer).28_ An offence under section 106A of the Taxes Management Act 1970 (fraudulent evasion of income tax).29_(1) An offence under section 50(2) or (3) of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 (improper importation of goods), other than an offence mentioned in subsection (5B) of that section._(2) An offence under section 68(2) of that Act (exportation of prohibited or restricted goods)._(3) An offence under section 170 of that Act (fraudulent evasion of duty etc), other than an offence mentioned in subsection (4B) of that section.30_ An offence under section 4 of the Aviation Security Act 1982 (offences in relation to certain dangerous articles).31_ An offence under either of the following provisions of the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982—(a) section 51(2) (publication etc of obscene material);(b) section 52 (taking, distributing etc indecent photographs of children).32_ An offence under section 6 of the Child Abduction Act 1984 (parent etc. taking or sending a child out of the United Kingdom).33_ An offence under section 1 of the Prohibition of Female Circumcision Act 1985 (prohibition of female circumcision).34_ An offence under section 2 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 (unauthorised access with intent to commit or facilitate commission of further offences).35_ An offence under section 72(1), (3) or (8) of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 (fraudulent evasion of VAT etc).36_ An offence under any of the following provisions of the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995—(a) section 7 (procuring prostitution etc);(b) section 8(3) (unlawful detention of women and girls); (c) section 10 (parents etc encouraging girls under 16 to engage in prostitution etc); (d) section 11(1)(b) (males soliciting etc for immoral purposes).37_ An offence under section 38B of the Terrorism Act 2000 (information about acts of terrorism).38_ An offence under section 35 of the Tax Credits Act 2002 (tax credit fraud).39_ An offence under section 313 of the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 (persons providing care services: sexual offences).40_ An offence under either of the following provisions of the Terrorism Act 2006—(a) section 1 (encouragement of terrorism);(b) section 2 (dissemination of terrorist publications).41_ Any of the following offences under the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009—(a) section 8 (sexual exposure);(b) section 9 (voyeurism);(c) section 11 (administering a substance for sexual purposes);(d) section 32 (causing an older child to be present during a sexual activity);(e) section 33 (causing an older child to look at a sexual image);(f) section 34(1) (communicating indecently with an older child);(g) section 34(2) (causing an older child to see or hear an indecent communication);(h) section 35 (sexual exposure to an older child);(i) section 36 (voyeurism towards an older child);(j) section 42 (sexual abuse of trust);(k) section 46 (sexual abuse of trust of a mentally disordered person).42_ An offence under either of the following provisions of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010—(a) section 38 (threatening or abusive behaviour);(b) section 39 (stalking).43_ An offence under section 2 of the Abusive Behaviour and Sexual Harm (Scotland) Act 2016 (disclosing etc an intimate photograph or film).PART 3OFFENCES UNDER THE LAW OF NORTHERN IRELAND44_ Any of the following offences at common law—(a) false imprisonment;(b) kidnapping;(c) riot;(d) affray;(e) indecent exposure;(f) cheating in relation to the public revenue.45_ An offence under any of the following provisions of the Offences against the Person Act 1861—(a) section 20 (inflicting bodily injury);(b) section 24 (administering poison etc with intent);(c) section 27 (exposing child whereby life is endangered etc);(d) section 31 (setting spring-guns etc with intent);(e) section 37 (assaulting an officer etc on account of his preserving wreck);(f) section 47 (assault occasioning actual bodily harm).46_ An offence under section 11 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 (indecency between men), where the offence was committed by a man aged 21 or over and the other person involved in the conduct constituting the offence was under the age of 16. 47_ An offence under either of the following provisions of the Punishment of Incest Act 1908—(a) section 1 (incest by a man);(b) section 2 (incest by a woman).48_ An offence under section 4 of the Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1967 (assisting offenders).49_ An offence under section 106A of the Taxes Management Act 1970 (fraudulent evasion of income tax).50_(1) An offence under section 50(2) or (3) of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 (improper importation of goods), other than an offence mentioned in subsection (5B) of that section._(2) An offence under section 68(2) of that Act (exportation of prohibited or restricted goods)._(3) An offence under section 170 of that Act (fraudulent evasion of duty etc), other than an offence mentioned in subsection (4B) of that section.51_ An offence under section 4 of the Aviation Security Act 1982 (offences in relation to certain dangerous articles).52_ An offence under Article 8 of the Homosexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 1982 (S.I. 1982/1536 (N.I. 19)) (living on the earnings of male prostitution).53_ An offence under section 1 of the Prohibition of Female Circumcision Act 1985 (prohibition of female circumcision).54_ An offence under either of the following provisions of the Child Abduction (Northern Ireland) Order 1985 (S.I. 1985/1638(N.I. 17))—(a) Article 3 (abduction of child by parent etc);(b) Article 4 (abduction of child by other persons).55_ An offence under Article 121 of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986 (S.I. 1986/595 (N.I. 4)) (ill-treatment of patients).56_ An offence under Article 15 of the Criminal Justice (Evidence, Etc.) (Northern Ireland) Order 1988 (S.I. 1988/1847 (N.I. 17)) (possession of indecent photograph of a child).57_ An offence under section 2 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 (unauthorised access with intent to commit or facilitate commission of further offences).58_ An offence under section 72(1), (3) or (8) of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 (fraudulent evasion of VAT etc).59_ An offence under Article 6 of the Protection from Harassment (Northern Ireland) Order 1997 (S.I. 1997/1180 (N.I. 9)) (putting people in fear of violence).60_ An offence under section 38B of the Terrorism Act 2000 (information about acts of terrorism).61_ An offence under section 3 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 2000 (sexual activity with a person aged under 18 in abuse of a position of trust).62_ An offence under section 35 of the Tax Credits Act 2002 (tax credit fraud).63_ An offence under section 53 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (controlling prostitution for gain).64_ An offence under any of the following provisions of the Firearms (Northern Ireland) Order 2004 (S.I. 2004/702 (N.I.3))—(a) Article 3(1)(b) (possession etc of firearms other than handguns without certificate);(b) Article 3(2) (possession etc of ammunition without certificate); (c) Article 24(1) (manufacturing, selling etc firearms or ammunition by way of trade or business without being registered as a firearms dealer).65_ An offence under either of the following provisions of the Terrorism Act 2006— (a) section 1 (encouragement of terrorism);(b) section 2 (dissemination of terrorist publications).66_(1) An offence under any of the following provisions of the Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 (S.I. 2008/1769 (N.I. 2))—(a) Article 20 (child sex offences committed by children or young persons);(b) Article 23 (abuse of position of trust: sexual activity with a child);(c) Article 24 (abuse of position of trust: causing or inciting a child to engage in sexual activity);(d) Article 25 (abuse of position of trust: sexual activity in the presence of a child);(e) Article 51 (care workers: sexual activity with a person with a mental disorder);(f) Article 53 (care workers: sexual activity in the presence of a person with a mental disorder);(g) Article 62 (causing or inciting prostitution for gain);(h) Article 63 (controlling prostitution for gain);(i) Article 64 (keeping a brothel used for prostitution)._(2) An offence under Article 32 or 33 of that Order (family child sex offences) where the offence is committed by a person under the age of 18._(3) An offence under Article 37 of that Order (paying for sexual services of a child), where the offence is committed against a person aged 16 or over.67_ An offence under section 67 of the Policing and Crime Act 2016 (breach of pre-charge bail conditions relating to travel).””
Lord Harris of Haringey
I do not intend to hold things up, nor am I necessarily expecting that the Minister will be able to respond—I had not given notice of this—but I hope that she might be able to respond well in advance of Report.
Clause 109 relates to the eligibility of deputy police and crime commissioners for election. Noble Lords may recall that on day 1 in Committee I raised the complexities of the position of the proposed deputy mayor for fire, but I then referred to the complexity of the position of the deputy mayor for policing and crime, it being a politically restricted post. As I understand it, deputy police and crime commissioners are politically restricted posts, yet here we have a very sensible clause which I believe creates an arrangement whereby deputy police and crime commissioners can stand for election. If deputy police and crime commissioners are politically restricted, we are now creating a situation that goes against that provision by saying that they can stand for election.
Between now and Report—perhaps in good time before Report—can the Minister tell us, first, what the rationale is for deputy police and crime commissioners, let alone deputy mayors for policing and crime, to be politically restricted under certain circumstances; and, secondly, whether this restriction is still necessary and, given that this clause assumes that it is possible for deputy police and crime commissioners to stand for election, whether the original idea that deputy police and crime commissioners should not be politically restricted can be adjusted? I think that this issue needs to be tidied up. It is certainly a matter that I intend to return to on Report unless we succeed in clarifying it before then.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, it seems like ages ago but I remember the debate and I remember what I thought at the time, although I cannot for the life of me think of an answer for the noble Lord at such a late hour. However, I said that we would reflect on the points that he raised because at the time—on day 1 of Committee, as the noble Lord said—they seemed very pertinent, and we will respond ahead of Report. I hope that he is happy with that.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I believe that we all sympathise with the intention of the amendment. These new clauses draw on the experience of the Hillsborough families, and their fight for justice has been a long time coming. As noble Lords will be aware, the Hillsborough families received public funding for their legal costs at the fresh inquest. That was a bespoke scheme. We need to ensure that any similar action we take in the future is appropriate and proportionate. It is for these reasons that the former Home Secretary commissioned Bishop James Jones to compile a report on the experiences of the Hillsborough families, and the Government believe that it is appropriate that we should wait for his report before considering these issues further.
In relation to the funding of former police officers, this was a decision taken by the police and crime commissioner taking into account relevant case law and guidance on this subject. Separately, the former Home Secretary took a decision to provide a special grant to the South Yorkshire PCC in order to assist with the legal costs incurred as a result of the former officers’ legal fees. In arriving at this decision, the former Home Secretary put the concerns and interests of the families at the forefront of her thinking, together with the principle of justice and the continuation of the inquests.
Additionally, in taking her decision on providing a special grant, the former Home Secretary was clear that it was important that justice should not only be done, but be seen to be done. It would have been wrong to leave police and other witnesses vulnerable to claims that justice had not been done because they lacked proper legal representation. The decision was taken specifically in the context of the Hillsborough inquests and should not be seen as setting a wider precedent.
In the light of these issues, it would be premature at this stage to commit to any further legislation, should it be required, before we have received Bishop Jones’s report and seen its recommendations. Without prejudice to our consideration of Bishop Jones’s conclusions and recommendations, it is important that I put on record that these amendments would place a significant financial burden on the Secretary of State or, in the case of Amendment 203, on PCCs. The cost of the legal representation for the 103 families at the fresh inquest into Hillsborough amounted to £63.6 million. Clearly, the Hillsborough inquests were an exceptional case, but it does at least provide an indication of the level of financial commitment these amendments imply. It is right that your Lordships’ House takes this into consideration fully. On Amendment 202, it is also unclear to me why a PCC has a role in making a recommendation to the Secretary of State when the financial implications of that decision fall solely on the Secretary of State.
There are other technical issues with these amendments. For example, how would a PCC be in a position to know the funding available to other interested persons, which can include other public bodies? A PCC has no powers to inquire into the legal costs of the ambulance service or a health trust, for example.
The reference in the amendments to “parity of funding” also requires careful consideration. There will be significant differences between the legal advice required by a police officer or former police officer who could potentially face criminal charges and the family of a victim who are seeking justice. Does parity mean the cost, or the number of solicitors and counsel, or the level of their qualifications, with, for example, both legal teams headed up by a QC?
On Amendment 203, it is not clear to me whether a PCC has discretion to consider the merits of the representations he or she receives, or whether the PCC is bound to provide funding by virtue of the fact that representations have been received.
I accept that these are all detail points, which, while they will need to be addressed, are secondary. As I have said, the Government are firmly of the view that we should wait for Bishop Jones’s report and then determine, in the light of it, the most appropriate way forward. On the understanding that this issue is firmly on the Government’s agenda, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Harris of Haringey
My Lords, before my noble friend responds, could we first have clarity as to the scope and terms of reference of Bishop Jones’s inquiry and whether it will look not at circumstances where large numbers of families are potentially involved, but at situations where there is one bereft family who are perhaps traumatised by what has happened and then face the full panoply of all this legal representation?
I note that the noble Baroness said very carefully that the former Home Secretary, in agreeing the funding in respect of the Hillsborough inquests, said that she was not setting a precedent. I appreciate that that is what one would do under such circumstances, but Hillsborough was a unique tragedy. I am not trying to gauge the size of tragedies and their impact, but the fact that for every person who died in Hillsborough their families were bereaved, shocked, appalled and in a terrible state does not alter the fact that individual families, perhaps whose 16 year-old son has died in a police cell or whatever else it might be, are suffering just as much as any of the Hillsborough families. Whether parity is the right word, as raised by the Minister, is a genuine question. It is quite complicated. However, what is important is the principle that it should be possible for families to seek representation of their choice and for it to be funded. I appreciate that they would be seeking to get to the bottom of what had happened, whereas police officers, who might be subject to criminal charges, would have a different set of objectives, but I hope that the Government, when they have fully considered this, will take on board the principle that those families should have the right to representation.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, the Government will see and respond to Bishop Jones’s review in due course. He is considering the terms of reference for his review with the families and intends to publish them shortly.
The noble Lord spoke of the suffering. He is absolutely right: it is not just the suffering of one person but the suffering of everybody associated with them, so I do not undermine the noble Lord’s point at all; in fact, I share his view. Let us see what Bishop Jones says and the Government will respond in due course.
Lord Rosser
I thank all noble Lords who have participated in this debate and the Minister for her response. I shall not pretend that the response was a tremendous shock, since it was not dissimilar to those given previously. I am not quite sure how the report by the bishop will necessarily address the issue of what could happen at inquests generally where the police are represented, as opposed to the rather special circumstances of Hillsborough. The point that I was trying to make—obviously to no avail—is that this issue is not about Hillsborough; it goes way beyond that to looking at inquests generally where the police are represented, where there is a distinct inequality of arms and the consequences that arise from that. I was disappointed to hear again the issue of the money being raised as a key point. Some might think that if spending that amount of money enabled us at long last to get at the truth over Hillsborough then maybe it was not money badly spent, but clearly the Government have a different view about that.
On the arguments about the technicalities of the amendments and on whether the wording is appropriate or a bit vague in certain areas, if the Government wanted to be serious about doing something they would not put that argument forward. They would say that there were issues with the amendments that my noble friend Lord Harris and I had put down, but that they accepted the principle of what we were trying to achieve and would come back on Report with an amendment of their own, or alternatively that they would have discussions about the appropriate wording. But that has not been the Government’s response.
Although I do not want to pretend that I am somehow shocked at the Government’s reply, since it is consistent with what has been said previously, I am disappointed with it, since I have not heard any guarantees that the report from the bishop will address the wider issue of inquests generally where the police are represented as opposed to what happened at Hillsborough. There was nothing in the Minister’s response to indicate that it would do that. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment. Obviously, we will have to consider whether to bring it back on Report.