Bank of England Act 1998 (Macro-prudential Measures) Order 2015
(9 years, 7 months ago)
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Lord Newby
That the Grand Committee do consider the Bank of England Act 1998 (Macro-prudential Measures) Order 2015.
Relevant document: 23rd Report from the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments
Lord Newby (LD)
My Lords, this Government have undertaken the most fundamental programme of financial reform this country has ever seen. The Bank of England sits at the heart of this new system, with clear responsibility for maintaining financial stability. The Bank is supported by the firm-level supervisors: the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority.
A key element of the new system is the Financial Policy Committee. The FPC is responsible for identifying, monitoring and addressing risks to the system as a whole. This macroprudential regulation was entirely absent from the system we inherited.
The FPC works to improve financial stability in two ways: first, through recommendations, which can be made to the regulators, industry, the Treasury, within the Bank and to other persons; and, secondly, through directions that can be given to the PRA and FCA. The FPC’s direction power is limited to macroprudential measures set out in orders like those currently before the House. The regulators must comply with a direction, but they will have discretion over its timing and implementation method.
The FPC has recommended that its powers of direction be expanded so that it may effectively tackle systemic risks within the financial sector. The Government agree with those recommendations and have brought forward the instruments that we are discussing today. These instruments will provide the FPC with powers of direction with regard to the UK housing market and a leverage ratio framework. I will discuss these powers in turn.
Owning a property is an aspiration for many people in the UK, and one which this Government support. However, we cannot be blind to the risks that can emerge from the housing market. More than two-thirds of previous systemic banking crises were preceded by boom-bust housing cycles, and recessions following property booms have been two to three times deeper on average than those without.
To solve this issue, we need to be clear about where the risks arise. They arise when people borrow too much and leave themselves vulnerable to changes in circumstances. Excessive debt can create serious difficulties for households and, given that mortgages are the single largest asset on bank balance sheets, it can result in significant vulnerabilities in the banking system. We all know from the experience of the financial crisis how important it is for the banking system to be resilient to all shocks, including those from the housing market. Excess debt can also force households to cut back on spending which can, in aggregate, create difficulties for the economy as a whole.
Let me be clear: there is no immediate cause for alarm. The FPC has itself stated that since taking action in June, there has been no increase in financial stability risk from the housing market. However, not to prepare for such events would be dangerously complacent. So we need to ensure the FPC has the tools at its disposal to deal with these risks should they arise, which is why we are giving the FPC far-reaching new powers over owner-occupied mortgages. Specifically, if the FPC judges that some borrowers are being offered excessive amounts of debt, they can limit the proportion of high debt-to-income—DTI—mortgages each bank can lend or, in extremis, simply ban all new lending above a specific ratio. Similarly, if the FPC is concerned by the risks posed by a housing bubble, it could impose caps on loan-to-value ratios. These additional powers over the housing market are commonly held by central banks in other countries, and the experiences of Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong confirm that DTI and LTV limits are efficient tools to address risks in the housing sector.
I now turn to the other instrument that we are considering today. The recent financial crisis revealed serious weaknesses in the existing framework of internationally agreed standards of capital adequacy. Banks in most jurisdictions were only required to meet risk-weighted capital requirements and were not subject to leverage requirements. In the lead-up to the crisis, some banks’ balance sheets expanded significantly while average risk weights declined. Firms’ leverage ratios were a useful indicator of failure during the last crisis, and the period immediately preceding the crisis was characterised by sharp increases in leverage. Firms with high leverage ratios have greater amounts of capital to absorb losses which materialise and have less reliance on debt financing.
There is international agreement that the leverage ratio is a crucial complement to risk-based capital requirements. The usefulness of the leverage ratio as a regulatory requirement has been recognised by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, which has included proposals for a 3% minimum leverage ratio in the Basel III agreement. Countries such as Canada and the US already impose leverage ratio requirements and have also committed to going beyond the Basel III requirements.
In the UK, both the Independent Commission on Banking and the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards have recommended that banks should be subject to minimum leverage ratio requirements. On 26 November 2013, the Chancellor requested that the FPC undertake a review of the leverage ratio and its role in the regulatory framework. In light of international developments, the Chancellor judged that it was an appropriate time for the FPC to consider all outstanding issues relating to the leverage ratio, including whether and when the FPC needed any additional powers of direction over the leverage ratio, and whether and how leverage requirements should be scaled up for ring-fenced banks and in other circumstances where risk-based capital ratios are raised.
On 31 October last year, following almost a year of work and extensive consultation with stakeholders, the FPC published its response, The Financial Policy Committee’s Review of the Leverage Ratio. The review recommended that the FPC be given new powers of direction over the leverage ratio framework for the UK banking sector. The Chancellor agreed with these recommendations and, following a consultation on the implementation of the proposals, brought forward the instrument that we are considering today.
The instrument will grant the FPC powers to set: a minimum leverage ratio that all firms must meet; additional leverage ratio buffers for systemic firms, linked to their systemic risk-weighted capital requirements; and a countercyclical leverage ratio buffer for all firms, linked to the countercyclical capital buffer that is also set by the FPC. These powers will allow the FPC to ensure that firms are not allowed to take on excessive levels of leverage, that the most systemically important firms are more resilient than other firms and that resilience is built up for all firms when times are good. I beg to move.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing these two orders. The Minister and I meet like this quite regularly, just the two of us. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Ashton of Hyde, for making the government side look a bit more multiple, but only two of us are going to speak. Often we discuss rather minor orders, but I do not think that these are minor; they are absolutely fundamental to the work that we have done in the Chamber with the various financial reform Acts and in the creation and designing of powers of the FPC. These are probably the key ones that have come before us. I thought that they were the first, and possibly I am wrong about that, but I certainly do not remember any as important as this. I do not want in any way to suggest that we are other than supportive of the orders, but I have a few queries and the odd complaint.
The Lords Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee commented on what it saw as the inadequacies of the Explanatory Memorandum. It particularly pointed out the very trivial summary of the consultation. I agree with the committee in the sense that the explanation of these orders needs quite a narrative. I would have appreciated it if that narrative was in the EM, but in fact one has to go into the impact assessment—and then, really to understand, I found that I had to go back into the minutes of the Financial Policy Committee and its interesting review of the leverage ratio. As a Committee, our considerations would have been enhanced if we had been led down that path rather than having to discover it. In the middle of this process, I realised what a different world it is, because 10 years ago without the internet I would not have had the faintest idea what we were talking about. It is really very complicated to get at if you cannot get back to those source documents.
The one thing that I did find in the Explanatory Memorandums from the Treasury was a name and telephone number. I have to say that my experience of ringing those numbers has been very impressive under previous orders. This time, because his name came up first, because it is attached to the second order, I publicly thank Christopher Woodspeed for spending 40 minutes taking this amateur politician through the intricacies and giving some signposts as to where to go.
I shall be slightly repetitive for the Minister, to set the scene. In creating the FPC and the other institutions, we said to the FPC that it could have two toolkits—a recommended and a directional toolkit. The recommended toolkit is a “comply or explain” toolkit, while the directional toolkit is a “do it” toolkit. As I understand it from going back into the minutes of the Financial Policy Committee of 17 and 25 June, written up as one, the committee discussed the world and particularly alighted on the UK housing market. I do not suppose anybody reads what we say, so it does not matter, but I commend whoever produced the minutes of that meeting, because I found them very readable. They are a good read; they fit together and are pleasantly discursive.
When discussing the housing market, in paragraph 11 of the minutes, the FPC reminds itself what its job is—which I thought was quite clever to put into its minutes. It states:
“Under its primary objective, the FPC was required to ‘remove or reduce systemic risks with a view to protecting and enhancing the resilience of the UK financial system’; legislation defined one source of systemic risk as ‘unsustainable levels of leverage, debt or credit growth’”.
Then the minutes describe a debate, which seems to have been a proper and interesting one. The paragraph that sums up where the committee got to says:
“Taking this evidence together, the Committee assessed that there was the potential for a large and diverse impact on aggregate demand from household indebtedness, with this risk more marked in relation to borrowers with higher levels of indebtedness. The Committee judged that the size of that impact on aggregate demand was sufficient to warrant intervening now”—
that is, in June—
“in the mortgage market, given current conditions and the potential upside risks to the FPC’s central view of the possible future path of the share of mortgages extended at high LTI multiples and hence to overall indebtedness”.
So the MPC had this conversation and produced a couple of recommendations. One was a stress test—about 3% over a period of years, and so on, which all makes sense—and the other is that:
“The PRA and the FCA should ensure that mortgage lenders do not extend more than 15% of their total number of new residential mortgages at loan to income ratios at or greater than 4.5”.
Then there is a de minimis bit of it, and so on. As I understand what the Minister has said, those recommendations did their work. My understanding from reading the various documents and from what he said is that there is not a concern with the housing market at this moment, and I do not think it is seen as a concern in the future. I do not know whether I can confess this, but I actually read the Daily Telegraph this morning—it happens. In an article, Roger Bootle, chief executive of Capital Economics and, as far as I know, pretty politically neutral, says:
“Time and again governments take measures that boost the demand for housing without doing anything to increase supply. The result is higher house prices without accommodating a single extra family—hard-working or otherwise”.
I would like the Minister to confirm that the increased demand that the Budget put into the housing market is not expected to create any destabilising effect.
So we think that the FPC has stabilised the market. However, in October 2014—no, sorry, that was the other stuff; perhaps it was September 2014—the committee determined that it wanted to move its powers from the recommendation toolkit to the direction toolkit. Does the Minister feel that that is because the FPC envisaged instability; is it just going to take the directional power and put in the same figures as in the recommendation, to tidy things up; or is it going to do neither of those things but simply put it in a drawer, with the marketplace knowing it is in a drawer and that it can be drawn out at any time to direct the marketplace away from an unstable path? I would be interested in which of those three options the Government envisage the FPC using these powers for.
I turn to the other order. I read lots of stuff on this but found one document particularly useful. The Minister has the advantage of me as he works in the Treasury; for my part, I end up understanding a bit of this legislation for about a day and a half before we discuss it and then it goes out of one’s mind. The nice thing about the Financial Policy Committee’s review of the leverage ratio is that it takes you through all the background so you can see how all the bits fit together.
As I understand it, the second order, which creates the leverage ratio concept, rules and “calibration”—the word that the FPC used—will not bite with most firms because the capital buffer, if that is the right term, derived from the risk-weighted analysis is in most cases greater than the leverage ratio buffer that will be recommended. In that sense, the new leverage ratio sits there as a floor rather than something that is biting and acting on firms. But I understand, or at least I hope I do—this will be a confirmation of whether or not I have understood it; please forgive me, but I think it is quite important—that some firms, particularly ones that have high-quality assets with low risk, may in fact be caught by the leverage ratio, and that particularly includes building societies.
My next question is: are any problems envisaged from the tightening of the market, for want of a better way of putting it, that the biting of this leverage ratio on those particular institutions is going to lead to? Will there be any adverse effects on housing finance as a result of these ratios being introduced? Finally, as I understand it, a firm could respond to the leverage ratio constraint by changing its asset mix; by moving between different levels of risk, it would change its risk-weighted buffer and come down to this buffer. It is an invitation for firms to look at their asset portfolios.
What I did not understand is the impact that this is going to have on lending to SMEs. I think there is a political consensus that SMEs need to be encouraged and funded in this country. I am curious about the extent to which it is envisaged—I got mixed messages when trying to understand it from the documentation—that this will impact on SME borrowing.
The two orders have the potential to have an impact on growth. The impact assessment has some worked-out examples. They are not forecasts, I accept that, but they illustrate scenarios where there may be some impact on growth through the use of the ratios. The leverage ratio could have a similar effect—a reduction in lending and hence some impact on growth.
It was a particular joy to read the Daily Telegraph this morning. I rather assumed it would be wall-to-wall praise. I take the Guardian to think but I take the Telegraph for therapy—that is one way of looking at it—and it is free at the club. The front page of the business section reads: “Osborne’s bank raid” and concludes that he has done a bank raid of £9.28 billion. The article refers to the OBR report. I have not a chance to read the OBR report—I am saving that for my holiday; I am covering everything in sight today, am I not? But I think it is an incredibly well constructed document which has developed well over the years, and I now find that it is genuinely worthwhile reading as one of the best documents to give you a feel for the economy as a whole. The article says:
“The OBR said in its review of the Budget that the higher levy could ‘affect banks’ ability to meet capital requirements … the measures could affect the supply of credit and therefore GDP growth’”.
So you have on the one hand the Budget with the high levy and on the other these leverage ratios, which if they bite could have an adverse effect. Given the central scenario—by that I mean the scenario that the OBR uses for its next five-year plan—are these orders expected to have any adverse effect on growth? You can read stuff that suggests they do not but it does not definitely say that they do not. Given the central scenario that the Government are using—that is, the OBR scenario for the next five years—are these orders expected to have an adverse effect on growth and, if they do, did the OBR take account of that adverse effect in its documentation or would that need to be added?
This is the end of the Parliament. I am not going to say much about the next order because it is so reasonable I cannot find anything to say about it. We have had a lot of encounters and we are in a situation which I do not know how to remedy but I somehow feel is wrong. We have here some incredibly important orders but I am not sure that we are using the correct mechanism to do them justice. There are just the two of us discussing them. The noble Lord will have studied these orders carefully and been fully briefed and no doubt will hopefully have put his staff under some pressure in this respect, and I have put quite a lot of effort into it. However, I worry about the value of these encounters. I have been trying to think through the value of this encounter. One of the things you can do with an affirmative order is to resist it by voting against it. Realistically, that happens two or three times a Parliament. Very occasionally, you vote it down. In my recollection, that occurs once or twice a decade, so it is hardly our central business. You can seek clarification which sometimes tends to verge on a bit of a blood sport where you are trying to catch the Minister out. I would not try to do that because I know the Minister is so well briefed.
The real issue is scrutiny. One of the problems with scrutiny is that it is so difficult for the Opposition to evidence the fact that they have put effort into scrutinising the legislation and making sure that it does not contain any faults. The value of scrutiny lies usually not so much in scrutinising the order but creating an atmosphere so that back at the ranch—back in the Treasury—people know that the orders that they bring forward are going to be carefully examined, and therefore they are encouraged to be that much more careful and thoughtful. In a sense, all one can do is stand up and say, “We have scrutinised the order”. These orders are particularly unhelpful in that regard, as I cannot find anything wrong with them. As far as I can see, they are well crafted. They sensibly add to the FPC’s powers. As I say, I am disappointed that I cannot find anything wrong with them.
I then glanced down at the first page of the report, which happens to list the membership of the FPC as being the Governor, four deputy-governors—for reasons I do not understand, three were there because they should be there and one was there because she was there; that is roughly what it says on the front page—the chief executive of the FCA, a man from the Treasury and four non-executives. They spent a year doing this work and, if they cannot get it right, we are in trouble. I think that they have got it right.
In summary, I thank the FPC for its efforts and commend it on the results.
Lord Newby
My Lords, I am extremely grateful to the noble Lord for taking such trouble over these orders. He raised a number of points. He asked whether it was the first time that we had used the macroprudential powers. We previously legislated to grant the FPC a power of direction with regard to sectoral capital requirements. This was done through a similar order in 2013. The debate in your Lordships’ House was on 26 February 2013. The FPC was also granted the power to set the UK rate of the countercyclical capital buffer under the CRD IV in the normal way.
The noble Lord was concerned about the lack of detail in the Explanatory Memorandum. The full consultation response document was published on the government website, but I take his point. Those of us who sat through the many weeks and months of consideration of the background policy to these orders when we were putting the Financial Services Bill through your Lordships’ House, had it in our water almost that this was going on. For people who did not do that, which of course is the vast majority of people, it is very important that the accompanying documentation is as comprehensive as possible. I am sure that my colleagues in the Treasury will have noted that, although I am of course very pleased that the noble Lord found the experience of seeking advice from the Treasury so positive.
The noble Lord asked about the extent to which there was concern at the moment about housing and whether this was a precautionary measure or the powers were going to be used immediately. The FPC is clear that these instruments are necessary to tackle financial stability risks that could emerge in the future rather than any risks that we are facing at the moment. As it said in its 2 October statement, the recommendation in relation to these powers,
“relates to the FPC’s general ability to tackle risks that could emerge from the housing market in the future. The Recommendation does not reflect any FPC decision about the current state of the housing market”.
This is a recognition of the importance of the housing market in relation to financial stability, but there is no concern at the moment that the housing market is in such a position that these powers are needed immediately.
The noble Lord asked whether, as a result of the Budget, there was likely to be a further problem with house prices and these powers might be needed sooner rather than later. The key thing here is that we are not just introducing new measures for first-time buyers, for example, but are taking, and have taken, significant steps to boost housing supply, including the new planning policy framework and the most ambitious affordable housing programme for 30 years. Everybody accepts that we need to do more on housing, but when the FPC looked at the Help to Buy scheme in October last year, which people are questioning as a potential problem in terms of financial stability, it came to the conclusion that it did not represent a material risk to financial stability, that it had not been a material driver of recent house price growth and that its key parameters remained appropriate.
The noble Lord asked about the SME lending proposals. The Government and the FPC do not expect leverage requirements to have a material impact on lending to the real economy. At the margins, firms that are bound by leverage ratio requirements may be incentivised to increase SME lending relative to other types of lending, as SME lending often attracts a higher return than other assets that have lower risk weights, as the leverage ration is not risk-weighted. However, we do not expect this effect to be significant.
The noble Lord asked how the leverage tool would affect companies with low-risk assets, particularly building societies. As he pointed out, the key capital constraint for banks and building societies is the risk-weighted capital requirements rather than the leverage ratio. The FPC’s impact assessment suggests that only two of the seven building societies in its sample would need to raise capital to meet leverage ratio requirements. The majority of building societies in the UK use standardised risk models, which means that their average risk weights are above 35%. An average risk weight above 35% means that risk-weighted capital requirements will bind—take effect—before the FPC’s proposed leverage requirements.