National Security Arrangements in Northern Ireland (Lord Carlile's Report)

Thursday 6th March 2014 Written Statements

[The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (Mrs Theresa Villiers)]

This is a summary of the main findings from the report by Lord Carlile, the independent reviewer of national security arrangements in Northern Ireland, over the period from 1 December 2012 to 31 December 2013.

“Once again I am grateful to Ministers for their close interest in the matters discussed here; several meetings with Ministers have occurred.

I have met several stakeholders for the purposes of this report. They have included the Secretary of State and other Ministers for the time being including the Minister of Justice in the Northern Ireland Executive, Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and MI5 at senior levels, the relevant Commissioners dealing with National Security matters, the Northern Ireland Policing Board, the Police Ombudsman of Northern Ireland (PONI), and others. I have also engaged with HM Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) concerning activities relevant to this Report. I have made myself available to the Northern Ireland political parties if so required, an offer which was not taken up this year.

The liaison between Mr Ford and those responsible for national security issues is satisfactory.

The context in which national security activities are performed in Northern Ireland is changing and remains challenging. I have considered the current threat level, and what I have learned of events of a terrorist nature during the year. The level of terrorist activity appears broadly similar to the previous year. The overall picture is of a very dangerous, unpredictable terrorist threat, though one much smaller than in the days of PIRA terrorist activity.

There were 30 national security incidents during 2013, and several hoaxes. The authorities deserve the highest praise for the successful security operations surrounding the G8 Summit at Lough Erne on 17-18 June and the World Police and Fire Games on 1-10 August, both of which always had the potential to be a magnet for terrorism.

Ongoing investigations are at a high level. I was provided with information about such investigations, and of the considerable number of officers involved. Peace is in no small way the result of these efforts by PSNI and MI5 personnel.

Additional challenges continue to be posed by the many connections which terrorists appear to have with organised crime—not least because such crime helps fund their politically motivated activities. The opposition to drugs use by dissident republican groups is less than convincing. Their continued involvement in tobacco smuggling is clear.

As before, I asked specifically about loyalist terrorists. Basically these are people whose real interest is in making money from crime. Their groups have always suffered from fractiousness, and this has not changed. The authorities are well sighted against these organisations.

I have asked questions again this year about the relationship between MI5 and PSNI staff working alongside each other in security sensitive operations in Northern Ireland. That they work together well and in the national interest is beyond question. Generally they are well sighted together over potential terrorist operations, better than other similar arrangements I have observed elsewhere in the world. There is no evidence of the two services in any way undermining each other’s work—quite the opposite.

In concurrence with MI5 and national security work, the use of CHIS has been effective. I was very impressed by what I was told of the training and verification processes: they are methodical, detailed and subject to constant checking.

The PSNI and MI5 respectively have their own in-house legal advisers. The PSNI also has an in-house Human Rights legal adviser. In addition, relations with the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland are excellent and founded on trust and mutual respect, and as a result the services can go to the Public Prosecution Service for advice if they feel that it would be helpful.

I am satisfied that there is undoubtedly solid scrutiny of interception, in an environment in which communications technology is developing quickly.

I have asked about the availability and use of technology for counter-terrorism operations. The amount of technically based work is on the increase, and the public are protected by investment in top quality and up to date technology.

I met the Policing Board during 2013, and attempted to address their understandable concern that they cannot make full judgments of relevant issues involving policing and national security on the basis of incomplete information. The nature of national security and the Northern Ireland context necessitates these arrangements, but the Board can feel reassured that the Human Rights Advisor is able to carry out that role with greater confidence. A stronger and coherent narrative is provided, and continuing capable judgment exercised as to what can and cannot be shared with the Board.

I consider that continuing discussion between the operational authorities and the PONI will help to define further the legitimate scope of any enquiries he may have in mind into national security issues and policy.

In relation to prosecutions, the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland is pursuing a policy consistent with that in GB, of prosecuting where the evidence reaches the required standards applicable to prosecution decisions generally. The threat of terrorism justifies the continuation of the non-jury system. There is no evidence of any disadvantage in terms of outcome to Defendants in the current system of non-jury trials.

Prisons remain a problem area on two grounds. First, short-term prisoners can emerge from gaol as more determined and better informed terrorists. Secondly, prison officers are a relatively easy target for terrorist attack.

I have measured performance in 2013 against the five key principles identified in relation to national security in Annex E to the St Andrews Agreement of October 2006.

My conclusions in relation to Annex E are as follows: