17:53 - Division on Amendment 17 - Ayes: 198 / Noes: 234 - Amendment 17 disagreed.
19:03 - Division on Amendment 18 - Ayes: 169 / Noes: 231 - Amendment 18 disagreed.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, I support Amendments 13 and 16. This debate follows on from our useful discussions on education and training last week. Once again, we see a tension between the need for a national strategy on education and training and the need for local ownership. Amendment 16 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Patel, gives us that, and I hope that the noble Earl will be sympathetic to it.
We all know about the problems that have arisen in the past where there has not been sufficient national leadership. Decisions about training places have been left to local bodies and the budget has been squeezed, the result being that a few years later there have not been enough people coming into the National Health Service, which has had a very damaging impact. I think there is unanimity in your Lordships' House that there has to be a very strong national strategy.
I very much take the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Emerton, that there must be co-ordination in workforce planning between Health Education England, as the national strategic body, and commissioners, but I would add providers because it is they who will employ the staff who have been trained. It is essential to get our workforce planning and our commissioning at a national level into sync. It is more an art than a science, and I suppose that it has never been achieved to 100 per cent satisfaction. None the less, that is what we should strive to do. Speaking as a foundation trust chair, I say to noble Lords who have discussed the national element of this that it is vital that NHS trusts and foundation trusts play a full part in the discussions. At the local level, the local education boards have a crucial role to play.
I very much support the argument of the noble Lords, Lord Patel and Lord Kakkar, on independent chairs and transparency. That is important, but it is also important that the education providers feel sufficient challenge from local NHS bodies when it comes to the quality of their education and training. I am sure that we will come later to the issue of nurse education and training. There are some real issues about the quality of nurse education and training in our universities. It is important that the local education bodies and employers provide sufficient challenge to the work of the universities. I hope that in accepting the need for an independent chair, noble Lords will agree that there should be no cosy relationship between commissioners, who ultimately have no real responsibility for the employment of staff, and universities. Unfortunately, the current system has led to too cosy a relationship. I look to the noble Earl, Lord Howe, for recognition that NHS trusts and foundations have to be very much around the table.
It would be useful if the noble Earl replied to the noble Lord, Lord Kakkar, and gave some sense about where postgraduate deans are to be placed within the new structure. I also hope that postgraduate deans will be able to recognise that in the new circumstances they can have a huge impact on NHS trusts and foundation trusts when it comes to their visitations. I also hope that clinical commissioning groups will recognise that if they are going to start shifting resources away from NHS bodies, that might have an impact on their capacity to provide education and training in the future.
That brings me to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Kakkar, about whether private providers will have contractual obligations with regard to education and training. It is important that there is a level playing field. If the Government insist on more contracts being placed with private sector providers in the future, there will have to be obligations on the part of providers. It would be grossly unfair and in the end it would not lead to the establishment of a national coherent system if private sector providers did not pay their fair share.
On governance, again, the noble Lords, Lord Patel and Lord Kakkar, made some substantive points about local education and training boards. It would also be helpful if the noble Earl responded to the point raised about academic science networks. We all agree that we must make the most of the fantastic basic education and science capacity in this country, and the links with the provision of patient care and the pharmaceutical industry. They have great potential. It would be useful to know how the noble Earl thinks they will fit into the new structure and particularly how they will link to the postgraduate deans and the academic science network. Overall, I am sure that the noble Earl will be able to come forward with a constructive response and I certainly hope that he is prepared to accept Amendments 13 and 16.
Earl Howe
My Lords, as I set out in our previous discussion on education and training, the Government are putting in place a strong national system for education and training, with a strengthened focus on quality outcomes.
We have introduced a clear duty on the Secretary of State to ensure that such a system is in place, and are now making good progress with establishing Health Education England and the local education and training boards. We are acutely aware of the importance of a safe transition to the new system and are proceeding with care and at a sensible pace to ensure the new system is fully up and running by April 2013.
As noble Lords will be aware, we have confirmed that we will set up Health Education England as a Special Health Authority in June 2012, so that it can take on some operational functions from October 2012 and be fully operational from April 2013, when it will take on the strategic health authority education and training functions. I repeat those assurances today. It will have an independently appointed chair and non-executive appointments. For this reason, we do not think that that part of Amendment 16, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Patel, and others, which would place a duty on the Secretary of State to set up Health Education England as a new special health authority, is necessary.
I hope that the undertaking will be sufficient by way of reassurance to noble Lords on that score. Nevertheless, in addressing the more detailed issues set out in that amendment, it would be helpful to elaborate a little on what I was able to tell the House last week.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
On that welcome news, I assume that would mean that it would also not involve having a higher education chair and that, in fact, to have an independent chair means that they should be independent of commissioning, providing and university providing.
Earl Howe
That is a logical inference but, if I can get further and better particulars for the noble Lord, I would be happy to do so. Each local board will set up local advisory arrangements to reflect the breadth of local interest and ensure that its decisions are informed by clinicians, clinical networks and education providers. My noble friend Lord Willis and the noble Lord, Lord Winston, asked about “any qualified provider” and whether non-NHS providers will have to play their part. Yes, indeed; all providers of NHS services will be expected to participate in education and training activities, and Health Education England will invest only in organisations which do that. The answer to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, is indeed yes. He is correct.
By April 2012, we expect the strategic health authorities to establish sub-committees that will develop the emerging local education and training boards. The role of strategic health authorities to lead on education and training has been extended until April next year. When Health Education England is fully functional as a special health authority from April 2013, it will then, as I have explained, take on the responsibility for hosting the local boards. There are plans for a safe and effective transition to the new system, which will ensure that the strategic health authority functions for education, training and workforce planning, including the work of the postgraduate deaneries, are continued. LETBs will take on these education and training functions and it is expected that many SHA and deanery staff will migrate to the local boards to ensure continuity and essential skills and knowledge for the future, subject to affordability.
As I emphasised in our earlier debate, postgraduate deans will continue to be a critical part of the medical training arrangements. We expect LETBs to be able to demonstrate that their postgraduate deans will be able to act independently so as to be able, among other things, to provide challenge where necessary—a point raised, quite rightly, by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. There will be systems and indicators in place to hold local education providers to account for the quality of education delivered by individual providers. Postgraduate deans will have all the powers that they have now to respond to any concerns about the quality of training, and to take action where required to improve standards and to assure the professional regulators, and indeed Health Education England, that poor performance is being tackled. In the new system, they will have support from the LETBs themselves and, if necessary, from Health Education England to challenge poor quality and behaviours.
Our proposed funding mechanisms reinforce that focus on quality by putting responsibility for education and training decisions in the right place, to be transparent so that funding follows the student on the basis of quality and value for money. The MPET budget will, as now, be predominantly provided to support the next generation of clinical and professional staff. Local boards will have some flexibility to invest in innovative approaches to continuing professional development and the education and training of the wider workforce. Health Education England will be responsible for developing a more transparent allocations policy for distributing education and training funding to local boards.
Now that the policy framework has been worked out, we need to push on and get the foundations of the new education and training system in place. We are doing that by establishing Health Education England and supporting the development of the emerging LETBs. It remains our intention to consolidate the functions of Health Education England by establishing it in primary legislation as a non-departmental public body. That will enable it to operate on a permanent statutory basis at arm’s length from the Department of Health while remaining accountable to the Secretary of State.
We want to do all this on the basis of consensus. We want to ensure that people with an interest have the opportunity to comment on and feed into the design of the new system, ahead of bringing forward the primary legislation in a second Bill. With that in mind, we intend to publish draft clauses on education and training for pre-legislative scrutiny in the second Session to ensure that the legislation is fit for purpose and to give Parliament an additional opportunity to scrutinise the proposals. I add that our vision for an education and training system that gives greater responsibility to employers and health professionals has been warmly welcomed.
As noble Lords will see, we have tabled amendments to strengthen links with the wider system. We have already discussed government Amendments 61 and 104, which would place duties on the board and on CCGs to promote education and training. These amendments were accepted in a previous debate. They are designed to ensure that commissioners of NHS services consider the planning, commissioning and delivery of education and training when carrying out their functions. The noble Lords, Lord Patel and Lord Warner, have tabled the very similar Amendments 62 and 106, and I hope that they will be reassured by the amendments that we have tabled and will feel able to withdraw them.
The noble Lord, Lord Patel, has tabled Amendment 13 on the role of providers. I say straight away that I am sympathetic to his intentions and I have given the amendment significant thought since it was first put down. In the beginning I thought that an amendment might not be needed, given that, in order to be established, LETBs will need to demonstrate that they meet robust authorisation criteria set by Health Education England, including demonstrating that all providers of NHS-funded services are fairly and properly represented in the LETB’s business.
At this point I shall answer the question posed by my noble friend Lord Mawhinney about the estimated costs of the amendment. I understand that Amendment 13 would be delivered by requiring commissioners to place a duty of this kind in their commissioning contracts. We do not anticipate any additional costs as a result of the amendment. Employers have told us and the Future Forum that they are keen to participate and play a leading role in the planning and commissioning of education and training through the LETBs, and of course we plan to legislate further for education and training, which will provide the opportunity to consider any duties that might be required of providers.
However, the amendment is satisfactorily drafted. In the light of what the noble Lord and others have said today in support of it, and in recognition of the strength of feeling on the issue, I can tell the noble Lord that I am willing to accept his proposal and support the amendment.
Lord Patel
My Lords, how can I put this? I am enormously content with all the things that the Minister has said about Amendment 16, which was badly drafted and defective but he has answered all the questions. I hope that all noble Lords who supported me will feel content that he really has been helpful. As far as Amendment 13 is concerned, I would much rather win it this way than by going through the Lobbies. I thank him enormously.
“( ) this Act,( ) the Health and Social Care Act 2008,( ) the Health Act 2009, and( ) the Health and Social Care Act 2012.””
Baroness Wheeler
My Lords, on behalf of these Benches, I would like to support Amendment 17 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Masham, to which I have added my name. As we did in Committee, we have again had an excellent debate, which I believe has gone a long way towards addressing the concerns expressed by some noble Lords during Committee and during this debate about making the duty of candour statutory, as well as demonstrating why the Government’s approach of relying solely on a contractual duty will not work or lead to the sea change in culture in the NHS that is needed to ensure openness and honesty when things go wrong in the care and treatment of patients.
The case for the introduction of a statutory duty has been forcefully made by the proposers and supporters of the amendment, and I shall not go over the issues again in detail. The amendment from Committee has now been substantially redrafted to ensure that there is no duplication or clash with the professional regulation and that the duty of candour applies only to actual patient-safety incidents, as already defined in statute. Thus we would no longer face the problem of how to define whether or not an incident is serious or harmful or whether it could lead to potential harm in future, a consequence feared by some noble Lords and by the Minister in his response to the Committee debate. Instead, our amendment would amend the current Care Quality Commission (Registration) Regulations by drawing on the actual text used in those regulations, requiring patient safety incidents which cause harm to patients to be notified to the CQC. The effect would be to place a statutory duty on any organisation registering with the CQC to,
“take all reasonable steps to ensure”,
openness with patients when things go wrong and cause harm. The definitions of harm and the organisations to which the duty would apply are exactly the same as those currently used to require notification of incidents to the CQC.
The Government's main arguments against statutory duty of candour are threefold: first, that implementing the contractual duty would suffice, and bring the responsibility for requiring openness closer to patients and with clinician-led commissioners; secondly, that the current consultation exercise on the contractual duty has only just closed and the Government need to analyse the responses—not much of an argument when the Government ruled out introducing the statutory duty in that consultation; and, thirdly, that existing provisions including the professional codes of practice, National Patient Safety Agency policy guidance and the requirements of the NHS constitution, with the new contractual duty, will address the problem.
However, as noble Lords have said, existing provisions exhorting NHS organisations to openness and health professions to openness and disclosure are not changing the culture of denial, obfuscation and blame that is so deeply embedded in many parts of the NHS when things go wrong. The instances of serious failure in care and treatment that have led to the campaign by patients’ organisations are, as we have heard, deeply shocking and tragic. Expecting CCGs to have the strength and will to take on powerful providers that have failed to be open and to enforce remedial measures without the support of a statutory authority will not achieve the changes we need.
On the role of the CQC, noble Lords have more than answered the Government's reservations. It is an appropriate role for the regulator and the new duty of candour would not require detailed monitoring of individual incidents or communications with patients, but could be reinforced by the CQC by using its guidance already in existence and setting it alongside all the other essential standards of quality and safety which have statutory force. I hope the Minister will reconsider his position and accept in principle that the duty of candour should be statutory, and incorporated into the Bill.
We of course recognise that there would need to be considerable work and consultation undertaken with all stakeholders to introduce and implement the statutory duty of candour. The work around implementing the contractual duty could be put to good use in this effect, as it would complement the statutory duty. Moreover, putting the principle into the Bill and working out later how it is to be implemented has been a central feature of most of the Bill's provisions, so it can be applied in this case. Tuesday’s letter in the Daily Telegraph from all the leading patient organisations emphasised that the introduction of a statutory duty of candour,
“would be a historic step forward for patients’ safety and rights”.
On these Benches we endorse this, and I hope that the Minister will now reconsider his position and accept this amendment.
Earl Howe
My Lords, this has been an excellent debate and I would like first to pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Masham, for her tireless advocacy of the need for openness and transparency in the NHS. She spoke very powerfully. What struck me from the debate is the consensus that there seems to be on all sides of the House on three key points. First, there is agreement on the importance of openness and candour in healthcare, and I think we would all accept that the NHS could only call itself a world-class health service if it embraced openness wholeheartedly. Secondly, there is agreement that at present there is significant room for improvement, the story of my noble friend Lady Hussein-Ece being a case in point. While areas of the NHS, such as Barnet and Chase Farm, are already providing exactly the transparency we wish to see, that is not by any means universal. Thirdly, there is agreement that something needs to change.
I, too, am in complete agreement with those points. I agree that we must do all that we can to encourage the development of a culture within the NHS that supports people to disclose where errors have occurred, so I am at one with the noble Baroness in her intention in tabling her amendment. The question before us is not whether we should do something but what we should do. We need to ensure that the route that we choose gives that good intention the best chance of succeeding. I note from today’s debate that opinion has not been all one way.
Lord Harris of Haringey
My Lords, is not the point that the contractual obligation that the Government are proposing would in effect be triggered only by the reporting of an incident to the CQC? Is it not also the case that the contractual obligation that the Government are talking about would not apply to primary care?
Earl Howe
I will move on to primary care in a moment, but I do not agree with the noble Lord at all on his first point. What we see happening from a contractual requirement is a process of culture change taking the form of conversations between management and clinicians about the fact that this was something that the organisation had to focus on. I do not agree that it will arise simply by reason of reported incidents.
As I said, any disagreement that I have with the noble Baroness is not out of any difference of intent; it is because of a difference of opinion about what we feel would work. Her amendment would require the Secretary of State to act with a view to securing that any CQC-registered organisation providing healthcare was required—we should perhaps log that word—to take all reasonable steps to ensure that a patient or their relatives were informed of a serious patient safety incident.
The key points here are around a requirement in relation to CQC-regulated healthcare. Any requirement must come with enforcement, otherwise it is not a requirement. The amendment as drafted would extend to providers of purely private healthcare—that is, non-NHS-funded healthcare—which suggests that any requirement would have to be enforced by the CQC. I and my officials have spoken at length with CQC colleagues regarding this. In response, the CQC has clearly stated that it would not be able to routinely monitor and enforce such a duty. This is not due to attaching less importance to this issue than to the others areas that they regulate. It is the very nature of openness that when errors occur, it is not easy to detect routinely where a lack of openness has occurred. When a patient or their relatives are not told of an error and the incident is not reported, it is often very difficult to discover that there has been a failure by an organisation to be open. The only way to fulfil this requirement would be to verify that openness was happening and, given the very nature of the issue, that would not be possible for a national regulator. It would require it to prove a negative—in this case, that people were not told about something going wrong with their healthcare.
Lord Harris of Haringey
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way again, but I am now genuinely confused about why this is different. His argument seems to be that a contractual arrangement—we will come back in a moment to the question of who that will cover and whether it will cover primary care—would magically produce a change in culture but that a statutory obligation, applying to all providers registered with the CQC, somehow would not. This is not about requiring the CQC to monitor every interaction with a patient; it is about creating that culture change and a clear sense of obligation—you cannot be registered as a provider with the CQC unless you are committed to doing this.
Earl Howe
My Lords, I hope that the noble Lord will allow me to remind him very respectfully that we are on Report and not in Committee. I am trying to work through my arguments, which I hoped would have a flow to them, but my flow has been interrupted. I am getting to what I hope he wants me to get to.
I was saying that the amendment would effectively require you to prove a negative—in this case, that people were not told about something going wrong with their healthcare. If they were not aware of the error, they would not be aware that they had not been told about it, and the volume of incidents is such that a single national body could not possibly verify compliance with that requirement.
I know that the noble Baroness advocates that the CQC should not routinely monitor this duty and instead should require organisations only to provide evidence that they encourage openness through having appropriate procedures and policies in place. Unfortunately, what that creates—this point was made by my noble friend Lord Ribeiro—is a tick-box exercise. Organisations can provide all the assurances in the world that processes are in place and therefore they are considered to be compliant, when in actual fact it could be that patients were still not being told about errors in their care. That is not acceptable and would not deliver the culture change that we need. We must have a requirement that ensures that patients are told of errors, not one that pays lip service to this and allows organisations—
Baroness Young of Old Scone
I was not intending to speak on this amendment but, as the former chairman of the Care Quality Commission, I have to make a point.
Baroness Northover
I remind the noble Baroness that, as my noble friend said, we are on Report. If she is seeking clarification or questioning something, that is slightly different, but she should not make a speech at this point.
Baroness Young of Old Scone
I merely want to ask the noble Earl what the material difference is between this requirement being laid on organisations by the CQC and many of the other basic requirements that are laid on organisations by the CQC. Those organisations are not inspected in detail on an ongoing basis, but the requirement is intended to seek from providers of health or social care an outline of how they intend to deliver that requirement, without their being inspected regularly in all cases.
Earl Howe
My Lords, I hope I have already explained that. In our conversation with the CQC, it made very clear that this would not be like any other requirement placed upon it. A requirement to prove candour will require the CQC to engage in a much more continuous and intensive process of monitoring than some of its other requirements. That was the distinction that it made and that is why it said that it did not have the capacity to fulfil this duty if it were built into the Bill.
I am afraid that the amendment would not be effective in meeting our shared objective. That is my problem with it. I have listened to the arguments put across by noble Lords in relation to primary care. I want to see openness in primary care as much as I do in secondary care. However, we still need to consider which requirements would work best in primary care.
Baroness Kingsmill
Can the Minister explain the distinction and why we cannot have both? It seems that culture change is best reinforced by legislative change, and the contractual point that the Minister made is a good idea.
Baroness Northover
For clarification, can I point out that only the mover of an amendment or the noble Lord in charge of a Bill should speak after the Minister on Report, other than for short questions of elucidation to the Minister or where the Minister speaks early to assist the House in debate? As this makes very clear, it is possible for a noble Lord to ask a short question about what the Minister has just said, but he or she should not introduce other speeches.
Earl Howe
The question of the noble Baroness relates back to something that I said some time ago. The answer is that we believe that culture change stands the best chance of happening when you bring home to those with direct responsibility for patient care that it is in the contract of the organisation that it must be candid. There are different views about this. I do not disagree with the noble Baroness that, in some cases, regulation is the right way to go. I will say a little more about that in a moment, as I wind up.
I was just talking about primary care in sympathetic terms. We need to remember that other requirements for openness still apply to all NHS services. All primary medical service contractors must have regard to the NHS constitution, professional codes of conduct, any guidance issued by PCTs or the Secretary of State and so on in relation to openness. Once they are registered with the CQC, a failure to be open with patients contravenes clear expectations set out in CQC guidance. The CQC can then take action. Therefore, primary care contractors currently have no excuse to avoid telling their patients about things going wrong with their healthcare. However, I acknowledge the concern of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and others that primary care contractors will not be covered by the current proposals for a duty of candour in the NHS standard contract. Any contractual amendment in relation to primary care contractors is a more complex process, requiring amendments to secondary legislation, among other things. Specifically because of this, we asked for views on this in our recent consultation, which closed at the end of last month. I can confirm to the House today that we are giving further thought to the issue of primary care and the duty of candour in light of the consultation responses we have received. They are complex issues. I hope noble Lords will understand that I cannot prejudge the careful analysis that is already under way in deciding how we go forward in this area. However, it is something that we are actively considering.
Earl Howe
My Lords, during the passage of the Bill we have had much discussion about the importance of freeing front-line professionals from needless bureaucracy and ensuring that they are able to focus on patient care—not least when we considered the duties of autonomy. This is one area where the House is in agreement. Certainly one aim of the Bill is to reduce bureaucracy and micromanagement, prevent politicians in Whitehall second-guessing the decisions of doctors and nurses, and streamline the architecture of the NHS.
The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, indulged himself in one of his occasional rhetorical forays, which I enjoyed. However, the amendment is rich coming from him. Perhaps I should remind the House that the previous Government did to management costs what the noble Lord accused us of doing. Since 2002-03, the management costs of PCTs and SHAs have increased by more than £1 billion—a rise of more than 120 per cent. The Bill aims to get a grip on a problem that under the previous Government simply got out of control. The noble Lord will know that my department has confirmed an overall running-cost budget of £492 million. That represents a 50 per cent reduction in costs and staff compared to the current cost of functions that will transfer to the board. At board level, the work previously done by 8,000 people will be done in future by approximately 3,500 full-time equivalent people. That is a major reduction.
The amendment tabled by the noble Lord seeks, first, to introduce a new duty on the Secretary of State to prevent bureaucracy and, secondly, to minimise the layers of management tiers within the Commissioning Board. The noble Lord produced a confection of arguments to bolster his case that bureaucracy in the NHS is increasing rather than diminishing. I can tell the House that the opposite is true. In saying that, I should stress that I am not in any way denigrating NHS managers. I have never done that and I will never do it.
Setting aside the noble Lord’s knockabout routine and getting back to earth, I agree with the principle behind this amendment. Noble Lords will already be aware of the autonomy duties, which we have recently amended, in no small part due to the Constitution Committee. Those duties ensure that proper consideration is given to whether any requirements or objectives set by the board or the Secretary of State will place unnecessary burdens on the health service or distract from good quality patient care. In addition, the Bill places duties on the NHS Commissioning Board, CCGs and other bodies to exercise their functions effectively, efficiently and economically. That is in new Section 13D of the National Health Service Act 2006 for the board and new Section 14P for CCGs. Together, I believe that these provisions ensure that the duty to maximise efficiency and minimise bureaucracy is embedded throughout the system. We do not need anything further.
The noble Lord, Lord Warner, asked me a question that I have been asked before in these debates. It concerned why we did not simply reform the PCT model. We chose not to try to reform the PCT model because it would not have delivered the empowered clinical commissioners we want to see and, indeed, the Opposition want to see. This Government supported the principle of practice-based commissioning, but there is one thing to say about practice-based commissioning: it was not working. It did not live up to the ambitions that people had for it. Central to this was clinical commissioners’ lack of autonomy. Only by conferring functions directly on clinical commissioners, as this Bill does, can that autonomy and responsibility be properly established.
Subsection (a) of the noble Lord’s amendment refers rather bafflingly, as my noble friend Lord Fowler pointed out, to a minimum level of management tiers. I am not quite sure how that would be interpreted by the courts, but I believe that the noble Lord is drawing attention to the published proposals for the board’s organisational structure. In line with the vision we set out in the White Paper, the proposals put forward make clear that the board will be a single nationwide organisation that will work across the country to improve quality and outcomes. However, there are some who have focused on the board’s proposal for a maximum of five layers of management, claiming that this represents some sort of increase rather than a reduction in bureaucracy. That is not the case. The structure proposed by the board is based on sound and well recognised principles of effective organisational structure. The proposed organisational structure for the board is designed above all to support it in its overarching role to improve health outcomes. What surely matters is the board’s efficiency and effectiveness. In fact, as I have already said, the board will operate with a 50 per cent reduction in running costs in comparison with the current system. I am not attracted to the part of the amendment that requires the Secretary of State to influence the number of management tiers in the NHS Commissioning Board. Apart from being inappropriate, it is unnecessary. The Bill already makes clear that the Secretary of State sets the resource limit for the board and new Section 223E of the 2006 Act allows him to impose a cap on administrative spend. Together these provisions ensure that financial limits are placed on the board, which will necessarily influence the way in which it is structured. However, I believe it would be inappropriate for the Secretary of State to go any further than this in influencing the organisational design of the board. The board is the body best placed to determine how to organise itself in the most effective and efficient way. It is therefore our intention to allow it as much autonomy as possible in determining its own membership, structures and procedures.
All our proposals for modernising the NHS, including the provisions in the Bill, are designed to minimise bureaucracy, micromanagement and unnecessary waste to enable the whole system to focus on what really matters, which is patient outcomes. For example, the outcomes framework will directly link quality improvement and outcomes with commissioning; clinically-led commissioning groups will be judged, through the commissioning outcomes framework, on whether they improve patient outcomes and experience rather than process targets; the NHS Commissioning Board will hold GP commissioners to account for their performance against NICE indicators; and CCGs will hold providers to account for driving up quality improvement using contracts and incentives. It is quality and outcomes that matter and with the safeguards already in place to limit administrative spend throughout the system, I believe that the noble Lord’s amendment is unnecessary. I hope that he will feel able to withdraw it.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
I must say that I am really rather disappointed by the noble Earl’s response to my constructive amendment. He does not seem to have answered the charge that is being made. First, I think we are all agreed that when we talk about bureaucracy we are not talking about the fine managers that the NHS has to whom we owe so much. This is an argument about the structure, the layers and the cost of a market that the Government wish to bring in to the health service. It is not about managers in the health service.
The fact is that the Secretary of State and his colleagues, including the noble Earl, have continued to intervene in the health service on a daily basis. They have yet to explain how, if this Bill eventually receives Royal Assent, at that point, magically, Ministers are going to step back and simply let this new system continue. I do not believe a word of it. What I believe will happen is that on the one hand you will have this complex structure where the mantra is that it is all arm’s length, it is all down to the clinical commissioning groups, the market and the gentle guidance of Sir David Nicholson and his colleagues at the national Commissioning Board, and Ministers can simply step back. It will not happen. What we will have is the system that the Bill enacts, if it is enacted, and Ministers continuing to micromanage. It is inevitable that Secretaries of State are accountable to Parliament, and they will be required by the very process of parliamentary democracy to continue to intervene and to take a close interest in what is happening. That is the charge I put to the Government as to why I believe that this is going to be a very complex situation indeed.
It is always good to debate with the noble Lord, Lord Fowler. Twenty years ago, I enjoyed debating with him issues mainly to do with the funding of the National Health Service. I think the National Association of Health Authorities and Trusts was a very modest organisation. It was very lean and certainly not subject to the strictures of the noble Lord who suggested that it was part of the bloated bureaucracy that I think he was implicating me in. He does not like the idea of declaratory law. That is all very well, but what is Clause 4 but a declaratory statement: “The Secretary of State’s duty as to promoting autonomy”? Indeed, the noble Earl, Lord Howe, referred to it in his winding-up speech. I have to say to him that if the duty of autonomy were currently on the statute book, I do not think that he could have brought this legislation in under it because it states that,
“unnecessary burdens are not imposed on any such person”.
This whole edifice is going to impose enormous burdens on many such people within the National Health Service.
The noble Lord, Lord Fowler, referred to the Griffiths report—at 24 pages, it was a remarkable letter which had a long-term impact on the health service. He will recall that we were very strong supporters of the introduction of general management. I am very concerned about the structures that are now being brought in because they may well inhibit the kind of leadership and clinical engagement that we saw as a result of the Roy Griffiths management inquiry.
I have to say to my noble friend Lord Harris that the description of Sir David Nicholson as the chief inquisitor was a little unfair.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, Amendment 19 comes back to a theme which takes us to the overriding responsibility of the Secretary of State for a comprehensive health service and to the relationship between the Secretary of State and the national Commissioning Board. I do not want to go over the ground that we went over in the previous debate but I want to make just two or three points.
The Minister will recall that in Committee we debated the whole question of the concurrent power being given to the national Commissioning Board in relation to the Secretary of State’s responsibilities in Clause 1. Given Clause 1 and our really important debates on it, and the welcome agreement on the first day on Report regarding the way in which an amendment was accepted to make clear that the Secretary of State is accountable to Parliament for NHS provision, I remain concerned as to whether it is right that a body such as the national Commissioning Board should carry such responsibilities as well—that it should have a concurrent responsibility and duty.
Surely, ultimately, the national Commissioning Board is a secondary body as compared to the Secretary of State. The very fact that there is a mandate in which the responsibilities and duties of that board are laid down on a regular basis by the Secretary of State reinforces the proper relationship between an unaccountable body, such as the national Commissioning Board, and an accountable person, such as the Secretary of State. I should be grateful if the Minister would give further reflection as to whether a concurrent power really is the appropriate way in which that relationship should be set out.
Of course, that is associated with the power of intervention by the Secretary of State. It seems to me that in the end, since the Secretary of State is accountable to Parliament for provision and for ensuring a comprehensive service, if he feels that the national Commissioning Board is not doing the right thing or that there is a matter which requires the intervention of the Secretary of State, it is right that that intervention can be taken out without obstruction or legislation. In my view, that would lead to a confusion of role as between the Secretary of State and the national Commissioning Board.
When we discussed this issue in Committee, I asked the Minister what would happen if there was an issue. Let us take, for instance, some of the recent interventions by the Secretary of State. He has expressed concern about the way in which primary care trusts have manipulated waiting lists. Rightfully, in my view, he sought to intervene. How would you do that under the new arrangements if clinical commissioning groups or some individual clinical commissioning groups were not doing what the Secretary of State thought to be appropriate?
From our debate in Committee, I had the impression from the Minister that in those circumstances provision could be made in the mandate set for the board by the Secretary of State. I can see that every so often you can alter the mandate to deal with an issue like that. But sometimes he will need to intervene rapidly rather than have to wait for the process of a mandate to be set. I also suspect that there is a risk that the mandate could become very detailed and prescriptive—in other words, the micromanagement that the Minister is so keen not to see introduced. There will be issues that arise during the year which might not have been envisaged when the mandate was drawn up.
The noble Earl may well say that we will have the intervention powers set out in proposed new Section 13Z1 set out on page 24. My problem with this is that the wording constrains the intervention because it has to be based on a failure to discharge or a failure properly to discharge any of its functions, and the failure is significant. Of course, the intervention none the less is based on what the Secretary of State himself considers, and no doubt he would always be properly advised by his officials and, in extremis, the Government Law Officers. But I can envisage situations in which the NHS Commissioning Board actually rejects the Secretary of State’s view and where it would be deemed that the issue is not one that comes under the auspices that could lead to intervention under Section 13Z1. I think that there should be a clear right in the Bill for the Secretary of State to have a power of direction.
In the end the sole accountability of the national Commissioning Board has to be through the Secretary of State and thus to Parliament. The board is not elected; it is an appointed body. There has to be full accountability, and for me, one element of that accountability is that the Minister responsible to Parliament has the right to tell that body what to do. I feel very uncomfortable with a body that is floated off. Okay, we have the mandate, but in the end it is not an accountable body except through the relationship it has with the Secretary of State, so it is right that the Secretary of State should issue direction powers without being fettered as I believe he is in Section 13Z1.
I do not think I need to mention the other two amendments at great length. Amendment 23 merely tries to encourage the noble Earl to say that clinical commissioning groups have the function of safeguarding the comprehensive provision of NHS services. It is very important that within all the autonomy that the Secretary of State wishes to give the clinical commissioning groups, it is made clear that they must, none the less, sign up to the overriding responsibility of anyone involved in the NHS to ensure that comprehensive provision is safeguarded. Amendment 70 is really consequential on Amendment 19. I beg to move.
Earl Howe
My Lords, Amendments 19 and 70 seek to reintroduce the Secretary of State’s powers to direct the health service. I have listened with care to what the noble Lord has said, but I continue to believe that this would be a retrograde step on every count, not least that of transparency. Under the Bill as it stands, the Secretary of State will be able to set objectives and requirements both through the mandate and through “standing rules” regulations under Clause 19, but unlike directions, these would be subject to full scrutiny, and the Bill creates a clear expectation that they would be set only once a year in order to provide certainty for planning. Ministers would also have robust intervention powers in the event of significant failure, as the noble Lord mentioned.
The system we are creating is designed to be predictable, transparent and structured, and will provide stability for the health service. I think that this is a better approach than allowing the Secretary of State to direct the health service whenever he wants, which risks returning us to the unpredictability and opaqueness of the current system. The noble Lord described the Commissioning Board as “unaccountable”. I must scotch that myth. The Secretary of State will have wide-ranging powers over the Commissioning Board, most prominently through the mandate and the standing rules, which will enable the board to be held rigorously to account. In addition, the board will have to meet in public, produce a business plan and an annual report, both of which will have to be laid before Parliament. Further, I would remind the noble Lord of Clause 51, which covers the,
“duty to keep health service functions under review”.
The process of holding the board to account is not a once-a-year task. In turn, the Commissioning Board will hold CCGs to account for the quality outcomes they achieve and for financial performance—and, again, will have the power to intervene where there is evidence that CCGs are failing or likely to fail to fulfil their functions. If the Commissioning Board fails to hold CCGs to account, the Secretary of State could then direct the board to do so. If the board failed to comply with that instruction, the Secretary of State could either discharge the function himself or make arrangements for another body to do so on his behalf. So it is quite wrong to say that there are no levers available to the Secretary of State.
I turn now to Amendment 23, which emphasises the need for clinical commissioning groups to safeguard,
“the comprehensive provision of NHS services”.
Noble Lords will recall that the House has already agreed an amendment to Clause 12 which explicitly requires CCGs to act consistently with the discharge by the Secretary of State and the Board of their duties to promote the comprehensive health service, and with the objectives and requirements in the mandate.
I fully appreciate and support the intentions behind this amendment, and I hope that the discussion we have already had and the amendment we have already discussed to Clause 12 will offer the noble Lord a reassurance that the effect of this amendment is already covered in the Bill. In the light of what I have said, I hope that he will feel able to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Howe, particularly for his remarks in relation to Amendment 23. Clearly we are not going to agree about this matter. I do wish that the late Lord Marsh could still be present because he would have enjoyed these debates. I think that he would have reminded us of the traditional relationship between the chairman of the board of a nationalised industry and the Minister responsible to Parliament. Although we have lost those nationalised industries, in one sense the Department of Health is now busily engaged in setting up the kind of structure that in many ways is akin to those industries. That is because the chairman and chief executive of the national Commissioning Board are, in essence, being handed a huge amount of power by the Secretary of State. They are to be given the budget, the mandate and the standing rules, and are to be told to get on with it. If we go back to our experience with the nationalised industries, of course it never worked because there was a continuous tension between the board of a nationalised industry and the Minister which arose from the fact that the Minister was accountable to Parliament for the running of the railways, iron and steel and the coal board.
That is exactly what we are constructing today. We have the myth that simply by having a mandate and standing rules, we can say to the national Commissioning Board, “Get on with it. I as a Minister will no longer intervene unless in extremis”, under the circumstances set out in Bill. Life is not like that. Parliament will continue to debate the health service, issues will arise and Ministers will make pronouncements. I do not believe for a minute that the 12 or so pronouncements we have heard from Ministers over the weeks that this Bill has been in your Lordships’ House will not be followed by similar pronouncements under the new structure. They will be forced to do so because Parliament will require it. That is the risk and why I believe it is such a complex system. On the one hand there is a structure which is based on an arm’s-length relationship, a market, with clinical commissioning based on a mandate, while on the other hand there is still the Secretary of State who will be fully held to account in Parliament. There will be enormous tension and great confusion within the National Health Service. For that reason, there is a strong argument for accepting that, in the end, the Minister is accountable and ought to have a power of direction. Saying that this can be done through a mandate and standing rules is not realistic, and no doubt, if the Bill is enacted, we will see this played out. I do not think anyone should be under the misapprehension about the fact that we are building into these arrangements a very unstable situation. But we have had a good debate, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.