Conduct of Undercover Policing and Surveillance Operatives Bill [HL]
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debateFriday 17th July 2026
(3 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberConduct of Undercover Policing and Surveillance Operatives Bill [HL] 2026-27 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Conduct of Undercover Policing and Surveillance Operatives Bill [HL] 2026-27 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Baroness in Waiting/Government Whip (Baroness Ramsey of Wall Heath) (Lab)
My Lords, before we begin our debate, I remind the House that the advisory speaking time for Back-Bench contributions is four minutes. This is to allow all colleagues to participate fairly and the House to rise at a reasonable time, around 3 pm.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, our reaction to rape, to violence against women and girls, to coercive control and to grooming has intensified over recent years, along with greater understanding of what it means to be a target, and the protection of human rights is always topical. This includes the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment. All these are what underlie the Bill. It has been known for some time that some undercover police officers entered into intimate sexual relationships with women members of organisations they had infiltrated. It is still not known how many women were deceived into long-term relationships with “boyfriends” who had assumed false names. It seems that there were upwards of 68. In some cases, children were born.
The Bill looks to the future, aiming to learn from the past. These women were activists, not terrorists. They went on protests and they were involved in planning protests. I do not suggest that the activities were insignificant, although I think some were fairly minor. Nor am I arguing that there is no place for undercover surveillance: that is not a matter for today. It would need a psychologist properly to describe the life-changing impact on the women targeted. They were in apparently close, forever relationships, only for their partners suddenly completely to disappear. That caused such anxiety, as it would. You would be distraught. They made huge, extraordinary efforts to find them. Disturbing information started to come to light: true identities, wives and children, and assumed names taken from dead children. It is not difficult to understand why such an experience means it is so hard—for some people, impossible—ever to trust again, including trusting themselves.
In 2015, the then Prime Minister Theresa May—the noble Baroness, Lady May—established an inquiry which, in its 11 years so far, has identified 30 officers who used this technique, although the total is not known. The inquiry has brought together many of those targeted. They found one another and found that their experiences were so similar, as they would be. The spy cops had managers, even regarding them as mentors: a whole structure behind them. Their seniors did not turn a blind eye. On the contrary, there was a so-called “tradecraft manual” in use, so no wonder their stories echo one another.
This is not a matter of a few bad apples, or even a barrel-load. Intimacy, the very closest, has been an instrument of surveillance by the state, not a risk at the margins which could be managed by better safeguards. The women targeted cannot have been seen as human beings capable of being injured. Indeed, some of the officers have blamed the women—something we hear about with regard to domestic violence.
The very system regarded as acceptable is and was simply wrong. The state has recognised this. Apologies have been made and damages paid. In 2015, the Met accepted that the relationships were
“deceitful, manipulative and wrong … a violation of … human rights”.
In 2021, a tribunal said that
“we are driven to the conclusion that either senior officers were quite extraordinarily naïve, totally unquestioning, or chose to turn a blind eye to conduct which was, certainly in the case of”—
a particular officer—
“useful to the operation”.
There was a finding of a violation of human rights and discrimination.
The Bill makes such conduct an offence. It uses the term CHIS, covert human intelligence source, which is defined for the purposes of the Bill. I accept that there are arguments for and against using a term already in use in other legislation. However, an intimate sexual relationship cannot be “organised”, as what would otherwise be law-breaking surveillance can be under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act. The penalty is the same as that for rape. It is a distinct offence in order to avoid the issue of whether the conduct is rape under existing legislation. Inciting or
“intentionally encouraging or assisting an offence”,
to cover the role of managers handling undercover operatives, is itself an offence. There is provision for a defendant who is in the intelligence services to apply for an anonymity order in proceedings, as I am aware of the issue of identifying intelligence officers. A duty of candour and assistance is included, although that may be overtaken by the Hillsborough Bill, or Act as it will be. Causing a person to engage in sexual activity without consent under the Sexual Offences Act is not affected: this Bill applies in the narrow situation of undercover surveillance.
Often, when we are passing legislation, noble Lords suggest guidance as a means of addressing a tricky issue. There is guidance. The College of Policing’s Authorised Professional Practice, published in 2021, says:
“It is never acceptable for a UCO”—
undercover officer—
“to have an intimate sexual relationship with those they are deployed to infiltrate and target or encounter during their deployment. Having an intimate sexual relationship must not be used as a tactic by a UCO”.
So far, so good. But there is a “but”. It continues:
“If a UCO engages in an intimate sexual relationship (for example, they perceive an immediate threat to themselves and/or others if they were not to do so) this activity will be restricted to the minimum conduct necessary to mitigate the threat”.
It goes on to provide procedures to be followed. So, the authorised professional practice is not an absolute bar. I wondered what situation this might be addressed to: a female UCO, perhaps, or a UCO being forced at knifepoint to take part in a gang rape. But would there not be a defence to the charge, namely self-defence?
I am conscious that I have not mentioned the people who seem to have been regarded as collateral damage: the wives and families of the UCOs, and the parents of the dead children whose names were assumed. I am afraid that my Bill is too narrow for that; actually, I feel a bit bad about that.
I am sure that the Minister will tell the House that the Government must await the outcome of the Undercover Policing Inquiry before addressing the situation, and I know that they have announced a consultation on the future of the inquiry. I do not accept that we need the outcome to know that this conduct is wrong. It must be outlawed. Otherwise, the apologies that have been made will seem pretty hollow and the future could hold further distress and damage, and then more apologies. No woman should experience this form of abuse again. These are means which cannot justify the end. I had never thought to use this term, but this was state-sponsored abuse. I beg to move.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for tabling this Bill. As we have seen, it has rightly generated an impassioned debate across the Chamber on the important issues it raises. I share the concerns of all noble Lords over the historic allegations about police undercover operations. Such behaviour, which we have discussed this morning, is appalling and should rightly be condemned. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, is right to describe the impact of these events on their victims as life changing, and I completely appreciate the intention of the Bill.
Public trust in the police is important, as the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Newcastle said. I join her in paying tribute to PC Jess Turnbull, who, as she said, paid the ultimate price for serving and protecting us. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, said, the reputation of the police is an important part of our discussions. I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger—once, and technically still, my rabbi at West London Synagogue—and what she said about their acts that we see daily and the way they protect all communities, particularly, over recent weeks and months, the Jewish community. When we talk about things that harm the reputation of the police, we must do so with great care and deliberation.
As noble Lords know, and as was mentioned many times in the debate, the Undercover Policing Inquiry was established to get to the truth of those events that we heard about and to ensure that lessons are learned for the future. Yesterday, my noble friend Lord Hanson of Flint announced his intention to run a focused public consultation to decide the future of the inquiry. The information gathered from this consultation will inform the next phase, ensuring that any new approach is effective, proportionate, timely and firmly grounded in the needs and priorities of those affected. The Government will, of course, carefully consider the inquiry’s findings and any recommendations in due course.
That said, the current landscape around undercover operatives is much changed. Steps have been taken to address many of the concerns and to help prevent that sort of historical activity from occurring again. This includes enhanced measures that apply to certain law enforcement agencies introduced via the so-called relevant sources order 2013. It provides a specific regime for the authorisation of undercover operatives for the police and certain other law enforcement agencies. Authorisation of such deployments is subject to an enhanced authorisation process—broadly, at assistant chief constable level—and furthermore ensures that deployments lasting over a year are subject to authorisation by a chief constable as well as prior approval by a judicial commissioner.
These enhanced arrangements are complemented by the independent oversight provided by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, the right honourable Sir Brian Leveson. As noble Lords will be aware, he will soon be joining us in your Lordships’ House, and I congratulate him on his appointment. I am sure he will bring much clarity and insight to our future debates. The commissioner provides robust independent oversight of CHIS powers and has a mandate to audit and inspect compliance by public authorities. Where issues are identified, Sir Brian takes effective action, and public authorities exercising these powers must take remedial steps in response to his findings. Furthermore, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal provides an independent right of redress for anyone who believes they have been subject to unlawful activity by a public authority using covert investigatory techniques.
I have spoken thus far about undercover operatives. However, under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, a covert human intelligence source—I apologise for using the acronym earlier without expanding it—is defined in such a way that it also includes members of the public tasked with gathering intelligence as informants, who I will refer to henceforth as informant CHIS.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, so eloquently set out—it is very good to see her back in her place—it is unclear whether the Bill is intended to include both undercover operatives and informant CHIS. Informant CHIS use their real identities and existing relationships to obtain information that is passed back to their handlers, generally for intelligence rather than evidential purposes. Their status as an informant CHIS should remain a secret and may not be revealed even to those closest to them, such as a life partner. Therefore, if this Bill extends to informant CHIS, many such individuals may be captured by the Clause 1 offence by virtue of having an existing relationship where no deceit as to their real identity or intentions is involved.
CHIS play a vital role in preventing, detecting and safeguarding the public from some of the most significant threats we face. We should be under no illusion that they do so at considerable personal risk to themselves, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, set out. The Bill, while well intentioned, will unintentionally increase significantly both the threats to the public and the risks to those acting as sources.
There is an issue around the clarity on sexual offences, which the noble and learned Lords, Lord Garnier and Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, referred to. The Clause 1 offence is tied to Section 78 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which does not specifically define intimate sexual activity and includes reference to “any other activity” considered by a reasonable person to be of a sexual nature. I mention this because the use of online undercover operatives can be a particularly effective tool in the identification and prosecution of those engaged in online child sexual exploitation. As part of that, it may be necessary for undercover operatives to communicate with those suspected of engaging in such vile behaviour. This leaves open the prospect of any communications with subjects of interest which are considered by the recipient to be of a sexual nature to be caught by the Clause 1 offence. The result of this would be a life sentence for the online undercover operative and, if taken with the provision of Clause 6(6), his or her name and marital and family status being disclosed to a paedophile as part of any proceedings.
Let me give noble Lords a case study to illustrate the potential harm the Bill could cause to vital undercover policing operations. Over a two-year period from 2023, Kurt Devoy-Foster attempted to engage in sexual communication online with girls aged between 12 and 15 years old. However, they were not children; they were undercover police officers. Devoy-Foster was ultimately charged with attempting to engage in sexual communication with a child, attempting to cause or incite a child to engage in sexual activity and failing to comply with his notification requirements. He was jailed for seven years and six months and made subject to an indefinite sexual harm prevention order. The Bill would cause a significant impact to the work that undercover operatives are able to undertake in scenarios such as this.
If your Lordships will indulge me I will give a further example, which is close to my heart and, I suggest, all our hearts—perhaps particularly that of the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger. Three individuals were recently convicted in connection with a foiled terrorist plot intended to target the Jewish community in Greater Manchester. In 2023, Walid Saadaoui came into online contact with a man he believed shared extremist views like his own. However, unbeknown to him, he was in contact with an undercover police officer. During these discussions, plans were made to import firearms from abroad which could be used in an attack. The individuals involved are serving police sentences.
I hope these examples show how crucial the CHIS capability can be, and what the impact would be of creating a checklist to test undercover officers and CHIS against. If this undercover operation had not been stopped, a terrible terrorist act may have ensued. The Bill would create a means for some of the most sophisticated actors to identify those who may be acting against them by, as I said, effectively creating a checklist to test suspected CHIS against.
I do not say this lightly, but, given the offences in scope of the Bill, such as those related to sexual conduct, this would in all likelihood be inadvertently responsible for creating a deeply troubling method of vetting by the most violent criminal groups. Those seeking to join such groups will likely be instructed to engage in profoundly immoral behaviour to prove themselves, or face significant repercussions, which may include serious injury or death. For those not acting on behalf of the state who are seeking to join such criminal groups, this increases the likelihood of being ordered to inflict sexual harm on innocent members of the public.
In contrast, for undercover operatives, published guidance, which noble Lords referred to, states that it is never acceptable for them to have an intimate sexual relationship with those they are deployed to infiltrate and target, or encounter during their deployment. However, that is caveated, for good reason, where they perceive an immediate threat to themselves or others, in which case such activity must be kept to the minimum conduct necessary to mitigate the threat. Any such conduct must immediately be reported and steps taken to investigate and establish the facts.
I turn briefly to some questions the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, asked about the inquiry and juvenile CHISs. Juvenile CHISs are used only in exceptional circumstances; I believe that in 2024, there were only four out of around 1,100 and none under the age of 16, and enhanced safeguards are in place. The duty of care that a public authority has towards a juvenile CHIS does not end when their authorisation or deployment ends.
The noble Baroness asked about the ISC, which of course already plays a significant role in the assurance, accountability and oversight of MI5 on behalf of Parliament. On the consultation, no outcome, such as ending the inquiry, is pre-judged, and it depends on the response received. I hope that that addresses the questions that the noble Baroness raised. I am aware that there were a few, but I will of course reflect on Hansard and I undertake to write to her if necessary, and that of course goes for all contributions from noble Lords in today’s debate.
The Bill would result in CHIS capability being diminished and vital intelligence and investigative leads being lost. At the same time, the public would be less safe from the most serious threats we face. It is for these reasons that I find the Bill troubling, and it is likely that the Government will seek to block it when it reaches the other place.