Data Protection and Digital Information (No. 2) Bill (First sitting)

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 10th May 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Stephanie Peacock (Barnsley East) (Lab)]

I am a proud member of a trade union. I refer the Committee to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests.

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)]

I am a proud member of two trade unions.

[Dr Rupa Huq (Ealing Central and Acton) (Lab)]

Should we declare our membership of any union?

--- Later in debate ---

[Carol Monaghan (Glasgow North West) (SNP)]

Q Clause 40 sets out the criteria by which a data controller can refuse data access requests. Do you think this is appropriate? Are you concerned that it may lead to a situation in which only those who can afford to pay a potential fee will be able to access their data?

John Edwards: Yes and no. Yes, I do believe it is an adequate provision, and no, I do not believe there will be an economic barrier to people accessing their information rights.

[Chi Onwurah]

Q The Bill’s intent is to reduce burdens on organisations while maintaining high data protection standards. Do you agree that high data protection standards are promoted by well-informed and empowered citizens? What steps do you think the Bill takes to ensure greater information empowerment for citizens?

John Edwards: Yes, I do believe that an empowered citizenry is best placed to enjoy these rights. However, I also believe that the complexity of the modern digital environment creates such an information asymmetry that it is important for strong advocates such as the Information Commissioner’s Office to act as a proxy on behalf of citizenry. I do not believe that we should devolve responsibility to citizens purely to ensure that high standards are set and adhered to in digital industries.

[Mike Amesbury]

Q Drawing on your expertise, is there anything missing from the Bill that you would have liked to see?

John Edwards: I do not believe so. We have been involved right from the outset. We made a submission on the initial White Paper. We have worked closely with officials. We have said that we want to see the Bill get to a position where I, as Information Commissioner, am able to stand up and say, “I support this legislation.” We have done that, which has meant we have achieved quite significant changes for the benefit of the people of the United Kingdom. It does not mean that we have just accepted what the Government have handed out. We have worked closely together. We have acted as advocates, and I believe that the product before you shows the benefits of that.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Five minutes left. This will be the quick-fire round. I have two Members indicating that they wish to ask questions—Chi Onwurah.

[Chi Onwurah]

Q Thank you, Mr Hollobone. We have heard that the intent in the Bill is in part to reduce the burden on organisations from data protection. We heard you set out what some of those burdens might be. The organisations affected by this Bill, and the organisations with which you work in different ways, operate in different jurisdictions. I think you, Ms Artz, set out quite well the challenges of having—or trying to have—the same regime in different jurisdictions. If forced to make a choice between following the European Union regime and following a divergent UK regime, what choice would the organisations with which you work make?

[The Chair]

Please choose one witness.

[Chi Onwurah]

Mr Ustaran, please.

Eduardo Ustaran: This is a question that many organisations that operate globally face right now. You must understand that data protection law operates all over the world and data flows all over the world, so consistency is really important in order to achieve compliance in an effective way. Therefore, a question—a very valid question—is, “Do I comply with the EU GDPR across the board, including in the UK, or should I make a difference?”

The reality is that when you look at the way in which the UK data protection framework is being amended, it provides a baseline for compliance with both the UK and EU regimes, in the sense that much of what is being introduced could potentially be interpreted as already being the case in the EU, if you apply perhaps a more progressive interpretation of EU law. Therefore, I think we should look just a little bit further than just saying, “Well, if I do comply with EU law, will I be all right in the UK?”

Maybe the way to look at it—something I see some organisations exploring—is, “If I were to take the UK interpretation of the GDPR on a wholesale basis, would that allow me to operate across the world, and certainly in the EU, in a more effective and efficient but still compliant way?” This is something that companies will be exploring, and it is not as easy as simply saying, “Well, I will just do EU law across the board.”

[Chi Onwurah]

Could I—

[The Chair]

Sorry. It must be one quick question and one quick answer. We must finish at 10.25 am. Damian Collins.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

There are two minutes left. Chi Onwurah has the last question.

[Chi Onwurah]

Q Mr Combemale, you set out some of the challenges of having centralised cookie management, and how that would give more power to the browsers. What you did not set out was how we could give more control and power to customers—citizens—over how they use their data. What are you doing to ensure that consumers have more control over how their data is used? You talked about the little thing that you can click to stop our personal data being used—that has been in place for some time now and it is great. If we have the time, Mr Ross, what is your sector doing as well, because the technology should be there to help and empower people?

Chris Combemale: I think a lot of what our sector does voluntarily—setting aside the legislation—is the creation of what are called permission centres. You will be familiar with them from when you go to a website and it asks about categories of information or products that you are interested in. That allows consumers to express their interest. Within the legislation there is very clear data notification, required at the point that data is collected, which requires companies to ask you what you want to do. Whether it is consent or legitimate interest, consumers always have the right to opt out.

With marketing, there is an absolute right to ask not to receive marketing of any kind, whether that is email, direct mail or telephone, at any time. Companies have an obligation to follow that. When it comes to marketing, which is my subject matter expertise, consumers are very well protected and do exercise their rights to opt out. They are further protected by central services, for example the telephone preference service. That is a law that companies can look up; 70% or so of households have registered their telephone number there. I think there are a large number of protections in place, both through the legislation and voluntarily.

[The Chair]

Q Mr Ross, you have 30 seconds.

Neil Ross: There has been a big drive among many tech companies to explain better how they use and handle data practices. There is a drive within the sector to do that anyway. Some of that has come from legislative regulatory activity—for example, the Online Safety Bill and other places.

One thing I would say about this legislation is that it does give people more control over data through the privacy management frameworks. By taking a less strict tick-box approach to data-handling practices, there is the opportunity for core sectors or interest groups such as trade unions to put forward what their ideal data-handling practice should be for a company. As long as that complies with what the ICO sets out or the broad guardrails, then you can see a range of different handling practices adopted, depending on which sector you are in. That flexibility gives some power back to consumers and other interest groups.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

The last question is from Chi Onwurah.

[Chi Onwurah]

Q Dr Tennison, could you give an example of the kind of abuse that you are most concerned about taking place if this Bill is passed unchanged, so that we can better understand your concern? And do I have time to ask—

[The Chair]

You have four minutes.

[Chi Onwurah]

Great. Ms Thomas, presumably all the automated decisions will be subject to employment law. Would employees have the information they need to appeal decisions and take them to an industrial tribunal?

Dr Tennison: You asked what kind of abuse I am particularly concerned about. I echo some of Anna’s concerns around the work context and what that looks like. We have recently been doing some case studies, which again I can share, and they really bring home the kinds of issues that workers are subject to as automated decision making is rolled out in organisations.

More broadly, though, I am concerned about the gradual drift of reducing trust in the public sphere when it comes to the use of data by Governments and organisations. In some ways, I am more concerned about this leading to people not adopting technology and opting out of data collection because they are worried about what might happen. That would hold us back from the progress and the good uses of data that I would really like to see.

Michael Birtwistle: I agree with that very much. We need to think about past public concern around GP data sharing, contact tracing and the Ofqual exams algorithm. When people see their data being used in unexpected ways, or in ways that make them feel uncomfortable, they withdraw their consent and support for that use, and we as a society lose the benefits that data-driven technology can bring.

Anna Thomas: Employment law and the other laws in that context certainly help in some areas; for example, there is unfair dismissal protection, and redundancy protection under the information and consultation regulations. However, it is a patchwork, and it is not clear. Clarity is needed for businesses, to reassure people at work that the principles in the AI White Paper ultimately apply to their data, and to promote prosperity and wellbeing as widely as possible.

[The Chair]

I thank our three witnesses very much indeed; you have all been fantastic. We are very grateful to you for being here. That brings us to the end of our morning session. The Committee will meet again at 2 o’clock, here in the Boothroyd Room, to continue taking oral evidence. We heard from 10 witnesses this morning and will hear from 13 this afternoon.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Steve Double.)

Data Protection and Digital Information (No. 2) Bill (Second sitting)

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 10th May 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Rebecca Long Bailey (Salford and Eccles) (Lab)]

Q In relation to medical research, concerns have been raised that the Bill might risk a divergence from current EU adequacy and that that might have quite a significant detrimental impact on collaboration, which often happens across the EU on medical research. Are you concerned about that, and what should the Government do to mitigate it?

Jonathan Sellors: I think that it is absolutely right to be concerned about whether there will be issues with adequacy, but my evaluation, and all the analysis that I have read from third parties, particularly some third-party lawyers, suggests that the Bill does not or should not have any impact on the adequacy decision at all—broadly because it takes the sensible approach of taking the existing GDPR and then making incremental explanations of what certain things actually mean. There are various provisions of GDPR—for example, on genetic data and pseudonymisation—that are there in just one sentence. It is quite a complicated topic, so having clarification is thoroughly useful, and I do not think that that should have any impact on the adequacy side of it. I think it is a very important point.

Tom Schumacher: I agree that it is a critical point. I also feel as though the real value here is in clarifying what is already permitted in the European GDPR but doing it in a way that preserves adequacy, streamlines and makes it easier for all stakeholders to reach a quick and accurate decision. I think that adequacy will be critical. I just do not think that the language of the text today impacts the ability of it to be adequate.

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)]

Q I know that you are very supportive of the Bill, but I wonder whether you see risks to patients and service users from facilitating a greater sharing of health and care data. Could you each answer that question?

Jonathan Sellors: I think that data sharing, of one sort or another, absolutely underpins medical research. You need to be able to do it internationally as well; it is not purely a UK-centric activity. The key is in making sure that the data that you are using is properly de-identified, so that research can be conducted on patients, participants and resources in a way that does not then link back to their health data and other data.

[Chi Onwurah]

Q So it has to be de-identified. We will return to that. But you do not see any other risks?

Jonathan Sellors: Let me put it this way: poor-quality research, undertaken in an unfortunate way, is always going to be a problem, but good-quality research, which has proper ethical approval and which is done on data that is suitably managed and collated, is an essential thing to be able to do.

[Chi Onwurah]

Q I agree with you. Sorry, I did not quite hear what you said—approval by whom?

Jonathan Sellors: Approval by the relevant ethics committee.

[Chi Onwurah]

Q Right. Is it a requirement of the Bill that the research should have the approval of the relevant ethics committee?

Jonathan Sellors: I do not think that it is a requirement of this Bill, but it is a requirement of pretty much most research that takes place in the UK.

[Chi Onwurah]

Q But not all research, surely, because the definition of research is something that can

“reasonably be described as scientific”

research. You would see concerns, then, if data was to be shared for research that was carried out outside of ethics committee approvals. I do not want to put words into your mouth, but I am just trying to understand.

Jonathan Sellors: Sure. I think it depends on the nature of the data that you are trying to evaluate. In other words, if you are looking at aggregated or summary datasets, I do not think there is any particular issue, but when you are looking at individual-level data, that has to be suitably de-identified in order for research to be safely conducted.

[Chi Onwurah]

Q On the point of de-identifying or pseudonymisation, do you recognise that there have been examples of pseudonymised data that has been re-identified, and that, particularly given the rise of huge datasets, artificial intelligence and so on, there is a risk of un-de-identifying pseudonymised data?

Jonathan Sellors: There is always a risk, but I think the way it is expressed in the Bill is actually quite measured. In other words, it takes a reasonable approach to what steps can constitute re-identification. There are a certain police-related examples whereby samples are found on crime scenes. The individuals can be identified, certainly, if you are on the police database, but if they are not on a reference database, it is extremely difficult to re-identify them, other than with millions of pounds-worth of police work. For all practical purposes, it is actually de-identified. Saying something is completely de-identified is quite difficult.

[Chi Onwurah]

Q Yes, I certainly agree with that—it is almost impossible—but I do think it is possible to re-identify data without spending millions of pounds, especially when it is correlated with other large datasets. Would you recognise that?

Jonathan Sellors: I definitely recognise that. That is one of our principal bits of concern, but usually the identifiers are the relatively simple ones. In other words, you can re-identify me quite easily by my seven-digit postcode and my age and my gender. Obviously, when we release data, we make sure not to do that. Releasing quite a big bit of my genetic sequence does not make me re-identifiable.

[Chi Onwurah]

Currently.

Jonathan Sellors: Currently—I accept that.

Tom Schumacher: I would say a couple of things. It is important to know that the Bill preserves the full array of safeguards in the GDPR around data minimisation, access controls and making sure that you have de-identified the data as much as possible for the purpose you are going to use it for. The opportunity that our company is quite concerned about is that, without some elements of real-world data, we are not going to be able to eliminate the bias that we see in the system. We are not going to be able to personalise medicine, and we are not going to be able to get our products approved, because our regulating bodies are now looking at and mandating that the technology we use is tested in different attributes that are relevant for that technology.

As an example, there are very few data pieces that we need for our digital surgery business, but we might need gender, weight and age. The Bill will allow customisation to say, “Okay, what are you going to do to make sure that only two or three data scientists see that data? How are you going to house it in a secure, separate environment? How are you going to make sure that you have security controls around that?” I think the Bill allows that flexibility to try to create personalised medicine, but I do not believe that the Bill opens up a new area of risk for re-identification provided that the GDPR safeguards remain.

[Chi Onwurah]

Q Let me ask a follow-up question. I recognise that your intent in research is ethical—there are ethics committees involved. Given the definition of scientific research to be anything that can be reasonably described as scientific, what is to stop data being shared for the purposes of, for example, justifying anti-covid vaccination conspiracy theories? Do you recognise that there are purposes that could be described as research but which many people would not want their data to be used for?

Tom Schumacher: In isolation, that would be a risk, but in the full context of the interrelationship between the data owner and controller and the manufacturer, there would be a process by which you would define the legitimate use you are going to use that data for, and that would be something that you would document and would go on your system. I do not believe that using data for political purposes would constitute research in the way that you would think about it in this Bill. Certainly the UK ICO is well regarded for providing useful interpretation guidance. I think that that office would be able to issue appropriate guardrails to limit those sorts of abuses.

Jonathan Sellors: If you look at a scientific hypothesis, it might not be a scientific hypothesis that you like, but it is much better to have it out there in the public domain, where the data that underpins the research can be evaluated by everybody else to show that it is not sound and is not being conducted appropriately.

[Chi Onwurah]

Q Yes, but people might not want their data to be used for that. They would have no control over it in this case.

Jonathan Sellors: There has to be some element of scientific flexibility, but scientists themselves have to be able to make a decision about what they wish to investigate. The main thing to ensure is that it is transparent—in other words, somebody else can see what they have done and the way in which they have done it, so that if it does come up with a conclusion that is fundamentally flawed, that can be properly challenged.

[The Chair]

If there are no further questions, may I thank both of you gentlemen very much indeed for your time this afternoon and for giving us your evidence. It is hugely appreciated. We now move on to the sixth panel.

Examination of Witnesses

Harry Weber-Brown and Phillip Mind gave evidence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Damian Collins]

I think the Estonian digital ID model works in a very similar way.

[Chi Onwurah]

Q You have both spoken very passionately, if I may say so, about the importance of citizens being in control of their data, particularly with open banking. We all take very seriously our financial data and the importance of trust and empowerment in these services. Can you say how the Bill will improve trust and control for citizens, or how it should do so?

Harry Weber-Brown: Part 2 of the Bill sets out the trust framework, which was being developed by the then Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport and which now comes under the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology. It will give certainty to the marketplace that any firm that wishes to store data—what is commonly known as an identity provider—will have to go through a certification regime. It will have to be certified against a register, which means that as a consumer I will know that I can trust that organisation because it will be following the trust framework and the policies that sit within it. That is critical.

Similarly, if we are setting up schemes with smart data we will need to make sure that the consumer is protected. That will come through in secondary legislation and the devil will be in the detail of the policies underpinning it, in a similar way to open banking and the pensions dashboard.

Further to the previous session, the other thing I would say is that we are talking on behalf of financial services, but parts 2 and 3 of the Bill also refer to other sectors: they apply equally to health, education and so on. If as a consumer I want to take more control of my data, I will want to be able to use it across multiple services and get a much more holistic view not just of my finances, but of my health information and so on.

One area that is particularly developing at the moment is the concept of self-sovereign identity, which enables me as a consumer to control my identity and take the identity provider out of the equation. I do not want to get too technical, but it involves storing my information on a blockchain and sharing my data credentials only when I need to do so—obviously it follows data minimisation. There are evolving schemes that we need to ensure the Bill caters for.

[Chi Onwurah]

Q Thank you very much for those points.

You mentioned data verification services. Briefly, can you help the Committee to understand who would be providing those services and who would be paying for them? You gave the example of tethering my property or other ownership. Who would be paying in that case? Would I be paying for the rest of my life to keep that data where it is? How do you see it working?

Phillip Mind: Who will provide the services? There is already a growing list of verified providers. There is a current market in one-off digital identity services, and I think many of those providers would step in to the reusable digital identity market.

What is the commercial model? That is a really good question, and frankly at this point I do not have an answer. That will evolve, but within the frameworks that are set up—trust schemes, in the jargon—there will be those who provide digital identity services and those organisations that consume them, which could be retailers, financial services providers or banks. It is likely that the relying parties, the consumers, would pay the providers.

Harry Weber-Brown: But not the individual consumers. If you wanted to open a bank account, and the bank was relying on identity measures provided by fintech, the bank would pay the fintech to undertake those services.

[The Chair]

We have time for a very quick question from Rupa Huq, with very quick answers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Damian Collins]

Q I want to follow on from the Minister’s questions. Looking at other legislation that is going through Parliament, particularly the anti-fraud provisions in the Online Safety Bill, one of the important areas is the extent to which regulators should expect companies to have good upstream solutions in place to combat fraud. Rather than chasing every example that they come across, they need things that block it in the first place. Do you see the provisions in this Bill as being helpful? Would you expect regulators to act on that and to direct companies to use systems that are known to be safe?

Keith Rosser: Absolutely. I will give a quick example relating to the Online Safety Bill and hiring, which I am talking about. If you look at people getting work online by applying through job boards or platforms, that is an uncertified, unregulated space. Ofcom recently did research, ahead of the Online Safety Bill, that found that 30% of UK adults have experienced employment scams when applying for work online, which has a major impact on access to and participation in the labour market, for many reasons.

Turning the question the other way around, we can also use that example to show that where we do have uncertified spaces, the risks are huge, and we are seeing the evidence of that. Specifically, yes, I would expect the governance body or the certification regime, or both, to really put a requirement on DVSs to do all the things you said—to have better upstream processes and better technology.

Also, I think there is a big missing space, given that we have been live with this in hiring for eight months, to provide better information to the public. At the moment, if I am a member of the public applying for a job and I need to use my digital identity, there is no information for me to look at, unless the employer—the end user—is providing me with something up front. Many do not, so I go through this process without any information about what I am doing. It is a real missed opportunity so far, but now we can right that to make sure that DVSs are providing at least basic information to the public about what to do, what not to do, what questions to ask and where to get help.

[Chi Onwurah]

Q Thank you very much for your evidence so far. It is going to be informative about the use of digital ID in recruitment. You said earlier that it helps to separate away from geography, which implied that the digital ID did not reference the location or the home address of the person who was being ID’d. What does the digital ID ID? Part of the reason behind that question is this: is it simply providing identification, or could it also be used as part of the triage process? Can that be done algorithmically, with some of the dangers that we see in algorithmic, automated decision making?

Keith Rosser: Those are several really good questions. I will use an example about location from the other perspective, first of all. At the moment, Home Office policy has not caught up with digital identity, and we are addressing that. There is a real opportunity to right that. It means that one in five work seekers right now cannot use digital identity to get a job, because they do not have an in-date British or Irish passport. If you have a visa or an in-date British or Irish passport, that is fine, but if you are among the one in five people in the country who do not have an in-date passport, you cannot. Those people have to visit the premises of the employer face to face to show their documents, or post their original documents across the UK.

This has really created a second-class work seeker. There are real dangers here, such as that an employer might decide to choose person one because they can hire them a week faster than person two. There is a real issue about this location problem. Digital identity could sever location to allow people more opportunities to work remotely across the UK.

There were really good questions about other information. The Bill has a provision for other data sharing. Again, there is the potential and the opportunity here to make UK hiring the fastest globally by linking other datasets such as HMRC payroll data. Rather than looking at a CV and wondering whether the person really worked in those places, the HMRC data could just confirm that they were employed by those companies.

There is a real opportunity to speed up the verification but, as I want to acknowledge and as you have referred to, there is certainly also a risk. Part of our mission is to make UK hiring fairer, not just faster and safer. I want to caution against going to a degree of artificial intelligence algorithmic-based hiring, where someone is not actually ever in front of a human, whether by Teams video or in person, and a robot is basically assessing their suitability for a job. We have those risks and would have them anyway without this Bill. It is really important as we go forward that we make sure we build in provisions somewhere to ensure that hiring remains a human-on-human activity in some respects, not a completely AI-based process.

[The Chair]

Mr Rosser, thank you very much indeed for your evidence this afternoon. We are grateful for your time, sir.

Examination of Witnesses

Helen Hitching and Aimee Reed gave evidence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Eastwood]

Q So it would be an advantage for the Government to look into including that.

Aimee Reed: It certainly would. It is not that we cannot do that now; I just think the guidance could be clearer. It would put it into sharper relief if we could release that burden from policing to the CPS and the CPS felt confident that that was within the rules.

Helen Hitching: The agency agrees with that—there would be the same impact.

[Chi Onwurah]

Q I think you implied that there was data that you would like to have access to but currently do not have access to. Can you elaborate on what data you do not have access to in terms of data sharing and the barriers? What would be helpful for investigations?

Aimee Reed: It is not so much about specific datasets; it is about synchronisation and the speed with which you can exchange data that enables you to make better decisions. Because the Data Protection Act is split into three parts, and law enforcement quite rightly has a section all of its own, you cannot utilise data analytics across each of the parts. Does that make sense? If we wanted to do something with Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency data and automatic number plate recognition data, we could not join together those two large datasets to enable mass analysis because there would be privacy rights considerations. If want to search datasets from other parts of that Act, we have to do that in quite a convoluted administrative way that perhaps we can share within law enforcement. It is more about the speed of exchange.

[Chi Onwurah]

Q Is it about the speed of exchange with other Government agencies or with local government agencies?

Aimee Reed: It is more with our local partners. I am sure that our partners would say they are equally frustrated by the speed at which they can get data from the police in large datasets to enable them to make better decisions in their local authorities. That is just how that Act was constructed, and it will remain so. The recent ICO guidance on sharing has made that simpler, but this realm of the Bill will not make that synchronisation available to us.

[Chi Onwurah]

Q Do you think it should be available to you? Are there reasons why it is not available to you?

Aimee Reed: It is about getting right the balance between what we do with people’s personal data and how the public would perceive the use of that data. If we just had a huge pot where we put everybody’s data, there would be real concerns about that. I am not suggesting for a second that the police want a huge pot of everybody’s data, but that is where you have to get the balance right between knowing what you have and sharing it for the right purpose and for the reason you collected it in the first place.

[Chi Onwurah]

Q Just to follow up on the questions about the different types of regulation, do you feel that the balance has been struck appropriately when it comes to biometric data, particularly for facial recognition, for example?

Helen Hitching: Sorry—could you repeat that?

[Chi Onwurah]

Has the balance between sharing and the regulation of biometric data, particularly facial recognition data, been struck in the right way?

Helen Hitching: I do not think facial recognition data is captured.

Aimee Reed: On facial recognition, given that we have deployed it—very high profile—I think that the balance is right. We have learned a lot from the South Wales judgment and from our own technical deployments. The Bill will also highlight how other biometric data should be managed, creating parity and an environment where biometric data that we do not yet have access to or use of is future-proofed in the legislation. That is really welcome.

[Rebecca Long Bailey]

Q Helen, you mentioned that you are broadly supportive of the abolition of the Biometrics Commissioner and the Surveillance Camera Commissioner, but that that abolition will not reduce the existing level of oversight. Now seems to be the time to request additional resources if you did not feel that the new commissioners would be adequately resourced, so do you have confidence that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner has sufficient resources and expertise to take on the functions it has to? Similarly, does the Information Commissioner have sufficient resources and expertise to oversee regulation in this area?

Helen Hitching: It is difficult for the agency to comment on another organisation’s resources and capabilities. That question should probably be posed directly to them. The Information Commissioner’s Office already deploys resources on issues related to law enforcement data processing, including the publication of guidance. From a biometrics perspective, the casework is moving to the IPC, so from a resourcing perspective I think it would have adequate casework provision and expertise.

Aimee Reed: I echo the comments about expertise, particularly of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. I think that the expertise exists but, like Helen, whether it has enough resources to cope with the casework I presume is a demand assessment that it will do in response to the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Damian Collins]

Q The issue is not different rates of pay per task, but the amount of paid work that someone might get within a period.

Mary Towers: Yes. Drivers are a good example. People drive a certain distance to pick people up or deliver items. Even when the driving time is exactly the same, people may be paid different rates, because the algorithm will have worked out how long certain groups of people are likely to wait before they accept a gig, for example. I emphasise that, in our view, those sorts of issues are not restricted to the gig economy; they spread way beyond it, into what one might consider to be the far more traditional professions. That is where our red lines are. They relate to transparency, explainability, non-discrimination and, critically, worker and union involvement at each stage of the AI value chain, including in the development of that type of app—you mentioned development. Unless the worker voice is heard at development stage, the likelihood is that worker concerns, needs and interests will not be met by the technology. It is a vital principle to us that there be involvement of workers and unions at each stage of the AI value chain—in development, application and use.

[Chi Onwurah]

Q Welcome to both of you. Apologies for my misuse of my own technology earlier.

The Minister talked about the need for growth, which has been sadly lacking in our economy for the last 13 years. Obviously, technology can make huge improvements to productivity for those in the workforce. Mr Pakes, as someone whose members are involved in technology, scientific and IT organisations, I wonder whether you would agree with this, which comes from my experience in the diffusion of technology. Is it possible to get the best from technology in an organisation or company without the people who will be using it, or the people on whom it will be used, being an active part of that diffusion of technology, and understanding and participating in its use?

Andrew Pakes: Absolutely. That has always been how productivity has improved or changed, in effect, the shop floor. If you are asking, “What problems are you using technology to solve?”, it may well be a question better asked by the people delivering the product or service than necessarily the vendor selling the software, whether that is old or new technology. I encourage the Committee to look at the strong evidence among our competitors who rate higher, in terms of productivity and innovation, than the UK, where higher levels of automation in the economy are matched by higher levels of worker participation. Unions are the most common form, but often it can be works councils or small businesses in terms of co-design and collaboration. We see that social partnership model of the doers, who identify and solve problems, being the people who do that.

We have good examples. We represent members in the nuclear sector who are involved in fusion, small modular reactors or other technology, where the employer-union relationship is critical to the UK’s intellectual property and the drive to make those successful industries. In the motor industry and other places where the UK has been successful, we can see that that sense of social partnership has been there. We have examples around using AI or the monitoring of conversations or voices. Again, I mentioned GPS tracking, but in safety-critical environments, where our members want to be kept safe, they know that technology can help them. Having that conversation between the workforce and the employer can come up with a solution that is not only good for our members, because they stay safe and understand what the safety regime is, but good for the employer, because days are not lost through illness or accidents. For me, that sense of using legislation like this to underpin good work conversations in the data setting is what the mission of this Bill should be about.

[Chi Onwurah]

Q In terms of data sharing, should there be provisions in the Bill to ensure that workers can give free and informed consent to the sharing of their data, or will the asymmetry of the relationship in the employment contract make that challenging?

Andrew Pakes: We think there should be a higher bar, because of the contractual nature. Whether it is self-employed workers contracting for a piece of work or an employment relationship, there is a fundamental difference in our view between my individual choice to go online and enter my data into a shop, because I want to be kept appraised of when the latest product is coming out—it is my free choice to do that—and my being able to consent in an employment relationship about how my data is used. As Mary said, the foundation stone has to be transparency on information in the first place. Beyond that, there should be negotiation to understand how that data is used.

The critical point for us is that most companies in the UK are not of a size where they will be developing their own AI products—very few will be; we can probably name a couple of them. Most companies using automated decisions or AI will be purchasing that from a global marketplace. We hope many of them will be within certain settings, but we know that the leaders in this tend to be the Chinese market and the US market, where they have different standards and a range of other things. Ensuring that we have UK legislation that protects that level of consent and that redresses that power balance between workers and employers is a critical foundation to ensuring that we get this right at an enterprise level.

[Chi Onwurah]

Q Have you identified any provisions to achieve that in the Bill as it stands?

Andrew Pakes: We would like to see more. We are worried that the current legislation, because of things such as DPIAs, drops that level of standards, which means that the UK could end up trading on a lower standard than other countries, and that worries us.

Mary Towers: We are also concerned about the change to the test for international data transfers, which might make the requirements less restrictive. There is a change from adequacy to a more risk-based assessment process in terms of international data transfers. Again, we have very similar concerns to Andrew about the use of technologies rooted in international companies and the inevitable international transfers of data, and workers essentially losing control over and knowledge of what is happening with their data beyond the workplace.

In addition, I would also like to make a point about the importance of transparency of source code, and the importance of ensuring that international trade deals do not restrict that transparency, meaning that workers cannot access information about source code once data and AI-powered tools are rooted in other countries.

[Mark Eastwood]

Q I would like to declare, again, that I am a member of Prospect, and therefore I have a bit of skin in the game on this one. You mentioned GPS and surveillance technology. Very quickly, could you give me an idea of the current scale of that? Are the majority of employers going down this route? If this Bill is pushed through, could you give me an idea of how usage could increase or decrease, depending on how you see the outcome of the Bill?

Mary Towers: I will give my statistics very quickly. Our polling revealed that approximately 60% of workers perceived that some form of monitoring was taking place in their workplace. The CEO of IBM told Bloomberg last week that 30% of non-customer facing roles, including HR functions, could be replaced by AI and automation in the next five years.

A recent report from the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre—the “Science for Policy” report on the platformatisation of work—found that 20% of German people and 35% of Spanish people are subject to algorithmic management systems at the moment. Although that is obviously not UK-based, it gives you a very recent insight on the extent of algorithmic management across Europe.

Andrew Pakes: And that matches our data. Around a third of our members say that they are subject to some form of digital monitoring or tracking. That has grown, particularly with the rise of hybrid and flexible working, which we are in favour of. This is a problem we wish to solve, rather than something to stop, in terms of getting it right.

Over the past two years, we have increasingly seen people being performance managed or disciplined based on data collected from them, whether that is from checking in and out of buildings, their use of emails, or not being in the right place based on tracking software. None of the balances we want should restrict the legitimate right of managers to manage, but there needs to be a balance within that. We know that using this software incorrectly can micromanage people in a way that is bad for their wellbeing.

The big international example, which I will give very quickly, is that if you look at a product like Microsoft—a global product—employers will buy it. My work computer has Office 365 on it. Employers get it on day one. The trouble with these big products is that, over time, they add new products and services. There was an example where Microsoft did bring in a productivity score, which could tell managers how productive and busy their teams were. They rowed back on that, but we know that with these big, global software projects—this is the point of DPIAs—it is not just a matter of consultation on day one.

The importance of DPIAs is that they stipulate that there must be regular reviews, because we know that the power of this technology transforms quickly. The danger is that we make life miserable for people who are good, productive workers and cause more problems for employers. It would be better for all of us to solve it through good legislation than to arm up the lawyers and solve it through the courts.

--- Later in debate ---

[Damian Collins]

Q Effectively, you would not need to consider whether the use of that technology in that case was disproportionate to the risk.

Alex Lawrence-Archer: Yes.

[Chi Onwurah]

Q We heard from some witnesses today that greater ease of access to data will increase competition for those such as Google and Meta that have large amounts of data as it is. What do you think the impact of this Bill will be for big tech?

Alex Lawrence-Archer: I think the Bill is quite big tech-friendly, and the way that it deals with research is well illustrative of that. One of the objectives of the Bill is obviously to boost the use of personal data for academic research, which is a really laudable objective. However, the main change—in fact the only change I can think of off the top of my head—that it makes is to broaden the definition of academic research. That helps people who already have lots of personal data they might do research with; it does not help you if you do not have personal data. That is one of the major barriers for academics at the moment: they cannot get access to the data they need.

The Bill does nothing to incentivise or compel data controllers such as online platforms to actually share data and get it moving around the system for the purposes of academic research. This is in stark contrast to the approach being taken elsewhere. It is an issue the EU is starting to grapple with in a particular domain of research with article 40 of the Digital Services Act. There is a sense that we are falling behind a little bit on that key barrier to academic research with personal data.

[Chi Onwurah]

Q We also heard that existing cookie management and subject access requests and so on represent a real burden, particularly for smaller companies. Do you recognise that? Do you know why there is less support in technology to help small businesses deal with, if you like, the data management challenges? How is that to be traded off against the privacy rights of individuals?

Alex Lawrence-Archer: I certainly recognise that the requirements of GDPR place compliance burdens on businesses of all sizes. I am sceptical that the right balance is being struck in trying to ameliorate the burdens of the costs and challenges that ordinary people will face—in terms of knowing how they are being profiled and tracked by companies—and resolving things when they have gone wrong. I am sceptical as well that there will be major benefits to many businesses who will continue to need to do business in Europe. For that reason, we will need either to have dual compliance or simply to continue to comply with EU GDPR. You can see this benefiting the largest companies, which can start to segment their users. We have already seen that with Meta, which moved its users on to US controllership, for example. I would see that as more beneficial to those large companies, which can navigate that, rather than, say, SMEs.

[The Chair]

Mr Lawrence-Archer, thank you very much for your time this afternoon.

That brings us to the end of our 11th panel. As an impartial participant in these proceedings—we have had over four-and-a-half hours of evidence with 23 witnesses —I would say it has been an absolute masterclass in all the most topical issues in data protection and digital information. Members might not realise it, but that is what we have had today.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Steve Double.)

Data Protection and Digital Information (No. 2) Bill (Third sitting)

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 16th May 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Stephanie Peacock (Barnsley East) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Hollobone. I echo the Minister’s thanks to everyone serving on the Bill Committee; it is indeed a privilege to be here representing His Majesty’s loyal Opposition. I look forward to doing our constitutional duty as we scrutinise the Bill today and in the coming sittings.

The definition of personal data is critical, not only to this entire piece of legislation, but to the data protection regime more widely. That is because the definition of what counts as personal data sets the parameters on who will benefit from protections and safeguards set out by the legislation, and, looking at it from the other side, the various protections will not apply when data is not classed as personal. It is therefore important that the definition should be clear for both controllers and data subjects, so that everyone understands where regulations and, by extension, rights do and do not apply.

The Bill defines personal data as that where a data subject can be identified by a controller or processor, or anyone likely to obtain the information,

“by reasonable means at the time of processing”.

According to the Bill, “reasonable means” take into account the time, effort, costs, technology and resources available to the person. The addition of “reasonable” to the definition has caused major concern among civil society groups, which are worried that it will introduce an element of subjectivity from the perspective of the controller when determining whether data is personal or not. Indeed, although recital 26 of the General Data Protection Regulation also refers to reasonable means—making this, in some ways, more of a formal change than a practical one—there must still be clear parameters on how controllers or processors are to make that judgment. Without those, there may be a danger of controllers and processors avoiding the requirement to comply with rules around personal data by simply claiming they do not have the means to identify living individuals within their resources.

Has the Department undertaken an impact assessment to determine whether the definition could, first, increase subjectivity in what counts as personal data, or secondly, reduce the amount of data classified as personal data? If an assessment identifies such a risk, what steps will the Department take to mitigate that and ensure that citizens are able to exercise their rights as they can under the current definition?

Other stakeholders have raised concerns that the phrase

“at the time of the processing”

in the definition might imply that there is no continuous obligation to consider whether data is personal. Indeed, under the current definition, where personal data is

“any information that relates to an identified or identifiable living individual”,

there is an implied obligation to consider whether an individual is identifiable on an ongoing basis. Rather than assessing the identifiability of a dataset at a fixed point, the controller or processor must keep the categorisation of data that it holds under careful review, taking into account technological developments, such as sophisticated new artificial intelligence or cross-referencing tools. Inserting the phrase

“at the time of the processing”

into this definition has prompted the likes of Which? to express concern that some processors may feel that they are no longer bound by this continuous obligation. That would be particularly worrying given the potential subjectivity of the new definition. If whether an individual is identifiable is based on “reasonable means”, including one’s resources and technology, it is perfectly feasible that, with a change of resources or technology, it could become reasonable to identify a person when once it was not.

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech. Does she agree that the absence of regard for the rate of technological change, particularly the rise of artificial intelligence—datasets are now being processed at phenomenal speeds—is potentially negligent on the part of the Government?

[Stephanie Peacock]

My hon. Friend makes an important point, which I will come to later.

In these circumstances, it is crucial that if a person is identifiable through data at any time in the future, the data is legally treated as personal so that the relevant safeguards and rights that GDPR was designed to ensure still apply.

When arguing for increased Secretary of State powers across the Bill, Ministers have frequently cited the need to future-proof the legislation. Given that, we must also consider the need to future-proof the definition of data so that technological advances do not render it useless. Does the new definition involve a continuous obligation to assess whether data is personal? Will guidance be offered to inform both controllers and data subjects on the application of this definition, so that both sides can be clear on how it will work in practice? As 5Rights has pointed out, that could avoid clogging up the regulator’s time with claims about what counts as personal data in many individual cases.

Finally, when determining whether data is personal, it is also vital that controllers take into account how a determined stalker or malicious actor might find and use their data. It is therefore good to see the change made since the first iteration of the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill, to clarify that

“obtaining the information as a result of the processing”

also includes information obtained as a result of inaction by a controller or processor—for example, as the result of a failure to put in place appropriate measures to prevent or reduce the risk of hacking.

Overall, it is important that we give both controllers and data subjects clarity about which data is covered by which protections, and when. I look forward to hearing from the Minister about the concerns that have been raised, which could affect the definition’s ability to allow for that clarity.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chi Onwurah]

I appreciate the Minister’s clarification. He has just said that the test of identification would apply when sharing the data with another authority. However, once that has been done, the test no longer applies. Does he accept that it is possible for data to be shared that could not by this test reasonably be identified but that, over time, in a different authority, could reasonably be identified, without the data subject having any redress?

[Sir John Whittingdale]

If data is shared and then held by a new controller, it will be still subject to the same protections even though it has been transferred from the original. It is important that there should be the ability to continue to apply protection no matter what technology evolves over the course of time, but it will still be subject to the same protection and, of course, still be enforceable through the Information Commissioner.

[Chi Onwurah]

Would it be subject to the same protection if it was transferred abroad?

[Sir John Whittingdale]

Again, yes, it will. It will be transferred abroad only if we are satisfied that the recipient will impose the same level of protection that we regard as necessary in this country.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2

Meaning of research and statistical purposes

Data Protection and Digital Information (No. 2) Bill (Fourth sitting)

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 16th May 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Sir John Whittingdale]

The Government absolutely share hon. Members’ view of the importance of transparency. We agree that individuals who are subject to automated decision making should be made aware of it and should have information about the available safeguards. However, we feel that those requirements are already built into the Bill via article 22C, which will ensure that individuals are provided with information as soon as is practicable after such decisions have been taken. This will need to include relevant information that an individual would require to contest such decisions and seek human review of them.

The reforms that we propose take an outcome-focused approach to ensure that data subjects receive the right information at the right time. The Information Commissioner’s Office will play an important role in elaborating guidance on what that will entail in different circumstances.

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)]

If I understood the Minister correctly, he said that decision subjects are a subset of data subjects. Can he envisage any circumstances in which a decision subject is not included within the group “data subjects”?

[Sir John Whittingdale]

It is certainly our view that anybody who is affected by an automated decision made on the basis of data held about individuals themselves becomes a data subject, so I think the answer to the honourable Lady’s question is no. As I said, the Information Commissioner’s Office will provide guidance in this area. If such a situation does arise, obviously it will need to be considered.The hon. Members for Barnsley East and for Glasgow North West asked about making information available to all those affected, and about safeguards, which we think are contained within the requirements under article 22C.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chi Onwurah]

I rise to speak briefly in support of the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley East and to emphasise the points that she made regarding the importance of putting forward a vision for the protection of workers as the nature of working environments change. That is part of what the amendment’s “digital information principles at work” seek to do. I declare an interest: I worked for Ofcom as head of technology before coming to this House. That work highlighted to me the importance of forward-looking regulation. As my hon. Friend set out, artificial intelligence is not forward looking; it is here with us and in the workplace.

Many technological changes have made work more accessible to more people: covid showed us that we could work from many different locations—indeed, Parliament successfully worked from many locations across the country. Technological changes have also made work more productive, and companies and public sector organisations are taking advantage of that increase in productivity. But some technologies have accelerated bad employment practices, driven down standards and damaged the wellbeing of workers—for example, workplace surveillance technologies such as GPS tracking, webcam monitoring and click monitoring, which encroach on workers’ privacy and autonomy. My constituents often say that they feel that technology is something that is done to them, rather than something that has their consent and empowers them.

It is important, as I am sure that the Minister will agree, that working people welcome and embrace the opportunities that technology can bring, both for them and for the companies and organisations they work for, but that cannot happen without trust in those technologies. For that, there need to be appropriate regulation and safeguards. Surely the Minister must therefore agree that it is time to bring forward a suite of appropriate principles that follows amendment’s principle of

“a fair, inclusive and trustworthy digital environment at work.”

I hope that he cannot disagree with any of that.

If we are to get ourselves out of the economic stagnation and lack of growth of the last 10 or 13 years, we need to build on new technologies and productivity, but we cannot do that without the support and trust of people in the workforce. People must feel that their rights—new rights that reflect the new environment in the workplace—are safeguarded. I hope that the Minister will agree that the principles set out in the amendment are essential to building that trust, and to ensuring a working environment in which workers feel protected and able to benefit from advances in technology.

[Sir John Whittingdale]

I am grateful to the hon. Members for Barnsley East and for Newcastle upon Tyne Central for setting out the thinking behind the amendment. We share the view, as the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central has just said, that those who are subject to artificial intelligence and automated decision making need to have trust in the process, and there need to be principles underlying the way in which those decisions are taken. In each case, the contributions go above and beyond the provision in the Bill. On what we are proposing regarding data protection, the changes proposed in clause 11 will reinforce and provide further clarification, as I have said, in respect of the important safeguards for automated decision making, which may be used in some workplace technologies. These safeguards ensure that individuals are made aware of and can seek human intervention on significant decisions that are taken about them through solely automated means. The reforms to article 22 would make clear employer obligations and employee rights in such scenarios, as we debated in the earlier amendments.

On the wider question, we absolutely recognise that the kind of deployment of technology in the workplace shown in the examples that have already been given needs to be considered across a wide range of different regulatory frameworks in terms of not just data protection law, but human rights law, legal frameworks regarding health and safety and, of course, employment law.

[Chi Onwurah]

I thank the Minister for his comments. I note that he castigates us, albeit gently, for tabling an amendment to this data protection Bill, while he argues that there is a need for wider legislation to enshrine the rights he apparently agrees with. When and where will that legislation come forward? Does he recognise that we waited a long time and listened to similar arguments about addressing online harms, but have ended up in a situation where—in 2023—we still do not have legislation on online harms? My question is: if not now, when?

[Sir John Whittingdale]

As I was Chair of the Culture, Media and Sport Committee in 2008 when we published a report calling for legislation on online safety, I recognise the hon. Lady’s point that these things take a long time—indeed, far too long—to come about. She calls for action now on governance and regulation of the use of artificial intelligence. She will know that last month the Government published the AI regulation White Paper, which set out the proposals for a proportionate outcomes-focused approach with a set of principles that she would recognise and welcome. They include fairness, transparency and explainability, and we feel that this has the potential to address the risks of possible bias and discrimination that concern us all. As she knows, the White Paper is currently out to consultation, and I hope that she and others will take advantage of that to respond. They will have until 21 June to do so.

I assure the hon. Lady and the hon. Member for Barnsley East that the Government are keenly aware of the need to move swiftly, but we want to do so in consultation with all those affected. The Bill looks at one relatively narrow aspect of the use of AI, but certainly the Government’s general approach is one that we are developing at pace, and we will obviously respond once the consultation has been completed.

Data Protection and Digital Information (No. 2) Bill (Fifth sitting)

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 18th May 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Sir John Whittingdale]

We now come to the provisions in the Bill relating to the powers of the Information Commissioner. Clause 27 will introduce a new strategic framework for the Information Commissioner when carrying out his functions under data protection legislation. The framework contains a principal data protection objective and a number of general duties.

The legislation does not currently provide the commissioner with a framework of strategic objectives to help to prioritise activities and resources, evaluate performance and be held accountable by stakeholders. Instead, the commissioner is obliged to fulfil a long list of tasks and functions without a clear strategic framework to guide his work.

The clause introduces a principal objective for the commissioner, first to secure an appropriate level of protection for personal data, taking into account the interests of data subjects, controllers and others along with matters of general public interest, and secondly to promote public trust and confidence in the processing of personal data. This principal objective will replace section 2(2) of the Data Protection Act 2018.

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)]

How does the Minister think the words

“an appropriate level of protection for personal data”

should be understood by the Information Commissioner? Is it in the light of the duties that follow, or what?

[Sir John Whittingdale]

Obviously that is a matter for the Information Commissioner, but that is the overriding principal objective. I am about to set out some of the other objectives that the clause will introduce, but it is made very clear that the principal objective is to ensure the appropriate level of protection. Precisely how the Information Commissioner interprets “appropriate level of protection” is a matter for him, but I think it is fairly clear what that should entail, as he himself set out in his evidence.

As I have said, clause 27 introduces new duties that the commissioner must consider where they are relevant to his work in carrying out data protection functions: the desirability of promoting innovation and competition; the importance of the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences; the need to safeguard public security and national security; and, where necessary, the need to consult other regulators when considering how the ICO’s work may affect economic growth, innovation and competition. There is also the statement of strategic priorities, which is introduced by clause 28. However, as I have indicated to the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central, the commissioner will be clear that his primary focus should be to achieve the principal objective.

Clause 27 also introduces new reporting requirements for the commissioner in relation to the strategic framework. The commissioner will be required to publish a forward-looking strategy outlining how he intends to meet the new principal objective and duties, as well as pre-existing duties in the Deregulation Act 2015 and the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006.

Finally, the commissioner will be required to publish a review of what he has done to comply with the principal objective, and with the new and existing duties, in his annual report.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 46 defines digital verification services. Central to the definition, and to the framing of the debate on part 2, is the clarification that they are

“services that are provided at the request of an individual”.

That is a crucial distinction: digital verification services and the kinds of digital identity that they enable are not the same as any kind of Government-backed digital ID card, let alone a compulsory one. As we will discuss, it is important that any such services are properly regulated and can be relied on. However, the clause seems to set out a sensible definition that clarifies that all such services operate at individual request and are entirely separate from universal or compulsory digital identities.

I will speak in more depth about clause 47. As we move towards an increasingly digitally focused society, it makes absolute sense that someone should be able, at their own choice, to prove their identity online as well as in the physical world. Providing for a trusted set of digital verification services would facilitate just that, allowing people to prove with security and ease who they are for purposes including opening a bank account or moving house, akin to using physical equivalents like a passport or a proof of address such as a utility bill. It is therefore understandable that the Government, building on their existing UK digital identity and attributes trust framework, want to legislate so that the full framework can be brought into law when it is ready.

In evidence to the Committee, Keith Rosser highlighted the benefits that a digital verification service could bring, using his industry of work and employment as a live case study. He said:

“The biggest impact so far has been on the speed at which employers are able to hire staff”––[Official Report, Data Protection and Digital Information (No. 2) Public Bill Committee, 10 May 2023; c. 52, Q112.]

In a study of 70,000 hires, the digital identity route took an average time of three minutes and 30 seconds, saving about a week compared with having to meet with an employer in person to provide physical documents. That has benefits not only to the individuals, who can start work a week earlier, but to the wider economy, since the same people will start contributing to taxation and their local economy a week earlier too.

Secondly, Keith identified that digital verification could open up remote jobs to people living in areas where employment opportunities are harder to come by. In theory, someone living in my constituency of Barnsley East could be hired in a role that would previously have been available only in London, thanks to their ability to prove who they are without ever having to meet their employer in person.

In the light of those benefits, as well as the potential reduction in fraud from cutting down on the usability of fake documents, in principle it seems only logical to support a framework that would allow trusted digital verification services to flourish. However, the key is to ensure that the framework breeds the trust necessary to make it work. In response to the digital identity call for evidence in 2019, the Government identified that a proportion of respondents were concerned about their privacy when it came to digital verification, saying that without assurances on privacy protections it would be hard to build trust in those systems. It is therefore curious that the Government have not accompanied their framework with any principles to ensure that services are designed and implemented around user needs and that they reflect important privacy and data protection principles.

Can the Minister say why the Government have not considered placing the nine identity assurance principles on the statute book, for example, to be considered when legislating for any framework? Those principles were developed by the Government’s own privacy and consumer advisory group back in 2014; they include ensuring that identity assurance can take place only where consent, transparency, multiplicity of choice, data minimisation and dispute resolution procedures are in place. That would give people the reassurance to trust that the framework is in keeping with their needs and rights, as well as those of industry.

Furthermore, can the Minister explain whether the Government intend to ensure that digital verification will not be the only option in any circumstance, making it mandatory? As Big Brother Watch points out, digital identity is not a practical or desired option, particularly for vulnerable or marginalised groups. Elderly people may not be familiar with such technology, while others might be priced out of it, especially given the recent rise in the cost of broadband and mobile bills attached to inflation. Although we must embrace the opportunities that technology can provide in identity verification, there must also be the ability to opt out and use offline methods of identification where needed, or we will risk leaving people out of participating in key activities such as jobseeking.

Finally, I look forward to hearing more about the governance of digital verification services and the framework. The Bill does not provide a statutory basis for the new office for digital identities and attributes, and there is therefore no established body for the functions related to the framework. It is important that when the new office is established, there is good communication from Government about its powers, duties, functions and funding model. After all, the framework and the principles it supports are only as strong as their enforcement.

Overall, I do not wish to stand in the way of this part of the Bill, with the caveat that I am keen to hear from the Minister on privacy protections, on the creation of the new office and on ensuring that digital verification is the beginning of a new way of verifying one’s identity, not the end of any physical verification options.

[Chi Onwurah]

It is a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley East. I have some general comments, which I intend to make now, on the digital verification services framework introduced and set out in clause 46. I also have some specific comments on subsequent clauses; I will follow your guidance, Mr Hollobone, if it is your view that my comments relate to other clauses and should be made at a later point.

Like my hon. Friend, I recognise the importance of digital verification services and the many steps that the Government are taking to support them, but I am concerned about the lack of coherence between the steps set out in the Bill and other initiatives, consultations and activities elsewhere in Government.

As my hon. Friend said, the Government propose to establish an office for digital identities and attributes, which I understand is not a regulator as such. It would be good to have clarity on the position, as there is no discussion in the Bill of the duties of the new office or any kind of mechanisms for oversight or appeal. What is the relationship between the office for digital identities and attributes and this legislation? The industry has repeatedly called for clarity on the issue. I think we can all agree that a robust and effective regulatory framework is important, particularly as the Bill confers broad information-gathering powers on the Secretary of State. Will the Minister set out his vision and tell us how he sees the services being regulated, what the governance model will be, how the office—which will sit, as I understand it, in the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology—will relate to this legislation, and whether it will be independent of Government?

Will the Minister also help us to understand the relationship between the digital verification services set out in the Bill and other initiatives across Government on digital identity, such as the Government Digital Service’s One Login service, which we understand will be operated across Government services, and the initiatives of the Home Office’s fraud strategy? Is there a relationship between them, or are they separate initiatives? If they are separate, might that be confusing for the sector? I am sure the Minister will agree that we in the UK are fortunate to have world leaders in digital verification, including iProov, Yoti and Onfido. I hope the Minister agrees that for those organisations to continue their world-leading role, they need clarification and understanding of the direction of Government and how this legislation relates to that direction.

Finally, I hope the Minister will agree that digital identity is a global business. Will he say a few words about how he has worked with, or is working with, other countries to ensure that the digital verification services model set out in this legislation is complementary to other services and interoperable as appropriate, and that it builds on the learnings of other digital verification services?

[Sir John Whittingdale]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Barnsley East for setting out the Opposition’s general support for the principle of moving towards the facilitation of digital verification services. She set out some of the benefits that such services can provide, and I completely echo her points on that score. I reiterate the central point that none of this is mandatory: people can choose to use digital verification services, but there is no intention to make them compulsory.

The trust framework has been set out with a wide number of principles and standards, to which privacy is central. The hon. Member for Barnsley East is right that that will be necessary to obtain trust from people seeking to use the services. She and the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central have both set out detailed questions about the operation of the new office and the work alongside other Government Departments. I would like to respond to their points but, given that we are about to break, we could accept the general principle of this clause and then discuss them, no doubt in greater detail, in the debate on subsequent clauses. Will the Committee accept this clause with the assurance that we will address a lot of the issues just raised as we come to subsequent clauses in this part of the Bill?

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 46 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Steve Double.)

Data Protection and Digital Information (No. 2) Bill (Sixth sitting)

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 18th May 2023 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Data and Digital Infrastructure (Sir John Whittingdale)]

Clauses 48 to 52 provide the Secretary of State with powers and duties relating to the governance and oversight of digital identities in the UK. Those functions will be carried out by the office for digital identities and attributes. I can tell the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central that the office is a team of civil servants in the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology. The office will oversee certified organisations that provide trusted digital verification services, to ensure that the purpose of the legislation is being upheld as the market develops.

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)]

I appreciate the Minister’s clarification that the office will be a group of civil servants, but I do not see that set out in the Bill, in the clause that we are currently debating. Am I wrong?

[Sir John Whittingdale]

As the office is an internal body, within the Department, I do not think that it would necessarily be specifically identified in the legislation in that way. If there is any more information on that, I will be happy to provide it to the hon. Lady in a letter, but the office is not a separate body to the Department.

[Chi Onwurah]

I thank the Minister for providing greater clarification, but if the office is not a separate body, it cannot be claimed to be independent of Government, which means that the governance of digital verification services is not independent. Will he confirm that?

[Sir John Whittingdale]

This is a function that will operate within Government. I do not think that it is one where there is any specific need for particular independence, but as I said, I am happy to supply further details about precisely how it will operate if that is helpful to the hon. Lady.

Let me move on from the precise operation of the body. Clause 53 sets out requirements for certified digital verification service providers in relation to obtaining top-up certificates where the Secretary of State revises and republishes the DVS trust framework.

Clause 48 provides that the Secretary of State must establish and maintain a register of digital verification service providers. The register must be made publicly available. The Secretary of State is required to add a digital verification service provider to the register, provided that it has met certain requirements. To gain a place on the register, the provider must first be certified against the trust framework by an accredited conformity assessment body. Secondly, the provider must have applied to be registered in line with the Secretary of State’s application requirements under clause 49. Thirdly, the provider must pay any fee set by the Secretary of State under the power in clause 50.

The United Kingdom Accreditation Service accredits conformity assessment bodies as competent to assess whether a digital verification service meets the requirements set out in the trust framework. That, of course, is an arm’s length body. Assessment is by independent audits, and successful DVS providers are issued with a certificate.

The Secretary of State is prohibited from registering a provider if it has not complied with the registration requirements. An application must be rejected if it is based on a certificate that has expired, has been withdrawn by the issuing body, or is required to be ignored under clause 53 because the trust framework rules have been amended and the provider has not obtained a top-up certificate in time. The Secretary of State must also refuse to register a DVS provider if the provider was removed from the register through enforcement powers under clause 52 and reapplies for registration while still within the specified removal period.

Clause 48(7) provides definitions for “accredited conformity assessment body”, “the Accreditation Regulation”, “conformity assessment body” and “the UK national accreditation body”.

Clause 49 makes provision for the Secretary of State to determine the form of an application for registration in the digital verification services register, the information that an application needs to contain, the documents to be provided with an application and the manner in which an application is to be submitted.

Clause 50 allows the Secretary of State to charge providers a fee on application to be registered in the DVS register. The fee amount is to be determined by the Secretary of State. The clause also allows the Secretary of State to charge already registered providers ongoing fees. The amount and timing of those fees are to be determined by the Secretary of State.

Clauses 51 and 52 confer powers and duties on the Secretary of State in relation to the removal of persons from the register. Clause 51 places a duty on the Secretary of State to remove a provider from the register if certain conditions are met. That will keep the register up to date and ensure that only providers that hold a certificate to prove that they adhere to the standards set in the framework are included in the register. Clause 52 provides a power to the Secretary of State to remove a provider from the register if the Secretary of State is satisfied that the provider is failing to provide services in accordance with the trust framework, or if it has failed to provide the Secretary of State with information as required by a notice issued under clause 58. Clause 52 also contains safeguards in respect of the use of that power.

Clause 53 applies where the Secretary of State revises and republishes the DVS trust framework to include a new rule or to change an existing rule and specifies in the trust framework that a top-up certificate will be required to show compliance with the new rule from a specified date.

I hope that what I have set out is reasonably clear, and on that basis I ask that clauses 48 to 53 stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock (Barnsley East) (Lab)]

As has been mentioned, a publicly available register of trusted digital verification services is welcome; as a result, so is this set of clauses. A DVS register of this kind will improve transparency for anyone wanting to use a DVS service, as they will be able to confirm easily and freely whether the organisation that they hope to use complies with the trust framework.

However, the worth of the register relies on the worth of the trust framework, because only by getting the trust framework right will we be able to trust those that have been accredited as following it. That will mean including enough in the framework to assure the general public that their rights are protected by it. I am thinking of things such as data minimisation and dispute resolution procedures. I hope that the Department will consider embedding principles of data rights in the framework, as has been mentioned.

As with the framework, the detail of these clauses will come via secondary legislation, and careful attention must be paid to the detail of those measures when they are laid before Parliament. In principle, however, I have no problem with the provisions of the clauses. It seems sensible to enable the Secretary of State to determine a fee for registration, to remove a person from the register upon a change in circumstances, or to remove an organisation if it is failing to comply with the trust framework. Those are all functions that are essential to the register functioning well, although any fees should of course be proportionate to keep market barriers low and ensure that smaller players continue to have access. That facilitates competition and innovation.

Similarly, the idea of top-up certificates seems sensible. Members on both sides of the House have agreed at various points on the importance of future-proofing a Bill such as this, and the digital verification services framework should have space for modernisation and adaptation where necessary. Top-up certificates will allow for the removal of any organisation that is already registered but fails to comply with new rules added to the framework.

The detail of these provisions will be analysed as and when the regulations are introduced, but I will not object to the principle of an accessible and transparent register of accredited digital verification services.

[Chi Onwurah]

I thank the Minister for clarifying the role of the office for digital identities and attributes. Some of the comments I made on clause 46 are probably more applicable here, but I will not repeat them, as I am sure the Committee does not want to hear them a second time. However, I ask the Minister to clarify the process. If a company objects to not being approved for registration or says that it has followed the process set out by the Secretary of State but the Secretary of State does not agree, or if a dispute arises for whatever reason, what appeal process is there, if any, and who is responsible for resolving disputes? That is just one example of the clarity that is necessary for an office of this kind.

Will the Minister clarify the dispute resolution process and whether the office for digital identities and attributes will have a regulatory function? Given the lack of detail on the office, I am concerned about whether it will have the necessary powers and resources. How many people does the Minister envisage working for it? Will they be full-time employees of the office, or will they be job sharing with other duties in his Department?

My other questions are about something I raised earlier, to which the Minister did not refer: international co-operation and regulation. I imagine there will be instances where companies headquartered elsewhere want to offer digital verification services. Will there be compatibility issues with digital verification that is undertaken in other jurisdictions? Is there an international element to the office for digital identities and attributes?

Everyone on the Committee agrees that this is a very important area, and it will only get more important as digital verification becomes even more essential for our everyday working lives. What discussions is the Minister having with the Department for Business and Trade about the kind of market that we might expect to see in digital verification services and ensuring that it is competitive, diverse and across our country?

[Sir John Whittingdale]

I look forward to debating the detail of the framework with the hon. Member for Barnsley East when it comes forward, but the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central raised a couple of specific points. As I said, the new office for digital identities and attributes will be in the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, and it will work on a similar basis to that of the office for product safety and standards, which operates within the Department for Business and Trade.

However, I should make it clear that the office for digital identities and attributes is not a regulator, because the use of digital identities is not mandatory, so it does not have investigatory or enforcement powers. It is not our intention for it to be able to levy fines or resolve individual complaints. Further down the line, as the market develops, it may be decided that it should be housed permanently in an independent body or as an arm’s length body, but that is for consideration in due course. It will start off within the Department.

I will come back to the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central with more detail about dispute resolution. I take her point; I am not sure how often what she describes is likely to happen, but clearly it is sensible at least to take account of it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir John Whittingdale]

Clauses 58 to 60 set out powers and duties conferred upon the Secretary of State in relation to the exercise of her governance and oversight functions under part 2.

Clause 58 enables the Secretary of State to issue a written notice that requires accredited conformity assessment bodies or registered DVS providers to provide information reasonably required by the Secretary of State to exercise functions under part 2. The notice must state why the information is required. It may also state what information is required, the form in which it should be provided, when it should be provided and the place to which it should be provided. Any notice given to a provider must also inform the provider that they may be removed from the DVS register if they fail to comply with the notice.

The power is subject to certain safeguards. Information does not have to be disclosed if to do so would breach clause 55 in relation to HMRC data or data protection legislation, or if disclosure is prohibited by the relevant parts of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. Information does not need to be disclosed if doing so would reveal an offence that would expose a person to criminal proceedings. That does not apply to offences mentioned relating to false statements.

Clause 59 gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations specifying that another person is able to exercise her functions under part 2. This clause enables us to move the governance and oversight functions of the Secretary of State to a third party if appropriate.

[Chi Onwurah]

I thank the Minister for giving way. Before he moves on to clause 60, can he set out, perhaps giving an example, where it might be appropriate to use the power in clause 59 to make arrangements for another person to take on these functions, or in what circumstances he envisages it being used?

[Sir John Whittingdale]

We are obviously at a very early stage in the development of this market. At the moment, it is felt right that oversight should rest with the Secretary of State, but it may be that as the market grows and develops there will need to be the oversight via a separate body. The clause keeps the power available to the Secretary of State to delegate the function if he or she chooses to do so.

Clause 60 requires the Secretary of State to publish an annual report on the functioning of this part. The first report must be published within 12 months of clause 47, the DVS trust framework clause, coming into force. The reports will help to ensure that the market continues to meet the needs of DVS providers, public authorities, regulators, civil society and individuals. I commend the clauses to the Committee.