European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill Debate

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Department: Department for International Development

European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill

Lord Wigley Excerpts
Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 14th January 2020

(4 years, 2 months ago)

Lords Chamber
Read Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 16-II Second marshalled list for Committee - (14 Jan 2020)
Finally, I ask the Government some questions. Why is there a provision to transfer the functions to another body? What kind of body do the Government imagine or think it should be transferred to? In what circumstances might this be thought necessary, and why?
Lord Wigley Portrait Lord Wigley (PC)
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My Lords, I believe I am right in saying that Amendment 59 is associated with this group.

Lord Greaves Portrait Lord Greaves
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No, it is coming later.

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Lord Wigley Portrait Lord Wigley
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It is coming later. I beg your Lordships’ pardon.

Lord McNicol of West Kilbride Portrait Lord McNicol of West Kilbride
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No, it is. The noble Lord is correct.

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Portrait Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)
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My Lords, I confess my inexperience in this court of Parliament in knowing whether it is the right opportunity to raise Amendment 59. I will do so. This may seem a very small point, but it goes to two points that underlie the amendments to which we will turn in due course. The first is the need to ensure that the Bill respects our constitution as regards devolution and that the devolution statutes that form part of our constitution are altered in a proper and constitutional manner. Secondly, going forward with our life outside the European Union, we achieve a stronger union by making sure that there is the closest possible working together of the devolved Governments, Assemblies and Parliaments with the Government at Westminster.

Although the amendment is addressed to deal with the position in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales together—logically it has to be—I approach this from the standpoint of Wales, for two reasons. First of all, my own experience of that devolution settlement is much clearer than my experience of the others. Secondly, I really think it of importance that in this House we try to do all we can to make sure that Wales, the Welsh Government and the Welsh Assembly understand that the union will work for the future as envisaged in the devolution statutes.

It may seem that devolution is not that important at this time in the context of this Bill, and I can well understand that view. But it is important to reflect for the future and to realise that much will need to be done to the way in which devolution operates when we are outside the European Union and with our own internal market. Those are the general points that underline my seeking to make this amendment.

The purpose of the amendment is to ensure that the principles agreed in respect of the IMA’s composition, as set out in the schedule, are carried forward in the event that a new body is created pursuant to the powers that have been added to the Bill. As regards the obligation to appoint the non-executive members of the IMA, provision is made in the Bill that the Secretary of State will appoint those with experience in relation to Scotland, in relation to Wales and in relation to Northern Ireland, who understand how the systems there work. This is plainly a proper and right provision as, over the past 20 years, as any examination of the detailed operation of devolution will show, things have changed. I find it sometimes regrettable that those who occupy the ministries in Whitehall do not realise the extent of that change. I therefore appreciate what the Government have done through this provision and the further discussions they have had of the role of the Welsh Administration and Welsh Ministers in the selection of the appropriate person. However, the provision is not carried forward if the functions of the IMA are transferred to a new body.

I accept that it is a small point, but small points can go a long way to ensure that the spirit of devolution and the constitution is respected. Of course the Government can say that there will be no change, no statement made and no clarification, but would that be wise? With the utmost respect, I suggest that it would not be wise because it would point out that even a small change that can capture the spirit of the way forward is something that the Government will not contemplate. On the other hand, if some assurance were given about any future transfer to a new body, is not that the first step in showing that the spirit of a post- devolution UK will be respected by this Government?

Lord Wigley Portrait Lord Wigley
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My Lords, I am delighted to support Amendment 59, standing in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, to which I added my name, although too late for it to appear on the Marshalled List today.

The IMA is intended to provide assurance to EU citizens who have already established their rights to live and work in the United Kingdom that, after we leave the EU, they will continue to enjoy the same rights as they do now, which flow from the principle of freedom of movement under which they first moved to the United Kingdom. The IMA will be able to investigate complaints by individual EU citizens and members of their families if it believes these complaints to have been compromised in any way.

Since such rights include access to public services, such complaints could be directed against one of the devolved Administrations. An example pointed out to me is of a Polish citizen who moved to Wales perhaps 10 years ago, and who might take up a question with the IMA if they believed that, in 2022, changes to administrative procedures in the Welsh NHS had made it impossible for them to access its services on the same basis as UK citizens. That is a matter that quite clearly has a direct relationship to the responsibilities of the National Assembly for Wales, and there will be parallels in Scotland and in Northern Ireland. It is therefore essential that the IMA has a good knowledge and understanding of the circumstances in each part of the United Kingdom. This applies to its non-executive members, as well as to its staff, who I understand are likely to be based in Wales—perhaps the Minister can confirm that.

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Lord Keen of Elie Portrait Lord Keen of Elie
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My Lords, the noble Lord perhaps anticipates what I shall come to in the course of my reply—how prescient he is in that regard.

The body is not under a sentence of death and the rationale for the ability to transfer was hinted at by the noble Lord when he talked about bodies that had long outlived their usefulness. I will elaborate on this point in a moment, but I certainly do not consider that the provisions of paragraph 39 impinge on the effective independence of the IMA. I would add—I will elaborate upon this—that we must have regard not only to the intentions of the Executive but to the joint committee and, therefore, to the interests of the other party to the international agreement that has given birth to the IMA.

Let me continue with the point I was about to raise on some of the further amendments spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Greaves. First, on Amendments 52 and 53, which seek to remove certain standard provisions for remuneration in respect of public bodies, he alluded to the term “gratuity”. There are circumstances in which public servants are brought into a body but, for one reason or another, their position is terminated early or prematurely and consideration has to be given to the question of gratuities. Where public servants are already employed in a position where they can be remunerated and there is a provision for gratuities to attract suitable employees into bodies such as the IMA, one must generally have regard to equivalence of terms and conditions. Therefore, because that appears in the context of other public bodies, it is repeated in the context of this legislation.

Amendment 54 would remove provisions that provide a proportionate and sensible way of approaching potential conflicts of interest for IMA members. At all times those members will be expected to adhere to the Cabinet Office Code of Conduct for Board Members of Public Bodies, and the approach set out in this paragraph in its unamended form is consistent with the code. For example, an individual member may make a subjective decision that they should disclose a conflict of interest but the board may determine objectively that it is not a pertinent conflict of interest and that they can therefore continue. That is why the matter is expressed in those terms.

The Government also expect the IMA to follow best practice in relation to its own transparency. Therefore, we regard Amendments 55 and 56 as unnecessary. Indeed, amending the Bill in the way proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, would take decisions around its transparency away from the IMA and thus, essentially, undermine its status as an independent body. We regard the IMA as essentially an independent body but, while enjoying the status of an independent body, it must be able to discharge certain functions as it sees appropriate, albeit while having regard to the relevant codes.

There is also a reference to not charging for the body’s functions in Amendment 61. That is unnecessary because this body will not charge for its functions. They are essentially systemic—as the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, appreciated, it is not a case of individual applications and individual disposals—and there is no room for any form of charging. Again, we feel it is unnecessary to consider that amendment.

On the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, important though the IMA will be in providing additional assurances that citizens’ rights will be protected, we do not expect its functions to be required in perpetuity. Indeed, the withdrawal agreement recognises that reality. Years from now, it might be more appropriate and effective to protect these rights differently. It is for this reason that we have included two powers in Schedule 2: one to transfer the IMA’s functions to another body under paragraph 39 and the other to remove or abolish the IMA’s functions under paragraph 40, but only following a decision by the relevant joint committees to do so.

As noble Lords have appreciated, the first power is about future-proofing to make sure that citizens’ rights obligations are monitored as effectively and efficiently as possible in the future. Indeed, years from now, the type of oversight needed for the UK’s citizens’ rights obligations and the wider UK regulatory landscape may have changed materially from what it is today, and in such new circumstances it may be more appropriate and effective for another public body to perform the IMA’s role. Removing that power, as would be required by Amendment 58, spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord McNicol, would make us less capable of ensuring that we are in a position to provide an efficient and effective monitoring of citizens’ rights and obligations.

In any event, we would be sure to keep the EU and the EEA EFTA states appropriately informed of any decision to transfer the IMA’s functions. Again, that would be by way of the joint committee and would not involve some unilateral executive action by the UK Government. Indeed, if this power were ever used, we have ensured that it would not affect the independence and effectiveness of how citizens’ rights obligations are monitored. The Secretary of State must have regard to the need for the transferee to possess the necessary independence and resources to provide effective oversight of citizens’ rights obligations.

Let me reassure the House that the commitments we have made to the devolved Administrations about their role in the Independent Monitoring Authority will be upheld in the event that its functions are transferred to another public body. We have designed this power so that the Secretary of State can make any modifications that he considers appropriate to the constitutional arrangements of the transferee. This will ensure that an equivalent to the important role of the devolved Administrations in the IMA is replicated for the transferee. I hope that reassures the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd—I apologise if I have mispronounced the Welsh—and other noble Lords that, in these circumstances, Amendment 59 is unnecessary.

As I indicated, we have included a second power to abolish the IMA, which can be exercised only following a decision by mutual consent through the relevant joint committees, comprising representatives of the UK on the one hand and the EU and EFTA states on the other. This power can do no more than give effect to a decision at the international level. It cannot be exercised following a unilateral decision by the Secretary of State or the Executive. We would give extremely serious consideration to any decision to agree to abolish the IMA and I am confident that the EU and EFTA states would do likewise.

Lord Wigley Portrait Lord Wigley
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Will the Minister also confirm that if we were to find ourselves wanting to propose such a change to our former European colleagues there would have been consultation with the devolved authorities before that stage?

Lord Keen of Elie Portrait Lord Keen of Elie
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My Lords, it is of the nature of the IMA’s function that it involves consideration of the views of the devolved Administrations and Gibraltar. It also involves consideration of the interests of those in England. We have to have regard not only to Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland but, in this context, England and Gibraltar. It would be appropriate to consider all their interests if we were to put forward a proposal for the abolition of the IMA. Indeed, I find it difficult to conceive of a situation in which we could put forward a proposal for the abolition of the IMA at the joint committee without having consulted the devolved Administrations. It strikes me as so improbable that one should not give much weight to it.