Asked by: David Davis (Conservative - Haltemprice and Howden)
Question to the Cabinet Office:
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, which Minister or official authorised the Rapid Response Unit to collect of data related to public statements, social media and internet activity as part of that unit's work.
Answered by Jeremy Quin
The Rapid Response Unit was launched, initially as a six-month pilot in April 2018; its formation having received approval at Ministerial level in January 2018. During the pandemic, the Cabinet Office expanded the team to monitor disinformation about Covid. The Rapid Response Unit used only publicly available data, including material shared on social media platforms, to assess UK disinformation trends and narratives.
Asked by: David Davis (Conservative - Haltemprice and Howden)
Question to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office:
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, which Minister or official authorised the Government Information Cell to collect data related to public statements, social media and internet activity as part of its work.
Answered by Leo Docherty - Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Minister for the Armed Forces)
The Government Information Cell (GIC) was established in February 2022 to support the UK's response to Russian disinformation relating to their invasion of Ukraine. Overall responsibility for the GIC lies with the Foreign Secretary.
Asked by: David Davis (Conservative - Haltemprice and Howden)
Question to the Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport:
To ask the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, which Minister or official authorised the Counter Disinformation Unit to collect data related to public statements, social media and internet activity as part of the unit's work.
Answered by Paul Scully
The Counter Disinformation Unit was established in 2019 as part of DCMS’s departmental responsibility for counter-disinformation, and as part of the government's manifesto commitment to make the UK the safest place in the world to be online while defending freedom of expression.
The monitoring of harmful disinformation narratives and trends, using publicly available information online, is an essential part of DCMS’ role in understanding the information environment and working with partners across government and with social media companies to counter narratives that have the potential to cause real world harm. The CDU reports regularly to ministers who have full oversight of the team’s work.
Asked by: David Davis (Conservative - Haltemprice and Howden)
Question to the Home Office:
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, which Minister or official authorised the Research, Information and Communication Unit to collect data related to public statements, social media and internet activity as part of that unit's work.
Answered by Tom Tugendhat - Minister of State (Home Office) (Security)
The Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) was established in 2007 under the Prevent strand of HMG’s CONTEST strategy. RICU aims to understand and counter terrorist and extremist ideologies to reduce the risk to the UK, its citizens, and its interests overseas.
RICU provides analysis on terrorist use of propaganda and exploitation of the internet to inform the UK’s counter-terrorism system. To support this crucial objective RICU undertakes open-source monitoring to better understand the media, online and communications environment as it relates to terrorism and extremism. All RICU data collection and analysis complies with relevant legislation.
The work of RICU is crucial to the delivery of Prevent and has helped to position the UK at the forefront of the battle against terrorist propaganda, particularly online terrorist content. Ministers have authorised RICU’s work since it was established in 2007, and through subsequent updates to the CONTEST strategy (in 2011 and 2018) and regularly receive RICU outputs.
Asked by: David Davis (Conservative - Haltemprice and Howden)
Question to the Department for Education:
To ask the Secretary of State for Education, pursuant to Answer of 15 November 2022 to Question 82174 on Gambling: Children, who authorised (a) the disclosure to Trustopia and (b) the contract terms of that disclosure; who was responsible for monitoring the management of that data; and whether disciplinary action has been taken following that incident.
Answered by Nick Gibb
The disclosure to Trust Systems Software UK Limited (trading name Trustopia) resulted from access given to a predecessor organisation that was a legitimate provider. The Department received a change of name request form and the amendment form which required Trustopia to sign a new learning provider agreement which set out terms of use for the Learning Records Service.
There is a dedicated team who manage the Learning Records Service. A signed copy of the agreement will be placed in the House of Commons Library in January 2023. The Department has worked closely with the ICO following this incident. Procedures for monitoring unusual activity have been strengthened, as have wider practices around Data Protection in the Department.
The Department’s legal advice at the time was not to pursue breach of contract pending the ICO investigation. The company has since ceased trading.
Asked by: David Davis (Conservative - Haltemprice and Howden)
Question to the Home Office:
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, whether her Department made an assessment of the level of risk of trafficking as part of its strategy to counter recruitment by (a) ISIS and (b) other groups in the period between 2013 and 2017.
Answered by Tom Tugendhat - Minister of State (Home Office) (Security)
The Government took a number of steps to address the serious risks associated with individuals travelling to Syria to fight for or otherwise support Daesh and other terrorist groups.
Since 2011, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has advised against all travel to Syria. The police and local authorities distributed over 200,000 leaflets and 30,000 posters, outlining the danger of travel to Syria.
The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 enables police officers at ports to temporarily seize and retain travel documents to disrupt intended travel when they reasonably suspect that a person intends to travel to engage in terrorism-related activity outside the UK. This power was used on 55 occasions between 2015 and 2017 (15 in 2017), and in some cases, has led to longer-term disruptive action. The Royal Prerogative can also be used to refuse a passport application, or withdraw an existing passport, under the public interest criteria. The Royal Prerogative was exercised to deny access to British passport facilities to 84 individuals between 2013 and 2017.
Our Prevent strategy includes work to identify and support individuals at risk of radicalisation. Since the introduction of the Prevent duty in 2015, over 3,000 referrals have resulted in individuals identified as being susceptible to radicalisation receiving support to move away from violent ideologies that could have resulted in harm to themselves, or others.
Asked by: David Davis (Conservative - Haltemprice and Howden)
Question to the Home Office:
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, whether her Department (a) issued and (b) used a standard operating procedure to help prevent the trafficking of vulnerable individuals from Britain to Syria by ISIS between 2013 and 2017.
Answered by Tom Tugendhat - Minister of State (Home Office) (Security)
The Government took a number of steps to address the serious risks associated with individuals travelling to Syria to fight for or otherwise support Daesh and other terrorist groups.
Since 2011, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has advised against all travel to Syria. The police and local authorities distributed over 200,000 leaflets and 30,000 posters, outlining the danger of travel to Syria.
The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 enables police officers at ports to temporarily seize and retain travel documents to disrupt intended travel when they reasonably suspect that a person intends to travel to engage in terrorism-related activity outside the UK. This power was used on 55 occasions between 2015 and 2017 (15 in 2017), and in some cases, has led to longer-term disruptive action. The Royal Prerogative can also be used to refuse a passport application, or withdraw an existing passport, under the public interest criteria. The Royal Prerogative was exercised to deny access to British passport facilities to 84 individuals between 2013 and 2017.
Our Prevent strategy includes work to identify and support individuals at risk of radicalisation. Since the introduction of the Prevent duty in 2015, over 3,000 referrals have resulted in individuals identified as being susceptible to radicalisation receiving support to move away from violent ideologies that could have resulted in harm to themselves, or others.
Asked by: David Davis (Conservative - Haltemprice and Howden)
Question to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office:
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, whether he holds any information on how many people traffickers operating in the English Channel the French authorities have (a) arrested and (b) charged in each of the last five years.
Answered by Andrew Mitchell - Minister of State (Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office) (Minister for Development)
The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office is not the owner of this information and we are therefore unable to provide the requested details. However, if the French Government publishes these figures we will update the Rt. Hon David Davis MP separately.
Asked by: David Davis (Conservative - Haltemprice and Howden)
Question to the Home Office:
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, whether she holds any information on how many people traffickers operating in the English Channel the French authorities have (a) arrested and (b) charged in each of the last five years.
Answered by Robert Jenrick
The Home Office are not the owners of this information therefore we are unable to provide it.
Asked by: David Davis (Conservative - Haltemprice and Howden)
Question to the Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport:
To ask the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, how many applications to de-list a listed building were (a) made and (b) successful in each year since 2010.
Answered by Stuart Andrew - Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Department for Culture, Media and Sport)
(a) The total number of applications received each year for the de-listing of a Listed Building is not recorded.
(b) The number of Listed Buildings de-listed each year since 2010 is detailed below:
Year | Number of Listed Buildings de-listed |
2010 | 138 |
2011 | 116 |
2012 | 131 |
2013 | 235 |
2014 | 207 |
2015 | 250 |
2016 | 306 |
2017 | 203 |
2018 | 258 |
2019 | 185 |
2020 | 83 |
2021 | 46 |
2022* | 114* |
* Up to 15th December 2022.