Fire Safety Bill

Chris Green Excerpts

Consideration of Lords amendments & Ping Pong & Ping Pong: House of Commons
Wednesday 24th February 2021 Commons Chamber

[John McDonnell (Hayes and Harlington) (Lab) [V]]

I, too, send my best wishes to the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (James Brokenshire) and wish him a speedy recovery.

I have been listening to the debate and the various interventions. A question asked consistently in interventions from Conservative Members has been whether it is not best to put things right rather than act quickly. I remind those Members, as others have, that it is now four years on from Grenfell. Four years is a timescale in which we should have been able to address this issue and given people security and some form of confidence.

Confidence has been shattered by the failure to include in the legislation the recommendations from the first phase of the Grenfell inquiry. I share the view of the Fire Brigades Union that the Government seem to be doing the bare minimum to fend off bad headlines. I have not the eloquence to speak on behalf of my constituents and portray just how strongly they feel about this matter. They are really very angry—and, I have to say, distressed. They feel not only at risk but that their lives have been put on hold by their inability to sell their properties and move from them.

We have heard today about the £5 billion that the Government have allocated; my constituents, like those of other Members, are asking what happens if the money runs out—the costs so far have been estimated to be nearer £15 billion. In addition to that, just as the hon. Member for Harrow East (Bob Blackman) said, the money will not cover many of the defects that have now been found and the additional measures that have been demanded and required. My constituents are now being hit with potential bills from the developers—including the worst, Ballymore—for things such as rectifying wooden balconies and other defects that were not of their making. The idea of waiting for the Building Safety Bill is like “Waiting for Godot”, what with the time it takes to get the right type of Bill and then get the legislation through and implemented.

My constituents in lower-rise blocks do not see why they are being discriminated against. My constituents were blameless. They were failed by developers, regulators, suppliers of materials, inspectors—all of them. Many of those developers made fortunes out of developments in my constituency; it is they who should pay the cost of their own failures. I urge urgency, which is why I will support all the amendments that would protect leaseholders from being burdened with the debt caused by others who have failed us all.

[Chris Green (Bolton West) (Con)]

I welcome the Government’s commitment to correct the historic wrongs, and I especially welcome my hon. Friend the Minister’s commitment to fundamentally change the culture in the building sector and to take a more robust, risk-based approach. Leaseholders are the innocent parties in this matter and rightly expect that the developers, builders and current landlords—some of whom were developers—along with the local building controllers, national regulators and component manufacturers, should be the ones to bear the costs.

My constituents have raised a range of their outstanding concerns that they feel still need to be addressed. They are concerned, first, that those responsible should take far more of the financial burden; secondly, that they have the unfair burden of massively increased insurance costs and waking watches; and thirdly, about the distinction between buildings above and below 18 metres and why they should be treated so differently.

To many people, a monthly cost of £50 may not be a great deal, but for many others who are already at their financial limit, the equivalent of a 13th month of mortgage payments is a huge burden that they can barely afford—if they can afford it. They want to be able to move on with their life—they may want to have a family, or move for work or for a whole range of other reasons—but they cannot. They feel trapped.

Oral Answers to Questions

Chris Green Excerpts

Monday 14th December 2020 Commons Chamber

[Peter Gibson (Darlington) (Con)]

What plans her Department has to reform the UK’s asylum system.

[Chris Green (Bolton West) (Con)]

What plans her Department has to reform the UK’s asylum system.

[Caroline Nokes (Romsey and Southampton North) (Con)]

What plans her Department has to reform the UK’s asylum system.

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[Chris Philp]

My hon. Friend is right to raise this issue. The United Kingdom’s resettlement scheme aims to take people directly from dangerous conflict zones, such as those around Syria, into the United Kingdom. We have run the biggest resettlement scheme of any country in Europe over the last five years. In terms of preventing claims from safe countries, he will be aware that we introduced some inadmissibility rules a few days ago, and we are working with our French colleagues to prevent these very dangerous small boat crossings from France to the UK. Thanks to that work, I am pleased to be able to report to the House that over the last three months since September, the number of small boat crossings per calm-weather day has come down by over 60%. That is testament to the great work being done by UK officers and by our colleagues in France as well.

[Chris Green]

It is immensely important that asylum seekers and refugees received the welcome and support they need when seeking sanctuary in the United Kingdom, but does my hon. Friend agree that those who are rejected should leave the country promptly?

[Chris Philp]

I agree entirely with my hon. Friend. Where an asylum claim has been rejected, it is only right and fair that the person whose claim has been rejected should leave quickly. Sadly, that is not always the case. In fact, we are currently accommodating some thousands of failed asylum seekers at public expense, but it is right that they should leave when their asylum claim has been rejected. One of the problems is that repeated appeals and last-minute claims can go on almost without limit and we intend to legislate in the first half of next year to ensure that that breakdown in process—that breakdown in the system—no longer happens.

Forensic Science Regulator and Biometrics Strategy Bill

Chris Green Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading: House of Commons
Friday 25th September 2020 Commons Chamber

[Chris Green (Bolton West) (Con)]

Will the hon. Gentleman also consider a problem in the digital sphere if there is no effective market for delivering services digitally? If victims of the worst crimes have their smartphone, which is so critical to many people’s lives, taken from them and it takes a long time for it to be returned, that will add to and compound that individual’s distress.

[Darren Jones]

I could not agree more with the hon. Gentleman. I am pleased to see him in the Chamber today, given his previous valiant efforts to try to secure a similar outcome in the previous Parliament. He makes an important point in respect of digital forensics, which, we know from the evidence reported to us in the House, has been in increasing demand, given the nature and complexity of modern crimes. There also seems to be a lack of expertise, skills and capacity to deal with that. There have been incidences reported in the media where victims have, for example, had all their data on their mobile phones downloaded at the point at which they have reported a crime. There are pretty significant questions about whether that is the right balance and approach: what the framework is around that, what happens with all that data going forward and whether that is the right approach to take. That, of course, comes to the questions around accredited standards for digital forensics.

With the market dominated by a few large players, and niche processes or specialised capabilities often, in practice, offered by a single small provider, the cost of achieving and retaining certification is frequently seen as a greater impediment to competitiveness than the ability to demonstrate the quality of their work. With the majority of affected forensic work conducted in-house, the absence of statutory regulation has meant that police forces themselves have come to the view that accreditation is a low priority for time and investment. Statutory regulation would therefore enable a path to competition on the basis of quality and encourage new providers to enter the market. Police authorities would not only be more accountable for the procurement decisions they make but better able to make the case to the Government for investment to enable funding safe, high-quality forensics.

I do not wish to present the Bill today as a panacea, but that kind of regulatory environment should be the baseline for a competitive market in services as publicly important as these. That aspiration is key, because although there is ample cause to regret that manner in which the forensic science service was shut down, the Bill seeks to improve and build on the marketised approach as it exists today, rather than seeking to turn back the clock. That is why making this change commands, in my view, such universal expert and political consensus.

In what form, then, could objections possibly be taken? I am conscious that a small minority of practitioners, for example, have previously expressed concern that a statutory regulator would mean essentially sound practices being invalidated on technicalities and leave robust prosecutions open to unfounded but seemingly credible defence challenges, but that is emphatically not a risk created by this proposed legislation. The enforcement and investigatory powers it seeks to create are not directly rooted in compliance with quality standards but justified by substantial risk that the course of justice will be prejudiced by reliance on the science conducted by these practitioners. As such, the only providers with a meaningful basis for concern are those whose work entails risk of that order. Most providers take the rules and codes of practice that govern their work, and the sense of public duty that comes with it, extremely seriously. Only a minority of bad actors have anything to fear from a system that begins with the aim of rewarding quality work done in good faith.

The same essential need for intelligent, enforceable and responsive regulation underpins the case for action to address the increasingly widespread collection, storage and use of biometric data. As I have already said today, the title of the Bill offers some clue to my initial aspirations on that front, but I take the Minister and the Government at their word that solutions are en route. They need to be, in my view, because this is an area in which it is even clearer that innovations and technology will consistently outpace the capacities of primary legislation and where current law leaves an intolerable vacuum for the abuse of new and developing biometrics.

In that context, and very briefly today, I would like to draw colleagues’ attention to the independent review of the governance of biometric data commissioned by the Ada Lovelace Institute, which I understand is due to report its conclusions next month. The findings, I suggest, would represent one of the most authoritative contributions to the debate on how we govern biometrics, and I hope Ministers will take full account of them.

The general data protection regulation defines biometric data in fairly bloodless terms as the information that results from

“processing relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of a natural person, which allow or confirm the unique identification of that natural person, such as facial images”.

Some of the processes we are talking about, such as fingerprinting, are well established and the limits on their use well defined, but the potential for abuse created by the speed with which technologies for processing other kinds of biometric data are advancing should make clear the need for political oversight to keep up.

Clearly, that does not begin and end with, for example, automatic facial recognition, but the worry that the technology simply is not ready for roll-out has been debated on the Floor of the House in the past.

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[Sir Christopher Chope]

I am fascinated by my hon. Friend’s response. The chief constable of Dorset is the lead chief constable on this very subject. Perhaps following today’s debate I will be able to have a conversation with him on this matter; but I still despair, really, that it is necessary for this House to intervene to get the police to do what we and an independent regulator think is the right thing for them to do.

[Chris Green]

Does my hon. Friend share my concern that spending on the forensics sector decreased, from memory, from about £120 million a year in 2008, or thereabouts, to about £50 million to £55 million a year over a 10-year period? That is a judgment that police forces have to take, but we have to consider the wider financial constraints that they face.

[Sir Christopher Chope]

Obviously police forces face constraints, but ensuring that the best quality forensic evidence is presented in the court system should be the top priority. Why should that be relegated as a lesser priority? My view would therefore be: yes, it is very important, but chief constables should be addressing that issue.

I am slightly sceptical about the need for this Bill, and my scepticism was increased when I looked at the regulator’s annual report and saw that her budget, supplied by the Home Office, runs to only about £400,000 in total admin expenditure for a year. What will be the costs of this legislation, which the Minister is supporting? We are now told in the explanatory notes that it will add about £400,000 a year to the costs of the Home Office, so the admin budget for the forensic regulator would be doubled. How does that compare with the estimate given when my hon. Friend the Member Bolton West (Chris Green) introduced his Bill in the 2017-19 Session? The explanatory notes for that Bill said:

“An impact assessment has been conducted by the Home Office. The Home Office estimates that the statutory powers of the Regulator will cost an average of £100,000 per year in addition”.

How is it that in the space of just two years the Home Office’s estimate of the cost of this legislation has quadrupled? And how, on that basis, can we rely on any of its promises about what the costs will be? I do not know whether in due course we will have a separate debate on the financial side of this Bill—I imagine that we would need a money resolution—but perhaps my hon. Friend the Minister can answer that point now.

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[Dr Rupa Huq (Ealing Central and Acton) (Lab)]

What a pleasure it is to be called so unexpectedly early in this debate. Obviously your algorithm is working, Mr Speaker, even though the algorithms for other things—testing, exam results—are not. Let us not get into that.

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol North West (Darren Jones) on coming so loftily in the private Members’ Bill ballot—a sensation I have never experienced and probably never will. He is also the Chair of the Business and Industrial Strategy Committee. He is one Opposition Member who will actually make his mark on our statute book. We all dream of the day we can do that, but from what the Minister says, it sounds like my hon. Friend will.

I rise to speak in support of my hon. Friend’s Bill. I have taken on board the points against it, but I think they are all refutable. It seeks to right a whole load of wrongs that are going on in our society—we have heard about miscarriages of justice and unreliable evidence—and it also reins in the once seemingly untrammelled forces of the free market. We have seen something of that during the pandemic—yesterday, another financial stimulus was announced. I am glad that the Government are now converts to interventionism, as some of us have always been. It is great to have this Bill at a time when we are all so preoccupied by coronavirus or Brexit. It is something a bit different, but it is badly needed.

Recently, the word “forensic” seems to be used every Wednesday when Prime Minister’s questions happens and our Leader of the Opposition takes apart the Prime Minister, but we are dealing with “forensics”—plural. The mere mention of that term conjures up images of wily experts solving cold cases long after the fact, dissecting the details and piecing together the evidence from the crime scene. We think of skilful professionals, with high-tech, high-end resources at their disposal, no expense spared, crusading for justice in the public interest. The American drama serials—the transatlantic type—have shaped the imagery in the public imagination: programmes such as “NCIS” and “CSI”. I know that our previous Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May), is a big “NCIS” fan. At the height of the cross-party talks in her Brexit negotiations, I found myself face-to-face with her at No. 10, and to break the ice, I asked, as you do, “Was being Home Secretary like ‘Bodyguard’?” Instead, she enthused about “NCIS”, which was her favourite programme, and said it was more like that.

Forensics started about a century ago with fingerprinting techniques, and it can stray into things such as taking fragments of carpet fibre and even bite marks. By the ’80s, when DNA profiling of samples was pioneered, the field really got a spring in its step. In today’s world, it is accelerating, and its use is going on and on. With cybercrime rapidly rising, it is needed more than ever.

[Chris Green]

The hon. Lady commented on the free market, but does she not think that, with DNA profiling and fingerprints, there is a happy marriage between forensics on the one hand and the free market on the other, each lending its expertise to the other?

[Dr Huq]

The hon. Gentleman is right: we need a mixed-economy approach. Yes, we can allow private firms—I am not saying ban the private sector—but they should coincide with regulation, which is a good thing.

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[Chris Green (Bolton West) (Con)]

I congratulate the hon. Member for Bristol North West (Darren Jones) on bringing forward such an important Bill at such an important time. There is so much pent-up demand in both Houses of Parliament for this Bill to be delivered, and I know that the Home Office is incredibly enthusiastic about it, so it is timely that we will get it done. Unfortunately, in the previous Parliament I tried and failed, and for me it is a lesson about instability in Parliament having an impact on people’s lives and about the ability to deliver key services. It is really important at this stage to get this Bill delivered.

As has been highlighted, there have been reports in both Houses, which I think indicates not only the level of support for the Bill, but the critical necessity of doing so at this stage. In 2011, 2013 and 2016, the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee recommended that the regulator should receive statutory powers to enforce compliance with quality standards. In Sir Brian Leveson’s review of the efficiency of criminal proceedings—that was in 2015—he repeated the call for statutory powers. In 2019, the House of Lords Science and Technology Committee, in a very extensive and authoritative report, called for such powers. The body of evidence building up indicates a signal failure within the system which now needs to be put right.

It is worth bearing in mind that there is a little bit of history before the dates that the hon. Member for Ealing Central and Acton (Dr Huq) highlighted, so I will touch on that briefly. In 2002, the Forensic Science Service stopped being a preferred supplier of forensic services to the police forces. In 2003, a Home Office review of the Forensic Science Service recommended that it become a Government-owned company, and in 2005 it became a Government-owned company in that sense. In 2008, the Forensic Science Regulator was established without the statutory provisions that are now so important. The Home Office also established the national forensics framework to allow police forces to purchase forensics from private suppliers and the FSS, using standard contracts with pre-agreed terms and conditions. Police forces therefore could choose not to purchase forensics through the framework but had to use the procedures for such services. Understandably, in 2010, with a whole series of concerns and problems, the coalition Government announced that they would shut down the FSS, citing in the decision its losses of £2 million a month. The need for reform was at that stage and is now abundantly clear; how the system is reformed is a different question.

[Dr Huq]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for the history lesson. I accept that there was some tinkering under the Brown and Blair Governments, but he must admit that it was under this Government’s previous incarnation that full-on privatisation occurred. That needs addressing. As I said, I do not want to have a fight with him, but I did want to put that on the record.

[Chris Green]

The hon. Lady makes a fair point. When a direction of travel is set, it is sometimes difficult to change it around.

The Forensic Science Regulator, Dr Gillian Tully, in her foreword to the 2019 annual report, published earlier this year, sets out clearly and comprehensively what we ought to think about in the debate. I will therefore read from the foreword at length, which says:

“Whether it is data science, computer science, physics, chemistry, biology or another discipline, forensic science should be firmly rooted in good science. Courts should not have to judge whether this expert or that expert is ‘better’, but rather there should be a clear explanation of the scientific basis and data from which conclusions are drawn, and any relevant limitations. All forensic science must be conducted by competent forensic scientists, according to scientifically valid methods and be transparently reported, making very clear the limits of knowledge and/or methodology. Implementation of quality standards is a means to this end, ensuring a systematic approach to scientific validity, competence and quality. It therefore remains my absolute priority to publish a standard for the development of evaluation opinions, to ensure that this systematic approach to quality covers all scientific activities from crime scene to court.

Some practitioners and leaders understand quality. They may be (and indeed should be) challenging about the detail of how to adopt the standards and may rightly point out the need for additional resources. However, they seek to use the requirement to adhere to quality standards to innovate in terms of process and/or technology and, in doing so, they bring about positive change. Often, they are truly inspiring.

Others misunderstand. They may grudgingly implement standards, but in a way that cripples their productivity and locks staff into rigid protocols, no matter what the case requires. Or they may devote much time and energy to avoiding compliance, arguing against change and sticking to ‘how we’ve always done it’. The problem is that technology has moved on. ‘How we used to take anti-contamination precautions’”—

for example,—

“is no longer fit for purpose in a world where the sensitivity of DNA methods has increased by several orders of magnitude.

My hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch (Sir Christopher Chope) is not currently in his place, but, on his point, perhaps with ever-changing technology and a need for higher levels of technology, there is a requirement for additional resources in this area, not just in general but for the regulator and her team.

The foreword continues:

“‘How we used to do digital forensics’ is no longer fit for purpose in a world where data volume and complexity have ballooned, and a substantial subset of the data required is in the cloud. Throwing massive volumes of extracted data to investigators, who generally lack the tools and methods to interrogate the data effectively, just shifts a problem; a more integrated approach could be transformative.

Leadership and innovation are critical, because trying to transpose quality standards onto ineffective processes without change only succeeds in adding inefficiency to ineffectiveness.

Whilst the body of this report deals with the year to 16 November 2019, the foreword presents an opportunity to comment on more recent events and I am pleased to note that the Government has committed to investing approximately £28 million over a year to improve forensic science, via the Transforming Forensics Programme. It will be a massive challenge for the programme to deliver effective change, but it is my hope that the work will design quality into innovative approaches, in a way that brings together the best of the public and private sectors and academia.

A new government has been elected and I have been assured that there is no change from the policy to legislate to provide statutory enforcement powers for the Regulator. I am, however, disappointed to note that there is, as yet, no definite plan for government legislation. I therefore welcome the Forensic Science Regulator and Biometrics Strategy Private Member’s Bill, proposed by Darren Jones, MP. The delay in legislating has, without doubt, resulted in slower progress towards compliance with quality standards, particularly in very small companies and police forces. Nonetheless, there is much learning from the progress thus far and this is reflected in my priorities around assisting with and improving the adoption of standards.

I will continue to lobby for change to ensure that the policies for commissioning forensic science support the provision of high quality forensic science. That has two main elements: the first is that those making case-specific commissioning decisions do so in a knowledgeable, collaborative and outcome-based manner, proportionate to the seriousness of the case and the potential for forensic science to contribute to criminal justice outcomes. I therefore welcome a new project, in the”—

Home Office,—

“that aims to better quantify the impact of forensic science in the Criminal Justice System. The second element is to ensure that a longer-term strategy for sustainable provision of high quality forensic science is developed as a matter of urgency. The pricing uplifts put in place to stabilise the market this year were the beginning but not the end of this process and I have recently been made aware of concerns in the digital forensics community about unsustainable pricing, driven by high weighting on price in procurement. We must not go back into a spiral of unsustainability.”

The sense of a spiral of unsustainability is incredibly important for the future, for the resources are allocated, encouraged and supported through the regulator and for those that police forces around the country allocate to different parts of what they deliver on justice and policing. This cannot be as underfunded as it has been. Ground needs to be regained.

Fundamentally, this is about the credibility of a significant body of evidence that should be used to convict the guilty and, in many cases, set the innocent free. Without rigour and the statutory enforcement power to back it up, too often, we will not see justice delivered and law and order upheld. In recent times, there have been a couple of very significant instances where we have seen failures in the system, if not necessarily in the market, and we have to be careful even though they are market providers—I am thinking of the failures of Randox and Key Forensic Services. Fundamentally, these could and perhaps should be seen more in the context of a lack of oversight, or a lack of ability to enforce concerns in the oversight position, as opposed necessarily to being a failure of the private sector. Whether we are talking about the police forces and their forensic units, or the market forensic units outside the police forces, they are all under pressure and under constraints, so we ought not to use Randox and Key Forensic Services as case studies against the market sector. However, we can reflect on the impact that those cases have had and how we should go forward.

Many thousands of cases are affected when a laboratory, in whichever way, goes wrong. Thousands of samples may not be analysed in the right way or may be contaminated, and that can have an impact on trials. In some cases, the guilty can get off; in other cases, the innocent may be found guilty.

We can just imagine the circumstances if someone who needs to drive for their living is convicted of drug-driving and can no longer do their job. That has a massive impact on them personally—perhaps they have to switch jobs or they become unemployed—it has an impact on their ability to look after their family and pay their mortgage, and it will have an impact on family life. Even though in many ways this issue can seem abstract and niche in its concerns, it has an impact, because law and order and the courts system have such a wide impact on so many people’s lives right around the country. That is an important reason why we need to tighten regulatory oversight.

There are two broad categories for forensic science: trace forensics, which is perhaps what people will be familiar with, thinking of DNA, fingerprints and drug samples, and digital forensics, which looks at computers, smartphones, mobile devices and social media. Increasingly, there are concerns about cloud computing and the colossal volumes of data we produce these days. It is thought that about 90% of crime has a digital element and, hearing the awful news of what happened in Croydon overnight, we can be pretty sure that there will be a significant forensics contribution to that investigation.

That digital element can expand to cover many different areas, including CCTV and cyber-attacks. I was startled to read that the average British household now has on average 7.4 digital-enabled devices, and we have to look at that being set to continue into the future, so there are massive challenges. That perhaps goes into the whole idea of big data, because big data is not just about large volumes of data but about the extraction, manipulation, use and interpretation of that data. There is far more to it than just getting hold of a device; we have to do so in a managed and controlled way.

As with any science, these disciplines do not sit in isolation, so increasingly we see that any given crime will require that expertise from both the trace element and the digital element of forensics. How we manage those two sectors coming together and working together places increasing demand on the sector, requiring more and more advanced management. If we do not have the resources to look into how we manage the system and perhaps do not have the resources going in, that creates increasing strains, which then have an impact on the rest of the criminal justice system and policing.

[Richard Fuller]

I have been listening with interest as my hon. Friend has explained an ever-expanding list of areas, including data, big data and artificial intelligence. It seems to me that his vision for what may be within the ambit of the Bill is much more expansive than perhaps was my first assessment of what may be contrived in this Bill—certainly, as we were hearing from my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch (Sir Christopher Chope), within a budget of £100,000 going up to £400,000. Have I got the scale of what my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton West (Chris Green) is envisaging right, or is it more restrictive, perhaps closer to what the hon. Member for Bristol North West (Darren Jones) said in his opening remarks?

[Chris Green]

I think that point reflects on what the hon. Member for Bristol North West said about this being a starting point in terms of the regulator body. This also reflects upon the sphere of law and order and the justice system that it ought to be looking at and investigating. It is those two aspects together that overall will require significant resources, and to get more and increasingly specialist skills to look at artificial intelligence, cloud computing and those sorts of areas. There may not be those skills necessarily within the regulated service, but certainly there would be an expectation of commissioning people to come in to inform and enable the regulator to have that oversight position, perhaps, later on.

[Kit Malthouse]

My hon. Friend is making an extremely important point, and nowhere is it more pertinent than in the area of digital forensics, as he said, which is developing very fast. One of the obstacles that we have faced in the prosecution of rape investigations, for example, has been the confidence of victims to allow interrogation of their mobile phone data as part of that investigation. Improving the confidence of victims around both the codes of practice and the techniques that are used in those forensic opportunities, and then how that is presented in court, will be a key part of getting them over the line to prosecution, whereas at the moment we are often seeing resistance because of notions of intrusion into privacy that are overwhelming their desire for justice.

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[Chris Green]

I agree with the concerns that my hon. Friend highlights. When the system looks in one way or another at a victim’s smart device, which has so many personal messages and so much personal information on it, the victim needs reassurance that it will be done in the right way and they ought to feel safe. I am cautious that that ought not to be an impediment to their seeking justice.

[Richard Fuller]

I am cautious about trying to have a dialogue with the Minister through my hon. Friend while he makes his speech, but may I just add a counterpoint to his response to the Minister about the assurance that comes when “the system”, as my hon. Friend called it, has access to data? If we provide a statutory underpinning to the powers that can be taken in the use of data for forensics, does that not provide a stronger basis for the state to intrude even further into the data requirements that law enforcement can pursue in pursuit of forensic evidence? Would that not be a cause of concern for many people?

[Chris Green]

I appreciate my hon. Friend’s concerns, but I would be cautious about going down that route. Increasingly, the policing system as a whole reflects on the specialist skills required to do the work and within that system there is increasing recognition that the police need people who are perhaps badged as police but who would not fit into the traditional view of policing. Whether those people are employed and recruited through the policing system or for a private sector provider, ensuring the standards are equally high and equally well adhered to is key to this aspect of the work.

[Kit Malthouse]

I, too, am anxious not to engage in ping-pong with my hon. Friend the Member for North East Bedfordshire (Richard Fuller) through my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton West (Chris Green). There are two issues in particular regarding digital forensics. One is the delay. Practices at the moment often mean that victims or others surrender their devices for many weeks, which has implications for them as well. In the end, it is through the regulator and statutory codes of practice that voice is given to democratic consent for the ambit in which the state can intrude into a private individual’s information to the extent that justice may be served. At the moment, that is broadly done at the discretion of the police. Possibly in the future it will be done by codes of practice, and as I said and as we said in our manifesto, we will look at a framework for the adoption of police technology and techniques in the future. Fundamentally, that has to come to this House for democratic consent and it is through these mechanisms that we give that permission.

[Chris Green]

I thank my hon. Friend for his message.

Let me finish this point about the future tech. We have not really touched on the internet of things, and that global connectivity of billions and billions of devices. That might have an impact on the way the police and other services investigate a crime.

I read a simple but odd thing about how electronic doorbells can play a part in crime. Apparently—I hope no one is listening to this—burglars can observe the data usage when a doorbell is rung and an internet connection is established with the owner, who may be at work or away. The fact that the data usage rockets up tells the burglar that the person has not come to the door and that they are observing what is going on from afar, and so are not there.

[Darren Jones]

I share the hon. Gentleman’s enthusiasm for debating the opportunities and risks of data and technology in this space, about which he is clearly very learned. I am sure he also welcomes the Minister’s comprehensive legislation on the issue. Does he agree that my Bill is—to coin a phrase—specific and limited in its scope, as it merely seeks to give enforcement rights to the regulator to accredit standards? I congratulate him on leading on the issue, but we will be able to have this debate, in which many hon. Members are clearly interested, in greater detail when the Minister brings forward his legislation.

[Chris Green]

I agree with the hon. Gentleman, but it is sometimes tempting to speculate more widely. I appreciate the focus that he wishes the debate to have, which is to some extent represented by the biometrics element having been taken out so that we can focus on the most important elements.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

Order. For clarification, I have allowed the hon. Gentleman to stray slightly beyond the realms of this narrow Bill for the sake of illustration, but of course we observe the rules carefully, especially on a Friday when we are looking at private Members’ Bills, to make sure that the debate is absolutely pertinent to the matter before us. The hon. Gentleman has done nothing wrong, but for the sake of clarity and for new Members who have not attended before on a Friday, the rules are not relaxed in any way today, and the hon. Gentleman whose Bill this is was correct to point out what he has just pointed out. Mr Green, you may proceed for illustrative purposes.

[Chris Green]

Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. I will pick up the point that was made about public perception, because the regulator has a role in reassuring people that the system—all elements of the forensics science area—is up to standard. The public need that reassurance.

To some extent, that goes back to the “CSI” vision in that area. Before coming here, I worked in the mass spectrometry industry and on occasion worked in forensics laboratories. Having been there, I am confident that—not being a big fan of the show—there is a world of difference between the two. The laboratory environment is incredibly focused and serious. It has many of the standards and expectations that any other laboratory environment would expect to have, whether in industry or other sorts of research, because we cannot have scientists and others contaminating samples in the lab with DNA or other samples, for example.

We have to have a clean-room environment and incredibly well-controlled samples and other materials. We hear about the negativity of single-use plastics, but in the laboratory environment it is incredibly important that people use a vial once and not on a number of occasions, because that is how we get cross-contamination.

We have to have an understanding of the quality of the science and the resources it needs because of the sensitivity of instrumentation these days. I worked in the mass spec industry for approaching 20 years, and the technology was transformed from the beginning of that time to when I left. Having been here for five years, I would now feel, in a sense, technologically redundant. I have been completely left behind. It is not just the physical technology and the electronics; it is also the software. In terms of the laboratory experience, this touches on wider concerns about data handling and how we can control and protect the enormous quantities of data that laboratories generate. We must have confidence, from beginning to end, about how the samples are gained from the crime scene, how they are processed and transferred, and how they go through the laboratory system, after which reports are written and, ultimately, presented in court.

[Julie Marson (Hertford and Stortford) (Con)]

The whole question of confidence makes me think of rape victims, for example. The rate of conviction in this country and elsewhere for rape is shockingly low, and this question of confidence feeds into the very purpose of the Bill. The work of these laboratories is valuable, intense and professional. Does my hon. Friend agree that public knowledge about that would give victims the confidence to come forward and submit to intrusive examinations, because they know what will happen with their evidence? This is all about enforcing and reinforcing the justice system.

[Chris Green]

I agree entirely; my hon. Friend makes an important point. This legislation, and our having this debate, is incredibly important in giving victims the confidence to come forward and know that they will be looked after and supported in the right way. There would be an ongoing duty and responsibility for the Forensic Science Regulator to work to raise standards in the system, so that people can recognise that.

I have not touched much on the digital side of a forensic science laboratory’s work. I am more familiar with mass spec, high-performance liquid chromatography and the other analytical techniques that can be used. I was a member of the Science and Technology Committee from 2015 to 2017, and we went on a visit to the Laboratory of the Government Chemist in Teddington. I had worked there a little bit beforehand, but it was fascinating to see the digital side of its work. I want to give a sense of the challenge ahead and the resources required.

The police and forensic scientists have to monitor, judge, analyse and access smartphones, smart watches, iPads, computers, desktops and many other devices. All those devices have different levels of software, different editions, newer versions and different operating systems. We need to have a compliant system within the digital sphere to ensure that that analysis can be done in a way that cannot then be challenged or undermined in the court system, and it can be shown that these standards have been adhered to and in no way have the digital services interfered with or corrupted the data being drawn from these devices.

[Richard Fuller]

My hon. Friend is outlining the expanding scope of the work that will be undertaken. I take the point from the hon. Member for Bristol North West (Darren Jones): this is about the statutory underpinning. Nevertheless, does my hon. Friend think that all this work he refers to about digital watches and digital whatsits can be done within a budget of £400,000 a year? Are we not really just seeing the first step in what will be an ever-increasing budget for this regulator?

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[Chris Green]

It is important that we set the direction of travel. We need to take this incredibly important step today. This work ought to be seen in the context of the total annual police budget, which is £12.3 billion, and not the £400,000 annual cost of the regulator, but we may have to revisit this at a later point as technology advances and changes with time.

Money is a key aspect. I highlighted earlier, in justification to my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch, the budget and the way it has changed. In 2008, the forensic science budget was about £120 million; in 2018-19, it was £50 million to £55 million out of a police budget of £12.3 billion that year, so we can see the reduction. Part of that may be due to improved efficiencies, but there are significant concerns in the system that things are being squeezed.

There are particular concerns about the squeeze when it comes to more niche services. We all know about services such as DNA and fingerprinting, which—this is very crude phrasing—might be seen as “mass production” services, but what about more specialised techniques? Mycology, for example, is a technique used in estimating times of death or events by using known growth rates of fungi, in providing trace evidence and in locating corpses. It can also include looking for causes of death or illness by fungi poisoning, and fungi used in biological warfare. There are quite extraordinary specialisms in the system.

One of the concerns highlighted to the House of Lords Science and Technology Committee was about lower commissioning rates of those more specialist services. An individual who contributed to the inquiry, David Hawksworth CBE, highlighted that about 10 years ago he might have had about five or six cases per year but that has really dipped to perhaps one or two, or even zero, cases per year. If he needs accreditation—if he needs to go on courses to be able to present that information in the court environment—that will be a significant cost to him. If he rarely uses his skills to make such contributions, it will be a great expense to him. There ought therefore to be recognition in the regulator’s approach that, for many things, we do want those standards—the 17025 standards, which are generic laboratory standards—but exceptions to that ought to be considered, perhaps on a case-by-case basis.

[Brendan Clarke-Smith (Bassetlaw) (Con)]

On that point, there has been some talk from smaller providers who are concerned at the cost of achieving accreditation. As I understand it, the Government are exploring with the Forensic Science Regulator ways to mitigate that and to work with those providers. Does my hon. Friend agree that that is important in ensuring that we get everybody signed up to this scheme to assist those small and medium-sized enterprises, which need our support now more than ever?

[Chris Green]

I wholeheartedly agree with my hon. Friend. That reinforces the point that there are workstreams that have been ongoing for a long time, and that this is an opportunity to bring them to a conclusion, or at least to take an early step, as we seek to make progress.

The Bill is a vital step, and I fully support it. It is so timely. I really welcome and applaud the support from both sides of this House, and the overwhelming support and body of evidence that the upper Chamber has contributed, in supporting and supplementing the winning arguments of the hon. Member for Bristol North West.

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[Wes Streeting]

I am grateful for that useful insight into the practical consequences of the system not working correctly. I wish I could see it for myself: I was booked for jury service in the next two weeks, only to be told this week by the jury officer that I am on standby. If I may say so, that is good news for criminals across east London and Essex, because I come from the “tough on crime” school of the Labour party.

[Chris Green]

My hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford (Julie Marson) makes an interesting point, further to which I note that if the forensic system works effectively and efficiently and the evidence is introduced early in the investigation, that can give someone a reason to say, “Look, I did it,” and thereby curtail the whole investigation, saving huge amounts of money and delivering justice much earlier.

[Wes Streeting]

That is so important for victims. Most people would not like the experience of going before a court, even if it is to testify against someone whose wrongdoing consists of fairly minor infractions, because there is a time cost and inconvenience. In really serious cases—for example, if someone is the victim of a serious sexual assault or serious violent crime—the knowledge that the ordeal of having to appear before the court and recount the story may well not need to happen because the forensics arrive and the offender knows they have no chance of getting off, can not only deliver the justice that victims deserve but prevent victims from enduring further pain as a result of a lengthy trial at which they have to relive their experiences in a court room of strangers. That is one of many reasons why the Bill and a forensics system that works well is really important.

Police services consistently remain far behind schedule in respect of gaining accreditation for the quality standard for crime-scene investigation. Significant improvements —for example, to reduce the potential for DNA contamination—can be made during preparation for accreditation, but without full compliance the risks remain. Without enforcement powers, it is difficult for the regulator to ensure that, among all the other policing pressures, sufficient priority is given to attaining compliance. Forensic collision investigators have discovered, in the process of adopting quality standards, that some of their methods gave results with a large amount of uncertainty. They have been able to get small and innovative companies to develop new equipment that can make a significant improvement, but there is further to go. That momentum will only be supported by a regulatory framework with sufficient incentives and enforcement powers.

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[Brendan Clarke-Smith (Bassetlaw) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford (Julie Marson). I congratulate the hon. Member for Bristol North West (Darren Jones) on introducing this excellent private Member’s Bill. I have learned so much about forensics today that I did not know before, and the contributions from my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton West (Chris Green) have also greatly informed that.

During lockdown, many of us had to make a lot of changes for entertainment. One of my most enjoyable activities was a weekly Zoom quiz, but lockdown also gave many the opportunity to catch up on a bit of TV. I have been glued to the new “Cobra Kai” series on Netflix—a bit of an ’80s throwback—but I also managed to stumble across an old favourite of mine, “Quincy, M.E.”. For those who have never watched it before, it follows the exploits of a forensic pathologist who works for the police in Los Angeles, helping them to solve all manner of crimes. It was a groundbreaking series when it was first launched in the late 1970s, although nowadays many crime dramas are based on concepts similar to those that we have been discussing in the Chamber today. One of the things that always made me smile was that Quincy seemed to spend more time in restaurants and bars chatting to people, and would usually send his excellent assistant Sam off to the laboratory to do most of the actual work.

“Quincy, M.E.” stoked a real interest in me in the nature of forensics and the huge contribution it can make to police work in what has effectively become a new age of fighting crime. Forensic science has made it possible to investigate crimes that we once thought unsolvable, and has given hope to those seeking justice in historical cases.

Science and technology will drive this country’s economy forward, and I am delighted that we are investing in them. Earlier, we heard from my hon. Friend the Member for Grantham and Stamford (Gareth Davies), whose constituency boasts a very famous female chemist, of whom I am very fond. We hope that such things will help to raise the profile of forensics. I am a former school teacher, and I would like to see more girls taking science, technology, engineering and maths; that is something that we really need to encourage.

Questions should be asked about the regulation and accreditation of such activities. Forensics is now widely used, so this Bill is to be welcomed. We want to ensure that the police, and the prosecution and defence in criminal proceedings, are adequately, sustainably and proportionately served by the high-quality scientific analysis of relevant evidence. That point was excellently made by my hon. Friend the Minister.

As it stands, the Forensic Science Regulator has no powers of enforcement, which is why we need to put it on a statutory footing. Although most of the services are completed in-house, an increasing number of small and medium-sized enterprises are providing them. Giving the FSR statutory powers will help to achieve consistency and will assist in the process of accreditation. It is also sensible to look at the assistance that can be given to smaller providers to help them meet the financial cost of accreditation.

[Chris Green]

Given recent events—some of the providers have failed—does my hon. Friend agree that having more comprehensive provision and more providers will enable a more resilient service? The excess capacity that could develop within the system would ensure that, if a problem arises in the future, other providers can cope with it.

[Brendan Clarke-Smith]

My hon. Friend is absolutely spot on in his analysis. One of the joys of the free market and allowing businesses to thrive is that they can contribute and give us a wide base of providers. I fully endorse what he says. That very much forms part of the structure that we are looking at, which the Bill will hopefully strengthen. Standardisation will help us to move towards a more efficient system. I am delighted that the National Police Chiefs’ Council also supports this proposed legislation.

Going back to “Quincy, M.E.”, I cannot remember a single case being thrown out because the laboratory was not up to the correct standards or because people were not sure of Quincy’s credentials or the competence of those undertaking the work—as I said, Sam was very good, while Quincy was having his coffee or whatever it was—but we live in a very different time from the 1970s and ’80s. Digital forensics now plays a highly important role in police worked. I was an aspiring computer programmer once upon a time, on my Amstrad, typing in BASIC, which is now completely obsolete, of course. I am having to relearn things.

Non-accredited labs are open to far more challenge. We can be proud that we have high standards in the UK, but a move towards a statutory, regulated service would help to build on that and reduce the potential for any challenges to be made in court. We do not want to be losing cases on technicalities, and this Bill will help to prevent that.

I very much welcome the Bill. I thank the hon. Member for Bristol North West once again for introducing it, and everyone else for their contributions.

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[Chris Green]

My hon. Friend makes a really important point about the quality of evidence and expertise. That was covered in the forensic science regulator’s report, published earlier this year, which talked of:

“Implementation of quality standards is a means to this end, ensuring a systematic approach to scientific validity, competence and quality.”

The report therefore covers the regulator’s approach, and the report produced in the Lords last year touched on such concerns in a more robust way. I think that what we are trying to achieve in this area will reinforce and improve the situation. There is also the perspective that there ought to be better briefing and understanding within the system, so that, in fields where there may be a variable quality or understanding of certainty, that is explained as a trial makes progress.

[Richard Fuller]

If I may say, that contribution from my hon. Friend has been one of the most valuable. He talked about how the Bill, in providing a statutory underpinning, will provide an opportunity for those listening to evidence to have more of a structure for what they are hearing that is completely independent from the case at hand. I am grateful to him for raising that.

I would like to move, if I may, in the second quarter of my contribution—or the second half of my contribution—to the broader issue of Parliament, regulators and the way in which we review the powers we give to regulatory agencies. Notwithstanding how a regulator is welcome in this particular sense, there are broader issues at stake about what Parliament and Government do next with regulators.

I point out to the House that this regulator will, I presume, be responsible to the Home Office—I hope so, because that is the only Department for which I have the data to hand—but 30 agencies already report into the Home Office, and that is of 413 agencies and other public bodies listed on the gov.uk website, all of which have an array of statutory or other regulatory enforcement powers. I ask hon. Members to consider when was the last time any hon. Member conducted a thorough review of any one of those agencies.

Local Government

Chris Green Excerpts

Tuesday 5th May 2020 Commons Chamber

[Chris Green (Bolton West) (Con)]

First, I pay tribute to all the blue light services that serve us so well, year in, year out—particularly during this difficult time of the covid-19 crisis. I also pay tribute to Greater Manchester fire services, particularly those who went to the fire at the University of Bolton last year, and did such a good job in saving lives and protecting property.

I welcome the decision to bring forward this positive change, which brings the governance and scrutiny of the fire services in line with those of policing. That is to be welcomed. The Minister referenced the importance of a clear line of sight, and therefore scrutiny and accountability, of leadership when it comes to delivering on these services. Currently, that is also the responsibility of the Mayor; obviously, the deputy Mayor is taking that responsibility for policing at the moment, and she will have the additional responsibility for fire services as well.

We in Greater Manchester are in a difficult position. London has the Greater London Authority—a body of people who can publicly scrutinise and challenge the Mayor of London. It can publicly hold him to account over his decisions, good or bad.

In Greater Manchester, however, we do not have that. The responsibility to hold the Mayor and the combined authority to account sits between Westminster politicians, councillors and borough leaders. At the moment, that is not an effective system. I value the move we are debating today, but a question needs to be raised about the overall transparency and scrutiny of the Mayor of Greater Manchester. I am not suggesting that we ought to have a Greater London Authority-type Assembly, but we do need an effective mechanism to challenge the Mayor, and the decisions that he and his team make. To put that in a particular context, there have been major failings in the iOPS computer system, which is used by frontline police officers day in, day out. Those failings have created major problems for frontline police, putting them and people across Greater Manchester in danger, but there has been no mechanism for the Mayor and his Deputy to be held directly to account in public. This is a good change, but further changes are required.

Operation Augusta

Chris Green Excerpts

Wednesday 5th February 2020 Westminster Hall

[Chris Green (Bolton West) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Christopher. I congratulate the hon. Member for Blackley and Broughton (Graham Stringer) on securing this important and timely debate.

We remember what Operation Augusta was about: the death of Victoria Agoglia due to a drug overdose inflicted on her by a 50-year-old man. She was in care. She should have had a huge amount of support from the state, but it was not there. It is right that the review commissioned by the Mayor of Greater Manchester, Andy Burnham, reflected on that, and it is right that we should look at the support for victims and seek to punish the criminals who were there at that time, but we should also challenge the decision makers.

Those people—people in Greater Manchester police, and social workers in Manchester City Council—made the decisions. Those people knew exactly what was going on, but they have not been challenged for their actions, whether they amount to negligence and misconduct or criminal actions. Because of the lack of challenge at the time, and the apparent lack of challenge now, we do not know where those people are. Have they been promoted elsewhere? We know they were involved in a cover-up. It seems clear to anyone who looks at this that there was a cover-up. If those people were promoted elsewhere or moved sideways, did that cover-up and that culture move with them?

A number of colleagues wrote a letter to Andy Burnham, the Mayor of Greater Manchester, challenging him on a number of concerns in the report. I think we were all pretty disappointed at his rather supine response. He accepts that Operation Augusta stopped solely due to lack of resource, but the number of police officers in Greater Manchester police increased by more than 1,000 between 1997 and 2004-05. It had 1,000 additional police officers in that time, yet we hear there was a lack of resource.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Bury North (James Daly) highlighted, there were a number of live inquiries, and we know the nature of the crime committed against Victoria Agoglia, but we ought to focus on the Manchester Evening News headline, which captures so much: “A paedophile grooming gang was left to roam the streets of Manchester—and police knew who they were and exactly what they were doing”. That is what we know to be true. The people who were involved in the decision making at that time have not been held to account. I am not sure it is credible to say this is only about resources.

It is also incredible that the identity of the gold commander—the person who made the decision to end Operation Augusta—is not known. It is also incredible that, just as his or her identity is not known, the minutes from Greater Manchester police of the meeting where it was decided to end Operation Augusta have disappeared—and, by amazing coincidence, the minutes from Manchester City Council disappeared at the same time. How many people at this stage would not suspect a cover-up?

The report references successes. It has been highlighted that of the 97 individuals under scrutiny for grooming, plying children with drugs and raping children, three were imprisoned—three of 97. That is referred to in the report as a success. In no way can an objective person see Operation Augusta described as a success. It was an utter failure. Its closure was a decision by the gold commander, and in Andy Burnham’s response to our letter and his description of it, he accepts the lack of knowledge. There is no challenge and no sense of an injustice.

Data sharing is incredibly important in these matters. The Mayor watched the television programme, and he started the inquiry in September 2017. In January 2018, Greater Manchester police agreed what access the review could have to that data. In September 2018—a year after the review started—Rochdale Borough Council agreed on access, and a month after that Manchester City Council agreed on access. Considering that we are talking about the production-line rape of children, it is extraordinary that it took Rochdale and Manchester councils a year to agree access to information. This was a serious review, with serious people heading it, and it took a year to reach agreement. I do not see how anyone cannot be aghast at that.

It is a consistent feature that when the Mayor of Greater Manchester ought to be challenging what has—or has not—been done, there is silence. If council leaders or people in the councils were not handing over information or being forthcoming, he should have used not just his position as police and crime commissioner of Greater Manchester police but his public platform as Mayor of Greater Manchester to challenge them to hand it over, but he chose not to.

A huge amount of follow-up work needs to be done. The report should have been in one piece, but it has been split up because of the delays. The sense of a cover-up and everything being kicked into the long grass is clear to anyone who reads the report and the response from Andy Burnham to our letter. The Minister, in reading Andy Burnham’s response, will find he mentions throughout it his lack of ability to act. If he cannot or will not act, I call on the Government to intervene: to look at Greater Manchester police and Manchester City Council and to take action where it is needed.

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[Mary Robinson (Cheadle) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Christopher. I thank the hon. Member for Blackley and Broughton (Graham Stringer) for securing the debate. My thoughts, like those of other hon. Members, are with the family of Victoria Agoglia and the other 25 victims identified in the recently published review, who were so tragically let down, as well as with the many for whom suffering is ongoing.

While the terms of reference of the Operation Augusta assurance review, commissioned by Greater Manchester Mayor Andy Burnham, indicated its intention to be a forward-facing exercise, the comments on the failures to protect Victoria are damning. Chapter 2.11 sets that out clearly, leaving no doubt that

“Victoria Agoglia was exposed to the most profound harm, at least from the age of 13. Her exposure to sexual exploitation by adult males was known to police and social services and, despite the risk of significant harm caused by the men who were sexually exploiting her, statutory child protection procedures, which should have been deployed to protect her, were not utilised”.

The report is set out as an assurance review, yet, from a sample of 25 children, there are no assurances. In the case of Victoria and 15 others, where there was

“significant probability of child sexual abuse”,

the report gave “no assurance” that that had been appropriately addressed by Greater Manchester police or Manchester City Council.

Those young schoolgirls were known to be being abused. They were not being protected from harm, and yet the investigation, Operation Augusta, which commenced following the death of Victoria in September 2003, was summarily and prematurely closed down on 1 July 2005. Some 12 years later, the BBC documentary “The Betrayed Girls” exposed the shocking extent of child sexual exploitation in Greater Manchester, and the Mayor of Greater Manchester commissioned the assurance exercise that reported in January, more than two years later.

In the light of the review, I joined other Greater Manchester MPs and co-signed a letter, sent by my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton West (Chris Green), to the Mayor of Greater Manchester, Andy Burnham. I hope to hear reassurance that people who see failings and neglect can bring them to light and challenge the system without fear. It takes incredible bravery to be a whistleblower, but it should not. People who speak out and highlight negligence and misconduct can save lives—people such as Maggie Oliver and Sara Rowbotham, whose actions were instrumental in exposing the failure to protect children and led to the opening of the investigation.

Many whistleblowers who fight uphill battles to get justice for victims too often find themselves becoming the target of retaliation and unfounded allegations to undermine their actions.

[Chris Green]

We hear about Greater Manchester police and the culture having shifted, but when it comes to whistleblowers and the failure of iOPS—it crashed overnight, and there might be a serious incident in Greater Manchester—off-duty police officers have told me that they are threatened with summary dismissal if they talk to an MP or the press about it. The culture of clamping down on whistleblowers seems to be alive and well in Greater Manchester police.

[Mary Robinson]

My hon. Friend hits the nail on the head. Without action to tackle that, we will see more of these cases. It is imperative that such issues are taken seriously in Greater Manchester and across the country.

I am not wholly satisfied with the response that we received from the Mayor to our letter. While recognising the bravery of the whistleblowers in this case, he offers no indication of what action he will take to ensure that future whistleblowers are valued and protected. If people are afraid to speak out or suspect they will not be listened to, negligence, malpractice and abuse will continue to go unchallenged.

A recent report by the all-party parliamentary group on whistleblowing highlighted the case for having an independent office for the whistleblower and a ban on non- disclosure agreements in whistleblowing cases, as well as protection against retaliation. I hope the Minister will be able to consider some of those potential resolutions.

The Manchester Evening News and its investigative reporter Jen Williams have given this case extensive coverage, and we owe them thanks for their reporting. One of the headlines read: “A paedophile grooming gang was left to roam the streets of Manchester—and police knew who they were and exactly what they were doing”. Amid ongoing concerns that a cover-up took place in the case of Operation Augusta, questions remain. Who knew about the scale of the abuse of those children? Why did nobody speak out? Could it happen again? In the light of today’s revelations that the iOPS system is not properly recording, or allowing officers to access, information on potentially serious cases, that is a live issue.

I welcome the Home Office’s intention to publish a national strategy across law enforcement and government authorities to tackle child sexual abuse. When can we expect that strategy to be published? Will the protection of whistleblowers form part of it so that the shocking incidents of abuse, neglect and abject failure highlighted today are not repeated?