Divorce

Baroness Deech Excerpts

Wednesday 6th January 2021 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Baroness Deech]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government, further to the research on the impact of divorce published by Resolution on 30 November, what steps they are taking (1) to improve the capacity of family courts, and (2) to support divorce litigants.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Stewart of Dirleton) (Con) [V]]

[Inaudible]—enormous pressure. Despite this unprecedented challenge, I can reassure the House that the whole system has worked together to prioritise support for the most vulnerable. Of course, we acknowledge that there is always more to do, which is why the department continues to work with the advice sector to provide vital support services for litigants.

[Baroness Deech (CB) [V]]

The Resolution report showed that we are heading for disaster in the family courts, and that 41% of those recently divorced suffered mental health episodes or even had suicidal thoughts. The Nuffield report on remote hearings showed that while the professionals are happy with remote court working, litigants are not. There are technical issues and a lack of privacy. What will the Government do to help those in divorce proceedings? Disputes over financial provision are a major irritant. If mediation is a solution, the law in that area has to be simplified. Will the Minister update the House on progress with a promised review of financial provision law aimed at making it less contentious?

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I do not accept the noble Baroness’s characterisation of the situation as one in which we are heading for disaster. The situation is no doubt complex, and we are aware of the data to which she refers.

Marriage and Religious Weddings

Baroness Deech Excerpts

Tuesday 30th June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

First of all, those who undergo only a sharia ceremony are not in marriage; that is the source of the problem we have to face here. That is more a social issue than a legal one, and it requires education and information more than legislation.

[Baroness Deech (CB) [V]]

Do the Government not realise how urgent reform is in this area? Not only are religious marriages continuing to take place, with all the drawbacks outlined by my noble friend Baroness Cox—the Minister is right to say that this must be stopped by education—but lockdown has shown the need for simpler weddings and more certainty in formalities, to increase choice, lower cost and ensure legality. Will the Government make time for statutory reform soon, encompass those reforms and whatever the Law Commission comes up with in its timely work on weddings, which has a broader scope but will include discussion of religious-only marriages and the consequences for couples who do not comply with the requirements?

Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill [HL]

Baroness Deech Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard - continued) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Tuesday 3rd March 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Deech (CB)]

My Lords, the phrase “the heat of the battle”, just used by the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, provides a very succinct and appropriate introduction to my amendment. Everyone who has spoken so far has been in agreement. We support the institution of marriage and civil partnership. We want people to be stable and happy, to avoid disputes, and to provide security and warmth for their children. We differ only on the detail of how best to do it.

The difference between the context of today and that of the last time divorce was debated is the social context: more varieties of relationship, more avoidance of marriage, less disapproval when things go wrong, and more individualism within and outside of the couple’s relationship. The enduring problem is the effect on children of the break-up and how to cope with the dismantling of the housing and financial structure created by the parents. They used to say, “Marry in haste, repent at leisure”; this Bill will put an end to that. It will be “Marry at leisure”—because so many people prefer to cohabit first—and “Repent or divorce in haste”.

I accept that the wish of nearly everyone is to remove as much dispute as possible from the divorce process: to get it over and done with, as quickly as possible, to reduce the pain. It is in that spirit that I am introducing Amendment 20. In their good intentions, the Government have put the cart before the horse. Divorce, whatever its basis, will be over and done with perhaps in weeks or months. But the financial settlement for the couple and their children will have a lifelong effect and is likely to take much longer to arrange than the divorce. It will contain all the bitterness and antagonism that this Bill tries to remove from the substantive divorce.

I have spoken many times about the iniquities of our outdated financial provision law and I will not rehearse them here, save to remind noble Lords that distinguished lawyers—and more importantly members of the public—find that law uncertain and overly judge-made, with little resemblance to the governing statute. The law has no public input, remains unreformed for half a century of social changes and is very costly. I have a list of cases where the legal costs amount to half or more of the couple’s assets. We must also remember that there is no legal aid, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has reminded us. Those who must represent themselves are left to flounder without even the most basic knowledge of what principles of division they should adopt.

Children’s needs are neglected while the adults fight. Only this week, the Times reported that one-third of separated parents are avoiding child payments. The Government will not succeed in removing hostility from the divorce proceedings unless they bring the financial provision law into line. It is almost oven-ready, as they say, as a few years ago the Law Commission drafted a Bill to put prenuptial agreements on a statutory basis. All who know Scottish law can see that its system is far better, cheaper and fairer, with much less recourse to litigation.

I have on several occasions set out proposals for reform, now taken up by the noble Baroness, Lady Shackleton, in her Private Member’s Bill—the Divorce (Financial Provision) Bill. She is unable to be in her place at this moment, but she is in full support of everything that I am saying.

With the Government’s Bill before us relating to substantive divorce as distinct from the money element, there are further urgent reasons to achieve reform of the financial element of divorce. I will set these out, as they underlie my amendment. In brief, there is no point in trying to achieve the aims of the divorce Bill—to make divorce less acrimonious and harmful to children—if the laws relating to the division of money on divorce remain as uncertain, expensive and acrimonious as they are. Research has shown that the quicker the divorce, the less likely the parties are to come to an agreed settlement, and that they will be more likely to settle on financial matters when more time has elapsed. This does not augur well for consensus in the proposed new law.

Twenty-six weeks is a brutally short period, after which one can well imagine that the unsuspecting spouse is still in the house, reeling with shock, utterly without plans about where to live or how to manage in the future, and without legal advice. The time taken to reach financial settlement is often far longer than the divorce itself, and even more prolonged if the couple cannot agree and must go before a judge. Financial orders can take years, as we read recently in the media about the highest in the land. It is not advisable to apply for the decree absolute, or final divorce order, until the finances are settled, as there may be tax disadvantages if there is a considerable gap between the end of the marriage and the consequential financial transfers.

As explained to me by that experienced noble Baroness, Lady Shackleton, the court can adjudicate capital only when a conditional decree—what we used to call the decree nisi—has been obtained. The Bill enables a conditional decree to be obtained faster, but disengagement from marriage can occur only when finances are sorted. Thus the acceleration of the decree is valuable only if the law relating to finance is overhauled, and that too can provide some certainty.

Moreover, if a spouse is not satisfied with the financial settlement on offer at the time of a conditional decree, he or she may apply for the final divorce to be postponed. This is provided for in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and carried over into the Bill, paragraph 10 of the Schedule to which says that

“the court hearing an application by the respondent … must not make the divorce order final unless it is satisfied”

that there should be no

“financial provision for the respondent, or … that the financial provision”—

the offer—

“made by the applicant … is reasonable and fair or the best that can be made in the circumstances.”

Again, the quick divorce may be thwarted by a spouse who is not happy with whatever has been offered and wishes to delay matters.

--- Later in debate ---

Amendment 7 withdrawn.

[Baroness Deech]

I have not withdrawn Amendment 20 yet.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Finlay of Llandaff) (CB)]

For the convenience of the House, when the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness is called, she may then have the opportunity to speak to it.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Deech]

20: Before Clause 6, insert the following new Clause—
“Review of operation of certain sections of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973
(1) The Secretary of State must conduct a review of the operation of sections 25, 25A and 34 to 36 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (the “Act”) to determine whether they—(a) properly reflect the patterns of family life of the present day,(b) provide for a system which is reasonably predictable in its outcomes from case to case, and(c) act to exacerbate the costs of legal representation which must be expended by parties litigating thereunder.(2) The review must in particular consider—(a) whether it would be appropriate for provisions akin to sections 9, 10 and 24 to 26 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 to be incorporated into the Act to assist the court in its determination of the matters to which the court is to have regard pursuant to section 25 thereof,(b) whether the operation of sections 25 and 25A of the Act in relation to the quantum and term of periodical payments is appropriate in the context of changes in the labour market since their entry into force, (c) whether agreements between parties (or prospective parties) to a marriage in relation to their financial arrangements should be presumptively binding on the court,(d) whether the provisions of subsection 25(1) of the Act are of meaningful effect in the majority of cases, and(e) any amendments to sections 25, 25A and 34 to 36 of the Act which may be necessary in consequence of the review.(3) The Secretary of State must begin the review before the end of the period of six months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed.(4) The Secretary of State must lay before both Houses of Parliament a report of the conclusions of the review and of any proposals which it makes within one year of the commencement of the review.”

[Baroness Deech]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for having spent some time with me and other supporters a week ago to discuss this. It was very constructive. If I do not press my amendment, it will be on the basis that he has given a commitment here to carry out a broad consultation on financial provision law, and indeed a speedy one. I offer a word of warning. I am worried about strong lobby groups that will try to take this over. Some of my best friends are barristers—I studied with them, taught them, regulated them, and I have been represented by them—but the eyewatering amounts that they charge in divorce is upsetting. I am married to a solicitor and I know that they get in on this act as well. I am not saying that they do not deserve it, but for poor couples who have no legal aid the legal costs are exorbitant. That is why I am worried about a consultation that is too heavily weighted towards the views of the legal profession. We need to hear from women’s groups and, indeed, from men; we need to hear from people who have been through a divorce—members of the public—and how it has affected them. We need also to remember that there is more than one feminist view on this. Indeed, as we might expect, there is a split between feminists on quite what the right outcome should be, financially, at the end of the divorce. I am grateful that the Minister has undertaken to have a wide-ranging and speedy review, so that the financial law will eventually get into line with the new divorce law.

Amendment 20 disagreed.

Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Bill

Baroness Deech Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 24th February 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti]

There is one law of the land and it binds everyone. Sharia councils do not provide an alternative legal regime; there is one law of the land, which is what I am talking about. If people seek to argue otherwise—I take the noble Baroness’s point—they need to be disabused of that. There is one law of the land which binds us all, in this House, in government and in opposition; it binds the citizenry, the suspects and the victims. I think we can agree about that.

[Baroness Deech (CB)]

Can the noble Baroness reassure us on the efficacy of the programmes for stopping radicalisation? I have read—I do not have the evidence—that at least one of the terrorists had successfully completed such a programme, and that other convicted terrorists are encouraged by their hierarchy to go neatly through the programme to secure release and be seen to have been deradicalised. In other words, there may be nothing we can do, no matter how much money is thrown at these programmes.

[Baroness Chakrabarti]

As always, the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, points out genuine challenges in this area. We have to try, and to put in sufficient resources to make the best attempt. We certainly cannot have a situation whereby those going into prison, not for terrorist offences, are being radicalised there and coming out more dangerous than when they went in. They will not be touched by this legislation. If and when they offend, people will not say, “That was a convicted terrorist”; they will just think that they were yet another person who has done the rounds, been in and out of prison for whatever offence, and come out more dangerous than when they entered.

We will have to break shortly, and then we will have the opportunity to consider amendments. So many noble Lords talked of their ambitions for the future, and I hope that when considering this Bill, and in future debates, they will remember not just the legalities but the practicalities of trying to ensure that this emergency is not a permanent one that takes us into the seventh circle of hell, debating more emergency legislation, to little effect, well into the future.

European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill

Baroness Deech Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 15th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My Lords, I also serve on the Constitution Committee and share the concerns expressed by my noble friend Lady Taylor and the noble Lord, Lord Beith. The relationship between the Executive, the judiciary and the legislature is a matter of some current controversy. The Executive have been stunned by the judgment made in the Supreme Court in the autumn, and I suspect that in part we are seeing a somewhat petulant response to that circumstance.

At all events, what is proposed in this legislation is a gross intrusion by the Executive into the proper realm of the judiciary. The Executive complain that the judiciary has extended itself excessively into its role; we are now seeing a retaliation on a major scale. Whatever practical motivation otherwise that may have caused the Government to write new subsection (5A)(b) into this clause, it is a foolish initiative on the part of the Government.

This is territory in which the Government ought to walk delicately, like Agag. It sets an appalling precedent, and it intrudes into the proper role of Parliament, because it is not appropriate. Even if it were appropriate for Ministers to interfere at all in this realm of judicial discretion, it is not appropriate for Ministers to do it by regulation. Such decisions ought to be made by Parliament in primary law, ensuring that the sort of very important principles which the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, has suggested might be interfered with by Ministers under the terms of this legislation cannot be dealt with in this kind of way.

[Baroness Deech (CB)]

My Lords, I am puzzled by some of the issues that have been raised by this amendment. First, only a year or two ago, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, then president, called for Parliament to tell our judges clearly how rulings of the CJEU are to be dealt with after Brexit. Apparently our noble and learned friend did not see any difficulty about that.

Secondly, to tell courts that they are not bound by something does not mean that they will not follow it. If they are not bound, they may well still choose to follow it if they think it is good law. There are indeed many instances where the Court of Justice of the European Union has not produced good law: for example, over the secret nature of MEPs' expenses, on genetically modified crops and on diplomatic immunity. This is not surprising, because it is a court very unlike our own type of court. Its judges are nominated by sending countries for six years—they have only a six-year tenure. They have enormous salaries and expenses, and I am sure that they are reluctant to lose them after six years, and anxious to be renominated.

There are of course no dissenting judgments. Many of the so-called judges are not judges at all. They have been professors—obviously, I have great admiration for professors—and civil servants, with of course the exception of the British judge. So I am a little sceptical about this court. I think people sometimes confuse it with the European Court of Human Rights. We hear much talk that, if we depart from the rulings of the CJEU, our human rights will be affected. That is not the issue today.

I ask those who put forward this amendment what they mean, or envisage, by binding and not following, and why they think it would be better for citizens to have to go all the way to to the Supreme Court, with all the delay and expense—and lots of nice jobs for lawyers—that will be involved if you can only get a diversion from EU law by going all the way to the Supreme Court.